Before the outbreak of the First World War, the great powers paid great attention to their Naval Forces, and large-scale naval programs were being implemented. Therefore, when the war began, the leading countries were numerous and powerful. Particularly stubborn rivalry in building up naval power was between Great Britain and Germany. The British at that time possessed the most powerful navy and merchant fleet, which made it possible to control strategic communications in the oceans, link together numerous colonies and dominions.

In 1897, the German Navy was significantly inferior to the British Navy. The British had 57 battleships I, II, III, classes, the Germans had 14 (4: 1 ratio), the British had 15 coastal defense battleships, the Germans had 8, the British had 18 armored cruisers, and the Germans had 4 (4.5: 1 ratio). ), the British had 125 cruisers of 1-3 classes, the Germans had 32 (4: 1), the Germans were inferior in other combat units.

Arms race

The British wanted not only to maintain the advantage, but also to increase it. In 1889, parliament passed a law, according to which more funds were allocated for the development of the fleet. London's naval policy was based on the principle that the British navy was to outnumber the two fleets of the most powerful naval powers.

Berlin initially did not pay much attention to the development of the fleet and the seizure of colonies, Chancellor Bismarck did not see much sense in this, believing that the main efforts should be directed to European politics and the development of the army. But under Emperor Wilhelm II, the priorities were revised, Germany begins the struggle for colonies and the construction of a powerful fleet. In March 1898, the Reichstag adopted the "Law on the Fleet", which provided for a sharp increase in the Navy. For 6 years (1898-1903) it was planned to build 11 squadron battleships, 5 armored cruisers, 17 armored cruisers and 63 destroyers. Germany's shipbuilding programs were subsequently constantly adjusted upward - 1900, 1906, 1908, 1912. According to the law of 1912, the number of the fleet was planned to be increased to 41 battleships, 20 armored cruisers, 40 light cruisers, 144 destroyers, 72 submarines. Particularly great attention was paid to ships of the line: in the period from 1908 to 1912 in Germany, 4 battleships were laid annually (in previous years, two).

In London, it was believed that Germany's naval efforts posed a great threat to Britain's strategic interests. England stepped up the naval arms race. The task was to have 60% more battleships than the Germans. Since 1905, the British began to build a new type of battleship - "dreadnoughts" (after the name of the first ship of this class). They differed from squadron battleships in that they had more powerful weapons, were better armored, with a more powerful power plant, greater displacement, etc.

Battleship "Dreadnought".

Germany responded by building its own dreadnoughts. Already in 1908, the British had 8 dreadnoughts, and the Germans had 7 (some were in the process of being completed). The ratio of the "pre-dreadnoughts" (squadron battleships) was in favor of Britain: 51 versus 24 German. In 1909, London decided to build two of its own for every German dreadnought.

The British tried to preserve their naval power by diplomatic means. At the Hague Peace Conference of 1907, they proposed limiting the construction of new warships. But the Germans, believing that this step would be beneficial only to Britain, rejected the proposal. The naval arms race between England and Germany continued until World War I. By its beginning, Germany had firmly taken the position of the second naval power, overtaking Russia and France.

Other great powers - France, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary, etc., also tried to build up their naval armaments, but for a number of reasons, including financial problems, were unable to achieve such impressive successes.

Queen Elizabeth is the lead ship of the Queen Elizabeth series superdreadnoughts.

The value of fleets

The fleets had to carry out a number of important tasks. First, to protect the coast of countries, their ports, important cities (for example, the main purpose of the Russian Baltic Fleet is to defend St. Petersburg). Secondly, the fight against enemy naval forces, support of their land forces from the sea. Thirdly, the protection of sea communications, strategically important points, especially Britain and France, they owned huge colonial empires. Fourthly, to ensure the status of the country, a powerful navy showed the position of the state in the world informal table of ranks.

The basis of the then naval strategy and tactics was linear combat. In theory, the two fleets were supposed to line up and find out who the winner was in an artillery duel. Therefore, the basis of the fleet was squadron battleships and armored cruisers, and then dreadnoughts (from 1912-1913 and superdreadnoughts) and battle cruisers. Battlecruisers had weaker armor and artillery, but were faster and had a longer range. Squadron battleships (battleships of the pre-dreadnought type), armored cruisers were not written off, but they were relegated to the background, having ceased to be the main striking force. Light cruisers were supposed to carry out raids on enemy sea communications. Destroyers and torpedo boats were intended for torpedo strikes, destroying enemy transports. Their combat survivability was based on speed, agility and stealth. The Navy also included special-purpose ships: minelayers (installed sea mines), minesweepers (made passages in minefields), transports for seaplanes (hydro-cruisers), etc. The role of the submarine fleet was constantly growing.

Battle cruiser "Goeben"

United Kingdom

At the beginning of the war, the British had 20 dreadnoughts, 9 battle cruisers, 45 old battleships, 25 armored and 83 light cruisers, 289 destroyers and destroyers, 76 submarines (most of them were outdated, they could not operate on the high seas). It must be said that, despite all the might of the British fleet, its leadership was distinguished by great conservatism. New items hardly found their way (especially, not related to the linear fleet). Also Vice-Admiral Philip Colomb, naval theorist and historian, author of the book "Naval warfare, its basic principles and experience" (1891), said: have changed in the way. " The admiral substantiated the theory of "ownership of the sea" as the basis of British imperial policy. He believed that the only way to achieve victory in a war at sea is to create complete superiority in the naval forces and destroy the enemy's naval forces in one general battle.

When Admiral Percy Scott suggested that "the era of dreadnoughts and superdreadnoughts is irrevocably over" and advised the Admiralty to focus on development and submarine forces, his innovative ideas were sharply criticized.

The general management of the fleet was carried out by the Admiralty, headed by W. Churchill and the first sea lord (chief of the main naval headquarters), Prince Ludwig Battenberg. British ships were based in the harbors of Humberg, Scarborough, Firth of Forth and Scapa Flow. In 1904, the Admiralty considered the issue of redeploying the main forces of the Navy from the English Channel to the north, to Scotland. This decision removed the fleet from the threat of a blockade of the narrow strait by the growing German naval forces, and allowed operational control of the entire North Sea. According to the British naval doctrine, which was developed shortly before the war by Battenberg and Bridgman, the basing of the main forces of the fleet in Scapa Flow (a harbor in Scotland on the Orkney Islands), outside the effective range of the German submarine fleet, should have led to a blockade of the main forces of the German fleet, which and happened during the First World War.

When the war began, the British were in no hurry to pry into the German shores, fearing attacks from submarines and destroyers. The main hostilities took place on land. The British limited themselves to covering communications, protecting the coast and blockading Germany from the sea. The British fleet was ready to join the battle if the Germans brought their main fleet out into the open sea.

British "Big Fleet".

Germany

The German Navy had 15 dreadnoughts, 4 battle cruisers, 22 old battleships, 7 armored and 43 light cruisers, 219 destroyers and torpedo boats, and 28 submarines. For a number of indicators, for example, in speed, the German ships were better than the British. Technological innovations received much more attention in Germany than in England. Berlin did not have time to complete its naval program, it was supposed to be completed in 1917. Although the German naval leaders were quite conservative, for example, Admiral Tirpitz initially believed that getting carried away with building submarines was "frivolous." And dominance at sea is determined by the number of ships of the line. Only realizing that the war would begin before the completion of the program of building a linear fleet, he became a supporter of unlimited submarine war and the forced development of the submarine fleet.

The German "High Seas Fleet" (German: Hochseeflotte), based in Wilhelmshaven, was to destroy the main forces of the British fleet ("Grand Fleet" - "Big Fleet") in open battle. In addition, there were naval bases in Kiel, about. Helgoland, Danzig. The Russian and French navies were not perceived as worthy opponents. The German High Seas Fleet posed a constant threat to Britain and forced the British Grand Fleet to be constantly in the North Sea region on full alert throughout the war, despite a shortage of battleships in other theaters of operations. Due to the fact that the Germans were inferior in the number of battleships, the German Navy tried to avoid open clashes with the Grand Fleet and preferred the strategy of raids into the North Sea, trying to lure out part of the British fleet, cut it off from the main forces and destroy it. In addition, the Germans focused on waging unrestricted submarine warfare to weaken the British Navy and lift the naval blockade.

The factor of the absence of autocracy affected the combat effectiveness of the German Navy. The main creator of the fleet was Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849 - 1930). He was the author of the "risk theory", in which it was argued that if the German fleet was comparable to the British in strength, then the British would avoid conflicts with the German Empire, because in the event of a war, the German Navy would have a chance to inflict sufficient damage on the Grand Fleet. for the loss of the British navy's supremacy at sea. With the outbreak of war, the role of the Grand Admiral fell. Tirpitz became responsible for building new ships and supplying the fleet. The "High Seas Fleet" was led by Admiral Friedrich von Ingenol (1913-1915), then Hugo von Pohl (from February 1915 to January 1916, before that was Chief of the General Naval Staff), Reinhard Scheer (1916-1918). In addition, the fleet was the favorite brainchild of the German Emperor Wilhelm, if he trusted the generals to make decisions on the army, then the Navy controlled itself. Wilhelm did not dare to risk the fleet in an open battle and allowed only a "small war" to be waged - with the help of submarines, destroyers, mine laying. The line fleet had to adhere to a defensive strategy.

German "High Seas Fleet"

France. Austro-hungary

The French had 3 dreadnoughts, 20 battleships of the old type (battleships), 18 armored and 6 light cruisers, 98 destroyers, 38 submarines. In Paris, they decided to focus on the "Mediterranean Front", since the British agreed to defend the Atlantic coast of France. Thus, the French saved expensive ships, since there was no great threat in the Mediterranean Sea - the Ottoman Empire's naval forces were very weak and tied by the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Italy was at first neutral, and then went over to the side of the Entente, the Austro-Hungarian fleet chose passive strategy. In addition, there was a fairly strong British squadron in the Mediterranean.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire had 3 dreadnoughts (the 4th entered service in 1915), 9 battleships, 2 armored and 10 light cruisers, 69 destroyers and 9 submarines. Vienna also chose a passive strategy and "defended the Adriatic", almost the entire war the Austro-Hungarian fleet stood in Trieste, Split, Pula.

"Tegetgof" in the pre-war years. Austro-Hungarian battleship of the Viribus Unitis class.

Russia

The Russian fleet under Emperor Alexander III was second only to the British and French navies, but then lost this position. The Russian Navy received a particularly big blow during the Russo-Japanese War: almost the entire Pacific squadron and the best ships of the Baltic Fleet sent to the Far East were lost. The fleet needed to be rebuilt. Several naval programs were developed between 1905 and 1914. They provided for the completion of 4 previously laid down squadron battleships, 4 armored cruisers and the construction of 8 new battleships, 4 battle cruisers and 10 light cruisers, 67 destroyers and 36 submarines. But by the beginning of the war, not a single program had been fully implemented (the State Duma, which did not support these projects, also played a role in this).

By the beginning of the war, Russia had 9 old battleships, 8 armored and 14 light cruisers, 115 destroyers and torpedo boats, 28 submarines (a significant part of the old types). Already in the course of the war, the following entered service: in the Baltic - 4 dreadnoughts of the "Sevastopol" type, all of them were laid down in 1909 - "Sevastopol", "Poltava", "Petropavlovsk", "Gangut"; on the Black Sea - 3 dreadnoughts of the "Empress Maria" type (laid down in 1911).

"Poltava" during the First World War.

