If a state goes to war, it fights for its survival. Every effort must be made to understand the art of war. This knowledge must be used for planning. A general who plans carefully before battle will defeat one who does not. Before the battle, think and plan everything. You can predict victory or defeat in advance. Compare the opposing armies point by point:

1. Which of the two rulers of the warring states achieves such complete consent and obedience from his people that they will follow him until his death?
2. Which of the two generals is more talented?
3. Which side has the advantage under circumstances such as weather, terrain, and distances to be covered?
4. Which side enforces discipline more strictly?
5. Which side has a stronger army?
6. Which side has better trained soldiers and officers?
7. Which side is more consistent in the system of rewards and punishments that enforces discipline?

Compare the enemy army with your own, find out the strengths and weak sides enemy. Plan according to your circumstances. If you know the enemy and know yourself, you will always be a winner.

Protect yourself from defeat and wait for opportunities to win

A successful strategist participates in battles only if he is confident in his victory - this protects him from defeat. And the unlucky one enters the battle and only then begins to think about how he can win. But even the most brilliant commander cannot say exactly when he will win. He must wait until the enemy makes a mistake and gives him an opportunity for victory.

To achieve victory there are rules:

1. You must know when to fight and when not to.
2. You must know how to fight stronger and weaker opponents.
3. Your army must have a strong, unified morale and discipline.
4. You must start the battle at a time when you are ready and the enemy is not.
5. You must have military power and the right to command your troops without interference from the ruler.

Be careful - attack when you have an advantage. Avoid your enemy where he is strong and attack where he is weak. Avoid the enemy army when its morale is high, its columns and banners are properly positioned, or when it has a more advantageous position, such as on high ground. Don't go into battle out of anger; you always have to fight for something. Your anger will disappear, but the destroyed state will not be reborn. Avoid enemy traps: do not lead your army into territory where supplies cannot be delivered, or where you do not know the terrain. Don't get involved with unfamiliar allies.

Rulers and generals can themselves cause defeat

The army is commanded by a general, and the general is the ruler. With his commands, the ruler can prevent the army from acting coherently. He may untimely give the command to attack or retreat; try to run the army as carelessly as the state; appoint officers to inappropriate positions. Mistakes can undermine soldiers' confidence and cause defeat.

Seven possible reasons defeats due to the general's fault:

1. An order to attack an enemy army ten times larger than your own, forcing your army to flee the battlefield.
2. Rudeness of soldiers towards officers, insubordination.
3. The weakness of soldiers is disrespect from officers and a drop in morale.
4. Indiscipline of senior officers, unauthorized attack without orders.
5. The weakness and indecision of the general is a weak, disorganized army.
6. Inability to correctly assess enemy forces.
7. Excessive concern for the comfort of his people, which hinders military tactics.

Save your resources through stratagems, foraging and espionage

Food, vehicles, clothing, weapons and ammunition for the army are expensive. A long war can exhaust the resources of any state, making it weak and vulnerable. Strive for quick and decisive victories rather than protracted military campaigns. Do not besiege fortified cities - this takes months of preparation.

The best way to reduce the cost of warfare is to capture enemy lands, cities, or armies intact rather than destroy them through costly battles. To do this, you need much greater forces than the enemy. The triumph of a skilled general is to subdue his enemies without a fight, through stratagems of war. Great fighters are distinguished by not just winning, but winning easily.

Save government resources by borrowing them from your enemy through local foraging and increase own strength weapons, armor and enemy soldiers. This saves the cost of supplying the army.

Engage intelligence officers: they obtain the most important information about the enemy, and also give them false secrets. Maintain friendly relations with your spies and reward them generously. Such a price would be very small compared to the protracted war they could help avoid. If you're basing a ploy on a secret a spy told you, kill him, as well as anyone he told the secret to, so your ploy doesn't lose its power.

Deceive your opponent and impose your will on him

The art of war is based on deception. Mask strength with weakness, courage with timidity, and order with disorganization. Confuse your opponent and let him act recklessly.

Let your troops pretend to be disorderly when in reality they are very disciplined. When you get close to the enemy, pretend you are far away. When you are able to attack, pretend you are not. Play with your enemy: if he is hot-tempered, irritate him, behave at ease, constantly disturb him. The enemy has a lot of supplies - make him starve; he calmly set up camp - make him leave.

