Timeline of the war in Afghanistan

1979

• Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, December 1979
• December 9-12 - arrival of the first “Muslim battalion” in Afghanistan.
• December 25 - columns of the Soviet 40th Army cross the Afghan border along a pontoon bridge over the Amu Darya River. H. Amin expressed gratitude to the Soviet leadership and gave orders to the General Staff Armed Forces DRA on providing assistance to the incoming troops.
• December 27 - storming of Amin's palace

1980

• January 10-11 - an attempt at an anti-government mutiny by artillery regiments of the 20th Afghan division in Kabul. About 100 rebels were killed during the battle; Soviet troops lost two killed and two more were wounded.
• February 23 - tragedy in the tunnel at the Salang pass. When the oncoming columns moved in the middle of the tunnel, a collision occurred and a traffic jam formed. As a result, 16 Soviet soldiers suffocated.
• March - the first major offensive operation of OKSV units against the Mujahideen - the Kunar offensive.
• April 20-24 - Mass anti-government demonstrations in Kabul are dispersed by low-flying jet aircraft.
• April - US Congress authorizes "direct and open help» Afghan opposition in the amount of $15 million.
• - the first military operation in Panjshir.
• June 19 - decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on the withdrawal of some tank, missile and anti-aircraft missile units from Afghanistan.
• August 12 - Special forces of the USSR KGB “Karpaty” arrive in the country.

1981

• September - fighting in the Lurkoh mountain range in Farah province; death of Major General Khakhalov
• October 29 - introduction of the second “Muslim battalion” (177 SOSN) under the command of Major Kerimbaev (“Kara-Major”).
• December - defeat of the opposition base in the Darzab region (Dzauzjan province).

1982

• November 3 - tragedy at the Salang pass. The fuel tanker explosion killed more than 176 people. (Already during the civil war between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, Salang became a natural barrier and in 1997 the tunnel was blown up on the orders of Ahmad Shah Massoud to prevent the Taliban from moving north. In 2002, after the unification of the country, the tunnel was reopened).
• November 15 - meeting between Yu. Andropov and Zia ul-Haq in Moscow. The Secretary General had a private conversation with the Pakistani leader, during which he informed him about “the new flexible policy of the Soviet side and the understanding of the need for a rapid resolution of the crisis.” The meeting also discussed the feasibility of the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the prospects for participation Soviet Union in war. In exchange for the withdrawal of troops, Pakistan was required to refuse assistance to the rebels.

1983

• January 2 - in Mazar-i-Sharif, dushmans kidnapped a group of Soviet civilian specialists numbering 16 people. They were released only a month later, and six of them died.
• February 2 - the village of Vakhshak in northern Afghanistan was destroyed by volumetric explosion bombs in retaliation for the hostage-taking in Mazar-i-Sharif.
• March 28 - meeting of the UN delegation led by Perez de Cuellar and D. Cordovez with Yu. Andropov. He thanks the UN for “understanding the problem” and assures the mediators that he is ready to take “certain steps”, but doubts that Pakistan and the United States will support the UN proposal regarding their non-intervention in the conflict.
• April - operation to defeat opposition forces in the Nijrab gorge, Kapisa province. Soviet units lost 14 people killed and 63 wounded.
• May 19 - Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan V. Smirnov officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and Afghanistan to “set a date for the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops.”
• July - the attack of the dushmans on Khost. The attempt to blockade the city was unsuccessful.
• August - the intense work of D. Cordovez’s mission to prepare agreements for the peaceful settlement of the Afghan problem is almost completed: an 8-month program for the withdrawal of troops from the country was developed, but after Andropov’s illness, the issue of the conflict was removed from the agenda of Politburo meetings. Now the talk was only about “dialogue with the UN.”
• Winter - fighting intensified in the Sarobi region and the Jalalabad Valley (Laghman province is most often mentioned in reports). For the first time, armed opposition units remain on the territory of Afghanistan for the entire winter period. The creation of fortified areas and resistance bases began directly in the country.

1984

• January 16 - dushmans shot down a Su-25 aircraft using the Strela-2M MANPADS. This is the first case of successful use of MANPADS in Afghanistan.
• April 30 - during a major operation in the Panjshir Gorge, the 1st battalion of the 682nd motorized rifle regiment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses.
• October - over Kabul, the dushmans use the Strela MANPADS to shoot down an Il-76 transport plane.
• April 21 - Death of the Maravar company.
• April 26 - uprising of Soviet and Afghan prisoners of war in Badaber prison in Pakistan.
• May – army operation on the border with Pakistan in Kunar province.
• June - army operation in Panjshir.
• Summer - a new course of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee towards a political solution to the “Afghan problem”.
• October 16-17 - Shutul tragedy
• Autumn - The functions of the 40th Army are reduced to covering the southern borders of the USSR, for which new motorized rifle units are brought in. The creation of support base areas began in hard to reach places countries.