The Russian Empire was not a backward power in the naval area. It even was in the lead in a number of areas. In Russia, excellent destroyers of the "Novik" type were developed. By the beginning of the First World War, the ship was the best destroyer in its class, and served as a world model in the creation of destroyers of the military and post-war generation. The technical conditions for it were created at the Marine Technical Committee under the leadership of the outstanding Russian shipbuilding scientists A.N.Krylov, I.G.Bubnov and G.F.Shlesinger. The project was developed in 1908-1909 by the shipbuilding department of the Putilovsky plant, which was headed by engineers D.D.Dubitsky (mechanical part) and B.O. Vasilevsky (shipbuilding part). At Russian shipyards, in 1911-1916, in 6 standard projects, 53 ships of this class were laid down. The destroyers combined the qualities of a destroyer and a light cruiser - speed, maneuverability, and rather strong artillery armament (4 102-mm guns).

Russian railway engineer Mikhail Petrovich Naletov was the first to implement the idea of ​​a submarine with anchor mines. Already in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, participating in the heroic defense of Port Arthur, Nalyotov at his own expense built a submarine with a displacement of 25 tons, capable of carrying four mines. He carried out the first tests, but after the surrender of the fortress, the apparatus was destroyed. In 1909-1912, a submarine was built at the Nikolaev shipyard, which was named "Crab". She became part of the Black Sea Fleet. During the First World War, the "Crab" made several combat exits with mines, even reached the Bosphorus.

The world's first underwater mine layer - the submarine "Crab" (Russia, 1912).

Already during the war, Russia became the world leader in the use of hydro-cruisers (aircraft carriers), the benefit of this was the dominance factor in the creation and use of naval aviation. Russian aircraft designer Dmitry Pavlovich Grigorovich, since 1912 he worked as the technical director of the plant of the First Russian Aeronautics Society, in 1913 he designed the world's first seaplane (M-1) and immediately began to improve the aircraft. In 1914, Grigorovich built the M-5 flying boat. It was a two-seater biplane of wooden construction. The seaplane entered service with the Russian fleet as a scout and artillery fire spotter, and in the spring of 1915 the plane made its first combat mission. In 1916, a new Grigorovich aircraft, the heavier M-9 (naval bomber), was adopted. Then the Russian nugget designed the world's first seaplane fighter M-11.

On Russian dreadnoughts of the "Sevastopol" type, for the first time, they used a system of installing not two, but three-gun turrets of the main caliber. In England and Germany initially were skeptical about the idea, but the Americans appreciated the idea and battleships of the "Nevada" type were built with three-gun turrets.

In 1912, 4 battle cruisers of the Izmail type were laid down. They were intended for the Baltic Fleet. These would be the world's most powerful battlecruisers in artillery armament. Unfortunately, they were never completed. In 1913-1914, eight light cruisers of the Svetlana class were laid down, four each for the Baltic and Black Sea fleets. They were going to be commissioned in 1915-1916, but did not have time. Russian submarines of the Bars type were considered one of the best in the world (they began to be built in 1912). A total of 24 Bars were built: 18 for the Baltic Fleet and 6 for the Black Sea Fleet.

It should be noted that in the Western European fleets in the pre-war years, little attention was paid to the submarine fleet. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, previous wars had not yet revealed their military significance, only in the First World War their great importance became clear. Secondly, the then dominant naval doctrine of the "open sea" assigned submarine forces one of the last places in the struggle for the sea. The domination of the seas was to be conquered by the ships of the line, having won a decisive battle.

Russian engineers and artillery sailors made a great contribution to the development of artillery. Before the start of the war, Russian factories mastered the production of improved models of naval guns of 356, 305, 130 and 100 mm caliber. The production of three-gun turrets began. In 1914, the engineer of the Putilov plant F.F.Lander and the artilleryman V.V. Tarnovsky became pioneers in the creation of a special anti-aircraft gun with a caliber of 76 mm.

In the Russian Empire, before the war, three new types of torpedoes were developed (1908, 1910, 1912). They surpassed similar torpedoes of foreign fleets in speed and range, although they had a lower total weight and weight of the charge. Before the war, multi-tube torpedo tubes were created - the first such device was built at the Putilov plant in 1913. He provided volley fire with a fan, Russian sailors mastered it before the start of the war.

Russia was the leader in the field of mines. In the Russian Empire, after the war with Japan, two special minelayers "Amur" and "Yenisei" were built, and the construction of special minesweepers of the "Zapal" type also began. In the West, before the start of the war, no attention was paid to the need to create special ships for setting and sweeping sea mines. This is proved by the fact that in 1914 the British were forced to buy a thousand ball mines from Russia to protect their naval bases. The Americans bought not only samples of all Russian mines, but also trawls, considering them the best in the world, and invited Russian specialists to train them in mine business. The Americans also bought the Mi-5 and Mi-6 seaplanes. Before the start of the war in Russia, they developed galvanic and shock-mechanical mines of the samples of 1908 and 1912. In 1913, a floating mine (P-13) was designed. It was kept underwater at a certain depth thanks to the action of an electric swimming device. The mines of the previous models were kept at a depth by means of buoys, which did not give great stability, especially during storms. The P-13 had an electric shock fuse, a charge of 100 kg of tar and could stay at a given depth for three days. In addition, Russian specialists have created the world's first river mine "Rybka" ("R").

In 1911, snake and boat trawls entered service with the fleet. Their use reduced the time of sweeping operations, since the cut and pop-up mines were immediately destroyed. Previously worn out mines had to be towed in shallow water and destroyed there.

The Russian navy was the cradle of radio. Radio became a means of communication and control in battle. In addition, before the war, Russian radio engineers designed radio direction finders, which made it possible to use the device for reconnaissance.

Considering the fact that the new battleships in the Baltic did not enter service, in addition, the Germans had complete superiority in the forces of the linear fleet, the Russian command adhered to a defensive strategy. The Baltic Fleet was supposed to defend the capital of the empire. The basis of naval defense was minefields - during the war years, 39 thousand mines were placed at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. In addition, there were powerful batteries on the coast and islands. Under their cover, cruisers, destroyers and submarines made raids. The battleships were to meet the German fleet if it tried to break through the minefields.

By the beginning of the war, the Black Sea Fleet was the master of the Black Sea, since the Turkish Navy had only a few relatively combat-ready ships - 2 old squadron battleships, 2 armored cruisers, 8 destroyers. Attempts by the Turks before the war to change the situation by buying the latest ships abroad did not bring success. The Russian command planned to completely blockade the Bosphorus and the Turkish coast with the beginning of the war, to support the troops of the Caucasian Front (if necessary, the Romanian) from the sea. The issue of carrying out an amphibious operation in the Bosporus region to capture Istanbul-Constantinople was also considered. The situation was somewhat changed by the arrival of the newest battle cruiser Goeben and the light Breslau. The cruiser "Goeben" was more powerful than any Russian battleship of the old type, but together the battleships of the Black Sea Fleet would have destroyed it, therefore, in a collision with the entire squadron, "Goeben" retreated, using its high speed. In general, especially after the commissioning of dreadnoughts of the "Empress Maria" type, the Black Sea Fleet controlled the Black Sea basin - it supported the troops of the Caucasian Front, destroyed Turkish transports, and attacked the enemy coast.

Destroyer of the "Novik" ("Ardent") type.

By the beginning of hostilities, the naval forces of the Entente significantly outnumbered the Navy of the Union of Central States

In terms of the spatial scope, the number of participants and the intensity of the armed struggle in the continental, oceanic and naval theaters of military operations, the First World War had no analogues in previous history.

The most intense hostilities were fought in the North Sea, in the North Atlantic Ocean, in the Mediterranean, Baltic, Black, Barents and White Seas. In addition, episodic hostilities, especially in the initial period of the war, and then when single German cruisers entered the ocean, were deployed in the central and southern parts of the Atlantic Ocean, as well as in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and (during the period of unlimited submarine warfare) off the Atlantic coast North America.

In the North Atlantic Ocean, between North America and Western Europe, were the most important routes of sea communications, which were of great importance for the military economy of the Atlantic countries, especially for England, whose economy was completely dependent on sea trade. The main hub of these communications was the southwestern approaches to England.

On the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, England and her allies had an extensive basing system, while the few German cruisers stationed before the war in the Atlantic and intended in the event of a war to operate on sea routes did not have such bases. In addition, counting on the short duration of the war, the outcome of which was to be decided in land battles and in the North Sea, Germany did not attach much importance to cruising operations on remote ocean communication routes. British cruising squadrons assigned to protect ocean communications were to operate, each in its own zone, based on Halifax, Kingston and Gibraltar, etc. In the first three to four months of the war, single German cruisers operated on sea communications in the Atlantic, which did not achieve significant success, but diverted large British cruising forces from the main naval theater - the North Sea.

After the defeat of the German squadron in the battle of the Falkland Islands, operations on ocean communications in the Atlantic almost ceased.

In 1915-1916, single German auxiliary cruisers only periodically appeared here, breaking the British blockade in the North Sea. In the fall of 1916, the first German submarines appeared off the coast of the United States. With the entry of the United States into the war (April 1917), during the period of unrestricted submarine warfare, they extended their area of ​​operations to the central and western part of the North Atlantic, up to the coast of the United States, having committed to this area in 1917-1918. up to 15 hikes. However, the main area of ​​operations of German submarines throughout the entire submarine war remained the western approaches to England, which included the northeast Atlantic, the Bay of Biscay, the English Channel and the Irish Sea. Here, during the period of the most intense unrestricted submarine war, up to 1/4 of all combat resources of the submarine forces of the German Navy, based in the North Sea, were concentrated, and up to six million tons of merchant tonnage were sunk (during the entire war). However, the huge forces and resources of the allies, in the presence of numerous and well-equipped bases, made it possible to successfully deploy a powerful anti-submarine defense. Transportations on the most important sea routes of the Entente in the Atlantic Ocean continued, albeit with great stress and with significant losses of tonnage, throughout the war.

In the Pacific Ocean, especially with the entry of Japan into the war, the allied fleets had a developed basing system, which ensured the actions of any formations of ships to protect sea communications. Germany had here its only colonial naval base, Qingdao, where the East Asian cruising squadron was based in peacetime, which made up half of all Germany's cruising forces, which it held outside the waters of the mother country before the war. In view of the overwhelming superiority of the forces of the allied fleets in the Pacific, the German command did not intend to use Qingdao as a base in wartime. The German cruising squadron, after some minor actions in the western part of the Pacific Ocean, went to the shores of South America. Here, at Coronel, the only naval battle during the war in the Pacific took place between German and British cruising squadrons. After that, only in 1917, two German auxiliary cruisers operated for quite a long time on sea routes in the Pacific Ocean. At this time, there were mines off the coast of New Zealand and Australia. Due to the relatively small military significance of the Pacific communications, these actions were predominantly demonstrative in nature and were intended to divert part of the forces of the allied fleets from the main theater of military operations - the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea.

The Indian Ocean, to the shores of which the vast colonial possessions of England came out, was considered, in terms of the basing system, an "English lake".

The well-equipped ports of Cape Town, Aden, Bombay, Colombo, Singapore provided the basing of all the forces necessary to protect sea communications against the single German cruisers that periodically operated here. In the initial period of the war, there were two German light cruisers in the Indian Ocean, against which the Entente, given the length and scattering of ocean communications, had to allocate quite significant forces. After the destruction of these cruisers, transportation across the Indian Ocean, which was of great importance to the economy of England, was carried out without hindrance. In 1917, during a particularly intense action by German submarines in the Mediterranean Sea, an important sea route leading from the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea was temporarily (and not for all ships) moved and passed around the southern tip of Africa. At the same time, a German auxiliary cruiser was operating on sea communications in the Indian Ocean, which laid mines off the southern coast of Africa and Ceylon.

The most important sea routes of communication> passed through the English Channel (English Channel), as well as along the east coast of England and to the coast of Norway.