If you want the enemy to attack, throw him some bait; If you want to force the enemy to retreat, defeat him. A smart fighter seizes the initiative and imposes his will on the enemy. Attack the enemy in weakly protected places so that he rushes to defend himself. Get him to open up so you can discover his vulnerabilities. Numerical weakness depends not only on numbers, but also on the need to be prepared for attack on many fronts.

Know the terrain and your enemy, then adapt

There are always positions that cannot be taken, roads that should not be taken, and commands from government that must be ignored. Adapt to the situation, terrain and enemy positioning. Study the area to take advantage of your natural advantages and avoid interference. To fight, do not climb to heights, go upstream or move away from water and shelter. Avoid steep cliffs, narrow passages or quagmires - in them a small army can destroy an entire army. Look for frightened birds or animals; they indicate an ambush.

Study the enemy. When soldiers stand leaning on their spears, it means they are suffering from hunger. When soldiers go for water and drink it themselves first, they suffer from thirst. And when they start eating their own livestock, forget to hang pots over camp fires, and act like they won't return to their tents, know that they are ready to fight to the death.

Adapt your tactics to the circumstances and take advantage of every opportunity as it arises.

Be strict with the troops, keep them in the dark and make them fight to the death

Management and control over a huge army is no different from managing a small one: you need to divide people into smaller groups, and then control your forces with the help of signals: gongs, drums, banners, signal fires. They will act as one: the coward will not dare to retreat, the brave will not stand guard alone.

An experienced general leads his army as if he were leading one man by the hand. Pamper your soldiers like sons, and they will stand by you to the death. But if you are not able to command them with authority, they will be as useless as spoiled children. Iron discipline is necessary among your soldiers. It is effective if your soldiers are attached to you. Treat them humanely, but keep them under control with discipline and punishment.

Keep your soldiers in the dark and change plans frequently to keep them and the enemy guessing. Change camp locations and take long, circuitous routes instead of short, straight ones. Reveal your cards only when you are deep in enemy territory.

When the situation looks rosy, tell your soldiers about it; deplorable - don’t talk about it. The further you penetrate into hostile territory, the more the soldiers will feel united. Put them in a desperate and hopeless situation, and they will lose their sense of fear and fight to the limit of their capabilities, to the death.

The most important

How to protect yourself from defeat and win?

• Planning, calculating and comparing armies leads to victory.
• Protect yourself from defeat and wait for opportunities to win.
• A war can be successful for a country only if defeat is not a consequence of the actions of its rulers and generals. === How to achieve an advantage over the enemy? ===

• Save your resources through stratagems, foraging, and espionage.
• Deceive your enemy and impose your will on him.
• Know the terrain and your enemy, then adapt accordingly.=== How to control troops? ===

To successfully wage a war, be strict with the troops, keep them in the dark and make them fight to the death.

“The Art of War” is a very ancient treatise written by the famous Chinese military leader Sun Tzu. It was found during excavations in the 20th century. It is difficult to determine the exact age of the treatise; it has been suggested that it could have been written in both the 6th and 4th centuries BC. In any case, it was written in ancient times, and what is written in it is of great value.

Sun Tzu talks about war, but it is not only a war in which people die, and everywhere there is blood, devastation, hunger and suffering of the population. The author of this book does not at all call for waging merciless wars in order to seize power. This book can be considered as a guide to waging any type of war, including psychological warfare. It is not for nothing that this book is loved by many politicians, businessmen and psychologists. It talks about conflict situations and how to get out of them without unnecessary losses.

The author of the book perceives war as the most extreme method when others have failed. He believes that it is much better to try to reach an agreement peacefully, it is better to skillfully play on the enemy’s fears, using his weaknesses, than to lead to a military clash. Sun Tzu is convinced that it is better to spend money on intelligence officers and spies than to ensure military operations, this will cost much more. And if it comes to war, it must be quick; a long war is not good for anyone. At the same time, we must not forget about the main goals and the population of the conquered territories.

You can learn a lot of useful things from the book that will be useful in everyday life, for example, when negotiating and concluding deals. The treatise will be of interest to most men and will be a wonderful gift for them.

On our website you can download the book “The Art of War” by Sun Tzu for free and without registration in fb2, rtf, epub, pdf, txt format, read the book online or buy the book in the online store.

The Art of War by Sun Tzu is one of the oldest military treatises on the art of strategy.

At the moment, it can be argued that this art is applicable in all sectors of life, be it work in corporations, firms, difficult relationships with people, and many others. etc. It is extremely interesting to consider “The Art of War” with psychological point vision.

A commander embodies wisdom, trust, humanity, courage and rigor.

