German operation on the Kursk Bulge. Battle of Kursk: what losses did the Red Army have?

In the summer of 1943, one of the most grandiose and important battles of the Great Patriotic War took place - the Battle of Kursk. The Nazis’ dream of revenge for Stalingrad, for the defeat near Moscow, resulted in one of the most key battles, on which the outcome of the war depended.

Total mobilization - selected generals, the best soldiers and officers, the latest weapons, guns, tanks, airplanes - this was Adolf Hitler's order - to prepare for the most important battle and not just win, but do it spectacularly, demonstrably, taking revenge for all previous lost battles . A matter of prestige.

(In addition, it was precisely as a result of the successful Operation Citadel that Hitler assumed the opportunity to negotiate a truce from the Soviet side. German generals repeatedly stated this.)

It was for the Battle of Kursk that the Germans prepared a military gift for Soviet military designers - a powerful and invulnerable Tiger tank, which there was simply nothing to resist. Its impenetrable armor was no match for Soviet-designed anti-tank guns, and new anti-tank guns had not yet been developed. During meetings with Stalin, Marshal of Artillery Voronov said literally the following: “We do not have guns capable of successfully fighting these tanks.”

The Battle of Kursk began on July 5 and ended on August 23, 1943. Every year on August 23, Russia celebrates the “Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of Victory of Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk.”

Moiarussia has collected the most interesting facts about this great confrontation:

Operation Citadel

In April 1943, Hitler approved a military operation codenamed Zitadelle (“Citadel”). To carry it out, a total of 50 divisions were involved, including 16 tank and motorized divisions; more than 900 thousand German soldiers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 aircraft. The location of the operation is the Kursk ledge.

German sources wrote: “The Kursk salient seemed a particularly suitable place for such a strike. As a result of the simultaneous offensive of German troops from the north and south, a powerful group of Russian troops will be cut off. They also hoped to destroy those operational reserves that the enemy would bring into battle. In addition, the elimination of this ledge will significantly shorten the front line... True, some even then argued that the enemy was expecting a German offensive in this area and... that therefore there was a danger of losing more of their forces than inflicting losses on the Russians... However, it was impossible to convince Hitler , and he believed that Operation Citadel would be a success if undertaken soon."

The Germans prepared for the Battle of Kursk for a long time. Its start was postponed twice: the guns were not ready, the new tanks were not delivered, and the new aircraft did not have time to pass tests. On top of that, Hitler feared that Italy was about to leave the war. Convinced that Mussolini was not going to give up, Hitler decided to stick to the original plan. The fanatical Hitler believed that if you strike in the place where the Red Army was strongest and crush the enemy in this battle, then

“The victory at Kursk,” he said, will capture the imagination of the whole world.”

Hitler knew that it was here, on the Kursk salient, that the Soviet troops numbered more than 1.9 million people, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and about 2.9 thousand aircraft. He knew that in terms of the number of soldiers and equipment involved in the operation, he would lose this battle, but thanks to an ambitious, strategically correct plan and the latest weapons, which, according to military experts of the Soviet army, would be difficult to resist, this numerical superiority would be absolutely vulnerable and useless.

Meanwhile, the Soviet command did not waste time. The Supreme High Command considered two options: attack first or wait? The first option was promoted by the commander of the Voronezh Front Nikolay Vatutin. The commander of the Central Front insisted on the second . Despite Stalin’s initial support for Vatutin’s plan, they approved Rokossovsky’s safer plan - “to wait, wear down and go on a counteroffensive.” Rokossovsky was supported by the majority of the military command and primarily by Zhukov.

However, later Stalin doubted the correctness of the decision - the Germans were too passive, who, as mentioned above, had already postponed their offensive twice.


(Photo by: Sovfoto/UIG via Getty Images)

Having waited for the latest equipment - Tiger and Panther tanks, the Germans began their offensive on the night of July 5, 1943.

That same night, Rokossovsky had a telephone conversation with Stalin:

- Comrade Stalin! The Germans have launched an offensive!

-What are you happy about? - asked the surprised leader.

– Now victory will be ours, Comrade Stalin! - answered the commander.

Rokossovsky was not mistaken.

Agent "Werther"

On April 12, 1943, three days before Hitler approved Operation Citadel, the exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel” of the German High Command, translated from German, appeared on Stalin’s desk, endorsed by all services of the Wehrmacht. The only thing that was not on the document was Hitler’s own visa. He staged it three days after the Soviet leader got acquainted with it. The Fuhrer, of course, did not know about this.

Nothing is known about the person who obtained this document for the Soviet command except his code name - “Werther”. Various researchers have put forward different versions of who "Werther" really was - some believe that Hitler's personal photographer was a Soviet agent.

Agent "Werther" (German: Werther) - the code name of an alleged Soviet agent in the leadership of the Wehrmacht or even as part of the top of the Third Reich during World War II, one of the prototypes of Stirlitz. During the entire time he worked for Soviet intelligence, he did not make a single misfire. It was considered the most reliable source in wartime.

Hitler’s personal translator, Paul Karel, wrote about him in his book: “The leaders of Soviet intelligence addressed the Swiss station as if they were requesting information from some information bureau. And they got everything they were interested in. Even a superficial analysis of radio interception data shows that during all phases of the war in Russia, agents of the Soviet General Staff worked first-class. Some of the information transmitted could only have been obtained from the highest German military circles

- it seems that the Soviet agents in Geneva and Lausanne were dictated to the key directly from the Fuhrer Headquarters.”

The largest tank battle


"Kursk Bulge": T-34 tank against "Tigers" and "Panthers"

The key moment of the Battle of Kursk is considered to be the largest tank battle in the history of the war near the village of Prokhorovka, which began on July 12.

Surprisingly, this large-scale clash of armored vehicles of the opposing sides still causes fierce debate among historians.

Classic Soviet historiography reported 800 tanks for the Red Army and 700 for the Wehrmacht. Modern historians tend to increase the number of Soviet tanks and reduce the number of German ones.

Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of Soviet troops and gain operational space, and Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group.

Based on the memoirs of German generals (E. von Manstein, G. Guderian, F. von Mellenthin, etc.), about 700 Soviet tanks took part in the battle (some probably fell behind on the march - “on paper” the army had more than a thousand vehicles ), of which about 270 were shot down (meaning only the morning battle on July 12).

Also preserved is the version of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, the son of Joachim von Ribbentrop, commander of a tank company and a direct participant in the battle:

According to the published memoirs of Rudolf von Ribbentrop, Operation Citadel pursued not strategic, but purely operational goals: to cut off the Kursk ledge, destroy the Russian troops involved in it and straighten the front. Hitler hoped to achieve military success during the front-line operation in order to try to enter into negotiations with the Russians on an armistice.

In his memoirs, Ribbentrop gives a detailed description of the disposition of the battle, its course and result:

“In the early morning of July 12, the Germans needed to take Prokhorovka, an important point on the way to Kursk. However, suddenly units of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army intervened in the battle.

The unexpected attack on the deeply advanced spearhead of the German offensive - by units of the 5th Guards Tank Army, deployed overnight - was undertaken by the Russian command in a completely incomprehensible manner. The Russians inevitably had to go into their own anti-tank ditch, which was clearly shown even on the maps we captured.

The Russians drove, if they managed to get that far at all, into their own anti-tank ditch, where they naturally became easy prey for our defenses. Burning diesel fuel spread a thick black fume - Russian tanks were burning everywhere, some of them had run over each other, Russian infantrymen had jumped between them, desperately trying to get their bearings and easily turning into victims of our grenadiers and artillerymen, who were also standing on this battlefield.

The attacking Russian tanks - there must have been more than a hundred of them - were completely destroyed."

As a result of the counterattack, by noon on July 12, the Germans “with surprisingly small losses” occupied “almost completely” their previous positions.

The Germans were stunned by the wastefulness of the Russian command, which abandoned hundreds of tanks with infantrymen on their armor to certain death. This circumstance forced the German command to think deeply about the power of the Russian offensive.

“Stalin allegedly wanted to put on trial the commander of the 5th Soviet Guards Tank Army, General Rotmistrov, who attacked us. In our opinion, he had good reasons for this. Russian descriptions of the battle - "the grave of German tank weapons" - have nothing to do with reality. We, however, felt unmistakably that the offensive had run out of steam. We did not see a chance for ourselves to continue the offensive against superior enemy forces, unless significant reinforcements were added. However, there were none.”

It is no coincidence that after the victory at Kursk, Army Commander Rotmistrov was not even awarded - as he had not lived up to the high hopes placed on him by Headquarters.

One way or another, Nazi tanks were stopped on the field near Prokhorovka, which actually meant the disruption of plans for the German summer offensive.

It is believed that Hitler himself gave the order to end the Citadel plan on July 13, when he learned that the Western allies of the USSR had landed in Sicily on July 10, and the Italians had failed to defend Sicily during the fighting and the need to send German reinforcements to Italy loomed.

"Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev"


Diorama dedicated to the Battle of Kursk. Author oleg95

When people talk about the Battle of Kursk, they often mention Operation Citadel, the German offensive plan. Meanwhile, after the Wehrmacht onslaught was repulsed, the Soviet troops carried out two of their offensive operations, which ended in brilliant successes. The names of these operations are much less known than “Citadel”.

On July 12, 1943, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Three days later, the Central Front began its offensive. This operation was codenamed "Kutuzov". During it, a major defeat was inflicted on the German Army Group Center, whose retreat stopped only on August 18 at the Hagen defensive line east of Bryansk. Thanks to “Kutuzov”, the cities of Karachev, Zhizdra, Mtsensk, Bolkhov were liberated, and on the morning of August 5, 1943, Soviet troops entered Orel.

On August 3, 1943, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began an offensive operation "Rumyantsev", named after another Russian commander. On August 5, Soviet troops captured Belgorod and then began to liberate the territory of Left Bank Ukraine. During the 20-day operation, they defeated the opposing Nazi forces and reached Kharkov. On August 23, 1943, at 2 a.m., troops of the Steppe Front launched a night assault on the city, which ended in success by dawn.

“Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev” became the reason for the first victorious salute during the war years - on August 5, 1943, it was held in Moscow to commemorate the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Maresyev's feat


Maresyev (second from right) on the set of a film about himself. Painting “The Tale of a Real Man.” Photo: Kommersant

The book of the writer Boris Polevoy “The Tale of a Real Man,” which was based on the life of a real military pilot Alexei Maresyev, was known to almost everyone in the Soviet Union.

But not everyone knows that the fame of Maresyev, who returned to combat aviation after the amputation of both legs, arose precisely during the Battle of Kursk.

Senior Lieutenant Maresyev, who arrived in the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, was faced with distrust. The pilots did not want to fly with him, fearing that a pilot with prosthetics would not be able to cope in difficult times. The regiment commander did not let him into battle either.

Squadron commander Alexander Chislov took him as his partner. Maresyev coped with the task, and at the height of the battles on the Kursk Bulge he carried out combat missions along with everyone else.

On July 20, 1943, during a battle with superior enemy forces, Alexey Maresyev saved the lives of two of his comrades and personally destroyed two enemy Focke-Wulf 190 fighters.

This story immediately became known throughout the front, after which the writer Boris Polevoy appeared in the regiment, immortalizing the name of the hero in his book. On August 24, 1943, Maresyev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

It is interesting that during his participation in battles, fighter pilot Alexei Maresyev personally shot down 11 enemy aircraft: four before being wounded and seven after returning to duty after amputation of both legs.

Battle of Kursk - losses of both sides

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including seven tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops exceeded the German ones - they amounted to 863 thousand people, including 254 thousand irrevocable. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about six thousand tanks.

