To prevent chickens from pecking eggs
Speak water or grain and give it to the chickens.
Chickens are pockmarked, chickens are white, chickens are black. Don't peck at the stars in the sky, but at the eggs in the nests. Key, lock, tongue. Amen.
So that the hay is not stolen
Walk around the stack backwards and read three times:
Heap, heap, field soul, protect your soul from theft, from eating a hare, from stray lightning, from field fireflies, from free cattle, from five men: old, gray-haired, strong and young, from thieving women, from eagled revelers. Field farmer, field farmer, my haystack is small. Stand with your backside, take care. Here he should stand, here he should wait for the owner. I rake, I rake, I close, I close with seven keys, conspiracy speeches. Key. Lock. Language. Amen. Amen. Amen.
To preserve livestock
Read on the day of the full moon, walking around the cattle:
I speak to the living from stray enemies, from biting dogs, from snake bites, from thinness, from the deeds of sorcerers, from glaring tongues. They don't count the stars in the sky, but my goods are numbered. Amen.
So that the dog does not run away from the house
Give them spoken water.
Whether it’s a path or a road, everyone’s legs are tangled. Amen, Amen. Amen.
So that the chickens don't die
When the chickens are brought into the house, they are given water to drink, with which the hostess washed her hands and then her feet, with the words:
Not white, not gray, not yellow, not pockmarked, but everything
there are some who will be saved and preserved
and they will multiply. Amen.
For growth in the garden
In clear weather, so that the stars are visible in the sky, walk around the garden crosswise and whisper:
The earth gave birth, the earth rewarded, the earth enriched.
Mother of God, save. Amen.
Damage so that no living creatures are found
In villages, many people know this damage and save it for a quarrel with someone. Others experienced this damage the hard way. Neither livestock nor poultry take root with such people.
They do this damage to millet, taken on Christmas Eve and hidden until the occasion. They pour millet into the yard with a whistling sound, but with an effective spell.
This is how you can remove this damage. The first and last in the family washes their feet up to the knees, then this water is placed in the yard so that the stars and the month are reflected in the water.
Then you need to squat down next to him and say three times:
You, month, brother,
be my matchmaker.
Get me horses, pigs, chickens
and all living creatures. Amen.
How these stars swarm in the sky,
so let them multiply for me too
horses and pigs, cows and sheep
and all living creatures. Amen.
I lock with 77 locks, I close with 77 keys.
May my word rise again
Amen. Amen. Amen.
Introduction
“Strange War” (“Sitting War”) (French Drôle de guerre, English Phony War, German Sitzkrieg) - the period of World War II from September 3, 1939 to May 10, 1940 on the Western Front.
After Britain declared war on Germany, Poles staged a joyful demonstration in front of the British Embassy in Warsaw
The name Phony War (Russian: fake, unreal war) was first used by American journalists in 1939. The authorship of the French version of Drôle de guerre (Russian strange war) belongs to the pen of the French journalist Roland Dorgeles. Thus, the nature of hostilities between the warring parties was emphasized - their almost complete absence, with the exception of combat operations at sea. The warring parties fought only local battles on the Franco-German border, mainly under the protection of the Maginot and Siegfried defensive lines.
The period of the “Phantom War” was fully used by the German command as a strategic pause. This allowed Germany to successfully implement the Polish campaign, Operation Weserubung, and also prepare the Gelb plan.
1. Prerequisites
After coming to power, Adolf Hitler began to implement the idea of uniting all the lands with the Germans living there into a single state. Relying on military power and diplomatic pressure, Germany unhindered the Anschluss of Austria in March 1938, and in October of the same year, as a result of the Munich Agreement, it annexed part of the Sudetenland, which belonged to Czechoslovakia.
On March 21, 1939, Germany began demanding the city of Danzig (modern Gdansk) from Poland and open the “Polish Corridor” (created after World War I to provide Poland with access to the Baltic Sea). Poland refused to comply with Germany's demands. In response, on March 28, 1939, Hitler declared the Non-Aggression Pact with Poland (signed in January 1934) invalid.