War is a path of deception. Therefore, even if you are capable, show your opponent your inability. When you must bring your forces into battle, pretend to be inactive. When the target is near, make it appear as if it is far away; when she is really far away, create the impression that she is close.

Pretend to be advantageous to lure him in. Make a mess of his powers and use him.

If it's full, get ready; if he is strong, avoid him.

If he is angry, disturb him; be respectful so that he will think of himself.

If the enemy is rested, force him to exert his strength.

If it is combined, unlink it.

Attack where he is not prepared, or forward where he does not expect.

The strategy of warfare is this: if the forces are ten times greater than the enemy, surround him; if five times more, attack him; if twice as many, divide your forces. If the forces are equal, you can fight him. If you have less strength, outsmart him. If you are superior, avoid him. Therefore, he who persists with the small will become a prisoner of the big.

He who knows when to fight and when not to fight will win.

He who understands how to use great and small forces will be victorious.

The one whose tops and bottoms burn with the same desire will win.

He who, being fully prepared, waits for the unprepared, will be victorious.

He who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be in danger in a hundred battles. He who does not know the enemy, but knows himself, will either win or lose. He who knows neither the enemy nor himself will inevitably be defeated in every battle.

Invincibility lies within oneself; the possibility of victory depends on the enemy.

Therefore, one who succeeds in war can make himself invincible, but cannot necessarily make the enemy submit, which is why it is said that the strategy of defeating the enemy can be learned, but cannot always be applied.

He who cannot win takes a defensive position; whoever can win attacks. Under these circumstances, if you take a defensive position, then there will be more than enough forces, while in an attack they will be lacking.

He who knows how to defend himself burrows into the very depths of the Earth. The one who knows how to attack falls from the very heights of Heaven. In this way they can preserve themselves and achieve complete victory.

To walk a thousand miles without getting tired, cross unoccupied territories. To ensure the target is reached during an attack, strike at unprotected positions. To be sure of the strength of your defense, strengthen positions that the enemy cannot attack.

Therefore, when someone knows how to attack, the enemy does not know where to organize defense; when one knows how to defend, the enemy does not know where to attack.

The shape of the army's forces is like water. The shape of water is to avoid heights and strive downwards. The form of the army's forces is to avoid completeness and strike at emptiness. The water shapes its flow in accordance with the terrain, the army marches to victory in accordance with the enemy. Therefore, the army does not have any permanent strategic disposition of forces; Water has no permanent shape.

The commander has five dangers:

Anyone who wants to die can be killed.

He who strives to live can be captured.

Those who are easily angered and act rashly may be offended.

Anyone who wants to be conscientious and pure can be disgraced.

A person who loves people may find himself in difficulty.

·He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot fight will be the winner.

· First be like an innocent girl - and the enemy will open his door. Then be like an escaped hare - and the enemy will not have time to take measures to defend himself.

·The willingness to sacrifice oneself for the sake of fulfilling one's duty is the basis for maintaining life.

·When soldiers are in mortal danger, they are not afraid of anything; when they have no way out, they hold on tight; when they go deep into enemy land, nothing holds them back; when nothing can be done, they fight.

· War loves victory and does not like duration.

·War is the path of deception. If you can do anything, show your opponent that you can’t; if you use something, show him that you don’t use it; even if you are close, show that you are far away; even if you are far away, show that you are close.

·A person’s bad qualities and actions depend on himself.

·If you don’t know what your children are like, look at their friends.

·If you find out that you have an enemy spy and is watching you, be sure to influence him with benefit; bring him in and place him with you.

·Fighting a hundred times and winning a hundred times is not the best of the best; the best of the best is to conquer someone else's army without fighting.

·Managing many is the same as managing few. It's a matter of organization.

· In battle, numerical superiority alone does not provide an advantage. There is no need to go on the attack, relying only on naked military might.

·The best war is to defeat the enemy’s plans; in the next place - to break his alliances; in the next place - defeat his troops. The worst thing is to besiege a fortress.

·Music is the source of joy for wise people, it can evoke good thoughts among people, it penetrates deeply into their consciousness and easily changes morals and customs.

·The one who correctly points out my mistakes is my teacher; he who rightly marks my right actions is my friend; he who flatters me is my enemy.

· War is a great matter of the state, the basis of life and death, the path to survival or death. This needs to be carefully weighed and considered.

·Music is the source of joy for wise people.

· Trouble comes when people, in their laziness, forget to take care of themselves.

