XXXIII HARAKI FORUM "POLITICAL SPACE AND
SOCIAL TIME: DIALOGUE OF AGES AND VALUES OF GENERATIONS "
Dokuchaeva S.V.
Senior Lecturer of the Department of Sociology and Political Science, Post-Graduate Student of the Faculty of History of the Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education "South Ural State University"
THE USE OF THE CULTURAL DIPLOMACY OF THE USSR DURING THE COLD WAR PERIOD AS A MEANS OF POLITICAL MYTH DESIGN1
Resume: The cultural diplomacy of the Soviet Union in Latin America during the Cold War can be viewed through the prism of the concept of political myth design. Cultural and political propaganda serves to form the desired image of the state within one's own country and in the international arena. This is a purposeful process that has common features with the process of constructing political myths. Cultural diplomacy, according to the author, is a set of political myths that form a special reality for those who are its recipients.
Keywords: cultural diplomacy, Cold War, Latin America, political myth, political myth design
The processes of communication and impact on the consciousness of people are basic in the political sphere of society. In different periods of history, to achieve the maximum effect in these areas, various techniques and techniques were used, and the more knowledge about the nature and human psyche was accumulated by science, the more serious and sophisticated these methods became.
Next, we will consider such a phenomenon as “cultural diplomacy” through the prism of influencing the mass consciousness of the population both within our country and abroad. The object of our research is the cultural diplomacy of the USSR in the countries of Latin America during the Cold War. The purpose of the work is to analyze such a method of expanding the spheres of their influence by states as cultural diplomacy from the point of view of political myth-design.
The objectives of the study are as follows: to define the concept of "cultural diplomacy", "political myth" and "political myth design", and to attempt to define the cultural diplomacy of the USSR in Latin America during the Cold War as an element of political myth-making.
Cultural diplomacy is one of the main ways of spreading their influence by the leading players of world politics in the international arena in the face of confrontation between cultures and ideologies.
To solve the set research tasks, we use the following interpretation of the concept of "cultural diplomacy" - this is a way of representing a state in the international arena, a channel for the formation of its positive representative image, identification among other cultures. The instrument for achieving this goal is the propaganda of varying degrees of harshness and aggressiveness2.
During ideological wars, the efforts of all parties are aimed at devaluing the enemy's culture and replacing it with their own cultural concepts.
1 The study was supported by a grant from the Russian Science Foundation (project No. 16-18-10213).
2 Dolinsky A.V. Discourse on public diplomacy // International processes, 2011. No. 25. P. 63-73.
At the same time, the spread of one's own culture to other countries and peoples requires a well-thought-out strategy, including a clear understanding of the goals, objectives and methods of achieving them. The use of cultural and political propaganda presupposes the formation of the desired image of the bearer of this culture in the eyes of the recipient of the communicative and cultural message. And this, in turn, entails a partial or complete change in the recipient's picture of the world.
In most cases, the impact on human consciousness for solving political problems is carried out with the help of political myth-making.
According to a number of researchers, a myth is the source of ideology, its "primary building material", and any ideology is mythological in nature, as it reflects the attitude of the political institutions of society to the political process1.
The socio-political myth can be defined as a form of political creative activity, the content of which is the construction of stereotyped ideas about the political realities of the past and present2.
Thus, cultural diplomacy as a means of ideological propaganda of the Soviet Union is a process of political myth-making, that is, the conscious and purposeful construction of political myths and their broadcast to the population of their state, as well as those countries that were in the sphere of the ideological and geopolitical interests of the USSR.
In the process of implementing the cultural diplomacy of the USSR in Latin American countries, the main emphasis was placed on opposing the image of the Soviet state to the imperialist enemy - the United States. It was necessary to create an attractive image of a free country, with which the oppressed and poor in the majority of Latin American countries would want to establish close cultural, economic, scientific, and then political contacts, but most importantly, they would get out of the influence of the United States, which within The Cold War was one of the main targets.
At the same time, it is worth noting an important feature of the region that influences the Soviet Union's choice of the pace and methods of using cultural diplomacy and various propaganda tools on which it was based. This is the geopolitical position of Latin America and its dependence on the United States. The region was part of the US zone of influence and the active intervention of the USSR in the affairs of its countries and the pursuit of an aggressive policy of "imposing" its culture as a counterweight to the culture of the States could lead to serious international consequences and provoke America to retaliate in countries historically included in the USSR's zone of influence.
Therefore, the implementation of the cultural diplomacy of the Soviet Union in the countries of Latin America was carried out carefully and depended on the internal political situation in the region. The key milestones in the activation of Soviet cultural diplomacy in Latin American countries were such events as the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the Caribbean Crisis of 1963, as well as significant anniversaries, for example, the anniversaries of the revolution or the 100th anniversary of V.I. Lenin.
It was after these events and on the eve of the anniversaries that the USSR began to actively spread its influence in the region using the tools of cultural diplomacy, which had several goals.
The most obvious goal was to strengthen the influence of the USSR in the international arena and confrontation with the United States.
1 Tsvetkova N. US public diplomacy: from “soft power” to “dialogue propaganda” // International processes, vol. 13, no. 3. pp. 12-133.
2 Tsvetkova N. Public diplomacy of the USA: from “soft power” to “dialogue propaganda” // International processes, V. 13, No. 3. P. 12-133.
Active work in the Latin American region through the Friendship Society and the Department of Latin American Countries in the structure of the USSF was aimed at the ideological propaganda of Soviet culture and science, especially in the period from 1956 to 1970. The main interest was aroused by representatives of the creative, scientific, cultural intelligentsia, whose representatives were invited to the Soviet Union as part of carefully selected delegations. And during a visit to the USSR, there was a complete immersion in the "constructed" reality. After returning home, the delegates broadcast images created for them and carried out ideological work in favor of the inviting party. And that was the process of creating an external image1.
However, we came to the conclusion that the process of implementing the cultural diplomacy of the USSR had less obvious, but no less important goals - the establishment of friendly ties and assistance to the countries of Latin America worked not only for foreign, but also for domestic policy.
This was due to the fact that the internal image created using the techniques of cultural diplomacy was a means of achieving such goals as: managing one's own population, sewerage and accumulation of negative and positive emotions in relation to "friends" - Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and then Cuba, and "alien" - the United States, the imperialist countries.
In addition, opportunities were created for the population to participate in public and social life in a safe way for the state, there was a process of educating the population, familiarizing them with the life and culture of countries that are lower in terms of living standards, that is, the comparison was in any case in favor of the USSR. Also, the negative emotions of people were redirected to specific objects outside the country, and at the same time citizens saw this image of their own state: disinterestedly helping, friendly to “friends”, fair, ready to protect the weak and the poor, generous, strong.