After the Battle of Kursk, the balance of forces at the front changed sharply in favor of the Red Army, which provided it favorable conditions to launch a general strategic offensive.

In memory of the heroic victory of Soviet soldiers in this battle and in memory of those who died, the Day of Military Glory was established in Russia, and in Kursk there is the Kursk Bulge Memorial Complex, dedicated to one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War.


Memorial complex "Kursk Bulge"

Hitler's revenge did not take place. The last attempt to sit down at the negotiating table was destroyed.

August 23, 1943 - is rightfully considered one of the most significant days in the Great Patriotic War. After the defeat in this battle, the German army began one of the most extensive and long routes of retreat on all fronts. The outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion.

As a result of the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the greatness and steadfastness of the Soviet soldier was demonstrated to the whole world. Our allies have no doubts or hesitations left in making the right choice sides in this war. And the thoughts that let the Russians and Germans destroy each other, and we look at it from the outside, faded into the background. The foresight and foresight of our allies prompted them to intensify their support for the Soviet Union. Otherwise, the winner will be only one state, which will receive vast territories at the end of the war. However, that's another story...

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Battle of Kursk: its role and significance during the war

Fifty days, from July 5 to August 23, 1943, the Battle of Kursk continued, including the Kursk defensive (July 5 - 23), Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive strategic operations of the Soviet troops. In terms of its scope, the forces and means involved, tension, results and military-political consequences, it is one of the largest battles of the Second World War.

General course of the Battle of Kursk

Huge masses of troops and military equipment were involved on both sides in the fierce clash on the Kursk Bulge - more than 4 million people, almost 70 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, up to 12 thousand aircraft. The fascist German command threw more than 100 divisions into battle, which accounted for over 43% of the divisions located on the Soviet-German front.

The salient in the Kursk region was formed as a result of stubborn battles in winter and in early spring 1943. Here the right wing of the German Army Group Center hung over the troops of the Central Front from the north, and the left flank of the Army Group South covered the troops of the Voronezh Front from the south. During the three-month strategic pause that began at the end of March, the warring parties consolidated their positions on the achieved lines, replenished their troops with people, military equipment and weapons, accumulated reserves and developed plans for further action.

Considering the great importance of the Kursk salient, the German command decided in the summer to carry out an operation to eliminate it and defeat the Soviet troops occupying the defense there, hoping to regain the lost strategic initiative and change the course of the war in their favor. He developed a plan for an offensive operation, codenamed “Citadel”.

To implement these plans, the enemy concentrated 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized), attracted over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns and over 2 thousand aircraft. The German command had high hopes for the use of new heavy Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, Focke-Wulf-190D fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft.

The Kursk ledge, which had a length of about 550 km, was defended by troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which had 1336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, over 3.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 2.9 thousand aircraft. East of Kursk, the Steppe Front, which was in the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, was concentrated, which had 573 thousand people, 8 thousand guns and mortars, about 1.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and up to 400 combat aircraft.

The Supreme High Command headquarters, having timely and correctly determined the enemy's plan, made a decision: to move on to a deliberate defense on pre-prepared lines, during which they would bleed the strike groups of German troops, and then go on a counter-offensive and complete their defeat. A rare case in the history of war occurred when the strongest side, which had everything necessary for an offensive, chose from several possible ones the most best option of your actions. During April - June 1943, a deeply layered defense was created in the area of ​​the Kursk salient.

The troops and local population dug about 10 thousand km of trenches and communication passages, 700 km of wire barriers were installed in the most dangerous directions, 2 thousand km of additional and parallel roads were built, 686 bridges were restored and rebuilt. Hundreds of thousands of residents of the Kursk, Oryol, Voronezh and Kharkov regions participated in the construction of defensive lines. 313 thousand wagons with military equipment, reserves and supply cargo were delivered to the troops.

Having information about the time of the start of the German offensive, the Soviet command carried out a pre-planned artillery counter-training in areas where enemy strike forces were concentrated. The enemy suffered significant losses, and his plans for a surprise attack were thwarted. On the morning of July 5 German troops went on the offensive, but the enemy's tank attacks, supported by the fire of thousands of guns and aircraft, were defeated by the insurmountable resilience of the Soviet soldiers. On the northern face of the Kursk salient he managed to advance 10 - 12 km, and on the southern face - 35 km.

It seemed that nothing living could resist such a powerful steel avalanche. The sky turned black with smoke and dust. The corrosive gases from the explosions of shells and mines blinded my eyes. From the roar of guns and mortars, the clanging of caterpillars, the soldiers lost their hearing, but they fought with unparalleled courage. Their motto became the words: “Not a step back, stand to the death!” German tanks were shot down by the fire of our guns, anti-tank rifles, tanks and self-propelled guns buried in the ground, hit by aircraft, and blown up by mines. The enemy infantry was cut off from the tanks and exterminated by artillery, mortar, rifle and machine gun fire, or in hand-to-hand combat in the trenches. Hitler's aviation was destroyed by our planes and anti-aircraft artillery.

When German tanks broke into the depths of the defense at one of the sectors of the 203rd Guards Rifle Regiment, the deputy battalion commander for political affairs, Senior Lieutenant Zhumbek Duisov, whose crew was wounded, knocked out three enemy tanks with an anti-tank rifle. The wounded armor-piercers, inspired by the officer’s feat, again took up arms and successfully repelled a new enemy attack.

In this battle, armor-piercing officer Private F.I. Yuplankov knocked out six tanks and shot down one Yu-88 plane, armor-piercing junior sergeant G.I. Kikinadze knocked out four, and Sergeant P.I. Houses - seven fascist tanks. The infantrymen boldly let enemy tanks through their trenches, cut off the infantry from the tanks and destroyed the Nazis with fire from machine guns and machine guns, and burned the tanks with combustible bottles and knocked them out with grenades.

A striking heroic feat was performed by the tank crew of Lieutenant B.C. Shalandina. The company in which he was operating began to be surrounded by a group of enemy tanks. Shalandin and his crew members, senior sergeants V.G. Kustov, V.F. Lekomtsev and Sergeant P.E. Zelenin boldly entered into battle with a numerically superior enemy. Acting from an ambush, they brought enemy tanks within direct shot range, and then, hitting the sides, burned two “tigers” and one medium tank. But Shalandin’s tank was also hit and caught fire. With the car on fire, Shalandin’s crew decided to ram it and immediately crashed into the side of the “tiger.” The enemy tank caught fire. But our entire crew also died. To Lieutenant B.C. Shalandin was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. By order of the Minister of Defense, he was forever included in the lists of the Tashkent Tank School.

Simultaneously with the fighting on the ground, there were fierce battles in the air. An immortal feat was accomplished here by guard pilot Lieutenant A.K. Gorovets. On July 6, as part of a squadron on a La-5 aircraft, he covered his troops. Returning from a mission, Horowitz saw a large group of enemy bombers, but due to damage to the radio transmitter, he was unable to inform the presenter about this and decided to attack them. During the battle, the brave pilot shot down nine enemy bombers, but he himself died.

On July 12, in the Prokhorovka area, the largest oncoming tank battle in World War II took place, in which up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part on both sides. During the day of the battle, the opposing sides lost from 30 to 60% of tanks and self-propelled guns each.

On July 12, the turning point in the Battle of Kursk came, the enemy stopped the offensive, and on July 18, he began to withdraw all his forces to their original position. The troops of the Voronezh Front, and from July 19, the Steppe Front, began pursuit and by July 23 drove the enemy back to the line that he occupied on the eve of his offensive. Operation Citadel failed; the enemy failed to turn the tide of the war in their favor.

On July 12, troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts began an offensive in the Oryol direction. On July 15, the Central Front launched a counteroffensive. On August 3, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began a counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. The scale of hostilities expanded even further.

Our troops showed massive heroism during the battles on the Oryol salient. Here are just a few examples.

In the battle for a strong point southwest of the village of Vyatki on July 13, the commander of a rifle platoon of the 457th Infantry Regiment of the 129th Infantry Division, Lieutenant N.D., distinguished himself. Marinchenko. Carefully camouflaging himself, unnoticed by the enemy, he led the platoon to the northern slope of the height and, from close range, brought down a shower of machine-gun fire on the enemy. The Germans began to panic. They threw down their weapons and ran. Having captured two 75-mm cannons at a height, Marinchenko’s fighters opened fire on the enemy from them. For this feat, Lieutenant Nikolai Danilovich Marinchenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

July 19, 1943 in the battle for locality Troen, Kursk Region, a heroic feat was performed by the gunner of a platoon of 45-mm cannons of the 896th Infantry Regiment of the 211th Infantry Division, Sergeant N.N. Shilenkov. The enemy here repeatedly launched counterattacks. During one of them, Shilenkov allowed German tanks to reach 100 - 150 m and set one on fire with cannon fire and knocked out three of them.

When the cannon was destroyed by an enemy shell, he took the machine gun and, together with the riflemen, continued to fire at the enemy. Nikolai Nikolaevich Shilenkov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On August 5, two ancient Russian cities, Orel and Belgorod, were liberated. That same day, in the evening, an artillery salute was fired for the first time in Moscow in honor of the troops who liberated them.

By August 18, Soviet troops, having inflicted a heavy defeat on Army Group Center, completely liberated the Oryol bridgehead. At that time, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts were fighting in the Kharkov direction. Having repelled strong counterattacks from enemy tank divisions, our units and formations liberated Kharkov on August 23. Thus, the Battle of Kursk ended in a brilliant victory for the Red Army.

The date August 23 is now celebrated in our country as the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the defeat of Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk (1943).

At the same time, it should be noted that the victory in the Battle of Kursk came at a very high cost to Soviet troops. They lost over 860 thousand people killed and wounded, more than 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 5.2 thousand guns and mortars, over 1.6 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, this victory was joyful and inspiring.

Thus, the victory at Kursk was new convincing evidence of the loyalty of Soviet soldiers to the oath, military duty and combat traditions of our Armed Forces. It is the duty of every soldier of the Russian Army to strengthen and multiply these traditions.

Historical significance of the victory at Kursk

The Battle of Kursk is one of the most important stages on the path to victory in the Great Patriotic War. The crushing defeat of Nazi Germany at the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union. The military feat of the soldiers merged with the selfless work of the home front workers, who armed the army with excellent military equipment and provided it with everything necessary for victory. What is the world-historical significance of the defeat of the Nazi troops at Kursk?

Firstly, Hitler’s army suffered a severe defeat, huge losses, which the fascist leadership could no longer make up for with any total mobilizations. The grandiose battle of the summer of 1943 on the Kursk Bulge demonstrated to the whole world the ability of the Soviet state on our own defeat the aggressor. The prestige of German weapons was irreparably damaged. 30 German divisions were destroyed. The total losses of the Wehrmacht amounted to more than 500 thousand soldiers and officers, over 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft. By the way, pilots of the French Normandy squadron, who shot down 33 German aircraft in air battles, selflessly fought alongside Soviet pilots in the battles on the Kursk Bulge.

The enemy tank forces suffered the heaviest losses. Of the 20 tank and motorized divisions that took part in the Battle of Kursk, 7 were defeated, and the rest suffered significant losses. The chief inspector of the Wehrmacht tank forces, General Guderian, was forced to admit: “As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to large losses in men and equipment... The initiative finally passed to the Russians.”

Secondly, in the Battle of Kursk, the enemy’s attempt to regain the lost strategic initiative and take revenge for Stalingrad failed.