Almost all of Germany's foreign maritime trade was carried out through this sea. With the closure of trade routes along the North Sea, Germany could only import from the Scandinavian countries through the Baltic Sea and its straits. North Sea maritime communications were of significant importance to England as well. This way, food and timber were imported from the Scandinavian countries, Swedish iron ore, and coal was exported.

In the bases of the North Sea, the main composition of the fleets of the strongest naval powers - England and Germany - was concentrated.

Table 1

The composition of the naval forces in the North Sea at the beginning of the war

The main naval base of the German fleet, Wilhelmshaven, had sufficient repair funds for ships of all classes and supplies. At the same time, approaches from the sea were covered by the island fortress of Helgoland, which in turn was the base of light forces and seaplane aviation.

The water space, protected by the fortifications of Helgoland, about. [Borkum] and adjacent to the mouths of the Weser and Elbe, was called the German Bay or "wet triangle". In preparation for the war, the German command paid great attention to the defense of the specified area. Coastal batteries were installed here, and barriers were placed on the approaches to the base. During the war, the base of the German fleet was expanded by equipping submarine bases in the Belgian ports of Bruges, [Zeebrugge] and Ostend.

It should be noted that the pre-war basing of the British fleet did not meet the task of the long-range blockade of Germany assigned to it and clearly lagged behind the construction of the fleet itself.

The lack of well-equipped bases in the northern part of the sea put the Grand Fleet in a difficult position at the beginning of the war, and only the presence of convenient sheltered anchorages allowed the fleet to be in this part of the sea. Before the war, the main base of the British fleet was Portsmouth, and the base of the fleet was Plymouth (Devonport). These bases were fortified from the sea and had docks, repair facilities and supplies of material and technical equipment.

The bases were Dover and Portland. On the southeastern coast of England (the Thames estuary) there was the North naval region with the Chatham and Sheerness bases. On the east coast of England, deep in the Firth of Forth, Rosyth's base was established, and the construction of Cromarty's base began in Morey Firth. However, the location of all these peacetime bases did not meet the main tasks facing the British fleet, to establish a long-range blockade of Germany and prevent the enemy from weakening the forces of the British fleet by the actions of mine flotillas and submarines. Therefore, immediately before the start of the war, the main forces of the British fleet were transferred to the vast sheltered bay of the Orkney Islands - Scapa Flow.

At the beginning of the war on the west coast of Scotland, Loch Eu Harbor and Loch na Keel were temporarily used as bases (prior to the Scapa Flow equipment). On the Shetland Islands, the port of Lerwick (Lerwick) was used to base the light forces that had provided Scandinavian convoys since 1917.

An important border separating England from the continent was the English Channel (English Channel) - a junction of the most important sea routes. Through the canal, all cargo and troop transportations from England to France were carried out and the route from the Atlantic to the eastern ports of England passed. At the same time, the English Channel with the Strait of Dover was the shortest route for German submarines to enter the western sea routes of England.

The main naval base of the French fleet Brest and the base of Cherbourg were also located on the coast of the English Channel. Due to the fact that the main forces of the fleet operated in the Mediterranean Sea, these bases were of secondary importance

An extensive network of hydro aerodromes was created on the east coast of England, and coastal batteries were installed to protect the direct approaches to ports.

Throughout the war, the North Sea remained the home base of the main forces of the navies of England and Germany. Together with the northeastern part of the Atlantic Ocean, the English Channel and the approaches to it from the west, it was the most important of the naval theaters of operations, although decisive military clashes between the fleets concentrated here did not take place.

An important strategic position during the First World War was occupied by the Mediterranean theater of military operations, where sea routes to Europe from India and the Far East passed, as well as the maritime communications of France and Italy with their North African colonies.

With the entry of Italy into the war, superiority in forces in the Mediterranean Sea was on the side of the Entente. England could not allocate significant forces for action in the Mediterranean. However, the main forces of the French fleet were concentrated here, which made it possible to block the Austrian fleet in the Adriatic Sea.

table 2

Considering the problem of basing fleets, it should be noted that the main naval base of the British fleet in the Mediterranean was La Valletta on the island of Malta, which was well fortified. The fleet was based in Gibraltar and the temporary base was Alexandria.

Assessing the overall basing system of the British fleet in the Mediterranean Sea, it should be admitted that it supported its combat activities, however, during the Dardanelles operation, the absence of bases in the Aegean Sea affected.

The main naval base of the French fleet was Toulon. At the same time, the base had all the ship repair facilities and large stocks of material and technical means. Bizerte served as a base for all classes of ships, Algeria was used mainly for basing destroyers, and Oran was a basing point.

The existing basing system as a whole supported the actions of the French fleet in the western Mediterranean. For operations in the Adriatic Sea, the French fleet was based at La Valletta.

The main base of the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean was La Spezia. At the same time, Taranto was the main base of the Italian fleet on the Adriatic Sea. Naples was also used as the base of the fleet. The ports on the east coast of Italy served as temporary bases: Brindisi, Ancona, Venice.

As for the basing systems of the Italian fleet, it provided combat operations in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, but was not sufficiently developed on the Adriatic Sea.

The basing system of the Austro-Hungarian fleet in the Mediterranean is of particular interest. its main naval base, Paula, had a sheltered dock for ships of all classes, several docks and repair shops. The basing point with limited repair facilities was Kotor. The close proximity to the Montenegrin border allowed until 1916 the possibility of shelling this base with artillery. From the sea, the approaches to the Bay of Kotor were protected by coastal artillery. During the war, the equipment of the Kotor base was improved. Most of the German submarines operating in the Mediterranean were based here.

By the beginning of the war, the German ships "Goeben" and "Breslau" located in the Mediterranean Sea passed through the straits to Constantinople and operated on the Black Sea during the war.

During the entire war in the Mediterranean, there were no major operations and military clashes of surface forces. At the same time, the operations of German submarines acquired the greatest development in the sea communications of the Entente. Moreover, in three years, from the autumn of 1915, about 4 million tons of commercial tonnage were sunk here, i.e. 1/3 of all merchant tonnage sunk by German submarines in 1915-1918. Throughout the entire war, the Entente carried out large military transportations across the Mediterranean to the Western European and Balkan theaters of military operations.

With the outbreak of the First World War, the ports of the Baltic and Black Seas were cut off from the ocean, acquired particular importance as the only route of communication between Russia and the allies (except for the route through the Pacific Ocean and Siberia), the Northern Russian maritime theater of military operations.

As you know, the Barents and White Seas, due to the harsh climatic conditions in winter, are largely covered by floating ice. At this time, only the Barents Sea near the western part of the Kola coast does not freeze and is accessible for swimming all year round.

It should be emphasized that the plans of the Russian soldiers did not provide for military operations in the Northern Theater. The Barents and White Seas had only some commercial value. The ports of the White Sea were used for the export of timber. There were no ports on the ice-free coast of the Barents Sea. Only Arkhangelsk was connected to the center of the country by rail. From a military point of view, the theater of operations was not equipped, and there were no defensive structures. All observation of the coast was carried out by the messenger vessel "Bakan", which annually came from the Baltic Sea to protect the fisheries.

The current situation required the rapid development of the equipment of the existing ports and the creation of new ones, as well as the deployment of measures to protect maritime communications. First of all, it was necessary to build a railway to the coast of the ice-free Kola Bay, and to use icebreakers to extend navigation in the White Sea. The first measures to equip the theater were limited to the construction of observation posts on the approaches to Arkhangelsk. On the island of Mudyugsky, coastal batteries were installed and a patrol service was organized. In January 1915, the laying of an underwater telegraph cable from England to Aleksandrovsk was completed. At the same time, to protect the cable exit near Aleksandrovsk, a battery and booms were installed. A radio station and several observation posts were also built here.

Throughout the war, the Baltic naval theater of operations was of great importance for Russia, from where an enemy with a strong fleet could threaten the entire Russian Baltic coast, including the St. Petersburg area.

In addition, the northern flank of the Russian-German front rested against the sea.

Difficult navigational and hydrometeorological conditions and prolonged freeze-up made it difficult to conduct hostilities and limited the use of naval forces. At the same time, the small size of the sea made it possible in a relatively short time to deploy forces for operations, and also facilitated the interaction of various classes of ships.

The Gulf of Finland, on the east coast of which the capital of Russia was located, was of great strategic importance. The mainstay of the sea defense of the bay and the main repair base of the fleet before the war was Kronstadt, but basing on Kronstadt was difficult due to prolonged freeze-up. Of particular importance for the defense of the Gulf of Finland was the narrow bay between the Napgen Island and the Porkkala-Udd Peninsula, as well as the Abo-Aland and Moonsund regions, which occupied a flanking position towards the entrance to the bay and provided the fleet for operations on the open sea. The Abo-Alandek skerry region was used for the basing of light forces, and the Moonsund region, which did not have any means for basing and defense at the beginning of the war, covered the entrance to the Gulf of Riga.

The main base of the Russian fleet on the Baltic Sea was Helsingfors with a roadstead and the Sveaborg fortress. However, Helsingfors was not sufficiently fortified and equipped for the basing of the fleet. The inner roadstead was inconvenient for large ships, so the battleships were forced to stand in the unprotected outer roadstead. As for the ship repair facilities, they were insignificant: the only dry dock for battleships in the Baltic Sea was in Kronstadt. Revel also had limited repair possibilities: the planned construction and equipment of the main, well-protected base of the Baltic Fleet (the fortress of Peter the Great) had just begun before the war.

The Baltic Port, Rogonul (from 1915) and Ust-Dvinsk were used as basing points for the light forces of the Russian fleet. The roadsteads of Porkkala-Uddsky [Lapvik], Eryo, Ute, Werder [Kuivast] served as anchorages.

The forward bases and strongholds of Libava and Vindava, according to the plan, at the beginning of the war were abandoned by the Russian fleet, and in 1915 they were occupied by the enemy.

For Germany, the importance of the Baltic Theater increased due to the fact that, in the presence of an almost circular blockade, the Baltic Sea with its strait zone remained the only way for the transportation of iron ore and other raw materials from Sweden, which Germany badly needed.

The German fleet had a deployed basing system with sufficient repair facilities in the Baltic Sea. In this case, the main base was Kiel. Due to the presence of the Kiel Canal, this base as a repair and rear base was of great importance for the North Sea. The bases used were Danzig with the well-sheltered roadstead Putzig, the Pillau base, and from the middle of 1915 - Libau. It should be emphasized that the ratio of the standing forces of the fleets in the Baltic Sea was in favor of the Russian fleet.

Table 3

The composition of the naval forces in the Baltic Sea at the beginning of the war

However, the German command had the opportunity, if necessary, to transfer significant forces of the Open Sea fleet through the Kiel Canal and thus create a large superiority in forces. So, in 1915, the ships were transferred from the North Sea to break through to the Gulf of Riga, and in 1917 - for the Moonsund operation.

Taking into account the possibility of quickly concentrating the main forces of the German fleet on the Baltic Sea, the Russian command proceeded from the general balance of forces of the fleets and set defensive tasks for its fleet, the most important of which was the defense of the coast and covering the approaches to the capital from the sea.

It should be noted that the equipment of the Baltic theater by the beginning of the war was insufficient and clearly did not meet the tasks assigned to the Russian fleet.

The basis of the defense of the Gulf of Finland at the beginning of the war was the Central mine and artillery position - a minefield, exposed in the narrowness of the bay and covered from the flanks by batteries on the Nargen sharp and at Porkkala-Udda. Directly adjacent to it was a flank-skerry position to the west of Porkkala-Udda, where mines and batteries were installed in the first days of the war. The coastal defenses of the Central Position did not provide solid flank protection. The defense of the position was entrusted to the fleet, the main forces of which were deployed in the rear of the position in anticipation of a battle with the German fleet during its breakthrough into the Gulf of Finland.