1986

• February - at the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, M. Gorbachev makes a statement about the beginning of developing a plan for a phased withdrawal of troops.
• March - the decision of the R. Reagan administration to begin deliveries to Afghanistan to support the Mujahideen Stinger ground-to-air MANPADS, which makes the combat aviation of the 40th Army vulnerable to attack from the ground.
• April 4-20 - operation to destroy the Javara base: a major defeat for the dushmans.
• Unsuccessful attempts by Ismail Khan’s troops to break through the “security zone” around Herat.
• May 4 - at the XVIII plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, M. Najibullah, who previously headed the Afghan counterintelligence KHAD, was elected to the post of Secretary General instead of B. Karmal. The plenum proclaimed the intention to solve the problems of Afghanistan through political methods.
• July 28 - M. Gorbachev demonstratively announced the imminent withdrawal of six regiments of the 40th Army (about 7 thousand people) from Afghanistan. Later the withdrawal date will be postponed. There is debate in Moscow about whether to withdraw troops completely.
• August - Massoud defeated a government military base in Farhar, Takhar Province.
• Autumn - Major Belov's reconnaissance group from the 173rd detachment of the 16th special forces brigade captures the first batch of three Stinger portable anti-aircraft missile systems in the Kandahar region.
• October 15-31 - tank, motorized rifle, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Shindand, motorized rifle and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kunduz, and anti-aircraft regiments were withdrawn from Kabul.
• November 13 - The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee sets the task of withdrawing all troops from Afghanistan within two years.
• December - an emergency plenum of the PDPA Central Committee proclaims a course towards a policy of national reconciliation and advocates an early end to the fratricidal war.

1987

• January 2 - an operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Army General V.I. Varennikov, was sent to Kabul.
• February - Operation Strike in Kunduz province.
• February-March - Operation Flurry in Kandahar province.
• March 8 - dushmans shelled the city of Pyanj, Tajik SSR.
• March - Operation Thunderstorm in Ghazni province.
• - Operation Circle in the provinces of Kabul and Logar.
• April 9 - Mujahideen attack on a Soviet border post.
• April 12 - the defeat of the Milov rebel base in Nangarhar province.
• May - Operation Salvo in the provinces of Logar, Paktia, Kabul.
• - Operation South-87 in Kandahar province.
• Spring - Soviet troops begin to use the Barrier system to cover the eastern and southeastern sections of the border.
• November 23 - start of Operation Magistral to unblock the city of Khost

1988

Soviet special forces group prepares for operation in Afghanistan

• January 8 - battle at height 3234.
• April 14 - with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation around the situation in the DRA. The USSR and the USA became guarantors of the agreements. The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its contingent within a 9-month period, starting on May 15; The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.
• May 15 - Dushmans control 10% of the territory of Afghanistan.
• June 24 - Opposition troops captured the center of Wardak province - the city of Maidanshahr.
• August 10 - Dushmans took Kunduz

1989

• January 23-26 - Operation Typhoon.
• February 4 - the last unit of the Soviet Army left Kabul.
• February 15 - Soviet troops are completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the Limited Contingent, Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, who, allegedly, was the last to cross the border river Amu Darya (city of Termez).

Soviet- Afghan war lasted more than nine years from December 1979 to February 1989. Rebel groups of “Mujahideen” fought during it against the Soviet Army and the Afghan government forces allied to it. Between 850,000 and 1.5 million civilians were killed and millions of Afghans fled the country, mostly to Pakistan and Iran.

Even before the arrival of Soviet troops, power in Afghanistan through 1978 coup captured by the communists and installed as president of the country Noor Mohammad Taraki. He undertook a number of radical reforms, which turned out to be extremely unpopular, especially among the rural population committed to national traditions. The Taraki regime brutally suppressed all opposition, arresting many thousands and executing 27,000 political prisoners.

Chronology of the Afghan War. Video

Armed groups began to form throughout the country for the purpose of resistance. By April 1979, many large areas of the country were in revolt, and in December the government held only the cities under its rule. It itself was torn apart by internal strife. Taraki was killed soon after Hafizullah Amin. In response to requests from the Afghan authorities, the allied Kremlin leadership, led by Brezhnev, first sent secret advisers to the country, and on December 24, 1979, sent the 40th Soviet army of General Boris Gromov there, declaring that it was doing this in fulfillment of the terms of the 1978 treaty on friendship and cooperation and good neighborliness with Afghanistan.

Soviet intelligence had information that Amin was making attempts to communicate with Pakistan and China. On December 27, 1979, about 700 Soviet special forces captured the main buildings of Kabul and stormed the Taj Beg presidential palace, during which Amin and his two sons were killed. Amin was replaced by a rival from another Afghan communist faction, Babrak Karmal. He headed the “Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan” and requested additional Soviet assistance.

In January 1980, the foreign ministers of the 34 countries of the Islamic Conference approved a resolution demanding the “immediate, urgent and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops” from Afghanistan. The UN General Assembly, by a vote of 104 to 18, adopted a resolution protesting Soviet intervention. President of the U.S.A Carter announced a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Afghan fighters began receiving military training in neighboring Pakistan and China - and receiving huge amounts of aid, funded primarily by the United States and the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. In conducting operations against Soviet forces CIA Pakistan actively helped.