On March 31, 1939, British Prime Minister Chamberlain, on behalf of the British and French governments, announced that he would provide all possible assistance to Poland if its security was threatened. The unilateral English guarantee to Poland on April 6 was replaced by a previous bilateral agreement of mutual assistance between England and Poland.
On May 15, 1939, a Polish-French protocol was signed, according to which the French promised to launch an offensive within the next two weeks after mobilization.
On August 25, 1939, the Anglo-Polish alliance was finally formalized and signed in London in the form of a Mutual Assistance Agreement and a secret treaty.
Article One of the Anglo-Polish Mutual Assistance Agreement stated:
The “European state,” as follows from the secret treaty, meant Germany.
September 1, 1939 German troops crossed the border with Poland. In accordance with the agreements, mobilization was announced in France on the same day.
2. The beginning of the war
Maginot Line
On September 3, 1939, Great Britain (at 5:00) and France (at 11:00) declared war on Germany. Already after the fact, on September 4, a Franco-Polish agreement was signed. After this, the Polish ambassador to France began to insist on an immediate general offensive. On the same day, British representatives, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Edmund William Ironside, and Air Chief Marshal Cyril Newell arrived in France to negotiate with the French General Staff. Despite numerous meetings of the Joint Staff Committee, which began in late March, by early September there was still no coordinated plan of action to provide assistance to the Poles.
The next day, Ironside and Newell reported to the Cabinet that, after completing the mobilization of their armies, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, Gamelin, was meeting approximately on September 17 "press the Siegfried line" and check the reliability of its defense. The report, however, stated that “Gamelin is not going to risk precious divisions with a rash attack on such fortified positions.”.
The situation at the front was as follows. As a result of preparatory measures from August 18 and covert mobilization from August 25, the German command deployed Army Group C in the West, consisting of 31 2/3 divisions. Even before September 1, 3 divisions were transferred from the OKH reserve to GA “C” and 9 more after the Allies declared war on Germany. In total, by September 10, there were 43 2/3 divisions on the western borders of Germany. They were provided with air support by the 2nd and 3rd Air Fleets, which had 664 and 564 combat aircraft, respectively. French mobilization efforts began on August 21 and primarily affected peacetime divisions and fortress and anti-aircraft units. On September 1, general mobilization was announced (the first day is September 2 from 0 o’clock) and the formation of reserve divisions of series “A” and “B” began (except for two, which began to form at the end of August). After the completion of mobilization and deployment by the beginning of the 20th of September, 61 divisions and 1 brigade were concentrated in the North-Eastern Front, covering the border with Belgium and Germany, against Italy - 11 divisions and 1 brigade, in North Africa(Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) there were 14 divisions and 5 brigades. Four English divisions arrived in France throughout September and by mid-October were concentrated on the Belgian border in the Arras area between the French 1st and 7th Armies. The length of the northern border of France was 804.67 km; the French could only advance in a small area 144.84 km wide from the Rhine to the Moselle. Otherwise, France would violate the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg. The Germans were able to concentrate the most combat-ready divisions on this territory and covered the approaches to the Siegfried Line with minefields. In such a situation, the offensive actions of the French became significantly more complicated.
Siegfried Line - anti-tank bumps on the Aachen-Saarbrücken line
Fort on the Maginot Line
However, what turned out to be more important was that the French were unable to launch an offensive operation until September 17th. Until this time, the Franco-German confrontation was limited only to local battles. France's inability to hit the Germans earlier was explained by an outdated mobilization system: the formed units did not have time to undergo proper training. Another reason for the delay was that the French command adhered to outdated views on the conduct of war, believing that before any offensive, as in the First World War, there should be a powerful artillery preparation. However, most of the French heavy artillery was mothballed, and it could not be prepared earlier than the fifteenth day after the announcement of mobilization.
Regarding British assistance, it was clear that the first two divisions of the English expeditionary force could arrive on the continent only in the first days of October, and two more in the second half of October. There was no need to count on other English divisions. For the French, this also served as a reason not to launch offensive actions.