The deployment in 1914 of inactive operations in the middle and southern parts of the sea required strengthening the equipment of the theater in order to ensure the defense of the Gulf of Finland. Batteries were built in the areas of Nargen Island and Reval Island, two batteries on Worms Island and a battery on the Porkkala Udd Peninsula.

To expand the basing of light forces and submarines in the areas of the Abo-Aland skerries and the Moonsund archipelago, intensive work began at the end of 1914, which continued in subsequent years.

Assessing the state of defense of the German coast at the beginning of the war, one should recognize it as stable. During the war, a wide network of guided aerodromes, radio stations and radio direction-finding stations was created on the coast. Defensive minefields were placed mainly in the strait zone and on the approaches to their bases, active minefields - in the northern part of the Baltic Sea in order to block the Russian fleet in the Gulf of Finland.

Turning to the consideration of the Black Sea theater of military operations, it should be noted that if more or less sufficient attention was paid to the equipment of the Baltic sea theater of military operations (theater of operations) before the First World War, then the same cannot be said about the Black Sea theater of operations. The attitude of the top military leadership of Russia to the latter, as a secondary theater of military operations, had a negative impact not only on the construction of ships, but also on the organization of the basing system.

Meanwhile, the limited size of the Black Sea, and, consequently, the relatively short distances to the most important enemy targets (280 miles from Sevastopol to the Bosphorus) made it possible to quickly deploy forces in any area.

The main base of the Black Sea Fleet was Sevastopol, the bases were Odessa and Batum, and the rear repair base was Nikolaev. At the same time, only the main base of the fleet was relatively equipped. However, from the sea, Sevastopol was weakly fortified. Therefore, the safety of the ships in Sevastopol in wartime was not guaranteed. The port itself was insufficiently equipped. The rest of the bases were in an extremely unsatisfactory condition. The military department, to which they were subordinate until 1910, repeatedly demanded the liquidation of the fortifications in Batum (Batumi) and Ochakov, and only the decisive opposition of the Naval Ministry against such a rash decision allowed them to be retained as possible bases for the fleet during the war.

Batum was important not only as a base for the fleet, but also as a transport and transshipment point for supplying the Caucasian army. Reinforced defensive work to fortify Batum began only during the war. The coastal defense was reinforced with field guns, an observation post, and minefields on the approaches to the port. A seaplane base was equipped, and Batum's fortress artillery, which had an insufficient firing range, at the end of 1914 received new guns for reinforcement.

In addition to the listed fortified points, coastal batteries were installed near Odessa, on the Tendrovskaya Spit, near Ak-Mechet, Evpatoria, Yalta, Feodosia, Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Sochi, Gagra, Sukhumi, Poti.

By the beginning of the war, there were several radio stations in Russia; a number of new stations were built during the war.

The network of observation and communication posts was extensively developed, all coastal points were linked by telegraph and telephone communications. The airfield network was developed.

The most serious shortcoming of the naval forces basing system in the Black Sea theater of operations was the absence of a well-equipped and protected naval base on the Caucasian coast.

The main enemy of Russia in the Black Sea theater of operations was Turkey.

By the beginning of the war, Turkey had the only naval base in the theater of operations - Constantinople, and since 1915, when Bulgaria took the side of the Central Powers, Varna was used for temporary basing (in particular, by submarines).

Sea communications on the Black Sea were of great importance for Turkey, since the road network on the Anatolian coast was very poorly developed. Its most important inland sea route ran along the Anatolian coast from Constantinople to Trebizond. In this way, the supply of the armies of the Caucasian Front was carried out, as well as coal was delivered to the capital from the Zonguldak and Eregli regions. The lack of convenient, sea-protected anchorages made it difficult for the Turks to organize the protection of maritime communications. During the war, this path has undergone some changes in comparison with peacetime. At the same time, the ships sailed closer to the coast at relatively shallow depths, which significantly complicated the actions of Russian submarines.

Table 4

The composition of the naval forces on the Black Sea by the beginning of the war with Turkey

By the beginning of the war, there were no new battleships in the Black Sea Fleet (3 dreadnoughts were built in Nikolaev), nevertheless, the Russian battleships were stronger than the Turkish ones. However, the arrival in August 1914 from the Mediterranean Sea to Constantinople of the German battle cruiser "Goeben" nullified the advantage of the Russian fleet.

The fact is that the high-speed Goeben, like the German light cruiser Breslau, could get away from any superior Russian ship formation and, in turn, had the ability to impose a battle on the weaker enemy ship.

A few words should be said about the Black Sea straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, which connect the Black and Mediterranean Seas through the Sea of ​​Marmara. The Bosphorus is 16 miles long and up to two miles wide; depth along the axis of the strait is 28-100 m. Both shores at the entrance to the strait from the Black Sea were heavily fortified by the beginning of the war.

On the Asian coast of the strait, from the side of the Black Sea entrance, there were eight forts and coastal batteries - up to 50 guns of caliber from 150 to 80 mm in total; on the European coast there are also eight forts and batteries - in total over 20 guns of caliber from 150 to 350 mm.

The mine defense of the Bosphorus was organized even before the start of the war. Three rows of land-guided mines were placed across the strait in the narrowness between Rumeli-Kavak and Agadolu-Kvvak. In this case, the passage was left on the east side. Several rows of mines were placed north of Anadolu-Kavak, and several separate mine banks were placed along the Asian coast. A barrier across the strait was placed directly at the entrance. Mines were also placed near Quillos.

The length of the Dardanelles Strait is 35 miles, the width is two to three miles, and the depth along the axis of the strait is 50-100 m; the narrowness at Canakkale is eight cables wide.

The fortifications of the Dardanelles consisted of a series of batteries, which were located near the coast and were divided into external and internal. Intermediate batteries located at heights had guns (mostly field guns and mortars) with a caliber not exceeding 150 mm.

By the beginning of hostilities, the defense of the strait included a number of old open forts built in 1877-1878, armed with outdated cannons, and several batteries. The firing range of the guns did not exceed nine km. The total number of guns reached 100. During the war, the equipment was updated and expanded, especially in connection with the Dardanelles landing operation of the Anglo-French fleet.

When approaching the strait from the Aegean Sea, enemy ships first of all fell into the zone of fire of the forts and external batteries of Kumkale and Seddulbakhir, installed at the very entrance to the strait. These forts and batteries were armed with 26 guns, including 16 - caliber 240-280 mm.

Approaching the traverse of the Seddulbakhir batteries, the ships emerged from the shelling of the Kumkale battery, but remained in the zone of fire of the batteries and the Seddulbakhir fort. Such a system of arrangement of guns made it possible to fire both across and along the strait, to the stern of the ships breaking through into the strait.

Further along the Asian and European coasts, intermediate batteries were located (85 guns of 120-210 mm caliber. Among them was the Dardanos battery on a high hill on the Asian coast near the Kepez-Limany bay, which fired on the strait in both directions at the maximum firing range.

The strait defense was based on strong internal batteries located on both sides of the narrow part of the strait up to Canakkale. On the Asian coast there were coastal batteries Hamidie I and Chimenlik, on the European coast - Rumeli, Hamidie II, Namazgah. In addition, north of Canakkale on the Asian coast, up to the narrowness of Nagra, there were three forts, which were also part of the general defense system of the narrowness of the strait.

All internal forts and batteries had 88 guns, including 12 guns of 280 - 355 mm caliber, 57 guns from 210 to 260 mm. The batteries of the newest construction - Hamidie I on the Asian coast and opposite Hamidie II - on the European coast were especially strongly fortified. The fire control of the batteries, like the entire leadership of the naval defense of the strait, was carried out by German officers.

Assessing the balance of forces of the parties at sea by the beginning of the First World War, it should be noted that the combined naval forces of the Entente (England, France and Russia) significantly exceeded the naval forces of the Union of Central States as a whole, there and in most naval theaters.

Taking into account the ships that were under construction, the fleets of the Entente states outnumbered the naval forces of Germany and its allies in new battleships by two times, in battle cruisers by 2.5 times, in destroyers by 2.5 times, in submarines - three times.

In addition, the Entente fleets had a more developed basing system and a better strategic position in most of the naval theaters of military operations.

Especially for the Century

On August 1, 1914, the First World War began, unleashed by imperialist Germany, which declared war first on Russia, and then on France and Belgium. Simultaneously with the actions of the army on the land fronts, the German fleet began operations on the seas. Significant naval forces of the Germans were sent against the Russian Baltic Fleet, and against the Black Sea - the Germans and a round of ek.

The results of the Russo-Japanese War left their mark on the Russian fleet. Through the efforts of the advanced part of Russian naval officers and, above all, the followers of the school of Admiral Makarov, the fleet, starting in 1907, began relatively quickly to restore and strengthen its combat power. More advanced warships were built, the system of training and education of personnel was updated and improved. The system of organizing fleet management has become more perfect. In the navy, more attention began to be paid to the study of probable enemies and the development of war plans; equipment for future theaters of military operations was deployed. As a result of all this, the Russian fleet turned out to be relatively well prepared for the First World War.

However, due to the technical and economic backwardness of the country and the lack of finals, the construction of battleships of the "dreadnought" type began in the Baltic in 1909, and in the Black Sea in 1941, and these ships entered service only in the second year of the war. The construction of coastal fortifications was also not completed by the beginning of the war. Germany, by the beginning of the war in the Baltic Sea, had a significant superiority in forces.

Russian sailors had to fight an insidious and powerful enemy. But excellent knowledge, skillful use of military equipment and loyalty to military duty ensured them success in the fight against the German fleet.

On the day of the declaration of war, the commander of the Baltic Fleet, a student and follower of the Makarov school, Admiral Essin, made an appeal to the personnel:

“Let each of you exert all your strength, spiritual and physical. will apply his knowledge, experience and skill on the day of the battle so that our shells would bring death and destruction to the enemy pages:! and ships ".

Starting the war, the German fleet set itself the goal of breaking into the Gulf of Finland, destroying the naval forces of Russia in the Baltic and striking Petrograd from the sea. In the very first month of the war, the German cruisers Magdeburg and Augsburg, accompanied by destroyers and submarines, tried to penetrate the Gulf of Finland. During the operation "Magdeburg" ran aground near the island of Odensholm. A detachment of Russian cruisers and destroyers was sent against the enemy ships, which, having inflicted enormous destruction on the Magdeburg, captured it. The ciphers and codes found on the cruiser made it possible for the Allies to unravel the intentions of the German command until the end of the war.

The Balts achieved especially great success in carrying out active minefields near enemy shores. Of all the belligerent states, Russia turned out to be the most prepared for the mission of war. The Russian mine terrified German pirates. This is evidenced by the recognition of one German submariner.

“At the beginning of the war,” he wrote, “only one mine was dangerous — the Russian mine. None of the commanders to whom England was "entrusted" - and we, in fact, were all like that. - did not go willingly to the Gulf of Finland. “Many enemies - a lot of honor” is a great saying. But near the Russians with their mines, the honor was too great. Germany, I must say frankly, had nothing to do there. Each of us, if not forced to do so, tried to avoid "Russian affairs".

Minefields were placed on a wide scale during the first months of the war.

On October 31, 1914, a special purpose half-division as part of the destroyers General Kondratenko and Okhotnik. "Border Guard" and "Novik", under the cover of four destroyers, set up a minefield in front of Memel. The operation, carried out at night, was not noticed by the enemy. On November 5, a minefield was laid on the approaches to Memel and in front of Pillau. On November 17, the German armored cruiser Friedrich-Karl exploded and died on this minefield. On the same day, the pilot ship "Elbing" was killed here by being blown up by a mine.