Soviet troops occupied cities and main lines of communication, and the Mujahideen waged guerrilla warfare in small groups. They operated on almost 80% of the country's territory, not subject to the control of the Kabul rulers and the USSR. Soviet troops widely used aircraft for bombing, destroyed villages where the Mujahideen could find refuge, destroyed irrigation ditches, and laid millions of landmines. However, almost the entire contingent introduced into Afghanistan consisted of conscripts who were not trained in complex tactics of fighting partisans in the mountains. Therefore, the war was difficult for the USSR from the very beginning.

By the mid-1980s, the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan had increased to 108,800 soldiers. The fighting took place throughout the country with greater energy, but the material and diplomatic cost of the war for the USSR was very high. In mid-1987 Moscow, where a reformer had now come to power Gorbachev, announced its intention to begin withdrawing troops. Gorbachev openly called Afghanistan a “bleeding wound.”

On April 14, 1988, in Geneva, the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the participation of the United States and the USSR as guarantors, signed the “Agreements to resolve the situation in the Republic of Afghanistan.” They determined the schedule for the withdrawal of the Soviet contingent - it ran from May 15, 1988 to February 15, 1989.

The Mujahideen did not take part in the Geneva Accords and rejected most of their terms. As a result, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the civil war in Afghanistan continued. New pro-Soviet leader Najibullah barely held back the onslaught of the Mujahideen. His government split, many of its members entered into relations with the opposition. In March 1992, Najibullah was no longer supported by General Abdul Rashid Dostum and his Uzbek police. A month later, the Mujahideen took Kabul. Najibullah hid in the UN mission building in the capital until 1996, and then was captured by the Taliban and hanged.

The Afghan war is considered part Cold War . In Western media it is sometimes called “Soviet Vietnam” or “Bear Trap”, because this war became one of the most important reasons for the fall of the USSR. It is believed that about 15 thousand died during it Soviet soldiers, 35 thousand were injured. After the war, Afghanistan lay in ruins. Grain production there fell to 3.5% of pre-war levels.

April Revolution

In April 1978, a coup took place in Afghanistan, later called. Afghan communists came to power - the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Events developed spontaneously. The impetus for the unrest was the April 17 assassination of a prominent PDPA figure, Mir Akbar Khaibar. Thousands of people took to the streets, demanding punishment for the killers and the resignation of the government. To stop the unrest, President Mohammed Daoud ordered the arrest of all PDPA leaders. The response to this was a military coup on April 27, during which Daoud was killed. The officers who overthrew him released the leaders of the PDPA from prison and transferred power to them. One of the leaders of the party, Hafizullah Amin, speaking from the armor of a tank immediately after the coup, with an impressive gesture showed the crowd his not yet removed

Thus, unexpectedly not only for the Soviet Union, but partly also for itself, the PDPA found itself in power. The government was headed by the writer Noor Mohammed Taraki, who carried out radical reforms: a ban on the activities of all political parties, land reform with confiscation of land, new marriage legislation. All this caused discontent among various segments of the population, who interpreted the reforms as an attack on sacred traditions and Islamic values. Already in June 1978, a split occurred in the party, which resulted in repression and persecution not only of the conspirators and their leader B. Karmal, but also of all those who disagree with the regime, primarily the clergy, which N. Taraki branded as “an obstacle to the progressive development of the country "

In foreign policy Afghanistan is beginning to focus on the USSR and is strengthening ties in a number of areas: Afghan students are being sent to study in the USSR, a number of industrial facilities in Afghanistan, military-technical cooperation is expanding. At the same time, most countries in the region perceived the revolution in Kabul as a threat. Saudi Arabia regarded it as a “threat to Islam and the integrity of the Islamic world” and “communist expansion.” The United States initially reacted negatively to the events in Kabul, but continued diplomatic and even economic relations. However, after the Islamic revolution in Iran in February 1979 and the assassination of the American ambassador, the United States seeks to regain influence in the region and ceases all relations with Afghanistan, focusing on the USSR. Since that time, the United States began to provide assistance to the opposition along with Great Britain, France, Germany and Japan.

Intra-party struggle. Amin's rise to power

A few months later, a sharp struggle broke out within the ruling party. In August 1979, a confrontation broke out between two party leaders - Taraki and Amin. During a summit meeting in Moscow, Taraki was warned about a conspiracy being prepared against him, for which he asked for direct military assistance from the Soviet Union, but received a reasoned refusal. Upon Taraki's return to Afghanistan, there was an unsuccessful attempt on Amin's life, during which he was killed by his personal adjutant. After this, Taraki was removed from his post, expelled from the party and taken into custody. Soon the former prime minister died - according to the official report, “after a serious long illness" According to other accounts, he was killed by suffocation with pillows. New mass repressions began against his supporters and other dissidents. All these events, especially the death of Taraki, caused discontent in Moscow. The mass “cleansings” and executions that began in Afghanistan among the party community caused condemnation. At the same time, ill-conceived agrarian reform brought only negative results, discontent ripened in the army, leading to armed uprisings and cases of mass desertion and defection to the side of the opposition.