The offensive strategy of the German troops was a complete failure. The Battle of Kursk led to a further change in the balance of forces at the front, made it possible to finally concentrate the strategic initiative in the hands of the Soviet command, and created favorable conditions for the deployment of a general strategic offensive of the Red Army. The victory at Kursk and the advance of Soviet troops to the Dnieper marked a radical turning point in the course of the war. After the Battle of Kursk, the Nazi command was forced to finally abandon the offensive strategy and go on the defensive along the entire Soviet-German front.

However, at present, some Western historians, shamelessly falsifying the history of the Second World War, are trying in every possible way to belittle the significance of the victory of the Red Army at Kursk. Some of them claim that the Battle of Kursk is an ordinary, unremarkable episode of the Second World War, others in their voluminous works either simply remain silent about the Battle of Kursk, or speak about it sparingly and incomprehensibly, other falsifiers seek to prove that the German- The fascist army was defeated in the Battle of Kursk not under the blows of the Red Army, but as a result of Hitler’s “miscalculations” and “fatal decisions”, due to his reluctance to listen to the opinions of his generals and field marshals. However, all this has no basis and is in conflict with the facts. The German generals and field marshals themselves recognized the inconsistency of such statements. “Operation Citadel was the last attempt to maintain our initiative in the east,” admits the former Nazi Field Marshal, who commanded a group of artillery units.
mission "South" E. Manstein. - With its termination, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. In this regard, the Citadel is the decisive turning point of the war on Eastern Front».

Thirdly, the victory in the Battle of Kursk is a triumph of Soviet military art. During the battle, Soviet military strategy, operational art and tactics once again proved their superiority over the military art of Hitler's army.

The Battle of Kursk enriched the domestic military art with the EXPERIENCE of organizing a deeply layered, active, sustainable defense, conducting flexible and decisive maneuver of forces and means during defensive and offensive actions.

In the field of strategy, the Soviet Supreme High Command took a creative approach to planning the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. Originality decision taken was expressed in the fact that the side with strategic initiative and overall superiority in forces went on the defensive, deliberately giving an active role to the enemy in the initial phase of the campaign. Subsequently, within the framework of a single process of conducting a campaign, following the defense, a transition to a decisive counter-offensive and the deployment of a general offensive was planned. The problem of creating an insurmountable defense on an operational-strategic scale was successfully solved. Its activity was ensured by the saturation of the fronts with a large number of mobile troops. It was achieved by conducting artillery counter-preparation on the scale of two fronts, wide maneuver of strategic reserves to strengthen them, and launching massive air strikes against enemy groups and reserves. The Supreme High Command headquarters skillfully determined the plan for conducting a counteroffensive in each direction, creatively approaching
choosing the directions of the main attacks and methods of defeating the enemy. Thus, in the Oryol operation, Soviet troops used concentric attacks in converging directions, followed by fragmentation and destruction of the enemy group in parts. In the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the main blow was delivered by adjacent flanks of the fronts, which ensured the rapid breaking of the enemy’s strong and deep defenses, the dissection of his group into two parts and the exit of Soviet troops to the rear of the enemy’s Kharkov defensive region.

In the Battle of Kursk, the problem of creating large strategic reserves and their effective use was successfully resolved, and strategic air supremacy was finally won, which was held by Soviet aviation until the end of the Great Patriotic War. The Supreme High Command headquarters skillfully carried out strategic interaction not only between the fronts participating in the battle, but also with those operating in other directions.

Soviet operational art in the Battle of Kursk for the first time solved the problem of creating a deliberate positional insurmountable and active operational defense up to 70 km deep.

During the counter-offensive, the problem of breaking through the enemy’s deeply layered defense was successfully resolved by decisively massing forces and means in the breakthrough areas (from 50 to 90% of them total number), the skillful use of tank armies and corps as mobile groups of fronts and armies, close cooperation with aviation, which carried out a full front-scale air offensive, which largely ensured the high rate of advance of ground forces. Valuable experience was gained in conducting oncoming tank battles both in a defensive operation (near Prokhorovka) and during the offensive when repelling counterattacks of large enemy armored groupings.

The successful conduct of the Battle of Kursk was facilitated by the active actions of the partisans. Striking the enemy's rear, they pinned down up to 100 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. The partisans carried out about 1.5 thousand raids on railway lines, disabled more than 1 thousand locomotives and destroyed over 400 military trains.

Fourthly, the defeat of the Nazi troops during the Battle of Kursk was of enormous military-political and international significance. He significantly increased the role and international authority of the Soviet Union. It became obvious that the power of Soviet weapons faced Nazi Germany with inevitable defeat. The sympathy of ordinary people for our country increased even more, the hopes of the peoples of the countries occupied by the Nazis for early liberation strengthened, the front of the national liberation struggle of groups of Resistance fighters in France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway expanded, the anti-fascist struggle intensified both in Germany itself and and other countries of the fascist bloc.

Fifthly, the defeat at Kursk and the results of the battle had a profound impact on the German people, undermined the morale of the German troops and faith in the victorious outcome of the war. Germany was losing influence on its allies, disagreements within the fascist bloc intensified, which later led to a political and military crisis. The beginning of the collapse of the fascist bloc was laid - Mussolini's regime collapsed, and Italy came out of the war on the side of Germany.

The victory of the Red Army at Kursk forced Germany and its allies to go on the defensive in all theaters of World War II, which had a huge impact on its further course. The transfer of significant enemy forces from the west to the Soviet-German front and their further defeat by the Red Army facilitated the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy and predetermined their success.

Sixth, under the influence of the victory of the Red Army, cooperation between the leading countries of the anti-Hitler coalition strengthened. She had a great influence on the ruling circles of the USA and Great Britain. At the end of 1943, the Tehran Conference took place, at which the leaders of the USSR, USA, and Great Britain I.V. met for the first time. Stalin; F.D. Roosevelt, W. Churchill. At the conference, it was decided to open a second front in Europe in May 1944. Assessing the results of the victory at Kursk, the head of the British government, W. Churchill, noted: “Three huge battles - for Kursk, Orel and Kharkov, all carried out within two months, marked the collapse of the German army on the Eastern Front.”

Victory in the Battle of Kursk was achieved thanks to the further strengthening of the military-economic power of the country and its Armed Forces.

One of the decisive factors that ensured victory at Kursk was the high moral, political and psychological condition personnel of our troops. In the fierce battle, such powerful sources of victory for the Soviet people and their army as patriotism, friendship of peoples, self-confidence and success emerged with all their might. Soviet soldiers and commanders showed miracles of mass heroism, exceptional courage, perseverance and military skill, for which 132 formations and units received the Guards rank, 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, and Kharkov. More than 100 thousand soldiers were awarded orders and medals, and 231 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The victory at Kursk was also achieved thanks to a powerful economic base. The increased capabilities of Soviet industry, the heroic feat of home front workers, made it possible to provide the Red Army with huge quantities of advanced models of military equipment and weapons, superior in a number of decisive indicators to the military equipment of Nazi Germany.

Highly appreciating the role and significance of the Battle of Kursk, the courage, resilience and mass heroism shown by the defenders of the cities of Belgorod, Kursk and Orel in the struggle for the freedom and independence of the Fatherland, by Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation dated April 27, 2007, these cities were awarded the honorary title “City of Military Glory” "

Before and during a lesson on this topic, it is advisable to visit the museum of the formation or unit, organize viewing of documentaries and feature films about the Battle of Kursk, and invite veterans of the Great Patriotic War to perform.

In the introductory speech, it is advisable to emphasize the importance of such a historical event as the Battle of Kursk, emphasizing the fact that here a radical turning point in the course of the war ended and the mass expulsion of enemy troops from our territory began.

When covering the first question, it is necessary, using a map, to show the location and balance of forces of the opposing sides at different stages of the Battle of Kursk, while emphasizing that it is an unsurpassed example of Soviet military art. In addition, it is necessary to talk in detail about the exploits, give examples of the courage and heroism of soldiers of their branch of troops committed in the Battle of Kursk.

In the course of considering the second issue, it is necessary to objectively show the significance, role and place of the Battle of Kursk in the Russian military history, take a closer look at the factors that contributed to this great victory.

At the end of the lesson, it is necessary to draw brief conclusions, answer questions from the audience, and thank the invited veterans.

1. Military encyclopedia in 8 volumes. T.4. - M.: Military Publishing House. 1999.

2. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941 - 1945: A Brief History. - M., 1984.

3. Dembitsky N., Strelnikov V. The most important operations of the Red Army and Navy in 1943 // Landmark. - 2003. - No. 1.

4. History of the Second World War 1939 -1945 in 12 volumes. T.7. - M., 1976.

Lieutenant colonel
Dmitry Samosvat,
Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences, Lieutenant Colonel
Alexey Kurshev

In July 1943, the German army launched Operation Citadel, a massive offensive against Oryol-Kursk Bulge on the Eastern Front. But the Red Army was well prepared to at some point crush the advancing German tanks with thousands of Soviet T-34 tanks.

CHRONICLE OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK July 5-12

July 5 - 04:30 The Germans launch an artillery strike - this marked the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge.

July 6 – over 2,000 tanks from both sides took part in the battle near the villages of Soborovka and Ponyri. German tanks were unable to break through the Soviet defenses.

July 10 - Model's 9th Army was unable to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops on the northern front of the arc and went on the defensive.

July 12 - Soviet tanks hold back the attack of German tanks in the grandiose battle of Prokhorovka.

Background. Decisive bet

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In the summer of 1943, Hitler directed the entire military power of Germany to the Eastern Front to achieve a decisive victory at the Kursk Bulge.

After the surrender of German troops at Stalingrad in February 1943, it seemed that the entire southern flank of the Wehrmacht was about to collapse. However, the Germans miraculously managed to hold out. They won the battle of Kharkov and stabilized the front line. With the onset of the spring thaw, the Eastern Front froze, stretching from the suburbs of Leningrad in the north to the west of Rostov on the Black Sea.

In the spring, both sides summed up their results. The Soviet leadership wanted to resume the offensive. In the German command, in connection with the realization of the impossibility of making up for the horrific losses of the last two years, an opinion arose about the transition to strategic defense. In the spring, only 600 vehicles remained in the German tank forces. The German army as a whole was short-staffed by 700,000 men.

Hitler entrusted the revival of tank units to Heinz Guderian, appointing him chief inspector of armored forces. Guderian, one of the architects of the lightning victories at the start of the war in 1939-1941, tried his best to increase the number and quality of tanks, and also helped introduce new types of vehicles, such as the Pz.V Panther.

Supply problems

The German command was in a difficult situation. During 1943, Soviet power could only increase. The quality of Soviet troops and equipment also improved rapidly. Even for the German army to transition to defense, there were clearly not enough reserves. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein believed that, given the superiority of the Germans in the ability to wage maneuver warfare, the problem would be solved by “elastic defense” with “inflicting powerful local attacks of a limited nature on the enemy, gradually undermining his power to a decisive level.”

Hitler tried to solve two problems. At first he sought to achieve success in the East in order to induce Turkey to enter the war on the side of the Axis powers. Secondly, the defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa meant that the Allies would invade southern Europe in the summer. This would further weaken the Wehrmacht in the east due to the need to regroup troops to deal with the new threat. The result of all this was the decision of the German command to launch an offensive on the Kursk Bulge - that was the name of the protrusion in the front line, which was 100 km across at its base. In the operation, codenamed Citadel, German tank armadas were to advance from the north and south. A victory would thwart the plans for the Red Army's summer offensive and shorten the front line.