On November 19, in difficult meteorological conditions, the Amur minelayer set up a minefield on the routes of the German fleet in the area between Bornholm Island and the Stolpe Bank. On this obstacle in March 1915, the German ships "Königsberg" and "Bavaria" were killed. In mid-November, a large obstacle was set up by the cruisers Rurik and Admiral Makarov in front of the Danzngskaya Bay. On these mines in May 1915, two German minesweepers were blown up.

At the end of December of the same year, 3 German ships were blown up and killed by mines. Since all the barrage operations were carried out secretly, few believed that: - the ships and steamers were sunk by the bottom boats.

In order to save warships and commercial ships, the German command was forced to reduce shipping. The navigation of the most valuable warships was limited to the parallel of Gotland. German cruisers relocated to the west - from Nepfarsasser to Svnemünde.

As a result of the active operations of the Russian Baltic Fleet, normal communication between Sweden and Germany was disrupted, which now could not receive the required amount of ore and cellulose used for the production of explosives and paper. All this could> not affect the war production of Germany.

Even more sensitive blows p) German communications were inflicted by the Baltic in 1915. According to the maps found by our submariners on German ships, it was established that the courses of the German ships lay in the southern part of the Gulf of Bothnia. from Kvarken to Alandsgaf, far from the coast. Next pg theglio. it was possible to carry out attacks on German ships without violating Schzed's neutrality.

Russian submarines were active in the Gulf of Bothnia. On October 24, 1915, the Alligator submarine seized a German steamer and launched it into the Aland archipelago, handing it over to the Obedient destroyer.

On October 29, the submarine Cayman, acting in conjunction with the cruisers, seized the German stettin, which had conscripts on board, and brought it to Abo. In 1915 alone, submarines of the Baltic Fleet destroyed and captured 15 German transports. During this year, they made 51 attacks on enemy ships.

Surface ships conducted active mini-barrage operations along the lines of communication of the enemy fleet.

In January 1915, the State Regiment of the cruisers "Oleg" and "Admiral Makarov", under the cover of three other cruisers, carried out a mine laying. Between the island of Bornholm and the Stolpe bank on January 25, the German cruiser Augsburg was blown up by a mine. The cruiser Gazelle was blown up on the Russian fence near the Arkona lighthouse, which received serious damage.

In April, a German steamer was killed in the same area. A special purpose half-division, consisting of five destroyers, laid mines on the approaches to Lnbava, which was occupied by the Germans. Minefields were also placed near Vindava.

In November, a detachment of four cruisers under the cover of the battleships Petropavlovsk and Gangut and the destroyer Novik to the south of Gotland set up a minefield of 56 mines on German lines of communication. A German cruiser blew up on this obstacle in the area of ​​Bank X "Borg.< Данциг».

On December 6, a detachment of cruisers under cover of battleships and the destroyer Novik set up a large minefield southeast of Gotland. On January 13, 1916, the German cruiser Lubeck was killed here.

On December 16, three destroyers - "Novik", "Pobeditel" and "Zabiyaka" - to the north-west of Vindava on the probable routes of German ships placed 150 mines. The area was under constant surveillance by enemy cruisers. To inflict damage not only on "Large, but also on small ships and enemy transports, mines were placed with a small deepening. On December 17, the cruiser Bremen, escorted by two destroyers, was blown up on this minefield. The first to hit the mine was the mineship squadron" V- " 191. "There was an explosion, and the ship went down. Rescuing the crew of the deceased destroyer." Bremen "nose hit two mines. Two powerful explosions followed, and the cruiser disappeared under water.

Convinced that the "Bremen" and "V-19I" were victims of submarines, the German ships and transports continued :! use the old fairways. On December 23, the patrol ship "Freya" was blown up by a mine. Arriving at the place of death, German patrolmen and two destroyers found mines. Maneuvering between them, they tried to get out of the minefield area. After about five miles, the German destroyer S-177 blew up and sank. After that, by the order of the commander of the German Baltic Fleet, the entire area of ​​Vindava "was prohibited for navigation; the same order canceled the carrying of a permanent disinfectant between the island of Gotland and Windus.

In 1914-1915, the total loss of the Germans from ships and transports amounted to 105 thousand tons. Poter Russians - 29 thousand tons.

Thus, a serious threat was created for the German merchant shipping in the Baltic. Trading companies refused to send their ships to Sweden.

The lack of raw materials adversely affected the work of the German war industry. The needs of the German army for weapons and ammunition, as well as the demands of industrial magnates who received huge profits on military orders, forced the Germans to increase the supply of iron ore, cellulose and timber. The German high military command was forced to transfer two light cruisers and a destroyer flotilla from the North Sea to the Baltic, which led to a weakening of the naval forces. operating against the British.

In the 1916 campaign of the year, Russian destroyers, with the support of cruisers, attacked the German lines of communication that had passed along the coast of Sweden.

On May 31, 1916, three Russian destroyers - "Novik". "Winner" and "Thunder" - "attacked a German convoy in Norrköpingskon Bay. The attack sunk the German auxiliary cruiser German and two armed escort ships. These actions of Russian ships caused great damage to German trade.

The Balts fought the enemy under any conditions. The crew of the destroyer "Novik" in a fierce battle with two German destroyers showed determination, fearlessness and contempt for the enemy - qualities that were displayed by almost all sailors of the Baltic Fleet.

On August 17, 1915, Novik noticed the silhouettes of two ships. These were the German destroyers "V-99" and "V-YuO", trying to break into the Nrbensky Bay.

Despite the fact that the Germans had a clear advantage in forces, the commander of the "Novik" 2nd rank captain Berenz decided to approach the German destroyers. The distance was rapidly decreasing. When 43 cables remained to the enemy, Novik opened fire. Covering was achieved from the third volley, and from the fourth he went over to defeat. A few minutes later, a fire broke out on the German lead destroyer. The order of the fleet commander gave a high assessment of the Russian destroyer. "After six minutes of combat, owing to the excellent shooting and skillful maneuvering of the Novik with its head, the destroyer, hit by shells, began to retreat." Encouraged by the first successes, the artillerymen of the Russian destroyer intensified the fire. On the destroyer "V-99" the middle pipe was shot down and a fire broke out in the poop. "Novik" transferred fire to "V-100", which caused serious damage.

Trying to break away from the pursuing Russian ship, "V-99" fell into a network barrage; backing up, he ran into Russian mines. There were two deafening explosions. A few minutes later, the enemy ship disappeared under water.

This success was possible thanks to the high combat training of the crew, the courage and organization of all its members. The commander of Novik, Berenc, wrote in a report addressed to the commander of the mine division: “I consider it my duty to note the amazing calmness and endurance of all personnel. So, for example, the shooting was opened strictly on command and after the signal "shot" not a single extra shot was made; the transition from volleys to rapid fire and back was just as good. Minor damages, so characteristic of guns, were repaired quickly, but without ado. "

The German fleet suffered a major defeat in the Baltic in the raid operation, which the German command decided to undertake in November 1916.

November 10 German flotilla, consisting of 11 newest high-speed destroyers "G-56", "S-57", "S-58", "S-59", "0-89", cG-90 "," V-72 "," V-75 "," V-76 "," V-77 "," V-78 "with a displacement of 1000 tons each and a speed of 34 knots, under the command of Vnting went to sea.

The flotilla was tasked with finding and attacking light forces

Baltic Fleet, defending the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, and then shelling the Baltic port, which at that time was a large number of wagons with artillery weapons prepared for the 12th Army. The Germans wanted to show that Germany in the Baltic has large forces that can paralyze the actions of the Russian battleships that have just entered service, as well as create a flank danger for the army.

Before the advanced Russian minefields, the flotilla was accompanied by the light cruiser Strasbourg. The destroyers left for their mission, and the cruiser remained here until their return. They decided to carry out the operation at night under cover of darkness. The destroyers marched in a wake line at a distance of about 1.5 cables from each other, forming a long straight line. From the lead ship, only the first three destroyers were visible, following the flagship to the wake.

The sea was calm. Low clouds covering the moon, poor visibility - all this favored the secrecy of the flotilla's actions. By 21 o'clock she was supposed to arrive at Odensholm Island, from where it was planned to undertake searches for the Russians.

At 20 hours 38 minutes the chief of the flotilla, who was on * the destroyer "S-56", was informed that the three end ships were behind. Ignoring this, Vntting continued the previous course of the flotilla. Suddenly, alarming news was received on the radio: one of the straggling destroyers "U-75" ran into a mine and was blown up. Water quickly filled the boiler room and the ship lost its speed. The destroyer S-57, which was nearby, took on board personnel from the V-75. After a while, a second mine exploded, and the "V-75" went to the bottom. From a huge concussion on the "S-57" the steam line was damaged, the destroyer lost its speed; "G-89" took on board the command of the sinking ship and, taking a reverse course, went to join the cruiser "Strasbourg".

For more than two hours the Germans continued their unsuccessful search for Russian ships at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. Having lost two of his destroyers and not finding Russian ships, Witning decided to ntn to the Baltic port in order to shell it. On November 11, at about 1 hour 20 minutes, 8 German destroyers approached Rogervik Bay. Three destroyers allocated for the bombardment of the city and port entered the bay; the rest of the ships were at the entrance to the harbor. After illuminating the port and the city with searchlights, the Germans began shelling, which lasted about 20 minutes. The shelling destroyed several buildings and killed a few civilians. After finishing the shelling, the German destroyers laid down on the opposite course.

It was decided to bypass the area of ​​the death of the first two destroyers to the north.

At 3 hours 15 minutes, the third German destroyer "V-72", which was the penultimate one in the ranks, was blown up. "V-77" took on board the command from "V-72" and sank the exploded destroyer with artillery fire.

The flotilla commander, hearing artillery fire, decided that * Russian ships attacked his end destroyers. Having made a successive 180 ° turn with his lead ship, Witning rushed to the place of firing. At 0320 hours, immediately after the turn, there was an explosion of deafening force under the G-90, following the flagship. The ship began to sink. "S-59" took command from "G-90" and "V-78" launched a torpedo into the sinking destroyer. The G-90 disappeared underwater in an instant. The line was broken. Two destroyers - "S-58" and "S-59" - separated from the core of the flotilla. What was happening around, Witting could not understand 21 only when he received the signal "MM" ("I have a mine hole") from the V-72, he realized that the destroyers were in a minefield and ordered the remaining ships to assemble and leave the dangerous place. At 3 hours 58 minutes the destroyer "S-58", in a hurry to connect with the flagship, was blown up by a mine. In the vicinity of the explosion, mines were found floating on the surface. In view of this, "S-59" to rescue the personnel of the sinking ship could only send boats. Having accepted the command, the destroyer began to maneuver between the mines, wanting to get out of the danger zone. Soon he was blown up by a mine. The flagship destroyer "S-56", having accepted the crew, sank it with a torpedo. After 45 minutes, I jumped on a V76 mine. After the smoke cleared, there was no ship or people on the surface of the water. Several minutes passed. Another explosion severely damaged the boilers of the flagship.

Thus, as a result of this adventurous operation, the Germans lost seven ships.

For 11 months after that, they did not dare to take action. It was only in the fall of 1917, when the working class of Russia was preparing for an armed uprising with the aim of overthrowing the Provisional Government, that the German imperialists undertook a major operation to seize the Baltic Islands. The Germans expected to break into the Gulf of Finland and strike at revolutionary Petrograd from the sea.

But the Baltic sailors, led by the Bolsheviks, inflicted

powerful blows to the German fleet and thwarted the evil plans of the enemy.

No less stubborn struggle against the Germans and Turks was conducted by the Black Sea Fleet.

In October 1914, the German-Turkish fleet suddenly attacked the Russian cities and ports of the Black Sea. Sevastopol was shelled. Odessa, Kerch and Novorossiysk. However, the Black Sea men repulsed all the attacks of the enemy.