As a result, the mindset automatically formed in the minds of people "if such to others, then to their own", and the image of the state became infallible, and all problems and deviations from the above-described model of behavior were attributed to individual performers, enemies of the people who deliberately seek to harm to the Soviet people and state, to discredit its image.
Thus, we can conclude that cultural diplomacy was indeed a process of political myth-making. In the process of its implementation, a complex system of socio-political myths of a double vector of influence was created. One vector was directed at the recipients (“recipients”) of the products of cultural diplomacy - in our case, these are residents of Latin America. The second vector was focused on the "carriers" of the broadcast culture themselves, that is, the population of the Soviet Union. We are convinced that the resources of cultural diplomacy as a means of creating and transmitting political myths are significant, but little studied from this point of view. However, their study makes it possible to expand the methodological toolkit through the methods of political psychology, in addition to studying a purely historical context and to better understand the peculiarities of the USSR's interaction with this group of countries.
Literature
1. Dolinsky A.V. Discourse on public diplomacy // International processes, 2011. No. 25. P. 63-73.
2. Klementyeva N.M. Development of ties between the USSR and a number of Latin American countries in the field of culture, 1965-1975. M .: VGBIL, 1983 .-- 173 p.
1 Shestov N.I. Political myth now and before. M .: Olma-Press. 2005.S. 5.
3. Tsvetkova N. US public diplomacy: from "soft power" to "dialogue propaganda" // International processes, vol. 13, no. 3. pp. 12-133.
4. Shestov N.I. Political myth now and before. M .: Olma-Press. 2005 .-- 416 p.
5. GARF, F. R-9576, op. 8, building 3
6. GARF, F. R-9576, op.8, d. 17
1. Dolinskiy A. (2011). Diskurs o publichnoy diplomatii. Mezhdunarodnye protsessy. Vol. 9.No. 25.R. 63-73.
2. Klementeva N.M. Razvitie svyazey megdy USSR i stranamy Latinskoy Ameriki v oblasty kultury, 1965-1975. M .: VGBIL, 1983 .-- 173 p.
3. Cvetkova N. Publichnaya diplomatiya USA: ot "soft power" k "dialogovoy propaganda" // Megdunarodnye process, T. 13, N. 3. P. 12-133.
4. Shestov N.I. Politicheskiy mif teper I pregde. M. Olma-Press. 2005 .-- 416 p.
5.GARF, P-9576, Op.8, D.3.
6.GARF, P-9576, Op.8, D.17.
USSR "S CULTURAL DIPLOMACY AS INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL MYTH" S IN
COLD WAR "S PERIOD
lecturer, postgraduate student of the History Department of South Ural State University [email protected]
Abstract: Cultural diplomacy of the Soviet Union in Latin America during the Cold war can be analyzed through the prism of political myths "concept. Cultural and political propaganda serve the formation of a desired image of a state within their own country and in the international arena. This is a deliberate process, that has common features with the process of construction of political myths. Cultural diplomacy, according to the author, is a set of political myths, which forms a distinct reality for its recipients.
Key words: cultural diplomacy, Cold War, Latin America, political myth, political mythology design
For citation: Dokuchaeva S.V. The use of cultural diplomacy of the USSR during the Cold War as a means of political myth design // Archon, 2017. No. 3. P. 47-50.
Instead of the de-ideologized
rivalry between the great powers, a confrontation unfolded between the Soviet Union and the United States under irreconcilable ideological slogans, and the presence of nuclear weapons left its indelible mark on the course of this confrontation.
Diplomacy has also undergone tremendous changes, having lost its former free hand. Here is what Henry Kissinger wrote about diplomacy during the Cold War: “The bipolar world cannot have any shades; the gain for one side is presented as an absolute loss for the other. Each problem is reduced to a question of survival. Diplomacy becomes tough; international relations - invariably cautious. "
Indeed, diplomacy cannot but be tough in the conditions of the unimaginable strength of coalitions and alliances uniting the main participants in international relations during the "European concert" (not so long ago, the 60th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - NATO, and the Warsaw The Treaty (OVD) lasted 35 years; no military alliance since the "European concert" or in the interwar period could boast such longevity).
Under the new conditions, the nature of relations between the great powers could not change either. Throughout world history, conflict (i.e., clash of interests) has been an integral part of relations between sovereign states in the international arena.
But never before (at least in the New period of world history) an interstate conflict was ideologically conditioned to such an extent. Almost all researchers studying the Cold War point to a close and indissoluble connection between the military-political and ideological considerations of the participants in the Cold War. At all times, the great powers strove to expand their spheres of influence, but, perhaps, for the first time in the history of international relations, the trend towards territorial expansion was so ideologically motivated. Unlike the great powers participating in the "European concert," the leaders of the bipolar world needed an ideological rationale to establish their control over the new territories; at the same time, the expansion of the Soviet (or American) spheres of influence was seen as confirmation of the triumph of Marxism-Leninism (or liberal interventionism) in the global battle for the hearts and minds of people.
Under these conditions, the conflict between the great powers could not but acquire the character of a protracted confrontation, from which it was impossible to find a way out using traditional methods of classical diplomacy, such as delimitation of spheres of influence, condominiums, the conclusion of new allied agreements, etc. It was the presence of significant ideological contradictions (and in the sphere of ideology there are no compromises and cannot be) that predetermined the confrontational, irreconcilable nature of the conflict during the Cold War.
The nuclear weapon factor.
But there was one more reason that predetermined the preservation of the military-political stalemate throughout the entire Cold War, and this reason was the presence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the "superpowers." Nuclear weapons have made the well-known formula of Karl von Clausewitz obsolete - "War is the continuation of politics by other means," and the conflict between the "superpowers", deprived of the opportunity to unleash a new world war, protracted.
conclusions
The following features of the Cold War can be distinguished:
- 1) the "cold war" is a protracted conflict between the two leaders of the bipolar world, the USSR and the United States, which is of a confrontational, irreconcilable nature;
- 2) a specific feature of this conflict was the presence of an ideological struggle between its participants;
- 3) at the same time, the factor of nuclear weapons excluded the possibility of a large-scale military clash between the "superpowers", the Soviet Union and the United States.
- Kissinger H. White House Years. Boston; Toronto: Little, Brown and C °. 1979. P. 67.
The restructuring of the American economy in the postwar years had
serious social consequences. Scaling up
industrial production, trade, service caused a rapid
US labor force growth: from 44,220,000 in March 1938 to
59 957 thousand people in April 1950. The number increased even more
employed in non-agricultural sectors of the economy: from 34,530 thous.
in 1938 to 52 450 thousand in 1950, that is, by more than 60%. This pro
the process was also facilitated by the growth of the US population (even in
years of the Second World War), an increase in life expectancy.