Opposition illegal parties and organizations also began to appear in different parts of the country. In Peshawar (Pakistan), with the patronage of the country's authorities, a number of parties were formed, including those with a pronounced Islamic orientation. Through the efforts of these parties, military camps were created in 1978 to train rebels for the purpose of fighting in Afghanistan. For many years, these camps would become a kind of base where the rebels could freely hide from Soviet and Afghan forces, replenish supplies and weapons, reorganize and launch attacks again. In addition, it was quite easy to get reinforcements from the ranks of the numerous refugees who flooded Afghanistan. As a result, by the end of 1979, large-scale hostilities broke out in the country, with armed clashes already taking place in 18 of the 26 provinces of Afghanistan. The critical situation in the country forced H. Amin to repeatedly seek military assistance from the Soviet Union.

Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan

The attitude towards the ruling regime in the Soviet leadership was ambiguous; radical reforms, accompanied by mass repressions, pushed many away from power. The proximity of China also alarmed the USSR, due to the struggle between countries for leadership in the socialist movement. In response to requests from the “legitimate government of Afghanistan”, and referring to Article 51 of the UN Charter on the right of states to self-defense against “external aggression”, December 25, 1979 The USSR launched an armed invasion of Afghanistan. The decision on this issue was made by a narrow circle of members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee - D. Ustinov, A. Gromyko, Yu. Andropov and K. Chernenko. A plan has also matured to eliminate the independent and authoritarian-prone Amin as a protege of the USSR. On December 27, there was an assault on the Taj Beg presidential palace, prepared by the KGB and the GRU, during which H. Amin was killed by a grenade explosion. After this, Soviet troops began to occupy all the most important points of the capital, meeting resistance in the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Most of the barracks containing Afghan forces were blocked off. They also took the Puli-Charkhi prison, from which they freed opponents of the regime who were awaiting imminent execution. Among them was Taraki's widow. Thus ended the hundred-day reign of H. Amin.

Babraka Karmal, who fled to Czechoslovakia in 1978 and then found refuge in the USSR, became Moscow’s protégé. At 19 o'clock from Dushanbe, on the frequencies of Kabul Radio, his appeal to the people was heard, in which he announced the overthrow of Amin and proclaimed himself General Secretary of the party. At night, Kabul Radio broadcast: “The revolutionary court sentenced the traitor Hafizullah Amin to death. The sentence has been carried out." The fighting in the city, which began around 6 p.m., subsided by the morning of December 28. It seemed that the military operation was successfully completed. At the same time, the presence of Soviet troops and their participation in the coup was kept silent. B. Karmal tried to normalize the situation in Afghan society: about 10 thousand party members were released from prison, and in 1980 he raised a new National flag, returning to it the traditional colors - black, red and green - instead of the entirely red one established by Taraki and Amin in October 1978, the rights of believers and the clergy were confirmed, and private property was secured. In 1981, measures were taken to adjust the land reform; the government promised to compensate for the confiscated land.

Soviet newspapers now called Hafizullah Amin a “CIA agent” and wrote about the “bloody clique of Amin and his henchmen.” In the West, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan caused violent protests, since Amin was the head of state recognized in the world, and his murder was perceived as an act of direct aggression. On January 14, 1980, the UN General Assembly demanded the withdrawal of “foreign troops” from Afghanistan. 104 states voted for this decision. More than 50 countries decided to boycott the Summer Olympics held in Moscow.

Civil War in Afghanistan

Meanwhile, in Afghanistan itself, armed resistance to Soviet troops began to intensify. It was, of course, not Amin’s supporters who fought against them, but opponents of the revolutionary government in general. Many were outraged by the unexpected arrests of the most different people- from mullahs to traders. But the authority of the new government was undermined even more by the land reform. The government tried to take land from tribal leaders. Villagers took up arms in defense of their usual way of life. At first, the Soviet press claimed that there were no battles in Afghanistan, and that peace and tranquility reigned there. However, the war did not subside, and when this became clear, the USSR admitted that “bandits were rampaging” in the republic. Supporters of B. Karmal dubbed them “dushmans” (enemies). Meanwhile, the struggle unfolded according to all the rules of guerrilla warfare. To destroy the rebels, Soviet troops began to attack villages that served as their support. As a result, over 5 million Afghans - about a third of the country's population - moved to Iran and Pakistan. The rebels controlled large parts of Afghanistan. All of them were united by the slogan of jihad - the holy Islamic war. They called themselves “Mujahideen” - fighters for the faith. Otherwise, the rebel groups' programs varied widely. Some spoke out under the slogans of revolutionary Islam, others supported King Zahir Shah, who was overthrown in 1973. The diversity of rebel groups also reflected the diversity of peoples and tribes in Afghanistan.