The Black Sea Fleet responded soon after.<0 ноября 1914 года русские корабли обстреляли турецкий порт

Zunguldak. from where the enemy was transferring coal to Constantinople. At the same time, Russian destroyers laid minefields near the Bosphorus. Returning to their bases, they sank three Turkish transports with troops.

On November 17, Russian ships fired at Trebizond and then set up a minefield off the Anatolian coast. The next day, near Cape Sarych, a battle between Russian ships and the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau took place, as a result of which Goeben received serious damage.

In 1915, the Black Sea Fleet carried out active cruising operations. In May, during one of them, "Goeben" was again hit by the artillery of Russian ships. In addition, surface ships and submarines laid mines off the Turkish coast, which were blown up by enemy warships and transports. In April 1915, the Turkish cruiser Medzhidie blew up on a minefield near Odessa-Ochakov, and in June the cruiser Breslau.

Russian submariners acted skillfully and courageously on the Black Sea. On October 12, 1916, the submarine "Seal" entered the battle with the armed steamer "Rodosto", captured it and brought it to Sevastopol.

In the 1916 campaign, the Black Sea Fleet supported the Svsk> Caucasian army advancing on Trebizond.

As a result of active offensive operations, the Black Sea Fleet in 1914-1917 "sank 102 enemy steamships. 110 motor ships and about 5,000 sailing ships. Russian sailors and German attacks in the north were successfully repelled, where the enemy sought to disrupt Russia's ties with its allies.

These are the brief results of the combat activities of Russian sailors during the First World War, with their activity, knowledge of the matter and skillful use of weapons, inflicting crushing blows on the strongest enemy. In this war, the sailors * fought without vain against the Germans, who tried to subordinate Russia to their policy and seize Russian lands, but at the same time, the bulk of the sailors did not want the autocracy to win. The most overdosed part of the sailors, under the leadership of the Bolsheviks, was preparing for a resolution, because only the overthrow of the autocracy could ensure the preservation of the national independence of the state and its free development and strengthening. In their struggle to turn the imperialist war into a civil war, the revolutionary sailors relied on rich revolutionary traditions and especially rich experience in the struggle against tsarism under the leadership of Bolshevik goats.

Our guide to books about the first world "The fatal war of Russia" compiled by Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Meshkov, was included in the short-list of the ASKI competition "Best Books of the Year"! In honor of this, the author sent especially for one more chapter from the book.

Leaving a foamy trail
A mine sprinted briskly.
Broken like a toy
The cruiser went to the bottom.

Swam to the surface
Gray submarine
And cuts proudly
A little wave.

Verse, calmed by the depths,
Vortex funnel.
The sea unclenched cheekbones
Their blue depths.

Corpses float menacingly,
It's a pity the wreckage is floating
Furious sharks
Splashing between them ...
Arseny Nesmelov. Episode

Former head of the Russian Foreign Ministry S. D. Sazonov in their "Memories" writes:

The Great War began on the Eastern Front with the bombardment of Libau by the German fleet ...(p. 242).

It so happened that the First World War began for Russia at sea and there, on the Baltic Sea, with the heroic defense of the Moonsund archipelago in October 1917, it ended. At the same time, the main bloody battles took place, of course, in the land theaters of military operations, where the Russian army lost two million killed and died from wounds during the war years. For comparison:

The participation of the Russian Navy in the First World War was mainly of a coastal defensive nature. At the same time, 32 warships were lost, and human losses were (together with the wounded and captured) 6063 people.

Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century: losses of the armed forces :
stat. issled. / Under total. ed. G.F. Krivosheeva. M., 2001.S. 103.

To begin with, let's name a number of general publications containing systematic information about military operations at sea in the First World War:

The combat chronicle of the Russian fleet: a chronicle of the most important military events. Russian history fleet from the IX century. to 1917/ Ed. Dr. military-mor. science cap. 1st rank N.V. Novikov; comp. V.A. Divin; Acad. Sciences of the USSR. Institute of History. M.: Military Publishing, 1948.490 p., Maps.

In 2 volumes / ed. N.B. Pavlovich. Moscow: Military Publishing, 1964. T. I; 647 s. T. II. 383 s.

V.A.Zolotarev, I.A.Kozlov. Three centuries of the Russian fleet, 1914-1941... M.: AST; SPb. : Polygon, 2004.750 p. : ill., portr. (Military History Library).

This is the third volume of the four-volume edition of the same name (the 1st volume is devoted to the history of the Russian fleet of the 18th century; the 2nd volume covers the period from the beginning of the 19th century to the beginning of the First World War; the 4th volume tells about the history of the fleet in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 , about the exploits of Soviet sailors at sea and on land).

A.A. Kersnovsky in the final, 4th volume of his "Stories of the Russian Army"[Kersnovsky A.A. History of the Russian Army: in 4 volumes / Comment. S.G. Nelipovich. M.: Voice, 1992-1994. T. 4.1915-1917. M., 1994. 368 p.] Considered it necessary, "at least in the most general outline, to outline the work" during the world war of the Russian fleet. As always, it is impartial towards the Headquarters of the Supreme Command:

The command of the naval forces was concentrated in the Headquarters. The fleet was commanded a thousand miles away from the Polesye swamps and commanded in a swamp manner.

The headquarters prohibited any activity of the Baltic Fleet, despite the insignificance of the German forces of Prince Heinrich, which consisted exclusively of old ships. Throughout the war we had a German naval code at our disposal, thanks to which all the enemy's intentions were known to us in advance. We got this code when the cruiser Magdeburg was destroyed at the very beginning of the war. The Germans did not even suspect about this find of ours. We immediately shared this most valuable discovery with the British. With such an unprecedented trump card, we could have acted offensively throughout the war, crushing the German Baltic forces, evading the fleet of the Open Sea.

But there was no naval commander in Baranovichi-Mogilev, just as there was no commander. They had no idea about naval strategy as well as about land strategy. All orders of the Headquarters in the naval unit were permeated with the fear of "losing ships." The fleet was doomed to inaction and inevitable demoralization ... Fearing to lose one or two ships, the Headquarters destroyed the entire Russian naval force. Our four Gangut provided us with an overwhelming superiority over the forces of Prince Henry. With a squadron speed of up to 24 knots (speed exceeding the contractual speed) and armed with longer-range guns than the Germans, they could, with excellent success, have fought with units of the High Sea fleet that went out to the Baltic and had a squadron speed of no more than 18 knots. The two-time sad experience of controlling the fleet from the shore - Menshikov in 1854, Alekseev's governor in 1904, who both times led the fleet to death, was completely in vain ...

The commander of the Baltic Fleet, Admiral Essen, died untimely in the spring of 1915 - just before the new ships entered service. His successor, Admiral Nepenin, for all his outstanding qualities, did not have enough authority in the eyes of the Headquarters and had to obey its hopelessly passive directives. The intelligence organized by Admiral Nepenin caused enormous harm to the enemy - the British fleet enjoyed its fruits throughout the war: all English operations at sea were the results of Russian intelligence. The Russian navy was the brain of the British. The German naval command guessed its most dangerous enemies in Nepenin and its highly qualified officers.<…>

With all this, the Baltic Fleet fulfilled the more than modest tasks assigned to it quite successfully. The Black Sea Fleet, which showed higher combat qualities, but had a much worse leader in the person of Admiral Eberhardt, did not work so successfully. In general, if the army was demanded more than it could give without strain, then all the capabilities of the fleet were not used (p. 233-235).

Osip Mandelstam. From the poem "Petropolis"
May 1916 (published in)

From the above-mentioned book "The Combat Chronicle of the Russian Fleet":

The first period of the war on the Baltic Sea passed under the sign of the expectation of an offensive operation of the Germans on the Gulf of Finland ...
It was assumed that the offensive of the Germans could follow even before the start of the declaration of war, while the installation of a barrier across the Gulf of Finland, which interrupted the freedom of navigation on a busy trade route, in itself represented an event fraught with major consequences. The uncertainty of the situation and general confusion that accompanied the days of July 30-31, instilled uncertainty in the solution of this most important issue for defense. The Essen Fleet Commander several times telegraphed to St. Petersburg with a request for instructions: to erect a fence or not? Not receiving permission, worried about ensuring the deployment of the fleet, he finally sent a telegram warning that if he did not receive a definite answer about the political situation, then in the morning of the 31st he would place a minefield himself. A positive response came when the fleet was ready to weaken anchor to carry out and cover this operation.

A few hours later, the fence was set up. On the same day, the fleet completed its deployment. The cruisers' sentinel curtain was put into the sea on the night of July 25-26.

Order of the Commander of the Baltic Sea Fleet, July 19, 1914, No. 2:
By the will of the Sovereign Emperor, war has been declared today.
I congratulate the Baltic Fleet on a great day for which we live, which we have been waiting for and for which we have been preparing.
Officers and teams!
From this day on, each of us must forget all our personal affairs and concentrate all our thoughts and will towards one goal - to protect the Motherland from the encroachment of enemies and enter into battle with them without hesitation, thinking only about inflicting the most difficult blows on the enemy, which are only for us. are possible.<…>
Remember that the only help that should be provided to each other in battle is to strengthen the enemy's attack, tension in order to deliver the strongest blows to him. Using all their forces and military means for this.
May each of us fulfill the greatest duty to the Motherland - to protect Her inviolability with his life - and may he follow the example of those who, two hundred years ago, with the Great Emperor, with their exploits and blood, laid the foundation of our fleet in these waters.
Admiral von Essen(p. 13-14).

This order is reproduced in the book: G.K. Count. Fleet and War: The Baltic Fleet in the First World War. M.: Veche, 2011.320 p. : ill. (Marine chronicle * ).

[* The RSL contains 94 books of the Marine Chronicle series, of which 28 digitized, you can flip through their first pages (1/10 of the volume) directly in the electronic catalog of the RSL using the links "More", and the full electronic versions can be obtained by registered readers NEB.]

Its author is Harald Karlovich Graf (1885-1966), senior officer of the destroyer "Novik", captain of the 2nd rank, participant in the Russian-Japanese, World War I and the Civil War, an emigrant since 1921. The book is the first part of his great work “On Novik: The Baltic Fleet in War and Revolution”, published in Germany in 1922. This publication covers the period from the outbreak of the First World War to the end of 1916.

As the author notes, destroyer "Novik" was built at the Putilov shipyard in St. Petersburg at the expense of the Committee for the collection of voluntary donations to strengthen the Russian navy. He brilliantly fulfilled all the requirements of the latest naval technology, and in terms of its artillery and mine armament, as well as the course, was one of the best ships of this class in the world.(p. 15).

GK Graf tells in detail about the hostilities in which Novik participated, about the operations of the entire Baltic Fleet, the service and daily life of Russian naval officers. The author highly appreciates the commander of the Baltic Fleet, Admiral Essen, whom he had known since the Russo-Japanese war:

The activities of N.O. Essen in Port Arthur did not go unnoticed. Arthur nominated him and gave him the right to be considered one of the most outstanding officers of our fleet ...

In 1906 he was entrusted with a detachment of mine cruisers. Under his talented command, this detachment becomes the nucleus of a rebuilding fleet, and a number of excellent commanders and young officers grow up in it. The Essen school is being created in the same way as once the schools of Lazarev, Butakov, Makarov ...

In 1908, already a rear admiral, N.O. Essen was appointed chief of the Baltic Sea Naval Services, and then confirmed by the fleet commander and remained in this position until the last day of his life.

In a little over seven years, he literally revived the fleet and destroyed the routine, which had already taken deep roots (pp. 96-97).

The life of the destroyers became richer and richer:

Running across the seas, playing
destroyer with a torpedo boat.