The number of working women has changed significantly - from 25% in 1940 to
up to 28.5% of the total labor force in 1950 103
Concentration of production in industry and agriculture,
the formation of giant corporations, the strengthening of the economic role of state
gifts and the growth of the state apparatus influenced the change
the composition of the working class and the social structure of American society
VA, in particular on the ratio of employment in industry and agriculture
farm. So, in 1950 it was 70% and 26% 104.
The number of people employed in agriculture from 1938 to 1950 decreased by
The majority of the workers, as before, were employed in factories.
no-factory branch of the economy, in the production of industrial goods.
at the same level (from 1919 to 1938), began to increase rapidly (from 9253 thous.
in 1938 to 14,967 thousand in 1950) The number of
ness of construction workers, which was caused by the military boom and the
home of post-war construction. A new phenomenon in the
years there was an increase in employment in such sectors of the economy as
govlya and the service sector, in the state apparatus. By the way, this trend
was outlined in the late 40s, and in the postwar years it became
dividing in structural shifts in American society. Number of busy
in trade, for example, increased from 6453 thousand (1938) to 9645 thousand.
(1950), in service - from 3196 thousand to 5077 thousand, on the state
service - from 3876 thousand to 6026 thousand people.
Employment, size and structure of the working class
in the United States it would be wrong if you do not take into account such a phenomenon,
how unemployment, which with the end of the war began to grow, despite
expanding the scale of production. Already in 1946 the number of unemployed
amounted to 2.3 million (4% of the total labor force) In 1948, when
decline in production in a number of industries, unemployment rose to 5.5%. it
was the worst indicator since 1941. There has been an increase in the average duration
unemployment rates: from 8.6 weeks in 1948 to 12.1 weeks in 1950
During the specified period, 25-26 out of every 100 unemployed were looking for work
15 weeks or more 105. Deterioration of the position of the working class as a whole
due to the rise in unemployment was complicated by inflation and tax
the politics of the state. Increasing taxes and prices, as well as introducing
the system of labor organization was largely "eaten up"
increases in wages received by workers in the course of persistent
struggle with capital.
Trade unions retained important economies for some time after the war.
the political and political positions they won during the years of the “new
ca ”106. Their number from the mid-30s to 1960 was more than
tripled (from 4 million in 1936 to 15 million)
zional organizations in a number of industries has enabled workers to
successfully defend ϲʙᴏand rights. The most unionized remain-
old industries were lost. These included construction
industry, transport, printing, marine and port facilities
wah. AFL trade unions have traditionally been strong in these sectors, with
which in 1946 had 7152 thousand members. The checkpoint, which united in 1946
6 million workers on the basis of production, had a relative
but stronger positions in industries such as steel, auto-
automotive, rubber, electrical engineering, aviation 107.
In 1946, a total of about 20% of the total US workforce was
united in trade unions, which, as expected, could become an important basis
/images/6/957_HISTORY% 20USA.% 20T.4_image020.gif"> to further enhance the role of the organized labor movement
in the public life of the country.
At the same time, the Second World War left a deep imprint on the actions
the strength of the trade unions, strengthening the position of the compromise wing. Over-
extraordinary wartime conditions, the need to concentrate efforts
ley in the fight against fascism put on the agenda issues of national
unity, the continuity of military efforts and military production.
The consequence of this was the official refusal of the trade unions from strikes
for the period of the war. Although national unity during the war years was a phenomenon
temporary, it gave rise - and not only among the trade union
leaders - illusions about the possibility of establishing a "class
peace "," voluntary cooperation of business, workers and farmers "under
state aegis 108.
The position of capital was essential in the new situation.
Its impact on trade unions in terms of ideological and political
increased many times. This was primarily due to the changed-
after the war, the international situation. It is worth saying that for the owners of industrial
to implement ϲʙᴏand the plans of global expansionism, it was
it is extremely important to throw the trade unions back to the state of
existed before the formation of the powerful checkpoint. Note that the close alliance between
The CPT and trade unions of other countries could become an obstacle to the expansion
the Zionist goals of US financial circles. To prevent it from happening,
the latter sought to undermine the unity in the leadership of the checkpoint, with the help of
repressive laws to shackle the activities of trade unions and inflate the
ryyu about the "red danger" "109.
Demobilization from the army, return home of millions of former
soldiers in need of work led to an increased supply of
labor force, which, along with the desire of business to restrict the rights
trade unions created a danger to trade union guarantees. And it is no coincidence
in the collective bargaining of the first years of peace, the unions gave
such a meaning of the "closed shop" agreement 110. It is important to note that one of the main
the reasons for the unfolding strike movement in these years was as follows
the same sharp activation of anti-union activities of business.
Strikes, which in American historiography were called
the development of the "first post-war strike war" began in February 1946,
when the National Wage Stabilization Office allowed
lilo steel companies to raise the price of steel. Steel workers
the foundry industry soon after his decision reached an agreement
communication with entrepreneurs on increasing wages1I. But
almost simultaneously with the th action of the National Stabilization Office
wages, the executive order was promulgated
President Truman, who allowed to increase
prices in other industries. Trade union response followed
Immediately. In total, 4985 strikes took place in 1946, in which
involved 4.6 million workers and lost 116 million
days 112. This is a record in the history of the United States. Coverage strikes
tili workers of leading industries - metallurgists, mines
moat, car makers, railroad workers, electricians, workers meat-
industry, etc. In the course of the strike battles, the workers pre-
fought significant wage increases 113.
It was this activity of the working people in the first post-war years that created
favorable environment for the growth of trade unions. However, much
depended on what forces prevail in the trade union movement, how
by what means the trade unions will solve the problems they faced
we. There was a sharp struggle in the trade unions between supporters of the "business"
unionism of the AFT, which was based on the same gompersism, and
a new, more progressive trend that emerged in the 30s and embodied
in the activities of the checkpoint.
In an atmosphere of intensified reaction and sharpening of the struggle within the "workers'
go home ”, the trade unions were unable to mobilize forces to repel the reaction.
Moreover, their positions were weakened. The Cold War is even more
heated up the struggle between democratic and reactionary tendencies in
trade union movement. Already at the end of 1946 in the trade unions began
persecution of progressive-minded activists, especially communist
stov. In the course of the adoption of the Taft-Hartley bill, the trade union
PS AFL and the CPR were not ready for decisive action. "Such
conditions when the leading centers shied away from direct performances
against anti-labor legislation, the protest movement could not
become organized and nationwide. It is worth noting that it wore a local and
disunited character ”114. The negative impact of the new law
the impact on the US labor movement was already evident in the first years of its
implementation.