The “limited contingent” of Soviet troops (40th Army) was not ready for a long war with partisans, which covered more and more regions of the country. Soviet troops captured Mujahideen bases and suffered heavy losses while storming the passes. But the partisans went to Pakistan and Iran along mountain paths, replenished their ranks, and returned again. It was impossible to block all mountain roads. The PDPA army fought against its compatriots reluctantly. The army had a problem with conscripts (most of them were from Kabul, the rest of the regions were not actually subordinate to the central authorities) and with the unity of command, torn apart by internal contradictions. If earlier the Soviet people, or “Shuravi” as they were called, were treated friendly in Afghanistan, now the majority of the population is hostile. Leaders of the Islamic opposition called on Afghans to start jihad not only against the Kabul regime, but also against the “Soviet aggressor.” In 1985, most of the opposition parties based in Peshawar merged. Help from the US and Saudi Arabia increased year by year. Thousands of Arab mercenaries are heading to Afghanistan. The opposition has created its own military-political structure in most of Afghanistan - local authorities called emirates or Islamic committees, fronts and armed formations.

The war in Afghanistan became one of the most difficult foreign policy crises that the USSR faced in the 80s. Moscow was forced to increase the military power of its “limited contingent,” the number of which during this period reached 120 thousand people. This caused a corresponding reaction from the United States and its allies, who methodically expanded the scale of military and humanitarian assistance to the Afghan opposition. However, none of the opposing sides in Afghanistan was able to achieve a decisive turning point. A deadlock situation has arisen. For both the Soviet leadership and its Afghan ally, it became increasingly obvious that other forms and means of breaking the deadlock should be sought besides the military path. In 1982, on the initiative of Moscow, Afghan-Pakistani negotiations began in Geneva on a peaceful settlement of the Afghan problem under the auspices of the UN and with the participation of the USSR and the USA. However, in subsequent years The White house, hiding behind peace-loving declarations, in fact slowed down the negotiation process. After coming to power, the opinion prevailed in the Soviet leadership about the urgent need to withdraw troops. B. Karmal objected to this. Under pressure from Moscow, Kabul was required to change the political system in Afghanistan in order to expand its social support, but B. Karmal was not going to share power and in 1986 he was removed from all posts.

Najibullah's rise to power

In June 1987, the first, so far symbolic, steps towards establishing peace were taken. The new Kabul government led by a program of “national reconciliation”, which included a ceasefire, an invitation to the opposition to dialogue and the formation of a coalition government. Efforts were made to revive the multi-party system. In April 1988, multi-party elections were held with numerous violations; part of the opposition boycotted them. However, the multi-party system proclaimed by President Najibullah turned out to be a missed chance for the regime - not a single opposition figure entered either parliament or the government. At the same time, steps were taken to attract independent field commanders to their side, they were provided with material assistance, weapons were transferred, and this partially bore fruit. On April 14, 1988, in Geneva, representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR and the USA, in the presence of the UN Secretary-General, signed an agreement on a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. Afghanistan and Pakistan pledged not to interfere in each other's affairs, and the United States pledged not to support the armed struggle against the Najibullah regime. The Soviet Union committed to withdrawing troops from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989. On this day, the direct participation of the USSR in the Afghan War ceased. He lost 14,453 people killed; 417 military personnel went missing and were captured.

The USSR continued to provide support to the Najibullah regime, but after the collapse of the country in 1991, all assistance ceased, and in April 1992, the Najibullah regime fell. Armed Mujahideen detachments entered Kabul. However, the struggle in the country did not stop there - interethnic clashes began in Kabul and other cities of the country between Mujahideen groups, which were later called a “civil war.” In 1996, the Taliban came to power in Kabul.

On May 15, 1988, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began. The operation was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. Soviet troops have been in the country since December 25, 1979; they acted on the side of the government Democratic Republic Afghanistan.

The decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and formalized by a secret resolution of the CPSU Central Committee. The official purpose of the entry was to prevent the threat of foreign military intervention. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee used repeated requests from the Afghan leadership as a formal basis.

A limited contingent of Soviet troops (OKSV) found themselves directly drawn into the civil war that was flaring up in Afghanistan and became its active participant.

The armed forces of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) on the one hand and the armed opposition (Mujahideen, or dushmans) on the other took part in the conflict. The struggle was for complete political control over the territory of Afghanistan. During the conflict, the dushmans were supported by military specialists from the United States, a number of European NATO member countries, as well as Pakistani intelligence services.
December 25, 1979 The entry of Soviet troops into the DRA began in three directions: Kushka-Shindand-Kandahar, Termez-Kunduz-Kabul, Khorog-Fayzabad. The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar.

The Soviet contingent included: the command of the 40th Army with support and service units, four divisions, five separate brigades, four separate regiments, four combat aviation regiments, three helicopter regiments, one pipeline brigade, one logistics brigade and some other units and institutions.

The presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conventionally divided into four stages.

1st stage: December 1979 - February 1980 Entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, placing them in garrisons, organizing the protection of deployment points and various objects.

2nd stage: March 1980 - April 1985 Conducting active combat operations, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units. Work to reorganize and strengthen the armed forces of the DRA.

3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986. The transition from active combat operations mainly to supporting the actions of Afghan troops by Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units. Special forces units fought to stop the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. The withdrawal of 6 Soviet regiments to their homeland took place.

4th stage: January 1987 - February 1989. Participation of Soviet troops in the Afghan leadership’s policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for the combat activities of Afghan troops. Preparing Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and implementing their complete withdrawal.