Clings like a sedge to honey,
to the torpedo boat.
…………………………
And why is it unbearable to us
peace in the family of minos?
Vladimir Mayakovsky. From a poem
1915

Destroyers! Whoever fell in love with them is forever fascinated.
High speeds are therefore harsh and courageous people.
They have nowhere to hide in battle - there is no armor here.
“I know from myself,” said Arteniev, chuckling. - Well, where is there to hide on our bridge? One defense is a sackcloth. And when it explodes nearby, you will definitely dive under the tarpaulin, and you seem to have already become immortal ...
In a small team, it is difficult to hide your weaknesses. This is not a battleship for you, where a person is lost, like a passer-by on the Nevsky. Here any scoundrel will immediately declare that he is a scoundrel ...

V.S. Pikul. Moonzund (p. 153; more on this book a little later).

Particularly interested in the work of destroyers is addressed to the book: L.G. Goncharov, B.A. Denisov. The use of mines in the world imperialist war 1914-1918 M .; L.: Voenmorizdat, 1940.176 p. : ill. schemes.

From the preface: During the war of 1914-1918. mines as a means of fighting at sea were first used in mass quantities. The scale of mine warfare turned out to be so large that it far exceeded all preliminary calculations. The very experience of conducting mine warfare, giving examples of the use of mines in various cases of a naval situation, deserves in-depth study and analysis. Certain methods of using mines will undoubtedly find application in modern warfare at sea.

This work is the first attempt at a systematic presentation of extensive factual material on the use of mines during the imperialist war of 1914-1918. the fleets of all the warring states.

Bulging eyes
Lighthouse
from behind the mountains
cried across the oceans;
but in the oceans
squadrons writhed
impaled on a mine on a count.
Vladimir Mayakovsky.
1915-1916

Military archivists, historians, publishers timed the release of the book to the centenary of Russian diving V.A.Merkushov "Notes of a submariner, 1905-1915"(compiled and scientific ed. by V.V. Lobitsyn. M.: Consent, 2004.622 p.: ill., portra.).

Hero of the Soviet Union, commander of submarines of three projects, commander of the flotilla of strategic nuclear submarine cruisers of the Northern Fleet, Vice Admiral Lev Matushkin says in his address "To the reader":

We are justly proud of our modern submarine fleet, serving in the oceans, cruising in the Arctic ice. But this was preceded by a hundred-year history - the first Russian combat submarine in 1903 was enlisted in the fleet as Torpedo Boat No. 150, and in June 1904, having received the name Dolphin, it became a training vessel for training crews. In 1906, submarines were allocated to a special class of military ships, and this date was decided to be considered the beginning of Russian diving.

The book you are holding in your hands was written by one of the first Russian submarine officers - Vasily Alexandrovich Merkushov, who began his service on a submarine in April 1905. Its author resurrects the time when everything was the first in Russian diving. At the same time, the traditions of the Russian submarine were formed and a new type of naval submarine officers was developed. The main thing for them was the interests of the service, which required fearlessness and exceptional endurance ... It was not for nothing that the selection of personnel for service on submarines was special: they were recruited exclusively from volunteers.

VA Merkushov (in the pre-revolutionary lists his surname was written Merkushev) in November 1912 received command of the submarine "Okun", on which he started the First World War and became one of the most famous commanders-submariners of the Baltic Fleet. For two torpedo attacks by German ships (May 21 and June 15, 1915) the commander of the Okun submarine was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th degree, respectively (he became the first officer of the Baltic Fleet to receive this high military award during the First World War) , awarded the St. George's arms and the Knight's Cross of the French Order of the Legion of Honor.

After October - a white officer, served in the Black Sea Fleet. From January 1920 he was at the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia. In March 1920, he was appointed commandant of the steamship "Kharaks", which in November evacuated the Don Cossacks from Kerch. On May 19, 1920 he was promoted to captain of the 1st rank. In November 1922, commanding the tug "Skif", he took part in ferrying Russian ships requisitioned by the French government from Constantinople to Marseilles. Then he settled in Paris. He died on December 4, 1949, and is buried in the Sainte-Genevieve-des-Bois cemetery. On his gravestone there is an inscription: "The commander of the submarine" Okun ", Cavalier of St. George, Captain 1st Rank VA Merkushov 1884-1949".

At the same time, he was also a talented naval writer, chronicler of the Russian fleet. The book "Notes of a Submariner, 1905-1915" in thirty-two short stories by VA Merkushov describes the formation of a new class of ships in the Navy, which was to play one of the main roles in future wars at sea. Excerpts from the story "The death of the cruiser" Pallas "on September 28, 1914" will give an idea of ​​what an exciting reading this is:

Armored cruiser "Pallada"

The highest view on the Pallada cruiser. Revel, 1913:

Shortly after lunch break, the terrible news of the death of the cruiser Pallada, blown up by a German submarine in the Gulf of Finland, spread across the Admiralty Basin, where the Okun was stationed. This news shocked everyone, and some of them rushed to the harbor hoping to find out details from the accidentally survived or wounded when they were delivered to the pier, but there were none ...

Subsequently, from conversations with officers of the cruiser "Bayan" and other ships who witnessed the explosion of the cruiser "Pallada", the following became clear.

Despite the formidable warning in the form of an unsuccessful attack of the Admiral Makarov by a German submarine, the next morning, September 28 / October 11, the cruisers Pallada and Bayan, preceded by the destroyer Stroyny, left the Ere raid on patrol at the mouth of the Finnskiy bay. The first brigade of cruisers had finished their duty, and both ships were now on their last cruise (p. 262).

12h 14m The chief of the Bayan on watch, Lieutenant Selyanin, noticed three flashes on both sides of the Pallada in front, as if from the explosion of three mines. Following this, clouds of brown smoke, mixed with steam, rose, and columns of water rose, hiding the unfortunate ship from prying eyes. There was a terrible explosion. Probably, a mine from a German submarine hit the bomb cellars or a mine cellar, which detonated - at the same time, eighteen boilers that were under the steam exploded, which caused the cruiser to die instantly.

The head of the watch immediately stopped the Bayan's vehicles and sounded a combat alarm, and the commander, who had run up onto the bridge, backed up at full speed. After one and a half to two minutes, smoke rose from the water, and in place of the Pallada cruiser with a displacement of 7835 tons, armed with two 8-inch, eight 6-inch and twenty-two 75-mm guns, some small debris floated, and it was not visible not a single person ...

The sight was so amazing that the officers and crew of "Bayan", who jumped out onto the upper deck right from the dining tables, seemed to freeze in their places, and the ship's doctor immediately fell into a quiet madness (the doctor was written off ashore and gradually recovered) ...

The height of the column of water, steam and smoke, according to the definition from the cruiser "Aurora", was equal to 3000 feet (914.4 m), but its top was blown to the side by the wind, forming a giant letter "G". The smoke lasted about seven minutes in the air and was visible from various ships and coastal posts at a distance of up to thirty miles ...

Here is how the inspector of the cruiser "Bayan", Lieutenant Lemishevsky, who only at noon changed from watch and went down to the cabin to change clothes, tells about it.

“Before I had time to do this, I heard sounds as if from a pistol shot. Putting on his tunic and binoculars on the move, he jumped out onto the upper deck. Before me stood a column of brown smoke mixed with steam. When the smoke rose, no one was in the Pallada's place.

At that moment "Bayan" was 1-1.5 kab. From the place of death. Through binoculars, flying caps, pieces of paper and various trifles were visible. The cruiser stopped and slowly moved back ... (p. 263-264).

Having received a report about the death of the cruiser, the commander of the Baltic Fleet immediately sent all the free destroyers into the sea, which for two days in a row searched the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, but did not see the German boat.

From the official German edition of "War on the Baltic Sea", volume one, we learn the following. “Submarine U-26 at 10.30 am spotted both of our cruisers on the Ost course and, having entered the line of their course, went towards the West course. During the attack to the right of the boat, at 10-20 cables, a large Russian destroyer passed the same course. The rapprochement proceeded quickly. Soon after 11 o'clock, the submarine, being 20-30 cables from the head cruiser and walking at a low speed, turned to the right to fire from the aft mine apparatus. The cruisers' speed was considered to be 15 knots. At 1110 hours a shot was fired at the head four-tube cruiser from a distance of 530 m. The mine hit right in the middle of the cruiser. The commander of U-26 saw the fall of chimneys through the periscope, after which he had to go 20 meters, since he was fired upon by the destroyer accompanying the cruiser "...<…>

As you know, unfortunately, there was not a single destroyer with our ships (due to a lack of them), while the Bayan, according to Lieutenant Lemishevsky, opened fire ten minutes after the explosion of the Pallada. Thus, the dull blows heard on the German submarine, mistaken for shell explosions, were in fact nothing more than a hail of large and small debris of the unfortunate ship that fell around U-26, as well as a series of separate, successive explosions inside the sinking Pallada ". Due to the small distance between the opponents - about 3 cables - the effect of such a terrible explosion should have been very great on the submarine, which is why its commander gave full speed, went to a depth of 20 meters and did not appear on the surface for twenty minutes. Although in their official description of the war at sea, the Germans often do not hesitate to distort the truth, it seems that they are telling the truth ...

There was no one to save, because not only a single living person, but not a single corpse floated at the place of death. This is explained by the fact that the entire personnel, except for the watch department, at the time of the mine explosion, had dinner in the interior of the ship and did not have time to jump out onto the upper deck.

A few days later, near Koksher Island, they found a ship image of the cruiser Pallas - Savior Not Made by Hands, which had risen from the depths of the depths, to everyone's amazement, which had not only no damage, but even scratches. The image was given to the Church of the Savior on the Waters in Petrograd, built in memory of the sailors who died in the war of 1904-1905.
On October 8/21, 1914, in the Ganges region, the body of the senior artillery officer of the "Pallada" Lieutenant L.A. Gavrilov was washed ashore, which turned out to be tied to some tree and without boots. When he managed to take off his boots, get a tree and tie himself to it, it remained a mystery forever. It was the only corpse thrown out by the sea from the entire personnel of the ship, 25 officers and 572 crew members ... (p. 265-266).

The effect of the death of Pallada was stunning. The ironic attitude towards submarines was gone. How did this happen? - everyone said. How to secure ships from submarine attacks? How to be? These are the constant topics of conversation in the wardroom.

There was no panic, but the mood of the spirit was rather depressed.<…>

In the order of October 27 / November 9, 1914 No. 332, Admiral von Essen had the civil courage to admit his mistakes and all the personnel of the Baltic Fleet. Here is this repentant order.

“The last weeks of the war have clearly indicated that in some naval theaters, which include the Baltic, submarines, barrage mines and aeronautical vehicles are gaining great importance.
All these factors were not sufficiently studied by us before the war, therefore I draw the attention of all years. officers on the desirability of a serious acquaintance with issues related to diving, minefields and aeronautics, since knowledge of the matter can not only clarify many misconceptions and misconceptions, but also cause the proposal of various ways of active and passive struggle against these elements of naval war "(with . 267-268).

Death of a dashing enemy
Always kind to my heart:
There is no place for compassion -
Everyone has the same fate! ..

The sailors rejoice
And on the back of an iron
This iron fish -
Jokes, accordion, laughter.

But the propeller hummed -
The steel bird is racing
Bomb overdue blob
It hangs in its paw.

The boat went into the depths
And lurks under the water
A bird is circling over her,
Watching the predatory shadow.

Bomb after bomb;
Like whales, fountains
Greedily they uplift,
They dig both the depth and the bottom ...

A submarine is wounded
And from the gaping wound
Rainbow pops up
Oil stain.

The sea is deserted. Waves
They walk at a leisurely pace
Seagulls, whistling with their wings,
They moan from all sides ...