In addition to the negative consequences of the repressive, anti-labor law,
an important factor that hindered the work of trade unions,
there was a sharp increase in cases of "dishonest labor practices" of workers
organizations that have acquired the character of a malicious campaign are clearly in
spirited from one center. In the financial year 1948/49, the National
The National Office for Labor Relations (NUTO) registered
1160 similar cases115 initiated by entrepreneurs. It is important to know that most
of them accused the trade unions of "terrible sins" - secondary boycotts.
takh, strikes for the right to organize a trade union, and that
trade unions "force" entrepreneurs to discriminate
hiring and firing policies in relation to non-members of professional
unions. Everything spoke of the beginning of a massive offensive, undertaken
in addition to business for trade union guarantees. Make way for my offensive
paved the Taft-Hartley law and the
government policy of interference in labor relations in the interest of
sah capital.
/images/6/157_HISTORY% 20USA.% 20T.4_image017.gif"> June 23, 1948, a little less than a year after the official
the entry into force of the law, The New York Times placed an editorial
an article that assessed the practice of applying the law. Newspaper
stressed that already in the first months of the existence of the law, the courts
used "emergency orders" in at least 12 cases.
It should not be forgotten that the most important among them were the issuance of judgments against
the miners' union, the International Union of Printing Workers,
Chechens at nuclear industry enterprises. During the same period
the President of the United States has appealed five times to his right to use “emergency
tea powers ". The 80-day "freeze" of strikes proclaims
elk by courts at the request of the president in the coal industry, for
enterprises of the telephone, nuclear, meat-packing industry, as well as
the same during the strikes of the port workers.
The defeat of some large, well-known martial traditions of the organ-
nizations of workers in the strikes of 1948-1949. clearly pro-
demonstrated the anti-union orientation of the new reactionary
legislation. It is unlikely that entrepreneurs would have withstood a powerful pressure
the grip of the trade unions of the printing workers, the mine owners are unlikely to resist
would it be in front of the solidarity of the miners, if they did not rely on the anti-government
barrel Taft-Hartley law, and with it the entire state
apparatus. Taft-Hartley law in the hands of entrepreneurs and bourgeois
of the state turned out to be an effective weapon of struggle against the strike
movement. Frightened by the threat of government sanctions, the reformist
For the sake of preserving his well-being, trade union leaders handed over one
position after another116, which resulted in the deepening of the split
between the left wing of the trade union movement, on the one hand, the centrists and
right - on the other.
Anti-union campaign of big business and government in
the first post-war years were opposed by a large group of progressive
trade unions that were part of the checkpoint. Hence it is clear why monopo-
Leah and the government so violently attacked the leftist forces in the trade union
zhenia. Everything was done to cause exacerbation of internal friction in
Checkpoint. In particular, a campaign was launched to support
foreign policy Do not forget that Washington. Truman used all the
influence on the leadership of the checkpoint in order to achieve unconditional
endorsement by this association of the Cold War policy and anti-communist
nism. It is worth noting that he found supporters in the person of W. Reiter, E. Reeve and some
other PPC leaders. The question was posed by them as follows: either progressive
new trade unions are breaking with the tradition of internationalism and international
native workers' solidarity, or will be expelled from the association.
Pressure from the outside and the transition of the majority in the leadership of the checkpoint to positions
anti-communism led to a split in the 1st organization in 1949.It is important to note that one
Twenty unions were expelled and one (the union of electricians) withdrew
from the CPR, which accounted for a third of all members of the association. Split
affected many sectoral and local branches of the trade unions of the CPR and
The conflict in the trade union movement took away a lot of his strength, weakening the workers
movement against the backdrop of a reaction to workers' rights117.
Events have shown that the senior management of the CPR and its leading professional
unions changed course all around and led matters to a rapprochement with the top
AFL. Based on all of the above, we come to the conclusion that since the end of the 40s in the labor movement there has been
strengthening of the conservative wing and a sharp weakening of the left, progress
sive wing. Many trade unions have moved to the position of "business" junior
nism in its new, modernized form, abandoning the line on
an offensive fight against capital.
Genesis of the Cold War
American diplomacy: directions and methods
The main features of Soviet diplomacy in the 1950s - 1980s
Diplomacy of the allied countries of the USSR and the USA
Third world and superpower diplomacy
Prominent Cold War diplomats: A.A. Gromyko, G. Kissinger
Methodical instructions
The first question is about the origins of the Cold War. It is necessary to identify and assess the potential for conflict between the USSR and the West that accumulated in the 1920s - 1930s, at the final stage of World War II and in the second half of the 1940s.
In the second question, it is necessary to characterize the development of the American diplomatic school, the new role of the United States after World War II in international relations, and outline the main directions of the US foreign policy activity in the world in the 1950s - 1980s. and the methods by which American diplomacy carried out its plans. It is supposed to characterize the foreign policy positions of American presidents and Soviet leaders.
The third question is similar to the second, but the diplomacy of the Soviet Union will be the object of consideration, analysis and assessment. As in the case of the United States, diplomacy should not be limited to the activities of diplomatic services, but pay attention to other formats of international communication, as well as to the personalities of Soviet secretaries general.
The fourth question is to characterize the diplomacy of the allied states of the USSR and the United States, identifying common and specific features in comparison with the "senior" partners, as well as the peculiarities of their position in the international arena.
In the course of answering the fifth question, it is necessary to explain the essence of the concept of the "Three Worlds", distinguish different types among the states of the third world and pay attention to the forms and methods by which the diplomacy of the Soviet Union and the United States achieved their goals in the developing states of Asia, Africa and Latin America.
The sixth question is devoted to the biographies of prominent diplomats of the opposing powers - A.A. Gromyko and G. Kissinger. In addition to highlighting the main milestones of the biography, it is necessary to pay attention to the following parameters of their diplomatic activities:
foreign policy attitudes;
interaction with management (president, first / general secretary);
personal negotiation style.
Sources:
Gromyko A.A. Memorable. M .: State Publishing House polit. literature, 1988 .-- 894 p.
Kissinger G. Diplomacy. M .: LODOMIR, 1997 .-- 579 p.
Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: In 2 volumes - 2nd edition - Moscow: Politizdat, 1976 .-- 944 p.
Reader on the history of international relations. In 5 volumes / Comp. D.V. Kuznetsov. Blagoveshchensk, 2013. T. 4. The newest time. S. 757 - 2149.
Literature:
"Better ten years of negotiations than one day of war." Memories of Andrei Andreevich Gromyko. M .: Ves Mir, 2009 .-- 336 p.
Akhtamzyan A.A. Diplomat's ABC / Otv. ed. A.V. Seregin. Moscow: MGIMO-University, 2014 .-- 156 p.
Diplomatic Service / Ed. A.V. Torkunova, A.N. Panova. M .: Aspect Press, 2014 .-- 352 p.
T.V. Zonova Diplomacy: Models, Forms, Methods. - 2nd ed., Rev. M .: Aspect Press, 2014 .-- 352 p.
History of Diplomacy / Ed. V.A. Zorin, V.S. Semenova, S.D. Skazkina, V.M. Khvostov. - 2nd ed., Rev. and add. Moscow: GIPL, 1959. T 1.– 896 p.