The plans of the German command are revealed

German plans for an offensive on the Kursk Bulge became known to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command from the Soviet resident “Luci” in Switzerland and from British codebreakers. At a meeting on April 12, 1943, Marshal Zhukov convincingly argued that instead of launching a preemptive offensive by Soviet troops, “it would be better if we exhaust the enemy on our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going on a general offensive we will finally finish off the main enemy group " Stalin agreed. The Red Army began to create a powerful defense system on the ledge.

The Germans planned to strike at the end of spring or early summer, but they were unable to concentrate attack groups. It was not until July 1 that Hitler informed his commanders that Operation Citadel would have to begin on July 5. Within 24 hours, Stalin learned from “Lutsi” that the strike would be carried out between July 3 and July 6.

The Germans planned to cut off the ledge under its base with powerful simultaneous attacks from the north and south. In the north, the 9th Army (Colonel General Walter Model) from Army Group Center was supposed to fight its way straight to Kursk and east to Maloarkhangelsk. This grouping included 15 infantry divisions and seven tank and motorized divisions. In the south, General Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army of Army Group South was to break through the Soviet defenses between Belgorod and Gertsovka, occupy the city of Oboyan, and then advance to Kursk to link up with the 9th Army. The Kempf army group was supposed to cover the flank of the 4th Panzer Army. The shock fist of Army Group South consisted of nine tank and motorized divisions and eight infantry divisions.

The northern front of the arc was defended by the Central Front of Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky. In the south, the German offensive was to be repelled by the Voronezh Front of Army General Nikolai Vatutin. Powerful reserves were concentrated in the depths of the ledge as part of the Steppe Front of Colonel General Ivan Konev. A reliable anti-tank defense was created. In the most tank-dangerous directions, up to 2,000 anti-tank mines were installed for every kilometer of the front.

Opposing parties. The Great Controversy

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In the Battle of Kursk, Wehrmacht tank divisions faced a reorganized and well-equipped Red Army. On July 5, Operation Citadel began - the experienced and battle-hardened German army went on the offensive. Its main striking force was tank divisions. Their staff at that time of the war was 15,600 people and 150-200 tanks each. In reality, these divisions included an average of 73 tanks. However, in three SS tank divisions (as well as the " Greater Germany") there were 130 (or more) combat-ready tanks. In total, the Germans had 2,700 tanks and assault guns.

Mainly tanks of the Pz.III and Pz.IV types took part in the Battle of Kursk. The command of the German troops had high hopes for the striking power of the new Tiger I and Panther tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns. The Tigers performed well, but the Panthers showed some shortcomings, in particular those associated with unreliable transmission and chassis, as Heinz Guderian warned.

1,800 Luftwaffe aircraft took part in the battle, especially active at the beginning of the offensive. Ju 87 bomber squadrons carried out classic massive dive bombing attacks for the last time in this war.

During the Battle of Kursk, the Germans encountered reliable Soviet defensive lines of great depth. They were unable to break through or get around them. Therefore, German troops had to create a new tactical group for a breakthrough. The tank wedge - “Panzerkeil” - was supposed to become a “can opener” for opening Soviet anti-tank defense units. At the head of the strike force were heavy Tiger I tanks and Ferdinand tank destroyers with powerful anti-shell armor that could withstand hits from Soviet anti-tank defense shells. They were followed by lighter Panthers, Pz.IV and Pz.HI, dispersed along the front with intervals of up to 100 m between tanks. To ensure cooperation in the offensive, each tank wedge constantly maintained radio contact with strike aircraft and field artillery.

Red Army

In 1943, the Wehrmacht's combat power was declining. But the Red Army was rapidly turning into a new, more effective formation. A uniform with shoulder straps and unit insignia was reintroduced. Many famous units earned the title of “guards”, as in the tsarist army. The T-34 became the main tank of the Red Army. But already in 1942, modified German Pz.IV tanks were able to compare with this tank in terms of their data. With the advent of the Tiger I tanks in the German army, it became clear that the T-34's armor and armament needed to be strengthened. The most powerful combat vehicle in the Battle of Kursk was the SU-152 tank destroyer, which entered service in limited quantities. This self-propelled artillery unit was armed with a 152 mm howitzer, which was very effective against enemy armored vehicles.

The Soviet army had powerful artillery, which largely determined its successes. Anti-tank artillery batteries included 152 mm and 203 mm howitzers. Rocket artillery combat vehicles, the Katyushas, ​​were also actively used.

The Red Army Air Force was also strengthened. The Yak-9D and La-5FN fighters negated the technical superiority of the Germans. The Il-2 M-3 attack aircraft also turned out to be effective.

Victory tactics

Although at the beginning of the war the German army had superiority in the use of tanks, by 1943 this difference had become almost imperceptible. The bravery of the Soviet tank crews and the courage of the infantry in defense also negated the experience and tactical advantages of the Germans. The Red Army soldiers became masters of defense. Marshal Zhukov realized that in the Battle of Kursk it was worth using this skill in all its glory. His tactics were simple: form a deep and developed defensive system and force the Germans to get bogged down in a labyrinth of trenches in a futile attempt to break out. Soviet troops with the help local population they dug thousands of kilometers of trenches, trenches, anti-tank ditches, densely laid minefields, erected wire fences, prepared firing positions for artillery and mortars, etc.

Villages were fortified and up to 300,000 civilians, mainly women and children, were recruited to build defense lines. During the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht was hopelessly stuck in the defense of the Red Army.

Red Army
Red Army groups: Central Front - 711,575 people, 11,076 guns and mortars, 246 rocket artillery vehicles, 1,785 tanks and self-propelled guns and 1,000 aircraft; Steppe Front - 573,195 soldiers, 8,510 guns and mortars, 1,639 tanks and self-propelled guns and 700 aircraft; Voronezh Front - 625,591 soldiers, 8,718 guns and mortars, 272 rocket artillery vehicles, 1,704 tanks and self-propelled guns and 900 aircraft.
Commander-in-Chief: Stalin
Representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters during the Battle of Kursk, Marshal Zhukov and Marshal Vasilevsky
Central Front
Army General Rokossovsky
48th Army
13th Army
70th Army
65th Army
60th Army
2nd Tank Army
16th Air Army
Steppe (Reserve) Front
Colonel General Konev
5th Guards Army
5th Guards Tank Army
27th Army
47th Army
53rd Army
5th Air Army
Voronezh Front
Army General Vatutin
38th Army
40th Army
1st Tank Army
6th Guards Army
7th Guards Army
2nd Air Army
German army
Grouping of German troops: 685,000 people, 2,700 tanks and assault guns, 1,800 aircraft.
Army Group "Center": Field Marshal von Kluge e 9th Army: Colonel General Model
20th Army Corps
General von Roman
45th Infantry Division
72nd Infantry Division
137th Infantry Division
251st Infantry Division

6th Air Fleet
Colonel General Graham
1st Air Division
46th Tank Corps
General Zorn
7th Infantry Division
31st Infantry Division
102nd Infantry Division
258th Infantry Division

41st Tank Corps
General Harpe
18th Panzer Division
86th Infantry Division
292nd Infantry Division
47th Tank Corps
General Lemelsen
2nd Panzer Division
6th Infantry Division
9th Panzer Division
20th Panzer Division

23rd Army Corps
General Friessner
78th Assault Division
216th Infantry Division
383rd Infantry Division

Army Group South: Field Marshal von Manstein
4th Panzer Army: Colonel General Hoth
Army Task Force Kempf: General Kempf
11th Army Corps
General Routh
106th Infantry Division
320th Infantry Division

42nd Army Corps
General Mattenklott
39th Infantry Division
161st Infantry Division
282nd Infantry Division

3rd Tank Corps
General Bright
6th Panzer Division
7th Panzer Division
19th Panzer Division
168th Infantry Division

48th Tank Corps
General Knobelsdorff
3rd Panzer Division
11th Panzer Division
167th Infantry Division
Panzer Grenadier Division
"Greater Germany"
2nd SS Panzer Corps
General Hausser
1st SS Panzer Division
"Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler"
2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich"
3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf"

52nd Army Corps
General Ott
57th Infantry Division
255th Infantry Division
332nd Infantry Division

4th Air Fleet
General Dessloch


Army Group

Frame

Tank Corps

Army

Division

Tank division

Airborne Brigade

First stage. Strike from the North

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Tanks and infantry from Model's 9th Army launched an attack on Ponyri, but ran into powerful Soviet defensive lines. On the evening of July 4, on the northern face of the arc, Rokossovsky’s troops captured a team of German sappers. During interrogation, they testified that the offensive would begin in the morning at 03:30.

Taking this data into account, Rokossovsky ordered counter-artillery preparation to begin at 02:20 in the areas where German troops were concentrated. This delayed the start of the German offensive, but nevertheless, at 05:00, intense artillery shelling of the advanced units of the Red Army began.

The German infantry advanced with great difficulty through densely shot terrain, suffering serious losses from anti-personnel mines planted at a high density. By the end of the first day, for example, two divisions that were the main striking force of the group on the right flank of the German troops - the 258th Infantry, which had the task of breaking through the Orel Kursk highway, and the 7th Infantry - were forced to lie down and dig in.

The advancing German tanks achieved more significant successes. During the first day of the offensive, the 20th Panzer Division, at the cost of heavy losses, in some places wedged 6-8 km deep into the defense line, occupying the village of Bobrik. On the night of July 5-6, Rokossovsky, assessing the situation, calculated where the Germans would attack the next day and quickly regrouped the units. Soviet sappers laid mines. The main defense center was the town of Maloarkhangelsk.

On July 6, the Germans tried to capture the village of Ponyri, as well as Hill 274 near the village of Olkhovatka. But the Soviet command appreciated the significance of this position at the end of June. Therefore, Model's 9th Army stumbled upon the most fortified section of the defense.

On July 6, German troops went on the offensive with Tiger I tanks in the vanguard, but they not only had to break through the Red Army's defensive lines, but also repel counterattacks from Soviet tanks. On July 6, 1000 German tanks launched an attack on a 10 km front between the villages of Ponyri and Soborovka and suffered serious losses on the prepared defense lines. The infantry let the tanks pass and then set them on fire by throwing Molotov cocktails onto the engine shutters. The dug-in T-34 tanks fired from short distances. The German infantry advanced with significant losses - the entire area was intensively shelled by machine guns and artillery. Although Soviet tanks suffered damage from the powerful 88-mm guns of the Tiger tanks, German losses were very heavy.

German troops were stopped not only in the center, but also on the left flank, where reinforcements that arrived in Maloarkhangelsk in time strengthened the defense.

The Wehrmacht was never able to overcome the resistance of the Red Army and crush Rokossovsky's troops. The Germans only penetrated to an insignificant depth, but every time Model thought that he had managed to break through, the Soviet troops retreated and the enemy encountered a new line of defense. Already on July 9, Zhukov gave the northern group of troops a secret order to prepare for a counteroffensive.

Particularly strong battles were fought for the village of Ponyri. As in Stalingrad, although not on the same scale, desperate battles broke out for the most important positions - a school, a water tower and a machine and tractor station. During fierce battles they changed hands many times. On July 9, the Germans threw Ferdinand assault guns into battle, but they could not break the resistance of the Soviet troops.

Although the Germans did capture most of the village of Ponyri, they suffered serious losses: more than 400 tanks and up to 20,000 soldiers. The model managed to wedge 15 km deep into the defensive lines of the Red Army. On July 10, Model threw his last reserves into a decisive assault on the heights at Olkhovatka, but failed.