On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Switzerland, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement of the situation in the DRA. The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its contingent within a 9-month period, starting on May 15; The United States and Pakistan, for their part, had to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

In accordance with the agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. On February 15, 1989, Soviet troops completely withdrew from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have traditionally been friendly, regardless of the changing political regimes in Kabul. By 1978, industrial facilities built with the technical assistance of the USSR accounted for up to 60% of all Afghan enterprises. But in the early 1970s. XX century Afghanistan was still one of the poorest countries in the world. Statistics showed that 40% of the population lived in absolute poverty.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the DRA received a new impetus after the victory in April 1978 of the Saur, or April, Revolution carried out by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). General Secretary of the Party N.-M. Taraki announced the country's entry into the path of socialist transformation. In Moscow this was greeted with increased attention. The Soviet leadership included many enthusiasts of Afghanistan’s “leap” from feudalism to socialism, like Mongolia or the Soviet republics Central Asia. On December 5, 1978, the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborhood and Cooperation was concluded between the two countries. But only due to a major misunderstanding could the regime established in Kabul be classified as socialist. In the PDPA, the long-standing struggle between the Khalq factions (leaders N.-M. Taraki and H. Amin) and Parcham (B. Karmal) factions intensified. The country's agrarian reform essentially failed; it was plagued by repressions and the norms of Islam were grossly violated. Afghanistan was faced with the outbreak of a large-scale civil war. Already in early spring 1979 Taraki asked to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan to prevent the worst-case scenario. Later, such requests were repeated several times and came not only from Taraki, but also from other Afghan leaders.

SOLUTION

In less than a year, the position of the Soviet leadership on this issue changed from restraint to agreement to open military intervention in the intra-Afghan conflict. With all the reservations, it boiled down to the desire “not to lose Afghanistan under any circumstances” (the literal expression of KGB Chairman Yu.V. Andropov).

Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko initially opposed providing military assistance to the Taraki regime, but failed to defend his position. Supporters of sending troops into the neighboring country, first of all, Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov, had no less influence. L.I. Brezhnev began to lean towards a forceful solution to the issue. The reluctance of other members of the top leadership to challenge the opinion of the first person, together with a lack of understanding of the specifics of Islamic society, ultimately predetermined the adoption of a decision to send troops that was ill-considered in its consequences.

Documents show that the Soviet military leadership (except for Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov) thought quite sensibly. Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov recommended refraining from attempts to resolve political issues in neighboring country military force. But the top officials ignored the opinion of experts not only from the Ministry of Defense, but also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The political decision to send a limited contingent of Soviet troops (OCSV) to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 in a narrow circle - at a meeting of L.I. Brezhnev with Yu.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov and A.A. Gromyko, as well as Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee K.U. Chernenko, i.e. five members of the Politburo out of 12. The goals of sending troops into a neighboring country and the methods of their actions were not determined.

The first Soviet units crossed the border on December 25, 1979 at 18.00 local time. Paratroopers were airlifted to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram. On the evening of December 27, special groups of the KGB and a detachment of the Chief intelligence agency special operation "Storm-333" was carried out. As a result, the Taj Beg Palace, where the residence of the new head of Afghanistan, Kh. Amin, was located, was captured, and he himself was killed. By this time, Amin had lost the trust of Moscow due to his organized overthrow and murder of Taraki and information about cooperation with the CIA. The election was hastily arranged general secretary PDPA Central Committee B. Karmal, who arrived illegally from the USSR the day before.

The population of the Soviet Union was faced with the fact of sending troops into a neighboring country in order, as they said, to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people in defending the April Revolution. The official position of the Kremlin was stated in the responses of L.I. Brezhnev, in response to questions from a Pravda correspondent on January 13, 1980, Brezhnev pointed to the armed intervention unleashed against Afghanistan from the outside, the threat of turning the country into “an imperialist military bridgehead on the southern border of our country.” He also mentioned the Afghan leadership’s repeated requests for the entry of Soviet troops, which, according to him, will be withdrawn “as soon as the reasons that prompted the Afghan leadership to request their entry no longer exist.”

At that time, the USSR really feared interference in Afghan affairs by the United States, as well as China and Pakistan, real threat for their borders from the south. For reasons of politics, morality, and the preservation of international authority, the Soviet Union also could not continue to indifferently observe the development of civil strife in Afghanistan, during which innocent people were killed. Another thing is that it was decided to stop the escalation of violence by another force, ignoring the specifics of intra-Afghan events. Loss of control over the situation in Kabul could be regarded in the world as a defeat socialist camp. Personal as well as departmental assessments of the situation in Afghanistan played no small role in the events of December 1979. It is a fact that the United States was extremely interested in involving the Soviet Union in the Afghan events, believing that Afghanistan would become for the USSR what Vietnam was for the United States. Through third countries, Washington supported the Afghan opposition forces that fought against the Karmal regime and Soviet troops.

STEPS

The direct participation of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Afghan war is usually divided into four stages:

1) December 1979 - February 1980 - introduction of the main personnel of the 40th Army, deployment to garrisons; 2) March 1980 - April 1985 - participation in hostilities against the armed opposition, providing assistance in the reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the DRA; 3) May 1985 - December 1986 - a gradual transition from active participation in hostilities to support for operations carried out by Afghan troops; 4) January 1987 - February 1989 - participation in the policy of national reconciliation, support for the DRA forces, withdrawal of troops to the territory of the USSR.