History of International Relations: In 3 volumes / Ed. A.V. Torkunova, M.M. Narinsky. M .: Aspect Press, 2012. T. 2. The interwar period and the Second world war. - 496 p.
History of International Relations: In 3 volumes / Ed. A.V. Torkunova, M.M. Narinsky. M .: Aspect Press, 2012. T. 3. Yalta-Potsda system. - 552 p.
Matveev V.M. US Diplomatic Service. M .: International relations, 1987 .-- 192 p.
Pechatnov V., Manykin A. History of US Foreign Policy. M .: International relations, 2012 .-- 688 p.
Systemic history of international relations. In 2 volumes / Ed. A.V. Bogaturov. M .: Cultural revolution, 2009. V.1. Events 1918-1945 - 480 p. T.2. Events 1945 - 2003 .-- 720 p.
3. The politics of the "cold war" and "atomic diplomacy"
The advent of atomic weapons has changed all international politics and diplomacy. On April 25, 1945, Truman met in the Oval Office of the White House with two interlocutors. Secretary of War Stimson first brought General Groves, the chief of the Manhattan Project, to a new president. Groves briefed Truman in detail about the Manhattan Project, promising to complete the most powerful weapon humanity has ever known in four months.
Information about the nearing completion of work on the creation of the atomic bomb had a serious impact on the foreign policy of the White House. However, Stimson recommended "postponing any exacerbation of relations with Russia until the atomic bomb becomes a reality and until its power is clearly demonstrated ... It is scary to enter the game with such high stakes in diplomacy without a trump card in hand," he stressed. While not rejecting "atomic diplomacy" in principle, Stimson did not believe that the new weapon could force the Soviet Union to accept American terms in resolving controversial international problems. In addition, he believed and informed Truman about this that the United States would not be able to "maintain a monopoly on the bomb for a long time."
The meeting made a downright stunning impression on Truman. He felt like a gambler who suddenly got a trump ace. The further course of action was clearly defined. First, show in practice that the United States has become the sole owner of a new weapon of unprecedented strength. And then, relying on the atomic monopoly, blackmail the Soviet Union, force it to submit to the American dictate. "If it explodes, and I (Truman) think it will, I will probably have a club on these guys (Russians)!"
In US government circles, "atomic thinking" prevailed even before the atomic bomb was tested. They considered the new weapon not only in terms of using it against Japan, but also as a means of pressure on the USSR, establishing the global dominance of the United States in the post-war world. The use of atomic bombs in the war against Japan was completely unnecessary - the outcome was already a foregone conclusion without them. However, those who stood for their immediate use had their own calculations, which boiled down to making a frightening impression on the whole world and, above all, on an ally in arms - the Soviet Union.
The so-called atomic diplomacy began, proceeding from the confidence of the reactionary, militant circles in the United States that they had a monopoly in possession of atomic weapons and that, given the most optimistic estimates, no one could have a bomb earlier than 7 ... 10 years.
After the demonstration of American nuclear power in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the atomic map becomes one of the "arguments" of American politicians. On August 6, 1945, President Truman emphasized the US intention to single-handedly maintain control over nuclear weapons in order to "maintain global peace." On October 30 of that year, General J. Patton confirmed that the United States should remain
"Armed and fully prepared." Against who? In the conditions of the military defeat of Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan, the answer suggested itself.
Top officials without a shadow of embarrassment called the future adversary in the "third world war." Already on September 18, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Directive 1496/2 "The Framework for the Formulation of Military Policy", where the USSR was named as the enemy of the United States. At the same time, the directive was based on the provision of the United States delivering a "first strike" in a possible war against the USSR. The Joint Defense Planning Committee directive 432 / D of December 14, 1945 read: "The only weapon that the United States can effectively use for a decisive strike against the main centers of the USSR is the atomic bomb." The American military put forward the achievement of absolute military superiority over the USSR as a primary task. Militaristic sentiments in Washington, breaking through, took on the character of outright blackmail of the USSR. In the US Congress, statements were heard about the ability of American aviation to "drop atomic bombs on any point on the earth's surface and return to
base ”34, although the real capabilities of the United States were far from consistent with these calculations. British researchers of the post-war history of the United States emphasized: "The nuclear myth was widely believed, but in reality there were too few atomic bombs, they were inaccurate, too weak and inconvenient to enable the United States to dominate the Soviet Union."
Of course, the psychic attack on the USSR was not successful. But "atomic diplomacy" had a negative impact on the international situation as a whole. It sparked, as one might expect, an arms race. In a memorandum to the President dated September 11, 1945, Minister of War G. Stimson emphasized: in the absence of partnership with the USSR on the basis of cooperation and trust, rivalry in the field of armaments is inevitable, especially due to the mistrust caused by the US approach to solving the atomic bomb problem. "For if we do not turn to the Russians (in order to solve the problem of atomic weapons), but simply negotiate with them, smugly holding these weapons in our hands, their suspicions and distrust about our intentions will intensify." These warnings were not heeded by Truman's inner circle. Stimson's proposals were rejected on the pretext that the US should not "share the bomb" with the USSR.
In an effort to maintain a monopoly in the field of nuclear weapons, the American government tried to control the main natural sources of uranium ore, to deprive other states (primarily the USSR) of their legal rights to use atomic energy at their discretion. This was one of the main goals of the Acheson-Lilienthal-Baruch Plan ("Baruch Plan"), submitted by the United States on June 14, 1946 to the UN Atomic Energy Commission. At the same time, the US government did not consider itself bound in the production, accumulation and improvement of atomic weapons. Until the end of the 1940s, American strategy, fueled by illusions about the "invulnerability" of the United States, proceeded from the idea of the possibility of victory over the USSR in a global war and was focused on creating air and nuclear superiority. This meant that the foreign policy doctrines of the United States in the postwar period took on the character of military doctrines.
“By the end of the 1940s,” wrote the American historian G. Hodgson, “the United States assumed the responsibility of the“ leader of the free world, ”in other words, influencing the political evolution of as much of the world as possible, as far as their gigantic power. As a result ... America has become an imperial power, of course of a new type, but nevertheless oriented towards intervention. " The elimination of the atomic monopoly made a stunning impression in the United States. The American historian J. Gaddis wrote: “... the explosion in the USSR occurred three years earlier than government experts predicted. The message about him smashed the fundamental premises of 1945-1947 to dust. that if war breaks out with Russia, US physical security will not be at stake. " Washington began to realize that the time of US military invulnerability was over.