The next strike was scheduled for July 11, but by then the Germans had new reasons for concern. Soviet troops undertook reconnaissance in force in the northern sector, which marked the beginning of Zhukov's counter-offensive on Orel to the rear of the 9th Army. Model had to withdraw tank units to eliminate this new threat. By noon, Rokossovsky could report to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command that the 9th Army was confidently withdrawing its tanks from the battle. The battle on the northern face of the arc was won.

Map of the battle for the village of Ponyri

July 5-12, 1943. View from southeast
Events

1. On July 5, the German 292nd Infantry Division attacks the northern part of the village and the embankment.
2. This division is supported by the 86th and 78th Infantry Divisions, which attacked Soviet positions in and near the village.
3. On July 7, reinforced units of the 9th and 18th tank divisions attack Ponyri, but encounter Soviet minefields, artillery fire and dug-in tanks. Il-2 M-3 attack aircraft strike attacking tanks from the air.
4. In the village itself there are fierce hand-to-hand fights. Particularly heated battles took place near the water tower, school, machine and tractor and railway stations. German and Soviet troops struggled to capture these key defense points. Because of these battles, Ponyri began to be called “Kursk Stalingrad”.
5. On July 9, the 508th German Grenadier Regiment, supported by several Ferdinand self-propelled guns, finally occupied height 253.3.
6. Although by the evening of July 9, German troops advanced forward, but at the cost of very heavy losses.
7. To complete the breakthrough in this sector, Model, on the night of July 10-11, throws its last reserve, the 10th Tank Division, into the assault. By this time, the 292nd Infantry Division was drained of blood. Although the Germans occupied most of the village of Ponyri on July 12, they were never able to completely break through the Soviet defenses.

Second phase. Strike from the south

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Army Group South was the most powerful formation of German troops during the Battle of Kursk. Its offensive became a serious test for the Red Army. It was possible to stop the advance of Model’s 9th Army from the north relatively easily for a number of reasons. The Soviet command expected that the Germans would deliver the decisive blow in this direction. Therefore, a more powerful group was created on the Rokossovsky front. However, the Germans concentrated their best troops on the southern front of the arc. Vatutin's Voronezh Front had fewer tanks. Due to the greater length of the front, it was not possible to create a defense with a sufficiently high density of troops. Already at the initial stage, the German advanced units were able to quickly break through the Soviet defenses in the south.

Vatutin became aware of the exact date of the start of the German offensive, as in the north, on the evening of July 4, and he was able to organize counter-armor preparations for the German strike forces. The Germans began shelling at 03:30. In their reports, they indicated that more shells were expended in this artillery barrage than in the entire war with Poland and France in 1939 and 1940.

The main force on the left flank of the German strike force was the 48th Panzer Corps. His first task was to break through the Soviet defense line and reach the Pena River. This corps had 535 tanks and 66 assault guns. The 48th Corps was able to occupy the village of Cherkasskoye only after fierce fighting, which greatly undermined the power of this formation.

2nd SS Panzer Corps

In the center of the German group was advancing the 2nd SS Panzer Corps under the command of Paul Hausser (390 tanks and 104 assault guns, including 42 Tiger tanks out of 102 vehicles of this type as part of Army Group South). This corps was also able to advance into the first day thanks to good cooperation with aviation. But on the right flank of the German troops, the army task force "Kempf" was hopelessly stuck near the crossings of the Donets River.

These first offensive actions of the German army worried the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The Voronezh Front was reinforced with infantry and tanks.

Despite this, the next day the German SS panzer divisions continued their success. The powerful 100 mm frontal armor and 88 mm guns of the advancing Tiger 1 tanks made them almost invulnerable to fire from Soviet guns and tanks. By the evening of July 6, the Germans broke through another Soviet defense line.

Resilience of the Red Army

However, the failure of Task Force Kempf on the right flank meant that the II SS Panzer Corps would have to cover its right flank with its own regular units, which hampered the advance. On July 7, the actions of German tanks were greatly hampered by massive raids by the Soviet Air Force. Still, on July 8, it seemed that the 48th Tank Corps would be able to break through to Oboyan and attack the flanks of the Soviet defense. On that day, the Germans occupied Syrtsovo, despite persistent counterattacks by Soviet tank units. The T-34s were met by heavy fire from Tiger tanks of the elite Grossdeutschland tank division (104 tanks and 35 assault guns). Both sides suffered heavy losses.

During July 10, the 48th Tank Corps continued to attack Oboyan, but by this time the German command had decided only to simulate an attack in this direction. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was ordered to attack Soviet tank units in the Prokhorovka area. Having won this battle, the Germans would have been able to break through the defenses and enter the Soviet rear into operational space. Prokhorovka was to become the site of a tank battle that would decide the fate of the entire Battle of Kursk.

Map of the defense of Cherkasy

Attack of the 48th Tank Corps on July 5, 1943 - view from the south
Events:

1. On the night of July 4-5, German sappers clear passages in Soviet minefields.
2. At 04:00, the Germans begin artillery preparation along the entire front of the 4th Tank Army.
3. New Panther tanks of the 10th Tank Brigade begin the offensive with the support of the fusilier regiment of the Grossdeutschland division. But almost immediately they stumble upon Soviet minefields. The infantry suffered heavy losses, the battle formations were mixed up, and the tanks stopped under concentrated hurricane fire from Soviet anti-tank and field artillery. Sappers came forward to remove the mines. Thus, the entire left flank of the 48th Tank Corps' offensive stood up. The Panthers were then deployed to support the main forces of the Grossdeutschland division.
4. The offensive of the main forces of the Grossdeutschland division began at 05:00. At the head of the strike group, a company of Tiger tanks from this division, supported by Pz.IV, Panther tanks and assault guns, broke through the Soviet defense line in front of the village of Cherkasskoe. In fierce battles, this area was occupied by battalions of the Grenadier Regiment; by 09:15 the Germans reached the village.
5. To the right of the Grossdeutschland division, the 11th Panzer Division breaks through the Soviet defense line.
6. Soviet troops offer stubborn resistance - the area in front of the village is filled with destroyed German tanks and anti-tank guns; A group of armored vehicles was withdrawn from the 11th Panzer Division to attack the eastern flank of the Soviet defense.
7. Lieutenant General Chistyakov, commander of the 6th Guards Army, reinforces the 67th Guards Rifle Division with two regiments of anti-tank guns to repel the German offensive. It did not help. By noon the Germans broke into the village. Soviet troops were forced to retreat.
8. Powerful defense and resistance of the Soviet troops stop the 11th Panzer Division in front of the bridge on the Psel River, which they planned to capture on the first day of the offensive.

Third stage. Battle of Prokhovka

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On July 12, German and Soviet tanks collided in a battle near Prokhorovka, which decided the fate of the entire Battle of Kursk. On July 11, the German offensive on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge reached its culmination. Three significant events occurred that day. First, in the west, the 48th Panzer Corps reached the Pena River and prepared for a further attack to the west. In this direction there remained defensive lines through which the Germans still had to break through. Soviet troops constantly launched counterattacks, limiting the Germans' freedom of action. Since the German troops now had to advance further east, to Prokhorovka, the advance of the 48th Tank Corps was suspended.

Also on July 11, the Army's Task Force Kempf, on the far right flank of the German advance, finally began to advance north. She broke through the Red Army's defenses between Melekhovo and Sazhnoye station. Three tank divisions of the Kempf group could advance to Prokhorovka. 300 units of German armored vehicles went to support an even larger group of 600 tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which was approaching this city from the west. The Soviet command was preparing to meet their rapid advance to the east with an organized counterattack. This German maneuver was dangerous for the entire defense system of the Soviet army, and forces were gathered in this area to prepare for the decisive battle with a powerful German armored group.

July 12th is the decisive day

Throughout the short summer night, Soviet and German tank crews prepared their vehicles for the battle that lay ahead the next day. Long before dawn, the roar of warming tank engines was heard in the night. Soon their bass roar filled the entire area.

The SS Tank Corps was opposed by the 5th Guards Tank Army (Steppe Front) of Lieutenant General Rotmistrov with attached and supporting units. From his command post southwest of Prokhorovka, Rotmistrov observed the positions of Soviet troops, which at that moment were bombed by German aircraft. Then three SS tank divisions went on the offensive: Totenkopf, Leibstandarte and Das Reich, with Tiger tanks in the vanguard. At 08:30, Soviet artillery opened fire on German troops. Following this, Soviet tanks entered the battle. Of the 900 tanks of the Red Army, only 500 vehicles were T-34s. They attacked German Tiger and Panther tanks at top speeds to prevent the enemy from exploiting the superior guns and armor of their tanks at long range. Having approached, Soviet tanks were able to hit German vehicles by firing at the weaker side armor.

A Soviet tankman recalled that first battle: “The sun helped us. It illuminated the contours of German tanks well and blinded the eyes of the enemy. The first echelon of attacking tanks of the 5th Guards Tank Army on full speed ahead crashed into the battle formations of the Nazi troops. The through tank attack was so swift that the front ranks of our tanks penetrated the entire formation, the entire battle formation of the enemy. The battle formations were mixed up. The appearance of such a large number of our tanks on the battlefield came as a complete surprise to the enemy. Control in its advanced units and subunits soon broke down. The Nazi Tiger tanks, deprived of the advantages of their weapons in close combat, were successfully shot at by our T-34 tanks from short distances, and especially when hit on the side. Essentially it was tank hand-to-hand combat. Russian tank crews went to ram. The tanks flared up like candles when hit by direct shots, scattered into pieces from the explosion of ammunition, and turrets fell off.”

Thick black oily smoke billowed over the entire battlefield. Soviet troops failed to break through the German battle formations, but the Germans were also unable to achieve success in the offensive. This situation continued throughout the first half of the day. The attack by the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions began successfully, but Rotmistrov brought in his last reserves and stopped them, albeit at the cost of significant losses. The Leibstandarte division, for example, reported that it had destroyed 192 Soviet tanks and 19 anti-tank guns, losing only 30 of its tanks. By evening, the 5th Guards Tank Army had lost up to 50 percent of its fighting vehicles, but the Germans also suffered damage to the tune of about 300 of the 600 tanks and assault guns that attacked in the morning.

Defeat of the German army

The Germans could have won this colossal tank battle if the 3rd Panzer Corps (300 tanks and 25 assault guns) had come to the rescue from the south, but they failed. The units of the Red Army opposing him skillfully and staunchly defended themselves, so that the Kempf army group did not manage to break through to Rotmistrov’s positions until the evening.

From July 13 to July 15, German units continued to conduct offensive operations, but by that time they had already lost the battle. On July 13, the Fuhrer informed the commanders of Army Group South (Field Marshal von Manstein) and Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Kluge) that he had decided to abandon the continuation of Operation Citadel.