Sun Tzu- an outstanding Chinese strategist and thinker who presumably lived in the 6th - 5th centuries. BC e. He was the author of a famous treatise on military strategy. Biographical information about him was recorded by Sima Qian in his “Historical Notes”. It is known that Sun Tzu was born in the kingdom of Qi and served as a mercenary commander for Prince Heliu in the kingdom of Wu.

The Art of War is the most famous ancient Chinese treatise on military strategy and politics. It is studied in military academies and business schools around the world, and many outstanding leaders have been inspired by this work.

We selected 10 quotes from it:

The rule of war is not to trust that the enemy will not come, but to rely on what I can meet him with; not to rely on the fact that he will not attack, but to rely on the fact that I will make it impossible for him to attack me.

Disorder is born from order, cowardice is born from courage, weakness is born from strength. Order and disorder are numbers; courage and cowardice are power; strength and weakness are form.

If there is no benefit, don't move; if you cannot acquire it, do not use troops; if there is no danger, do not fight. A prince should not take up arms because of his anger; a commander should not go into battle because of his anger. They move when it suits their benefit; if this does not correspond to the benefit, they remain in place.

There are roads that are not taken; there are armies that are not attacked; there are fortresses over which they do not fight; there are areas over which people do not fight; There are orders from the sovereign that are not carried out.

Avoiding confrontation with great forces does not indicate cowardice, but wisdom, for sacrificing oneself is never an advantage. Sun Tzu Add to favorites Add to favorites

A prince should not take up arms because of his anger; a commander should not go into battle because of his anger. They move when it suits their benefit; if this does not correspond to the benefit, they remain in place. Anger can again turn into joy, anger can again turn into joy, but the lost state will not be reborn again, the dead will not come to life again.

The skill of a commander is judged by the diligence of his subordinates.

Fury kills the enemy, greed seizes his wealth.

To win a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the pinnacle of martial art. To defeat the enemy without fighting is the pinnacle.

War is a path of deception.

IN Lately Sun Tzu, the legendary Chinese military leader, is often quoted. It is believed that his treatise “The Art of War,” written in the 5th century BC, is a masterpiece of military thought that is still relevant. This opinion, albeit with some reservations, is reflected in the corresponding article on Wikipedia. In particular, it says that “in many East Asian countries, The Art of War was part of the examination syllabus for potential candidates for military service" That in Japan during the Sengoku era, the commander Takeda Shingen (1521-1573), precisely because he studied the “Art of War,” almost never knew defeat. What did this treatise do? significant influence on Mao Zedong - Sun Tzu’s ideas were reflected in Mao’s work “On Guerrilla Warfare.” That The Art of War was a subject of study among Viet Cong officers who "could recite entire sections of the book by heart." And the victory over the French in the famous Battle of Dien Bien Phu was largely predetermined by the fact that the Viet Cong general Vo Nguyen Giap successfully applied the tactics described in The Art of War.

However, if we seriously talk about the same battle of Dien Bien Phu, the question cannot help but arise: would Vo Nguyen Giap really not have achieved his goal if he had known nothing about Sun Tzu’s treatise, but simply acted in accordance with, say, with the “Combat Manual of the Ground Forces” (BUSV) of the USSR?

And further. Paying tribute to this treatise, one cannot help but see that by the middle of the 20th century, military issues had been enriched with new facts and circumstances, in relation to which Sun Tzu’s recommendations no longer look so universal and effective. And it’s not just the emergence of weapons of mass destruction that radically changed the nature of modern warfare. In the conditions of a war of technologies, including information, the general philosophical “universals” of the treatise, even if we assume that they have not lost either justice or relevance, should have been filled with new content - adequate both to these technologies and to the scale of the problems of modern war.

New industries emerged in response to new challenges scientific knowledge, to one degree or another related to military development and direct combat operations. Among them is a scientific discipline called “Systems Analysis”.

At the end of the sixties, the book by E. S. Quaid “Analysis of complex systems: Methodology of analysis in the preparation of military decisions” was presented to the attention of the Soviet reader, which is a revised presentation of a course of lectures on systems analysis given by leading employees of the RAND Corporation for senior officials of the US Department of Defense and Industry . It says, in particular:

“The survival of a nation may depend to a large extent on its ability to solve the problems of modern war in advance, bearing in mind that the experience of previous wars is unlikely to be reliable basis to solve these problems. Much of what may be associated with a future conflict cannot be resolved in any other way than by calculation. There is no other way to determine the number of missiles needed to destroy a group of targets, or to determine how to preserve a communications center when a bomb with a charge equivalent to 20 megatons of trinitrotoluene explodes nearby, or to achieve reliable disarmament."