Senator McMahon, Chairman of the Joint Congress Atomic Energy Control Commission, and Tydings, Chairman of the Senate Arms Committee, made statements about the advisability of negotiations with the USSR. At the same time Tydings stressed that the United States is "more vulnerable" to nuclear attack than the Soviet Union163. The Truman administration chose a different path. In late January 1950, President Truman gave the order to begin work on the hydrogen bomb. However, even the White House felt that the situation had changed dramatically. The balance of forces in the international arena was not in favor of imperialism. Many prerequisites for the US foreign policy have been called into question. Nevertheless, Washington's escalation of international tension intensified. In the fall of 1949, at the direction of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a sinister plan for a war against the USSR, which was supposed to start in 1957. The Dropshot plan was focused on delivering the first atomic strike against the USSR and its occupation by American troops.
"Atomic diplomacy", a term for the US foreign policy after the end of World War II, based on the desire of the American ruling circles to use the arsenal of nuclear weapons created by the US as a means of political blackmail and pressure on other countries. "Atomic diplomacy" was built with the expectation, first of all, on the monopoly of the United States of atomic weapons, then on the preservation of American superiority in the production of atomic weapons and on the invulnerability of the US territory. In conducting "Atomic Diplomacy," the United States rejected all proposals from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to ban the use, halt production, and destroy stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The creation in the USSR of atomic (1949) and hydrogen (1953) weapons, and subsequently of intercontinental missiles, doomed Atomic Diplomacy to failure.
4. Power diplomacy at the beginning of the XXI century.
In the half century of international security history since World War II, "nuclear deterrence" has become a key concept. It retains its importance at the present time and for the foreseeable future, although, naturally, it is undergoing a profound transformation under the influence of the dynamics of international relations and scientific and technological development.
In principle, deterrence is the prevention of any action by the other party through the threat of harm to it. If this damage is greater than the fruits of such actions, then the other side, in theory, should refrain from them - deterrence will work. In a more active, offensive sense, deterrence is sometimes interpreted as intimidation, that is, not only deterring, but also forcing the enemy to take certain actions, as a rule, concessions on certain issues with the help of the threat of causing damage. As far as nuclear deterrence is concerned, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons acts as a deterrent, and this policy, especially in an offensive version, may well be called “nuclear blackmail”.
The fall of the American monopoly on nuclear weapons did not mean the collapse or the end of "nuclear diplomacy." Under the sign of such diplomacy, over the next half century, either on the part of the United States or on behalf of the USSR, a military-political strategy was carried out with both an open and an unspoken threat of the use of nuclear weapons.
In conditions of acute ideological confrontation, the enemy's policy was inevitably demonized, and the destructive potential of nuclear weapons was the best fit to ascribe to the enemy all conceivable and inconceivable sins. The nightmares of nuclear strikes were directly linked to the properties of the "oppressive" social system, "misanthropic ideology" and "by its very nature" aggressive state policy of the adversary. This leitmotif was characteristic of both Soviet and American propaganda (for example, in the same spirit, the Western press covered the USSR nuclear missile bluff campaign led by Nikita Khrushchev).
Thus, the nuclear arms race became inseparably associated with the Cold War, ideological confrontation and geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the USSR from the late 1940s to the late 1980s. Logically, the end of the Cold War on the eve of the 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet empire and the collapse of the Soviet Union itself should have led to the end of the nuclear arms race. But this did not happen. True, the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the USSR over the past ten years have decreased by about 50 percent (and tactical - even more), their modernization programs have been significantly slowed down and narrowed. But the two nuclear superpowers and the third nuclear powers intend to maintain and improve nuclear weapons as part of their armed forces for the entire foreseeable future, and in parallel, more and more new countries are explicitly or secretly joining the nuclear club or are actively working in this direction.
The end of the cold war in itself could not end the nuclear arms race and entail nuclear disarmament without tremendous efforts by the leading countries to reduce and eliminate such weapons, as well as to reorganize the entire security system, which until then was based on the military-strategic balance of forces in the East and West. Without this, the end of the cold war could not automatically lead to nuclear disarmament.
But such efforts were not made in the 1990s. A little more than a decade after the end of the Cold War, deep disappointment and growing anxiety reigned in the public perception of this problem, and the “nuclear factor” is once again entering the forefront of world politics, albeit in a significantly changed form.
In May 2002, the United States formally withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty, which for the past thirty years has been the cornerstone of the entire process and regime of central nuclear disarmament. Instead, a document of a general nature was signed on cooperation between the Russian Federation and the United States in the field of creating a strategic missile defense system, which has not yet found practical and technical implementation. Together with the ABM Treaty, the START-2 Treaty and the framework agreement on START-3 fell. Instead, the new Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), signed in Moscow in 2002, outlines their reduction in ten years to 1,700-2,200 warheads (there were so many on the eve of the START talks in the late 1960s). But this treaty is rather an agreement of intent, since it does not contain any rules for counting warheads, or a reduction schedule, or procedures for the elimination of weapons, or a system of verification and control. In addition, its validity period expires simultaneously with the term of reductions.
With all Washington's official declarations that Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries, its actual operational plans and lists of targets for the use of nuclear weapons against facilities on Russian territory have remained virtually unchanged, which limits the prospects for reducing these funds. Moreover, the United States is developing new low-yield nuclear weapons, according to the official version, to penetrate deep underground and destroy warehouses and bunkers of terrorists and "rogue" regimes, for which Washington refused to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT of 1996) and is preparing for their possible resumption in Nevada.
As for Moscow, unlike during the Cold War, when official Soviet propaganda called for nuclear disarmament, in a democratic Russia that is building a market economy on the Western model and counting on large foreign investments, maintaining an impressive nuclear potential aimed primarily at to the same West, enjoys the unanimous public support of the government, the political and strategic elite and the entire people. Moreover, in contrast to the Soviet Union's 1982 declaration on the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, the principle of the use of nuclear weapons in emergency situations became the first cornerstone of the Russian military doctrine.
True, since nuclear weapons have colossal, practically limitless, destructive power and threaten with dire secondary consequences of their use, they are still viewed mainly not as a means of waging war, but as an instrument of political pressure, deterrence or intimidation of other countries. In this capacity, nuclear weapons are considered a very effective instrument for ensuring national security and national interests in the broad sense of the word.
But at the same time, accordingly, non-nuclear states, under certain circumstances, have a desire to also join this type of weapon, which, of course, qualitatively surpasses everything else that has been created by man so far to destroy their own kind. Thus, nuclear deterrence constantly and invariably fuels nuclear proliferation. This is the dialectical relationship between these two important factors of nuclear issues in world politics.
As never before, nuclear deterrence now looks like a factor that will remain forever in international politics (at least until an even more destructive weapon is invented), and not just because of all the difficulties of achieving complete nuclear disarmament, but in view of the supposedly inherent nuclear weapons of significant merit as a means of ensuring security and "civilizing" impact on international relations, encouraging restraint in the use of force.
Meanwhile, historical experience and strategic analysis paint a very contradictory picture.