The initial number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was 50 thousand people. Then the number of OKSV exceeded 100 thousand people. Soviet soldiers entered the first battle on January 9, 1980, when they disarmed the rebel artillery regiment of the DRA. Subsequently, the Soviet troops, against their will, were drawn into active hostilities, the command moved to organize planned operations against the most powerful groups of Mujahideen.

Soviet soldiers and officers showed the highest fighting qualities, courage and heroism in Afghanistan, although they had to operate in the most difficult conditions, at an altitude of 2.5-4.5 km, at a temperature of plus 45-50 ° C and an acute shortage of water. With the acquisition of the necessary experience, the training of Soviet soldiers made it possible to successfully resist the professional cadres of the Mujahideen, trained with the help of the Americans in numerous training camps in Pakistan and other countries.

However, the involvement of OKSV in hostilities did not increase the chances of a forceful resolution of the intra-Afghan conflict. Many military leaders understood that it was necessary to withdraw troops. But such decisions were beyond their competence. The political leadership of the USSR believed that the condition for withdrawal should be a peace process in Afghanistan, guaranteed by the UN. However, Washington did its best to obstruct the UN mediation mission. On the contrary, American assistance to the Afghan opposition after the death of Brezhnev and the coming to power of Yu.V. Andropova has increased sharply. Only since 1985 regarding the participation of the USSR in civil war There have been significant changes in the neighboring country. The need for OKSV to return to its homeland became completely obvious. The economic difficulties of the Soviet Union itself became more and more acute, for which large-scale assistance to its southern neighbor was becoming ruinous. By that time, several thousand Soviet troops had died in Afghanistan. Hidden dissatisfaction with the ongoing war was brewing in society, which was discussed in the press only in general official phrases.

PROPAGANDA

ABOUT PROPAGANDA SUPPORT OF OUR ACTION IN RELATION TO AFGHANISTAN.

Top secret

Special folder

When covering in our propaganda work - in the press, on television, on radio - the action of assistance undertaken by the Soviet Union at the request of the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan against external aggression, be guided by the following.

In all propaganda work, proceed from the provisions contained in the appeal of the Afghan leadership to the Soviet Union with a request for military assistance and from the TASS report on this matter.

The main thesis is that the dispatch of limited Soviet military contingents to Afghanistan, carried out at the request of the Afghan leadership, serves one purpose - to provide the people and government of Afghanistan with assistance and assistance in the fight against external aggression. This Soviet action does not pursue any other goals.

Emphasize that as a result of acts of external aggression and growing outside interference in internal Afghan affairs, a threat has arisen to the gains of the April Revolution, to the sovereignty and independence of the new Afghanistan. Under these conditions, the Soviet Union, to which the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has repeatedly asked for help in repelling aggression over the past two years, responded positively to this request, guided, in particular, by the spirit and letter of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation .

The request of the Afghan government and the satisfaction of this request by the Soviet Union is solely a matter for two sovereign states - the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which themselves regulate their relations. They, like any UN member state, have the right to individual or collective self-defense, which is provided for in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

When covering changes in the leadership of Afghanistan, emphasize that this is an internal matter of the Afghan people, based on statements published by the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan, from the speeches of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan, Karmal Babrak.

Give a firm and reasoned rebuff to any possible insinuations about the alleged Soviet interference in internal Afghan affairs. Emphasize that the USSR had and does not have anything to do with changes in the leadership of Afghanistan. The task of the Soviet Union in connection with the events in and around Afghanistan comes down to providing assistance and assistance in protecting the sovereignty and independence of friendly Afghanistan in the face of external aggression. As soon as this aggression stops, the threat to the sovereignty and independence of the Afghan state disappears, Soviet military contingents will be immediately and completely withdrawn from the territory of Afghanistan.

WEAPON

FROM INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CO-AMBASSADOR IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

(Secret)

Specialist. No. 397, 424.

Visit Comrade Karmal and, referring to the instructions, inform him that the requests of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for the supply of special equipment for the border troops and detachments of party activists and the defense of the revolution have been carefully considered.

The USSR government, guided by the desire to assist the DRA government in carrying out measures to combat counter-revolution, found the opportunity to supply the DRA free of charge in 1981 with 45 BTR-60 PB armored personnel carriers with ammunition and 267 military radio stations for border troops and 10 thousand Kalashnikov AK assault rifles, 5 thousand . Makarov PM pistols and ammunition for detachments of party activists and defense of the revolution, totaling about 6.3 million rubles...

GRAVES

...Suslov. I would like some advice. Comrade Tikhonov presented a note to the CPSU Central Committee regarding perpetuating the memory of soldiers who died in Afghanistan. Moreover, it is proposed to allocate a thousand rubles to each family for the installation of tombstones on their graves. The point, of course, is not about money, but about the fact that if now we perpetuate the memory, we write about it on the tombstones of graves, and in some cemeteries there will be several such graves, then from a political point of view this is not entirely correct.