Map of the tank battle near Prokhorovka

Hausser tank attack on the morning of July 12, 1943, as seen from the southeast.
Events:

1. Even before 08:30, Luftwaffe planes begin intensive bombing of Soviet positions near Prokhorovka. The 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" advance in a tight wedge with Tiger tanks at the head and the lighter Pz.III and IV on the flanks.
2. At the same time, the first groups of Soviet tanks emerge from camouflaged shelters and rush towards the advancing enemy. Soviet tanks crash into the center of the German armored armada at high speed, thereby reducing the advantage of the Tigers' long-range guns.
3. The clash of armored “fists” turns into a fierce and chaotic battle, breaking up into many local actions and individual tank battles at very close range (the fire was almost point-blank). Soviet tanks seek to envelop the flanks of the heavier German vehicles, while the Tigers fire from the spot. All day and even into the approaching dusk, a fierce battle continues.
4. Shortly before noon, the Totenkopf division is attacked by two Soviet corps. The Germans are forced to go on the defensive. In a fierce battle that lasted all day on July 12, this division suffered heavy losses in men and military equipment.
5. All day long the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" has been fighting very hard battles with the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. Soviet tanks steadfastly hold back the advance of the German division. By the end of the day, the battle continues even after dark. The Soviet command allegedly estimates the losses of both sides during the battle of Prokhorovka at 700 vehicles

Results of the Battle of Kursk

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The result of the victory in the battle of Kursk was the transfer of strategic initiative to the Red Army. On the outcome Battle of Kursk influenced, among other things, by the fact that a thousand kilometers to the west the Allies landed in Sicily (Operation Husky). For the German command, this meant the need to withdraw troops from the Eastern Front. The results of the German general offensive near Kursk were disastrous. The courage and tenacity of the Soviet troops, as well as the selfless work in the construction of the most powerful field fortifications ever created, stopped the selected Wehrmacht tank divisions.

As soon as the German offensive stalled, the Red Army prepared its offensive. It started in the north. Having stopped Model's 9th Army, Soviet troops immediately went on the offensive on the Oryol salient, which jutted deep into the Soviet front. It began on July 12 and became the main reason for Model’s refusal on the northern front to continue the advance, which could affect the course of the battle of Prokhorovka. The model himself had to fight desperate defensive battles. The Soviet offensive on the Oryol salient (Operation Kutuzov) failed to divert significant Wehrmacht forces, but German troops suffered heavy losses. By mid-August, they retreated to a prepared defense line (the Hagen line). In the battles since July 5, Army Group Center lost up to 14 divisions, which could not be replenished.

On the southern front, the Red Army suffered serious losses, especially in the battle of Prokhorovka, but was able to pin down the German units wedged into the Kursk ledge. On July 23, the Germans were forced to retreat to the positions they had occupied before the start of Operation Citadel. Now the Red Army was ready to liberate Kharkov and Belgorod. On August 3, Operation Rumyantsev began, and by August 22, the Germans were driven out of Kharkov. By September 15, von Manstein's Army Group South had retreated to the western bank of the Dnieper.

Losses in the Battle of Kursk are assessed differently. This is due to a number of reasons. For example, defensive battles near Kursk from July 5 to 14 smoothly flowed into the phase of the Soviet counteroffensive. While Army Group South was still trying to continue its advance at Prokhorovka on 13 and 14 July, the Soviet offensive had already begun against Army Group Center in Operation Kutuzov, which is often seen as separate from the Battle of Kursk. German reports, hastily compiled during intense fighting and then rewritten after the fact, are extremely inaccurate and incomplete, while the advancing Red Army had no time to count its losses after the battle. The enormous importance that these data had from the point of view of propaganda of both sides was also reflected.

According to some studies, for example, Colonel David Glanz, from July 5 to July 20, the 9th Army of Army Group Center lost 20,720 people, and the formations of Army Group South - 29,102 people. Total – 49,822 people. The losses of the Red Army, according to rather controversial data used by Western analysts, for some reason turned out to be more than three times higher: 177,847 people. Of these, 33,897 people were lost by the Central Front and 73,892 people by the Voronezh Front. Another 70,058 people were lost to the Steppe Front, which acted as the main reserve.

The losses of armored vehicles are also difficult to estimate. Often damaged tanks were repaired or restored the same or the next day, even under enemy fire. Taking into account the empirical law that usually up to 20 percent of damaged tanks are completely written off, in the Battle of Kursk German tank formations lost 1b12 vehicles damaged, of which 323 units were irretrievable. The losses of Soviet tanks are estimated at 1,600 vehicles. This is explained by the fact that the Germans had more powerful tank guns.

During Operation Citadel, the Germans lost up to 150 aircraft, and up to 400 more were lost during the subsequent offensive. The Red Army Air Force lost over 1,100 aircraft.

The Battle of Kursk became the turning point of the war on the Eastern Front. The Wehrmacht was no longer able to conduct general offensives. Germany's defeat was only a matter of time. That is why, since July 1943, many strategically thinking German military leaders realized that the war was lost.

The Battle of Kursk, in its scale, military and political significance, is rightfully considered one of the key battles not only of the Great Patriotic War, but also of the Second World War. The Battle of Kursk finally established the power of the Red Army and completely broke the morale of the Wehrmacht forces. After it, the German army completely lost its offensive potential.

The Battle of Kursk, or as it is also called in Russian historiography, the Battle of Kursk, is one of the decisive battles during the Great Patriotic War, which took place in the summer of 1943 (July 5-August 23).

Historians call the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk two of the most significant victories of the Red Army against the Wehrmacht forces, which completely turned the tide of hostilities.

In this article we will find out the date of the Battle of Kursk and its role and significance during the war, as well as its causes, course and results.

The historical significance of the Battle of Kursk is difficult to overestimate. If not for the exploits of Soviet soldiers during the battle, the Germans were able to seize the initiative on the Eastern Front and resume the offensive, again moving towards Moscow and Leningrad. During the battle, the Red Army defeated most of the Wehrmacht's combat-ready units on the Eastern Front, and it lost the opportunity to use fresh reserves, since they were already depleted.

In honor of the victory, August 23 forever became the Day of Military Glory of Russia. In addition, the battles included the largest and bloodiest tank battle in history, and also involved a huge amount of aircraft and other types of equipment.

The Battle of Kursk is also called the Battle of the Arc of Fire - all because of the critical importance of this operation and the bloody battles that took hundreds of thousands of lives.

The Battle of Stalingrad, which occurred earlier than the battle on the Kursk Bulge, completely destroyed the German plans for the rapid capture of the USSR. According to the Barbarossa plan and the Blitzkrieg tactics, the Germans tried to take the USSR in one fell swoop even before winter. Now the Soviet Union had gathered its strength and was able to pose a serious challenge to the Wehrmacht.

During the Battle of Kursk from July 5 to August 23, 1943, historians estimate that at least 200 thousand soldiers were killed and more than half a million were wounded. It is important to note that many historians consider these figures to be underestimated and the losses of the parties in the Battle of Kursk may have been much more significant. It is mainly foreign historians who speak about the bias of these data.

Intelligence service

Played a huge role in the victory over Germany Soviet intelligence, who was able to learn about the so-called Operation Citadel. Soviet intelligence officers began receiving reports of this operation at the beginning of 1943. On April 12, 1943, a document was placed on the Soviet leader’s desk, which contained full information about the operation - the date of its conduct, the tactics and strategy of the German army. It was difficult to imagine what would have happened if intelligence had not done its job. Probably, the Germans would still have been able to break through the Russian defense, since the preparations for Operation Citadel were serious - they prepared for it no worse than for Operation Barbarossa.

On this moment historians are unsure exactly who exactly delivered this important knowledge to Stalin. It is believed that this information was obtained by one of the British intelligence officers, John Cancross, as well as a member of the so-called “Cambridge Five” (a group of British intelligence officers who were recruited by the USSR in the early 1930s and worked for two governments at once).

There is also an opinion that information about the plans of the German command was conveyed by the intelligence officers of the Dora group, namely the Hungarian intelligence officer Sandor Rado.

Some historians believe that all the information about Operation Citadel was conveyed to Moscow by one of the most famous intelligence officers of the Second World War, Rudolf Ressler, who was in Switzerland at that time.

Substantial support for the USSR was provided by British agents who were not recruited by the Union. During the Ultra program, British intelligence managed to hack the German Lorenz encryption machine, which transmitted messages between members of the senior leadership of the Third Reich. The first step was to intercept the plans for the summer offensive in the area of ​​Kursk and Belgorod, after which this information was immediately sent to Moscow.

Before the start of the Battle of Kursk, Zhukov claimed that as soon as he saw the future battlefield, he already knew how the strategic offensive of the German army would proceed. However, there is no confirmation of his words - it is believed that in his memoirs he simply exaggerates his strategic talent.

Thus, the Soviet Union knew about all the details of the offensive operation “Citadel” and was able to adequately prepare for it so as not to leave the Germans a chance to win.

Preparing for battle

At the beginning of 1943, the German and Soviet armies carried out offensive actions that led to the formation of a bulge in the center of the Soviet-German front, reaching a depth of 150 kilometers. This ledge was called the “Kursk Bulge”. In April, it became clear to both sides that one of the key battles would soon begin for this ledge, which could decide the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front.

There was no consensus at German headquarters. For a long time, Hitler could not develop an exact strategy for the summer of 1943. Many generals, including Manstein, were against the offensive at the moment. He believed that the offensive would make sense if it began right now, and not in the summer, when the Red Army could prepare for it. The rest either believed it was time to go on the defensive or launch an offensive in the summer.

Despite the fact that the most experienced military leader of the Reich (Manshetein) was against it, Hitler still agreed to launch an offensive in early July 1943.

The Battle of Kursk in 1943 was the Union’s chance to consolidate the initiative after the victory at Stalingrad, and therefore the preparation for the operation was taken with previously unprecedented seriousness.

The situation at the USSR headquarters was much better. Stalin was aware of the German plans; he had a numerical advantage in infantry, tanks, guns and aircraft. Knowing how and when the Germans would attack, Soviet soldiers prepared defensive fortifications and laid minefields to meet them in order to repel the attack and then launch a counteroffensive. A huge role in the successful defense was played by the experience of Soviet military leaders, who, after two years of military operations, were still able to develop the tactics and strategy of waging war among the best military leaders of the Reich. The fate of Operation Citadel was sealed even before it began.

Plans and strengths of the parties

The German command planned to conduct a major offensive operation on the Kursk Bulge under the name (code name) "Citadel". In order to destroy the Soviet defense, the Germans decided to launch descending attacks from the north (area of ​​the city of Orel) and from the south (area of ​​the city of Belgorod). Having broken the enemy defenses, the Germans had to unite in the area of ​​​​the city of Kursk, thus completely encircling the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts. In addition, the German tank units had to turn in an eastern direction - to the village of Prokhorovka, and destroy the armored reserves of the Red Army so that they could not come to the aid of the main forces and would not help them get out of the encirclement. Such tactics were not at all new for German generals. Their tank flank attacks worked for four. Using such tactics, they were able to conquer almost all of Europe and inflict many crushing defeats on the Red Army in 1941-1942.

To carry out Operation Citadel, the Germans concentrated 50 divisions with a total number of 900 thousand people in Eastern Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. Of these, 18 divisions were tank and motorized. Such a large number of tank divisions was common for the Germans. The Wehrmacht forces always used lightning attacks from tank units to prevent the enemy from even having a chance to group and fight back. In 1939, it was the tank divisions that played a key role in the capture of France, which surrendered before it could fight.

The commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht forces were Field Marshal von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Manstein (Army Group South). The strike forces were commanded by Field Marshal Model, the 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf were commanded by General Hermann Hoth.

Before the start of the battle, the German army received long-awaited tank reserves. Hitler sent more than 100 heavy Tiger tanks, almost 200 Panther tanks (first used at the Battle of Kursk) and less than a hundred Ferdinand or Elefant (Elephant) tank destroyers to the Eastern Front.

"Tigers", "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" were some of the most powerful tanks during the Second World War. Neither the Allies nor the USSR at that time had tanks that could boast such firepower and armor. If Soviet soldiers had already seen the “Tigers” and learned to fight against them, then the “Panthers” and “Ferdinands” caused many problems on the battlefield.

The Panthers were medium tanks that were slightly inferior in armor to the Tigers and were armed with a 7.5 cm KwK 42 cannon. These guns had an excellent rate of fire and fired over long distances with great accuracy.