Ideally, nuclear deterrence means that nuclear weapons are not a means of waging war, but a political instrument, primarily ensuring that nuclear weapons will not be used in practice: neither in the context of a deliberate attack, nor as a result of an escalation of a non-nuclear conflict between nuclear powers. Now, in the sixth decade of the nuclear era, this position is taken for granted. However, historically, this has not always been the case and has not been so in everything, and in the future everything may also turn out differently.
For nuclear weapons to be used as a means of psychological pressure in order to deter the enemy, it was necessary to create a whole military-political theory. This did not happen immediately. When the atomic bomb was created in the United States, it was viewed simply as a new, much more destructive weapon that could be used in warfare, as was done in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, atomic and hydrogen warheads in the form of bombs and missile warheads were built up by the United States on a huge scale and were mainly considered as a means of total destruction of enemy cities if the USSR attacked American allies in Europe or Asia ( strategy of "massive retaliation"). Deterrence, if present in this strategy, was rather as a by-product, and not the main goal of US military policy and military development. And only after 10-15 years of accumulating nuclear weapons and, most importantly, after the Soviet Union built up arsenals of similar weapons and means of their delivery, the concept of deterrence came to the fore in the American military-political strategy.
Towards the end of the 1950s, the leadership of the United States began to be inclined to understand the fact that nuclear weapons were not used in direct military terms. "Only a madman can see victory in the total annihilation of mankind," President Eisenhower said. The number of nuclear weapons reached many thousands of nuclear bombs, began to enter service and were planned for mass deployment of land and sea ballistic missiles. In the United States, strategic theory was not developed by generals, but mainly by civilian specialists, including natural scientists and humanitarians. The works of such theorists as Kissinger, Brody, Schelling, Kistyakovsky, Kennan and others gave birth to a theory according to which nuclear weapons are not just a more destructive means of war, but a qualitatively new weapon that can destroy the whole world and leave no winners ... Therefore, an epoch-making conclusion was made that nuclear weapons should be used not in order to defeat the enemy in a war, but in order to prevent this war, or rather, to prevent such actions of the alleged enemy that could lead to war.
In the Soviet Union, this conclusion was reached much later, because there neither humanitarians, nor natural scientists, and even more so the military simply could not freely discuss such topics. All had to strictly follow the dogmas of Marxism-Leninism and very poor military doctrines. At the ideological level, the theory of containment was branded as a servant of the "aggressive policy of imperialism", which was opposed to the "peace-loving course of the USSR." (All this, by the way, took place against the background of Khrushchev's hysterical missile bluff, which was also a kind of "offensive containment", more precisely, "intimidation" of the West during the Suez, Berlin and Caribbean crises.) And at the military-strategic level, nuclear weapons were considered in the classical canons of waging a world war and achieving victory in it.
Western strategic theory was based on the close linkage of politics to military strategy and the feedback of strategy to politics, facilitated by free discussion of political scientists and military experts and the openness of military information, as well as the regular movement of civilians and military personnel between government posts and the academic world.
On the other hand, the USSR was characterized by a “watertight” separation of politics and strategy, civilian and military specialists, and complete defense secrecy. Hence the fundamental thesis of the Soviet military doctrine: the policy of the USSR is peaceful, but if a war breaks out, the army and people "under the wise leadership of the CPSU" will defeat the enemy and win. The nuclear and conventional armed forces of the country must prepare for such a victory, for which it is necessary to achieve superiority over the enemy in every possible way and focus on offensive actions. The idea that such preparations themselves cast doubt on the "peacefulness" of Soviet policy and were pushing the other side to countermeasures was regarded as a monstrous heresy and, up to the early 1980s, could entail official and even criminal "consequences."
Of course, in the 1990s, the situation in Russia radically changed in terms of greater accessibility of military information, communication and movement of military and civilian specialists, freedom of opinion and assessment. But in many respects the Soviet legacy has not been eliminated to this day: insufficient openness of information, behind-the-scenes nature of decision-making on military issues and, most importantly, a persistent stereotype of thinking, according to which military issues are the business of the military, and political issues are of politicians and political scientists. This is largely the source of the inconsistency and inconsistency of Russian foreign and military policy.
In the Soviet Union, it was only in the early 1970s that the official line, with great reservations and ambiguities, accepted the idea that victory in a nuclear war was unattainable due to its total destructive consequences and, accordingly, perceived the view of nuclear weapons as a means of "deterring imperialist aggression." At the same time, the ideological dispute with the PRC played an important role, the leadership of which openly proclaimed the possibility of the victory of communism through a general nuclear war. And in 1982, Moscow took a symbolic but politically important step in consolidating its containment strategy - a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.
However, in practice, the relationship between the two fundamental views on nuclear weapons (as a deterrent or a means of warfare) is very contradictory. In the generally accepted interpretation, deterrence implies that nuclear capabilities deter a potential adversary from a nuclear attack. This function is called “minimal” or “finite deterrence”, and it logically implies the ability and probability of a retaliatory strike by sufficiently invulnerable forces against the most valuable administrative and industrial facilities of the aggressor.
The forces and concepts of "minimum deterrence", in whatever terms countries formulated it at the official level, were in fact supported by the Soviet Union against the United States until the mid-1990s, Great Britain, France and Israel with an eye on the USSR until the late 1980s ( after which the potential of the first two increased sharply with the deployment of MIRVed missiles (MIRVs), and the latter's means were out of reach of targets with the collapse of the USSR), as well as China in relation to the Soviet Union until the early 1990s and against the United States - in the immediate the future.
However, nuclear weapons are often intended to deter not only an opponent's nuclear attack, but also his other undesirable actions: aggression with the use of other types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or general-purpose forces, as well as other power and political actions that can entail an armed conflict. This option is called "enhanced deterrence", and its cardinal feature is that it involves the use of nuclear weapons first.
It should be noted that this type of containment is much more widespread than is commonly believed, implying the option of “minimum containment” by containment. Those who easily interpret deterrence in a broader sense do not always realize that in this context they mean the first nuclear strike, that is, the outbreak of a nuclear war.
After the end of World War II, the United States initially relied on "extended deterrence" to prevent the superior armies of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact from attacking its NATO allies, and in Asia - an attack by the USSR and / or China and the DPRK on its partners in the western part of the Pacific ocean. Washington never renounced this type of deterrence and always implied its readiness to use nuclear weapons first. Recently, this applies to "rogue" countries if they use chemical and bacteriological weapons against the United States or in other cases, for which there are plans to create low-yield nuclear warheads capable of penetrating deep underground to destroy command bunkers and WMD storage facilities.