Someone blonde
Quietly walks on the waters
Mourning on green
His white tunic.
Arseny Nesmelov. Episode

Several books by the Deputy Head of the Institute of Military History of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Vice-President of the Russian Association of Historians of the First World War, Candidate of Historical Sciences are devoted to the combat operations of the Russian Baltic Fleet. D.Yu. Kozlova. The first one is "Memel operation" of the Baltic Sea fleet. June 1915 "(M.: Tseikhgauz, 2007.48 p.: Ill. ( Battles of the Great War ) ) acquaints the reader with the operation, the significance of which is still being debated by historians. In the face of the defeats and retreat of the Russian armies in 1915, the success of this operation was primarily of political importance.

The higher authorities did not tire of reminding the Baltic command that its main task was to prevent the breakthrough of superior German naval forces into the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland for landing at the gates of the empire's capital, and demanded to protect the fleet from the slightest risk and save it for a decisive battle on the central mine and artillery position. However, such close attention of the headquarters was initiated by the commander of the fleet, Admiral N.O. von Essen, who in the early days of the war, on his own initiative, almost provoked a war with neutral Sweden. At the same time, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who managed to stop Nikolai Ottovich's escapade literally at the last moment, considered the admiral's actions a defiant act and an undeserved insult to the Swedes, who are loyal to Russia.

In October 1914, the commander was deprived of the right to use at his own discretion the main forces of the fleet entrusted to him (battleships), and all active operations in the middle and southern parts of the sea were conducted exclusively by cruisers, destroyers and partly submarines (p. 3).

We dare not agree with the conventional wisdom, according to which the events of June 19 (July 2), 1915 are nothing more than "one of the combat episodes" and "cannot even be regarded as a noticeable stage in the general course of events of the war in the Baltic Sea" (M A. Petrov).

In this sense, it is very indicative that the authors of the semi-official retrospective essay "The Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet" (1978) did not at all consider it necessary to mention the only naval battle in the Great War in the open part of the Baltic. It seems to us that the success of the Russians in the battle near the island of Gotland - a very significant event by Baltic standards - had serious consequences. The defeats from the British in the battles at Helgoland (August 1914) and at Dogger Bank (January 1915) were followed by another failure of the German "small naval war" - this time the annoying embarrassment from the "inert", "locked", "poorly trained "," Cowardly ", etc. Russian fleet in the Baltic (p. 46-47).

After the battle on June 19 (July 2), 1915, the admiral headquarters immediately dispatched the small cruiser Bremen and the new destroyer V-99, comparable in strength and speed to the Russian Novik, to reinforce the naval forces of the Baltic Sea. However, both German ships, as it turned out, came here to meet their imminent death: the cruiser "Bremen" died on Russian mines near Vindava on December 4 (17), 1915, taking 250 crew members with it, and the "V-99" ran aground near Luserort after the inglorious defeat by Novik in the battle on August 4 (17), having lost 43 people killed and wounded (p. 47).

The Riga business is a good illustration
to the confusion reigning in our fleet.
We took a leap into the void, and the Russians
won a great naval victory.

Grand Admiral Alfred Friedrich von Tirpitz

These are the words of the main creator and commander of the German Navy D.Yu. Kozlov set as an epigraph to his other book - “Battle for the Gulf of Riga. Summer 1915 "(M.: Tseikhgauz, 2007.64 p.: Ill. ( Battles of the Great War ) ).

After bloody victories at the Carpathian passes in early 1915, where the last strategic stocks of ammunition were wasted and the last reserves were thrown into battle, the entire tragic year for Russia in 1915, the Russian imperial army suffered one defeat after another, leaving not only Galicia, conquered at such a high price, but the actual lands of the empire: Poland, Courland and others. Against the background of heavy setbacks, the victory over the German fleet in the battle for the Gulf of Riga stands out especially clearly. The victory in this battle did not demonstrate the brilliant genius of the Russian naval commanders, but rightfully went to the side that made the least number of mistakes. After the failure of the Irbene operation in the Gulf of Riga, the active operations of the German fleet in the Baltic Sea ceased for more than two years. Only in October 1917, when the demoralized Russian army surrendered Riga to the Germans, squadrons of the High Seas Fleet would reappear near the Moonsund Islands.<…>

The August events deprived the command of the Baltic Fleet of the illusion of the relative readiness of the British fleet at the right time to assist the Russian allies with active operations in the North Sea. Since the Germans, without fear of the superior British fleet, could concentrate in the Baltic Sea for an operatively significant period of time half of their naval forces (including a squadron of the most modern dreadnought battleships), the Russian command had to reckon with the possibility of enemy actions not only against Riga, but also against Gulfs of Finland (p. 60).

The ending

The book by Vyacheslav Meshkov can be purchased in the Assortment Office of the RSL (open door immediately to the left of the main entrance, to the turnstiles) or

Commanders

Forces of the parties

World War I(July 28, 1914 - November 11, 1918) - one of the largest armed conflicts in the history of mankind. The first global armed conflict of the 20th century. As a result of the war, four empires ceased to exist: Russian, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and German. The participating countries lost more than 10 million people in killed soldiers, about 12 million civilians killed, about 55 million were injured.

Military action at sea in World War I

Participants

The main participants in the First World War:

Central Powers: German Empire, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria.

Entente: Russian Empire, France, Great Britain.

For a complete list of contributors see: World War I (Wikipedia)

Background to the conflict

The naval arms race between the British Empire and the German Empire was one of the most important causes of the First World War. Germany wanted to increase its navy to a size that would allow German overseas trade to be independent of British goodwill. However, the expansion of the German fleet to a size comparable to the British fleet inevitably threatened the very existence of the British Empire.

Campaign of 1914

Breakthrough of the German Mediterranean Division into Turkey

On July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Mediterranean squadron of the Kaiser's Navy under the command of Rear Admiral Wilhelm Souchon (battle cruiser Goeben and light cruiser Breslau), not wanting to be captured in the Adriatic, went to Turkey. German ships escaped collision with superior enemy forces and, passing through the Dardanelles, came to Constantinople. The arrival of the German squadron in Constantinople was one of the factors that pushed the Ottoman Empire to enter the First World War on the side of the Triple Alliance.

Operations in the North Sea and the English Channel

Long-range blockade of the German fleet

The British fleet intended to solve its strategic tasks by means of a long-range blockade of German ports. The German fleet, inferior to the British forces, chose a defensive strategy and began laying minefields. In August 1914, the British fleet carried out the transfer of troops to the continent. During the cover of the transfer, a battle took place in Heligoland Bay.

Both sides actively used submarines. German submarines operated more successfully, so on September 22, 1914, U-9 sank 3 English cruisers at once. In response, the British fleet began to strengthen its anti-submarine defense, the Northern Patrol was created.

Activities in the Barents and White Sea

Activities in the Barents Sea

In the summer of 1916, the Germans, knowing that an increasing amount of military cargo was entering Russia by the northern sea route, sent their submarines into the waters of the Barents and White Seas. They sunk 31 Allied ships. To confront them, the Russian Arctic Ocean Flotilla was created.

Actions in the Baltic Sea

The plans of both sides for 1916 did not include any major operations. Germany kept insignificant forces in the Baltic, and the Baltic Fleet constantly strengthened its defensive positions by installing new minefields and coastal batteries. The actions were reduced to raiding operations of the light forces. In one of these operations, on November 10, 1916, the German 10th "destroyer" flotilla lost 7 ships at once in a minefield.

Despite the generally defensive nature of the actions of both sides, losses in the ship's composition in 1916 were significant, especially in the German fleet. The Germans lost 1 auxiliary cruiser, 8 destroyers, 1 submarine, 8 minesweepers and small ships, 3 military transports. The Russian fleet lost 2 destroyers, 2 submarines, 5 minesweepers and small ships, 1 military transport.

Campaign of 1917

Dynamics of losses and reproduction of tonnage of allied countries

Operations in Western European waters and the Atlantic

April 1 - A decision was made to introduce a convoy system on all routes. With the introduction of the convoy system and the increase in the forces and means of anti-submarine defense, losses in trade tonnage began to decrease. Other measures were introduced to strengthen the fight against boats - a massive installation of guns on merchant ships was started. During 1917, the guns were installed on 3,000 British ships, and by the beginning of 1918 up to 90% of all large-tonnage British merchant ships were armed. In the second half of the campaign, the British began a massive installation of anti-submarine minefields - in just 1917 they put 33,660 mines in the North Sea and Atlantic. For 11 months of unrestricted submarine warfare, it lost 1,037 ships with a total tonnage of 2 million 600 thousand tons only in the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. In addition, the allies and neutral countries lost 1,085 ships with a capacity of 1 million 647 thousand tons. During 1917, Germany built 103 new boats, and the losses were 72 boats, of which 61 were lost in the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean.

Cruiser hike Wolf

Raids of German cruisers

On October 16-18 and December 11-12, German light cruisers and destroyers attacked the "Scandinavian" convoys and achieved major successes - they sank 3 British escort destroyers, 3 trawlers, 15 steamers and damaged 1 destroyer. Germany in 1917 completed operations on the communications of the Entente with surface raiders. The last raid was carried out by a raider Wolf- in total, he sank 37 ships with a total tonnage of about 214,000 tons. The fight against the shipping of the Entente switched exclusively to submarines.

Actions in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic

Otrant barrage

The fighting in the Mediterranean was mainly limited to the unlimited actions of German boats on enemy sea lanes and on the anti-submarine defense of the allies. For 11 months of unrestricted submarine warfare in the Mediterranean, German and Austrian boats sank 651 ships of allies and neutral countries with a total tonnage of 1 million 647 thousand tons. In addition, over a hundred ships with a total displacement of 61 thousand tons were blown up and killed by mines delivered by minelaying boats. Large losses from boats in 1917 were suffered by the Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean: 2 ships of the line (English - Cornwallis, French - Danton), 1 cruiser (French - Châteaurenault), 1 minelayer, 1 monitor, 2 destroyers, 1 submarine. The Germans lost 3 boats, the Austrians - 1.

Actions in the Baltic

Defense of the Moonsund Archipelago in 1917

The February and October revolutions in Petrograd completely undermined the combat capability of the Baltic Fleet. On April 30, the sailors' Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet (Tsentrobalt) was created, which controlled the activities of the officers.

From September 29 to October 20, 1917, using the quantitative and qualitative advantage, the German Navy and ground forces carried out Operation Albion to capture the Moonsund Islands in the Baltic Sea. In the operation, the German fleet lost 10 destroyers and 6 minesweepers, the defenders - 1 battleship, 1 destroyer, 1 submarine, up to 20,000 soldiers and sailors were captured. The Moonsund archipelago and the Gulf of Riga were abandoned by Russian forces, the Germans managed to create an immediate threat of a military attack for Petrograd.

Actions in the Black Sea

Since the beginning of the year, the Black Sea Fleet continued to carry out the blockade of the Bosphorus, as a result of which the Turkish fleet ran out of coal and its ships were at their bases. The February events in Petrograd, the abdication of the emperor (March 2) sharply undermined the fighting spirit and discipline. The actions of the fleet in the summer and autumn of 1917 were limited to the raids of the destroyers, which were still harassing the Turkish coast.

Throughout the 1917 campaign, the Black Sea Fleet was preparing for a major landing operation on the Bosphorus. It was supposed to land 3-4 rifle corps and other units. However, the timing of the landing operation was repeatedly postponed; in October, the Headquarters decided to postpone the operation on the Bosphorus to the next campaign.

Campaign of 1918

Events in the Baltic, the Black Sea and the North

On March 3, 1918, a peace treaty was signed in Brest-Litovsk by representatives of Soviet Russia and the Central Powers. Russia withdrew from the First World War.

All subsequent hostilities that took place in these theaters of operations historically refer to