"Ferdinand" is a heavy self-propelled anti-tank gun (tank destroyer), which was one of the most famous during the Second World War. Despite the fact that its numbers were small, it offered serious resistance to USSR tanks, since at that time it had perhaps the best armor and firepower. During the Battle of Kursk, the Ferdinands showed their power, perfectly withstanding hits from anti-tank guns, and even coped with artillery hits. However, its main problem was the small number of anti-personnel machine guns, and therefore the tank destroyer was very vulnerable to infantry, which could get close to it and blow them up. It was simply impossible to destroy these tanks with head-on shots. The weak points were on the sides, where they later learned to fire sub-caliber shells. The most vulnerable point in the tank’s defense was the weak chassis, which was disabled, and then the stationary tank was captured.

In total, Manstein and Kluge received less than 350 new tanks at their disposal, which was catastrophically insufficient, given the number of Soviet armored forces. It is also worth highlighting that approximately 500 tanks used during the Battle of Kursk were obsolete models. These are Pz.II and Pz.III tanks, which were already out of date at that time.

The 2nd Panzer Army during the Battle of Kursk included elite Panzerwaffe tank units, including the 1st SS Panzer Division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "DasReich" and the famous 3rd Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (it aka "Death's Head").

The Germans had a modest number of aircraft to support infantry and tanks - about 2,500 thousand units. In the number of guns and mortars, the German army was more than twice as inferior to the Soviet army, and some sources indicate a threefold advantage of the USSR in guns and mortars.

The Soviet command realized its mistakes in conducting defensive operations in 1941-1942. This time they built a powerful defensive line capable of holding off a massive offensive by German armored forces. According to the command's plans, the Red Army was supposed to wear down the enemy with defensive battles, and then launch a counter-offensive at the most unfavorable moment for the enemy.

During the Battle of Kursk, the commander of the Central Front was one of the most talented and effective generals in the army - Konstantin Rokossovsky. His troops took upon themselves the task of defending the northern front of the Kursk ledge. The commander of the Voronezh Front on the Kursk Bulge was a native of the Voronezh region, Army General Nikolai Vatutin, on whose shoulders fell the task of defending the southern front of the salient. USSR Marshals Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky coordinated the actions of the Red Army.

The ratio of troop numbers was far from being on Germany's side. According to estimates, the Central and Voronezh Fronts had 1.9 million soldiers, including units of the Steppe Front (Steppe Military District). The number of Wehrmacht fighters did not exceed 900 thousand people. In terms of the number of tanks, Germany was less than twice as inferior: 2.5 thousand versus less than 5 thousand. As a result, the balance of forces before the Battle of Kursk looked like this: 2:1 in favor of the USSR. Great Patriotic War historian Alexey Isaev says that the strength of the Red Army during the battle is overestimated. His point of view is subject to great criticism, since he does not take into account the troops of the Steppe Front (the number of fighters of the Steppe Front who participated in the operations amounted to more than 500 thousand people).

Kursk defensive operation

Before you give Full description events on the Kursk Bulge, it is important to show a map of actions to make it easier to navigate the information. Battle of Kursk on the map:

This picture shows the diagram of the Battle of Kursk. A map of the Battle of Kursk can clearly show how combat units acted during the battle. On the map of the Battle of Kursk you will also see symbols that will help you assimilate the information.

The Soviet generals received all the necessary orders - the defense was strong and the Germans would soon face resistance, which the Wehrmacht had not received in the entire history of its existence. On the day the Battle of Kursk began, the Soviet army pulled up a huge amount of artillery to the front in order to provide a response artillery barrage, which the Germans would not expect.

The beginning of the Battle of Kursk (defensive stage) was scheduled for the morning of July 5 - the offensive was supposed to take place immediately from the northern and southern fronts. Before the tank attack, the Germans carried out large-scale bombing, to which the Soviet army responded in kind. At this point, the German command (namely Field Marshal Manstein) began to realize that the Russians had learned about Operation Citadel and were able to prepare a defense. Manstein told Hitler more than once that this offensive at the moment no longer made sense. He believed that it was necessary to carefully prepare the defense and try to first repel the Red Army and only then think about counterattacks.

Start - Arc of Fire

On the northern front, the offensive began at six o'clock in the morning. The Germans attacked a little west of the Cherkassy direction. The first tank attacks ended in failure for the Germans. The strong defense led to heavy losses in the German armored units. And yet the enemy managed to penetrate 10 kilometers deep. On the southern front the offensive began at three o'clock in the morning. The main blows fell on the settlements of Oboyan and Korochi.

The Germans were unable to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops, since they were carefully prepared for battle. Even the Wehrmacht's elite tank divisions were barely making any progress. As soon as it became clear that German forces could not break through on the northern and southern fronts, the command decided that it was necessary to strike in the Prokhorovsk direction.

On July 11, heavy fighting began near the village of Prokhorovka, which escalated into the largest tank battle in history. Soviet tanks in the Battle of Kursk outnumbered German tanks, but despite this, the enemy resisted to the end. July 13-23 - The Germans are still trying to carry out offensive attacks, which end in failure. On July 23, the enemy completely exhausted its offensive potential and decided to go on the defensive.

Tank battle

It is difficult to answer how many tanks were involved on both sides, since data from different sources differs. If we take average data, then the number of USSR tanks reached about 1 thousand vehicles. While the Germans had about 700 tanks.

The tank battle (battle) during the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge took place on July 12, 1943. Enemy attacks on Prokhorovka began immediately from the western and southern directions. Four tank divisions were advancing in the west and about 300 more tanks were sent from the south.

The battle began early in the morning and the Soviet troops gained an advantage, since the rising sun shone directly into the Germans’ tank observation devices. The battle formations of the sides quickly became mixed up, and just a few hours after the start of the battle it was difficult to tell where whose tanks were.

The Germans found themselves in a very difficult position, since the main strength of their tanks lay in long-range guns, which were useless in close combat, and the tanks themselves were very slow, while in this situation maneuverability was key. The 2nd and 3rd tank (anti-tank) armies of the Germans were defeated near Kursk. Russian tanks, on the contrary, gained an advantage, since they had a chance to target the vulnerable spots of heavily armored German tanks, and they themselves were very maneuverable (this is especially true of the famous T-34).

However, the Germans still gave a serious rebuff with their anti-tank guns, which undermined the morale of the Russian tank crews - the fire was so dense that the soldiers and tanks did not have time and could not form formations.

While the bulk of the tank forces were engaged in battle, the Germans decided to use the Kempf tank group, which was advancing on the left flank of the Soviet army. To repel this attack it was necessary to use the tank reserves of the Red Army. In the southern direction, already by 14.00, Soviet troops began to push back German tank units, which did not have fresh reserves. In the evening, the battlefield was already far behind the Soviet tank units and the battle was won.

Tank losses on both sides during the battle of Prokhorovka during the Kursk defensive operation were as follows:

  • about 250 Soviet tanks;
  • 70 German tanks.

The above figures are irrecoverable losses. The number of damaged tanks was significantly greater. For example, after the Battle of Prokhorovka, the Germans had only 1/10 fully combat-ready vehicles.

The Battle of Prokhorovka is called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not entirely true. In fact, this is the largest tank battle that lasted only one day. But the largest battle took place two years earlier, also between the forces of the Germans and the USSR on the Eastern Front near Dubno. During this battle, which began on June 23, 1941, 4,500 tanks collided with each other. The Soviet Union had 3,700 units of equipment, while the Germans had only 800 units.

Despite such a numerical advantage of the Union tank units, there was not a single chance of victory. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the quality of the Germans' tanks was much higher - they were armed with new models with good anti-tank armor and weapons. Secondly, in Soviet military thought at that time there was a principle that “tanks do not fight tanks.” Most tanks in the USSR at that time had only bulletproof armor and could not penetrate the thick German armor themselves. That is why the first largest tank battle became a catastrophic failure for the USSR.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk ended on July 23, 1943 with the complete victory of Soviet troops and the crushing defeat of the Wehrmacht forces. As a result of the bloody battles, the German army was exhausted and bleeding, a significant number of tanks were either destroyed or partially lost their combat effectiveness. The German tanks that took part in the battle of Prokhorovka were almost completely disabled, destroyed, or fell into enemy hands.

The loss ratio during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk was as follows: 4.95:1. The Soviet army lost five times as many soldiers, while German losses were much smaller. However, a huge number of German soldiers were wounded, as well as tank troops destroyed, which significantly undermined the combat power of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.

As a result of the defensive operation, Soviet troops reached the line they occupied before the German offensive, which began on July 5. The Germans went into deep defense.

During the Battle of Kursk, a radical change occurred. After the Germans exhausted their offensive capabilities, the Red Army counteroffensive began on the Kursk Bulge. From July 17 to July 23, Soviet troops carried out the Izyum-Barvenkovskaya offensive operation.

The operation was carried out by the Southwestern Front of the Red Army. Its key goal was to pin down the enemy’s Donbass group so that the enemy would not be able to transfer fresh reserves to the Kursk Bulge. Despite the fact that the enemy threw perhaps his best tank divisions into battle, the forces of the Southwestern Front still managed to capture bridgeheads and pin down and encircle the Donbass German group with powerful blows. Thus, the Southwestern Front significantly helped in the defense of the Kursk Bulge.

Mius offensive operation

From July 17 to August 2, 1943, the Mius offensive operation was also carried out. The main task of the Soviet troops during the operation was to pull fresh German reserves from the Kursk Bulge to the Donbass and defeat the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht. To repel the attack in the Donbass, the Germans had to transfer significant air forces and tank units to protect the city. Despite the fact that Soviet troops failed to break through the German defenses near Donbass, they still managed to significantly weaken the offensive on the Kursk Bulge.

The offensive stage of the Battle of Kursk continued successfully for the Red Army. The next important battles on the Kursk Bulge took place near Orel and Kharkov - the offensive operations were called “Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev”.

The offensive Operation Kutuzov began on July 12, 1943 in the area of ​​the city of Orel, where Soviet troops were confronted by two German armies. As a result of bloody battles, the Germans were unable to hold a bridgehead; on July 26, they retreated. Already on August 5, the city of Orel was liberated by the Red Army. It was on August 5, 1943 that for the first time during the entire period of hostilities with Germany, a small parade with fireworks took place in the capital of the USSR. Thus, it can be judged that the liberation of Orel was an extremely important task for the Red Army, which it successfully completed.

Offensive operation "Rumyantsev"

The next main event of the Battle of Kursk during its offensive phase began on August 3, 1943 on the southern face of the arc. As already mentioned, this strategic offensive was called “Rumyantsev”. The operation was carried out by forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Front.

Just two days after the start of the operation, on August 5, the city of Belgorod was liberated from the Nazis. And two days later, the forces of the Red Army liberated the city of Bogodukhov. During the offensive on August 11, Soviet soldiers managed to cut the German Kharkov-Poltava railway line. Despite all the counterattacks of the German army, the Red Army forces continued to advance. As a result of fierce fighting on August 23, the city of Kharkov was recaptured.

The Battle of Kursk was already won by Soviet troops at that moment. The German command also understood this, but Hitler gave a clear order to “stand until the last.”

The Mginsk offensive operation began on July 22 and lasted until August 22, 1943. The main goals of the USSR were as follows: to finally disrupt the German plan of attack on Leningrad, to prevent the enemy from transferring forces to the west and to completely destroy the 18th Army of the Wehrmacht.

The operation began with a powerful artillery strike in the enemy direction. The forces of the parties at the start of the operation on the Kursk Bulge looked like this: 260 thousand soldiers and about 600 tanks on the side of the USSR, and 100 thousand people and 150 tanks on the side of the Wehrmacht.