Domestic military doctrine also initially allowed for the first use of nuclear weapons, which was canceled at the declarative level in 1982, but re-openly proclaimed in 1993 and confirmed in a revised formulation in 2000. "Extended containment" by Moscow unambiguously presupposes the first use of nuclear weapons "in response to large-scale aggression with the use of conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation." Russia is considering deterrence in an extended version, in view of its growing lagging behind NATO in terms of general purpose forces (SPF) now and from China in the foreseeable future. In this case, the emphasis is apparently mainly on tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), although the selective first use of strategic nuclear forces (SNF) is now also allowed.
Other states also followed the "extended containment" strategy. Thus, Great Britain and France intended their nuclear weapons to deter both a nuclear strike by the USSR and an attack by the Warsaw Pact Sleep. At the same time, as is now the case with Russia and NATO, their nuclear potential objectively did not provide a base for the "extended containment" of the Soviet Union. But unlike the current situation of the Russian Federation, they had a strong patron and defender in the person of the United States, under whose huge "nuclear umbrella" these two countries could afford any strategic experiments. In the next 10-15 years, the nuclear forces of Great Britain and France (when fully loaded with warheads, their SLBMs with MIRVs), for the first time in history, will become comparable in size to the Russian strategic nuclear forces.
The same strategy was pursued by Israel, assigning its nuclear weapons to deter the attack of the conventional armies of the Arab countries, and in the event of a critical situation for itself - for the first nuclear strike on them. This strategy was and remains quite creditworthy, at least as long as the Arab countries and their Muslim counterparts do not have their own nuclear weapons. This concern of Israel explains its attack on the Iraqi nuclear center in 1982, and its concern about Iran's nuclear programs.
Thus, the factor of the enormous ambiguity of nuclear deterrence in the modern world is that, in contrast to popular beliefs, only in a small number of cases and in limited periods of time was deterrence interpreted in the narrow sense of this concept as a strategy to prevent nuclear war. More often than not, deterrence has been and is being given an expansive strategic meaning, which often presupposes the first use of nuclear weapons. This is another contradiction of nuclear deterrence: it implies a willingness to initiate the outbreak of a nuclear war. Fortunately, over the past half century, this apocalyptic paradox has remained the province of theory. But in the future, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the increasingly multilateral nuclear relations of states threaten to put it on a practical plane.
It is also obvious that nuclear deterrence cannot be used against organizations of international terrorism, including the hypothetical threat of such organizations acquiring nuclear weapons or an explosive device. Terrorists have no territory, industry, population, or standing army to retaliate against. In cases where a state provides them with a base, as the Afghan Taliban provided it to Al-Qaeda, nuclear deterrence is hardly applicable to that state, since it is unlikely to have an impact on terrorists who are able to move quickly and secretly across borders. Perhaps terrorists will even be interested in provoking a nuclear strike on a particular country in the name of the political advancement of their cause. (In this sense, even the US non-nuclear operation against Iraq in 2003 turned out to be very beneficial for international terrorism.)
Nuclear deterrence is related to the fight against terrorism only in terms of pressure (through the threat of retaliation, including nuclear) on certain countries in order to prevent them from supporting terrorism, providing terrorists with bases and providing them with any other assistance. But it is difficult to imagine that any state would openly support terrorists with nuclear weapons. And a nuclear strike against any country, even a rogue state, given its side effects and political shock in the outside world, is too powerful a means to be used without full evidence of the existence of a “corpus delicti”. Quite indicative in this respect is the reaction of the world community to the ill-founded American operation in Iraq in 2003, using only general-purpose forces, and with minimal collateral losses and material damage. The split of the anti-terrorist coalition has greatly inspired the resistance movement and international terrorism in Iraq, entailed the United States getting bogged down in the swamp of an unpromising occupation course.
Thus, the essence of the phenomenon of nuclear deterrence and its role in international politics have been extremely ambiguous and contradictory over the past half century. Perhaps nuclear weapons played a role in preventing a third world war, or maybe we were all just very lucky. And in this case it is very good that history does not know the subjunctive mood. But how the evolution of nuclear deterrence will proceed in the foreseeable future, after the end of the Cold War, against the background of the expansion of the geography of regional and local, internal and cross-border conflicts, in parallel with the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, is very difficult to predict.
Only complete nuclear disarmament can be a guarantee of the unconditional non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, this cannot be achieved only within the framework of interaction in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The world cannot be simply taken and returned to its pre-1945 state, just as one cannot “shut down” America or cancel electricity. Nuclear deterrence and proliferation have become deeply integrated elements of modern international relations, economics, science and technology. Only by fundamentally changing these relations, the approach to economics and technology, can we get rid of their threatening by-products, figuratively speaking "nuclear waste".
5. Conclusion.
Scientists believe that with several large-scale nuclear explosions, which led to the burning of forests, cities, huge layers of smoke, burns would rise to the stratosphere, thereby blocking the path of solar radiation. This phenomenon is called “nuclear winter”. Winter will last for several years, maybe even just a couple of months, but during this time the ozone layer of the Earth will be almost completely destroyed. Streams of ultraviolet rays will rush to the Earth. Modeling of this situation shows that as a result of an explosion with a power of 100 Kt, the temperature will drop on average at the Earth's surface by 10-20 degrees. After a nuclear winter, further natural continuation of life on Earth will be quite problematic:
there will be a shortage of food and energy. Due to strong climate change, agriculture will decline, nature will be destroyed, or will change greatly;
radioactive contamination of areas of the terrain will occur, which again will lead to the extermination of wildlife;
global environmental changes (pollution, extinction of many species, destruction of wildlife).
Nuclear weapons are a huge threat to all of humanity. So, according to the calculations of American experts, the explosion of a thermonuclear charge with a capacity of 20 Mt can raze all residential buildings within a radius of 24 km to the ground and destroy all living things at a distance of 140 km from the epicenter.
Taking into account the accumulated stocks of nuclear weapons and their destructive power, experts believe that a world war with the use of nuclear weapons would mean the death of hundreds of millions of people, turning into ruins all the achievements of world civilization and culture.
Fortunately, the end of the Cold War eased the international political climate a little. A number of treaties have been signed to end nuclear tests and nuclear disarmament.
Also an important problem today is the safe operation of nuclear power plants. After all, the most ordinary failure to comply with safety precautions can lead to the same consequences as a nuclear war.
Today people should think about their future, about what kind of world they will live in in the coming decades.
6. Literature
Military encyclopedic dictionary. 2nd ed. -M .: Military publishing house, 1986.
Nuclear non-proliferation. Textbook for students of higher educational institutions. In 2 volumes. Volume I, II. Under total. ed. V.A. Orlova. 2nd ed. - M .: PIR Center, 2002.
V. Ovchinnikov. Hot ash. -M .: Pravda, 1987.
History of the United States. Volume four, 1945-1980. -M .: "Science", 1987.
B. Kazakov. Transformation of elements. -M., "Knowledge", 1977.
A. Arbatov. Power diplomacy at the beginning of the 21st century. / Free thought-XXI, No. 4, 2004.