Defining defense policy, Quaid believes, required “systematic quantitative research by physicists, sociologists, engineers in collaboration with military specialists.” The results of these studies provide recommendations to those "who make decisions on the broadest issues of national security." Such studies constitute the content of the discipline “Systems Analysis”. The circumstances that prompted us to turn to research of this type are not without interest. Quaid writes:

“At the time of the catastrophic military situation created in England during the Second World War, those responsible for the defense of this country decided to involve physicists, biologists, mathematicians and other highly educated specialists in solving purely military problems. The involvement of specialists was caused not only by the depth of the crisis experienced at that time, but also by the emergence of new weapons based on new production methods that were not known from past military experience. These weapons and weapon systems (radar being a prime example) were so new in concept and design that their use could not be planned on the basis of conventional military experience alone. New methods of analysis were required, which were developed during the Second World War and gave rise to a field of knowledge called at that time operations analysis, and later, depending on the application, operations research, systems engineering, cost-benefit analysis and systems analysis. The success of a small but fairly organized effort in England provided an impetus for development in this direction, and, as might be expected, the involvement of scientists contributed to the solution of problems that were usually considered beyond their competence.

The first chapter of Sun Tzu's treatise is called "Preliminary Calculations." Here are some excerpts from it:

1. Sun Tzu said: war is a great matter for the state, it is the ground of life and death, it is the path of existence and death.

4. Therefore, the war is weighed by seven calculations and in this way the situation is determined.

9. Who - even before the battle - wins preliminary calculation, he has a lot of chances; whoever - even before the battle - does not win by calculation has little chance. Whoever has a lot of chances wins; those who have little chance do not win; especially the one who has no chance at all. Therefore, for me - at the sight of this one thing - victory and defeat are already clear.

This a wisdom that some believe is at least two and a half millennia old.

But, for example, the real situation in the late forties and early fifties. Let me remind you that on December 19, 1949, the US Committee of Chiefs of Staff (CHS) approved the “Dropshot” plan for a war against Soviet Union and its allies, which proposed using the US nuclear monopoly that still existed at that time to organize large-scale atomic bombings cities of the Soviet Union and mass destruction of civilians unprecedented in history. However, structures such as KNSh exist in order to develop the most different scenarios conducting combat operations - if possible, for all occasions. The date of approval of the document is also interesting here - there were several years left before the appearance of Soviet (and American) intercontinental ballistic missiles. The main means of delivering nuclear weapons at that time were strategic bombers.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the US Air Force command invited the RAND Corporation to conduct “study of the problem of choosing air bases on other continents”. In other words, to make those same “seven calculations” (“Measure seven times”?) that Sun Tzu speaks of. And then the specifics and special circumstances came out, reflecting the specifics cold war. Quaid writes:

“However, a preliminary study of this issue soon showed that the main problem was not how to acquire, build and operate air bases on the territory of other countries, but where and how to base strategic air forces and how to operate these forces in interaction with the selected system of bases. It became clear that the issue of choosing bases could decisively affect the composition and striking power of strategic aviation, as well as the total cost of it. It was therefore unwise to consider the question of bases only in relation to savings in their cost. It was necessary to take into account how the decision on bases affected the overall cost of all strategic aircraft, for example, how it would affect the costs due to the increase in the range of bombers, which cannot reach the target without refueling, or on the routes on which aircraft must fly over enemy territory, the losses they may suffer from enemy air defense fire while flying along these routes, as well as the difficulties that may arise in restoring bases after an enemy attack on them.”.

Let us turn again to the wisdom of Sun Tzu. The third chapter of the treatise “Strategic attack” says: “they win if they know when to fight and when not to”. And further:

"9. That is why it is said: if you know him and know yourself, fight at least a hundred times, there will be no danger; if you know yourself, but don’t know him, you will win once, another time you will be defeated; If you don’t know yourself or him, every time you fight you will be defeated.”

In his book, Quaid devotes dozens of pages to research prior to making the required decision, where both the actions of the US military and the proposed actions of the command of the USSR Armed Forces are examined in detail. And he comes to the following conclusions:

“To my knowledge, this was the first study in which, as the most important problem the question was raised about the vulnerability of US strategic aviation, the most powerful aircraft in the world, and it was pointed out that it could be destroyed as a result of a surprise attack by the enemy. Researchers considered many means and techniques to counter this threat, and subsequent discussions provided recommendations to the Air Force for other measures. As a result, the necessary measures were approved to protect US strategic aviation from the combined threat of aircraft and ballistic missiles and the role of active air defense systems was reconsidered."