Andropov. Of course, soldiers need to be buried with honors, but it is too early to perpetuate their memory.

Kirilenko. It is not practical to install tombstones at this time.

Tikhonov. In general, of course, it is necessary to bury it; whether inscriptions should be made is another matter.

Suslov. We should also think about answers to parents whose children died in Afghanistan. There should be no liberties here. Answers should be concise and more standard...

LOSSES

Military personnel who died in hospitals on the territory of the USSR from wounds received during combat operations in Afghanistan were not included in the official statistics of casualties of the Afghan war. However, the casualty figures directly on the territory of Afghanistan are accurate and carefully verified, Vladimir Sidelnikov, professor of the department of thermal injuries at the Military Medical Academy of St. Petersburg, said in an interview with RIA Novosti. In 1989, he served in the Tashkent military hospital and worked as part of a commission of the USSR Ministry of Defense at the headquarters of the Turkestan Military District, which verified the true number of losses during the war in Afghanistan.

According to official data, 15 thousand 400 Soviet troops were killed in Afghanistan. Sidelnikov called “speculation” the statements of some media that in Russia, even 28 years after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan on February 15, 1989, they are silent about the true scale of losses in the Afghan war. “The fact that we are hiding colossal losses is stupidity, this cannot happen,” he said. According to the professor, such rumors appeared due to the fact that a very large number of military personnel needed health care. 620 thousand citizens of the USSR went through the war in Afghanistan. And during the ten years of war, medical care was provided to 463 thousand military personnel, he said. “This figure includes, among other things, almost 39 thousand people who were injured during the fighting. The most significant part of those who sought medical care, about 404 thousand, are infectious patients who have suffered from dysentery, hepatitis, typhoid fever and other infectious diseases,” said the military doctor. “But a significant number of people who were admitted to hospitals on the territory of the USSR died due to severe complications, wound disease, purulent-septic complications, severe wounds, and injuries. Some stayed with us for up to six months. These people who died in hospitals were not included in the number of officially announced losses,” the military doctor noted. He added that he could not give their exact number due to the fact that there are simply no statistics on these patients. According to Sidelnikov, rumors about colossal losses in Afghanistan are sometimes based on the stories of combat veterans themselves, who often “tend to exaggerate.” “Often such opinions are based on statements by the Mujahideen. But, naturally, each warring side tends to exaggerate its victories,” the military doctor noted. “The largest reliable one-time losses were, as I know, up to 70 people. As a rule, more than 20-25 people did not die at one time,” he said.

After the collapse of the USSR, many documents from the Turkestan Military District were lost, but the medical archives were saved. “The fact that documents about losses in the Afghan war were preserved for our descendants in the Military Medical Museum is an undoubted merit of military doctors,” former military intelligence officer, retired colonel Akmal Imambayev told RIA Novosti by phone from Tashkent. After serving in the southern Afghan province of Kandahar, he served at the headquarters of the Turkestan Military District (TurkVO).

According to him, it was possible to save “every single medical history” in the 340th general arms hospital in Tashkent. All the wounded in Afghanistan were admitted to this hospital, and then they were transferred to other medical institutions. “In June 1992, the district was disbanded. Its headquarters were occupied by the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan. Most of the military personnel by this time had already left for new duty stations in other independent states“Imambayev said. Then, according to him, the new leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense refused to accept documentation from TurkVO, and behind the building of the former district headquarters a furnace was continuously operating, in which hundreds of kilograms of documents were burned. But even in that difficult time, officers, including military doctors, tried to do everything possible so that the documents did not sink into oblivion, Imambaev said. According to the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan, medical records of military personnel who were wounded in Afghanistan were sent to the Military Medical Museum after their closure. “Unfortunately, no other statistical data on this issue has been preserved in Uzbekistan, since all orders and accounting books for the 340th general military hospital in Tashkent until 1992 were handed over to the Podolsk archive of the USSR Ministry of Defense,” the veteran noted. “What military doctors and officers of the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan have preserved for posterity is difficult to overestimate,” he believes. “However, it’s not for us to evaluate this. We only honestly fulfilled our duty to the Fatherland, remaining faithful to the oath. And let our children judge whether this war was fair or not,” said the Afghan war veteran.

RIA Novosti: Statistics of losses of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan do not include those who died from wounds in hospitals in the USSR. 02/15/2007

AMNESTY

SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE USSR

Resolution

ABOUT AMNESTY FOR FORMER MILITARY SERVICEMEN OF THE SOVIET FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN WHO COMMITTED CRIMES

Guided by the principles of humanism, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decides:

1. Exempt former military personnel from criminal liability for crimes committed by them during military service in Afghanistan (December 1979 - February 1989).

2. Release from serving sentences persons convicted by courts USSR and union republics for crimes committed during military service in Afghanistan.

3. Clear criminal records from persons released from punishment on the basis of this amnesty, as well as from persons who have served sentences for crimes committed during military service in Afghanistan.

4. Instruct the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to approve the procedure for implementing the amnesty within ten days.

Chairman

Supreme Soviet of the USSR