Despite strong artillery bombardment, the German army put up fierce resistance. Although the Red Army forces managed to immediately capture the first echelon of the enemy’s defense, they were unable to advance further.

At the beginning of August 1943, having received fresh reserves, the Red Army again began to attack German positions. Thanks to numerical superiority and powerful mortar fire, USSR soldiers managed to capture the enemy’s defensive fortifications in the village of Porechye. However, the spacecraft again could not advance further - the German defense was too dense.

A fierce battle between the opposing sides during the operation unfolded over Sinyaevo and Sinyaevskie Heights, which were captured by Soviet troops several times, and then they went back to the Germans. The fighting was fierce and both sides suffered heavy losses. The German defense was so strong that the spacecraft command decided to stop the offensive operation on August 22, 1943 and switch to a defensive defense. Thus, the Mgin offensive operation did not bring final success, although it played an important strategic role. To repel this attack, the Germans had to use reserves that were supposed to go to Kursk.

Smolensk offensive operation

Until the Soviet counteroffensive in the Battle of Kursk 1943 began, it was extremely important for the Headquarters to defeat as many enemy units as possible that the Wehrmacht could send under the Kursk to contain the Soviet troops. In order to weaken the enemy’s defenses and deprive him of the help of reserves, the Smolensk offensive operation was carried out. The Smolensk direction adjoined the western region of the Kursk salient. The operation was codenamed "Suvorov" and began on August 7, 1943. The offensive was launched by the forces of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, as well as the entire Western Front.

The operation ended in success, since it marked the beginning of the liberation of Belarus. However, most importantly, the military leaders of the Battle of Kursk achieved pinning down as many as 55 enemy divisions, preventing them from heading to Kursk - this significantly increased the chances of the Red Army forces during the counteroffensive near Kursk.

To weaken the enemy’s positions near Kursk, the Red Army carried out another operation - the Donbass offensive. The parties’ plans for the Donbass basin were very serious, because this place served as an important economic center - Donetsk mines were extremely important for the USSR and Germany. There was a huge German group in the Donbass, which numbered more than 500 thousand people.

The operation began on August 13, 1943 and was carried out by the forces of the Southwestern Front. On August 16, the Red Army forces met serious resistance on the Mius River, where there was a heavily fortified defensive line. On August 16, the forces of the Southern Front entered the battle and managed to break through the enemy defenses. Of all the regiments, the 67th stood out especially in battles. The successful offensive continued and on August 30 the spacecraft liberated the city of Taganrog.

On August 23, 1943, the offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Kursk itself ended, but the Donbass offensive operation continued - the spacecraft forces had to push the enemy beyond the Dnieper River.

Now important strategic positions were lost for the Germans and the threat of dismemberment and death loomed over Army Group South. To prevent this, the leader of the Third Reich nevertheless allowed her to retreat beyond the Dnieper.

On September 1, all German units in this area began to retreat from Donbass. On September 5, Gorlovka was liberated, and three days later, during the fighting, Stalino, or as the city is now called, Donetsk, was taken.

The retreat for the German army was very difficult. The Wehrmacht forces were running low on ammunition for their artillery guns. During the retreat, German soldiers actively used “scorched earth” tactics. The Germans killed civilians and burned villages and small towns along their route. During the Battle of Kursk 1943, retreating through cities, the Germans plundered everything they could get their hands on.

On September 22, the Germans were pushed back across the Dnieper River in the area of ​​the cities of Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk. After this, the Donbass offensive operation came to an end, ending in complete success for the Red Army.

All the above operations led to the fact that the Wehrmacht forces, as a result of the fighting in the Battle of Kursk, were forced to retreat beyond the Dnieper in order to build new defensive lines. The victory in the Battle of Kursk was the result of the increased courage and fighting spirit of Soviet soldiers, the skill of commanders and the competent use of military equipment.

The Battle of Kursk in 1943, and then the Battle of the Dnieper, finally secured the initiative on the Eastern Front for the USSR. No one doubted anymore that victory in the Great Patriotic War would be for the USSR. Germany’s allies also understood this, and they began to gradually abandon the Germans, leaving the Reich even less chance.

Many historians also believe that the Allied offensive on the island of Sicily, which at that moment was occupied mainly by Italian troops, played an important role in the victory over the Germans during the Battle of Kursk.

On July 10, the Allies launched an attack on Sicily and Italian troops surrendered to British and American forces with virtually no resistance. This greatly spoiled Hitler’s plans, since in order to retain Western Europe he had to transfer some troops from the Eastern Front, which again weakened the German positions near Kursk. Already on July 10, Manstein told Hitler that the offensive near Kursk must be stopped and go into deep defense beyond the Dnieper River, but Hitler still hoped that the enemy would not be able to defeat the Wehrmacht.

Everyone knows that the Battle of Kursk during the Great Patriotic War was bloody and the date of its beginning is associated with the death of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. However, there were also funny (interesting) facts during the Battle of Kursk. One of these cases involves the KV-1 tank.

During a tank battle, one of the Soviet KV-1 tanks stalled and the crew ran out of ammunition. He was opposed by two German Pz.IV tanks, which could not penetrate the KV-1’s armor. German tank crews tried to get to the Soviet crew by sawing through the armor, but nothing worked. Then two Pz.IVs decided to drag the KV-1 to their base to deal with the tankers there. They hooked up the KV-1 and began towing it. About halfway there, the KV-1 engine suddenly started and the Soviet tank dragged two Pz.IVs with it to its base. The German tank crews were shocked and simply abandoned their tanks.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

If the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad ended the period of defense of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War, then the end of the Battle of Kursk marked a radical turning point in the course of hostilities.

After a report (message) about the victory in the Battle of Kursk arrived on Stalin’s desk, the General Secretary stated that this was only the beginning and very soon the Red Army troops would oust the Germans from the occupied territories of the USSR.

The events after the Battle of Kursk, of course, did not unfold simply for the Red Army. Victories were accompanied by huge losses, because the enemy stubbornly held the line.

The liberation of cities after the Battle of Kursk continued, for example, already in November 1943, the capital of the Ukrainian SSR, the city of Kyiv, was liberated.

A very important result of the Battle of Kursk - change in the Allies' attitude towards the USSR. A report to the US President, written in August, stated that the USSR now occupied a dominant position in World War II. There is proof of this. If Germany allocated only two divisions for the defense of Sicily against the combined forces of Great Britain and the United States, then on the Eastern Front the USSR attracted the attention of two hundred German divisions.

The US was very worried about the Russian successes on the Eastern Front. Roosevelt said that if the USSR continued to pursue such success, the opening of a “second front” would be unnecessary and the United States would then not be able to influence the fate of Europe without benefit to itself. Consequently, the opening of a “second front” should follow as quickly as possible, while US assistance was needed at all.

The failure of Operation Citadel entailed the disruption of further strategic offensive operations of the Wehrmacht, which had already been prepared for execution. A victory at Kursk would make it possible to develop an offensive against Leningrad, and after that the Germans set off to occupy Sweden.

The result of the Battle of Kursk was the undermining of Germany's authority among its allies. The successes of the USSR on the Eastern Front provided the opportunity for the Americans and British to expand in Western Europe. After such a crushing defeat for Germany, the leader of fascist Italy, Benito Mussolini, broke the agreement with Germany and left the war. Thus, Hitler lost his faithful ally.

Success, of course, came at a heavy price. The losses of the USSR in the Battle of Kursk were enormous, as were the German ones. The balance of forces has already been shown above - now it’s worth looking at the losses in the Battle of Kursk.

In fact, it is quite difficult to establish the exact number of deaths, since data from different sources differ greatly. Many historians take average figures - 200 thousand dead and three times as many wounded. The least optimistic data speaks of more than 800 thousand dead on both sides and the same number of wounded. The sides also lost a huge number of tanks and equipment. Aviation in the Battle of Kursk played almost a key role and aircraft losses amounted to about 4 thousand units on both sides. At the same time, aviation losses are the only ones where the Red Army lost no more than the German ones - each lost about 2 thousand aircraft. For example, the ratio of human losses looks like 5:1 or 4:1 according to different sources. Based on the characteristics of the Battle of Kursk, we can come to the conclusion that the effectiveness of Soviet aircraft at this stage of the war was in no way inferior to German ones, whereas at the beginning of hostilities the situation was radically different.

Soviet soldiers near Kursk showed extraordinary heroism. Their exploits were noted even abroad, especially by American and British publications. The heroism of the Red Army was also noted by German generals, including Manschein, who was considered the best military leader of the Reich. Several hundred thousand soldiers received awards “For participation in the Battle of Kursk.”

Another interesting fact is that children also took part in the Battle of Kursk. Of course, they did not fight on the front line, but they provided serious support in the rear. They helped deliver supplies and shells. And before the start of the battle, hundreds of kilometers were built with the help of children railways, which were necessary for the rapid transportation of military and supplies.

Finally, it is important to secure all the data. Date of the end and beginning of the Battle of Kursk: July 5 and August 23, 1943.

Key dates of the Battle of Kursk:

  • July 5 – 23, 1943 – Kursk strategic defensive operation;
  • July 23 – August 23, 1943 – Kursk strategic offensive operation;
  • July 12, 1943 – bloody tank battle near Prokhorovka;
  • July 17 – 27, 1943 – Izyum-Barvenkovskaya offensive operation;
  • July 17 – August 2, 1943 – Mius offensive operation;
  • July 12 – August 18, 1943 – Oryol strategic offensive operation “Kutuzov”;
  • August 3 – 23, 1943 – Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation “Rumyantsev”;
  • July 22 – August 23, 1943 – Mginsk offensive operation;
  • August 7 – October 2, 1943 – Smolensk offensive operation;
  • August 13 – September 22, 1943 – Donbass offensive operation.

Results of the Battle of the Arc of Fire:

  • a radical turn of events during the Great Patriotic War and World War II;
  • the complete fiasco of the German campaign to capture the USSR;
  • The Nazis lost confidence in the invincibility of the German army, which lowered the morale of the soldiers and led to conflicts in the ranks of the command.

The idea of ​​attacking near Kursk and cutting off the bulge of the Soviet front that had formed here arose among Hitler and his military during the Wehrmacht counteroffensive near Kharkov in February-March 1943. This counteroffensive showed that the German army was still capable of seizing the strategic initiative. In addition, the Soviet command was afraid of repeating its mistake in the spring of 1942, when attempts to attack first led to a heavy defeat near Kharkov, which determined the unsuccessful course of the entire summer campaign of 1942. The Red Army has so far been very bad at conducting an offensive in the summer.

At the suggestion of Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov and Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky this time was supposed to give the initiative of offensive actions to the enemy in advance, wear him down with stubborn defense and, after suffering heavy losses, launch a counterattack. It was no secret that the Germans would attack near Kursk.

This plan aroused objections from the commander of the Voronezh Front N.F. Vatutin, who had to repel a German attack south of Kursk. In his opinion, giving the initiative to the enemy was inappropriate. The condition of the Soviet troops and the balance of forces at the front made it possible to launch an assault. Waiting for a German strike meant, Vatutin believed, wasting time. Vatutin proposed to strike the Germans first if they did not go on the offensive before the beginning of July. Stalin instructed the commanders of the Central and Reserve (Steppe) Fronts K.K. Rokossovsky and R.Ya. Malinovsky to present his thoughts on this issue. But Zhukov and Vasilevsky defended the previously proposed plan. The Soviet offensive was supposed to begin only after the German one had broken down.