The “sophisticated” reader of our days tends to believe that many of the provisions of Sun Tzu’s treatise seem quite obvious (“Thank you, Cap”). Interestingly, RAND analysts also encountered a very similar assessment of their own activities - albeit several years after the completion of the study commissioned by the Air Force command. Let's give the floor to Quaid again:

“Critics today believe that the results of the analysis should have been obvious before it was carried out and that no careful analysis was required. They argue that it is absurd not to take all reasonable measures to protect one's offensive forces, especially when the enemy is expected to launch a first strike, and that it is also absurd to transport rocket fuel by air during combat operations when it can be transported by sea at little cost to peacetime and stored where it is likely to be needed. However, these “absurdities” were not obvious at the time and became obvious a number of years after our analysis.”.

Apparently, attempts at such criticism of Sun Tzu’s book should be treated with some caution.

Yes, times are different now. Only within the framework of the rapidly developing discipline “System Analysis” have new methods, including mathematical ones, been developed. And development information technologies has created completely new opportunities for collecting and processing information, managing complex and highly complex systems. What Sun Tzu says in his own general view, almost in philosophical categories, in modern implementation is reflected in working computer programs, database and knowledge storage systems. And, which is not uninteresting, the developers of all this “good” may well have known nothing about Sun Tzu himself or his treatise.

Some idea about modern methods The study of systems as applied to the organization of combat operations is given by the monograph by V.I. Novoseltsev "System analysis: modern concepts." The editor’s preface notes that the book is not cluttered with mathematical symbolism, which “allowed a rather difficult but interesting topic to be made accessible to a wide range of readers,” it says:

“The book puts forward and examines three utilitarian imperatives of systems research in their dialectical unity:

— dominance of the essence of the problem over formal methods of solving it;
— constructiveness of the conflictological view of the nature of things;
— the unconditional priority of model methods for substantiating decisions over empiricism and speculativeness."

Modern methods of systems analysis involve, in particular, the use of logical-linguistic solution methods.

For example, to describe situations, the so-called situational management language (SLM) is used, the vocabulary of which is formed by sets of: basic concepts (v), basic relations (r), names (i), elementary solutions (p) and ratings (O). From the elements of these sets, according to certain rules of the LSU grammar, texts are constructed that describe the input situations S(t). An example illustrating the capabilities of this language is the description of the following situation:

The tenth motorized rifle battalion (MSB) of the “greens” occupies the defense of the settlement “O”. The fifth mechanized brigade (ICB) of the "blues", reinforced with fire support helicopters, was tasked with capturing locality"ABOUT". The first motorized rifle (MSR) and second tank (TB) battalions of the fifth ICBM of the “blues” are on the march and approaching the zones of mortar and anti-tank weapons of the “greens”. The "blue" fire support helicopters entered the range of the "green" anti-aircraft missiles.

The use of such structures eliminates the ambiguity in understanding the described situations (typical of natural language). They are “understandable” to a computer, that is, they can be easily recorded, stored and processed, forming a base of subject knowledge. Such texts allow formal transformations of their constructions, in accordance with the grammar of a given language, which makes it possible to derive new concepts and generalize situations (divide many situations into subsets-classes).

So what is the value of Sun Tzu’s treatise for our contemporary?

It would seem that for the conduct of modern combat operations the combat regulations of various types of troops are much more useful. Modern systems analysis tools are very effective for planning military operations of any scale. Why do we need this Sun Tzu then? Is it worth spending time studying it?

It seems to me that the answer to this question follows precisely from the universal, philosophical nature of this work. Precisely as a bearer of certain philosophical ideas- in relation to all spheres of human activity in which there is competition and confrontation. In this sense, Novoseltsev’s point of view is personally close to me:

“At all times, philosophical knowledge is music for the soul, the harmony of the mind coming from above. Our time is no exception. Any educated person, turning to the thoughts of great philosophers, can receive pleasure similar to that which you experience listening to the divine creations of Bach, Vivaldi, Tchaikovsky. In philosophy, as in life, there is everything: tragic and funny, eternal and transitory. You just need to learn to understand the music of philosophy - then life will become different, professional and everyday problems will be resolved in a completely different way.”

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