Before September 17, the collapse of Poland was so obvious that, paying attention to all the above reasons, the French had a good excuse for revising their intentions regarding the active prosecution of the war.
The German army was also in no hurry to start a full-scale war on the Western Front. The “Order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Military Forces, Adolf Hitler, on the attack on Poland (08/31/1939)” stated the following:
“3) In the West, responsibility for the start of the war should be placed entirely on the British and French. Minor border violations must first be responded to with purely local actions...
The German land border in the west must not be violated at any point without my permission. The same applies to all naval operations, as well as to other activities at sea that can be assessed as military operations.
The actions of the air force should be limited to the air defense of state borders from enemy air raids...
4) If England and France begin military operations against Germany, then the goal of the armed forces operating in the West will be to ensure appropriate conditions for the victorious completion of operations against Poland...
Ground forces will hold the Western Wall and prepare to prevent its bypass from the north..."
Im Westen kommt es darauf an, die Verantwortung für die Eröffnung von Feindseligkeiten eindeutig England und Frankreich zu überlassen. Geringfügigen Grenzverletzungen ist zunächst rein örtlich entgegen zu treten…
Die deutsche Westgrenze ist zu Lande an keiner Stelle ohne meine ausdrückliche Genehmigung zu überschreiten. Zur See gilt das gleiche für alle kriegerischen oder als solche zu deutenden Handlungen.
Die defensiven Massnahmen der Luftwaffe sind zunächst auf die unbedingte Abwehr feindl. Luftangriffe an der Reichsgrenze zu beschränken…
4) Eröffnen England und Frankreich die Feindseligkeiten gegen Deutschland, so ist es Aufgabe der im Westen operierenden Teile der Wehrmacht, unter möglichster Schonung der Kräfte die Voraussetzungen für den siegreichen Abschluss der Operationen gegen Polen zu erhalten…
Das Heer hält den Westwall und trifft Vorbereitungen, dessen Umfassung im Norden..."
To carry out this task, Army Group C, under the command of Colonel General Wilhelm von Leeb, had at its disposal 11 2/3 personnel and 32 reserve and landwehr divisions. The latter could not be considered fully combat-ready either in terms of technological equipment or military training. Army Group West did not have tank formations. The Western Wall (Siegfried Line) was significantly inferior in fortification to the Maginot Line and was still under construction. German troops were deployed as follows: the 7th Army (commander General of Artillery Dolman) along the Rhine from Basel to Karlsruhe, the 1st Army (commander Colonel General Erwin von Witzleben) - from the Rhine to the border with Luxembourg. A small task force "A" under the command of Colonel General Baron Kurt von Hammerstein guarded the border with neutral states as far as the city of Wesel.
3. “Active actions” on the Western Front
November 28, 1939: Soldiers of the British Expeditionary Force and the French Air Force on the front line. A humorous inscription above the dugout “10 Downing Street” is the address of the residence of the British Prime Minister.
Since the beginning of the war, the French limited themselves to only a few local attacks in the Western Wall area. When constructing the protective barrier, the Germans did not adhere to the natural curvature of the borders, so the line in some areas was a straight line. In addition, German troops were ordered to only defend the Siegfried Line and not engage in protracted hostilities. On September 13, 1939, the French managed to relatively easily occupy two protruding sections - the Warndt section west of Saarbrücken and the protruding border between Saarbrücken and the Palatinate Forest.
When, after the end of the war with Poland, the redeployment of German formations from the Eastern Front to the Western Front became noticeable, the French, starting on October 3, liberated most of the border zone they had captured and retreated to the state border, and in some places beyond it. According to the German military, they were surprised by the poorly prepared field positions that the French abandoned.
3.1. Saar offensive
The purpose of the attack was to help Poland, which was being attacked by Germany. However, the offensive was stopped and French troops left German territory.
According to the Franco-Polish military treaty, the French army's obligation was to begin preparations for a major offensive three days after mobilization began. French troops were to seize the area between the French border and the German defense line and conduct reconnaissance in force. On the 15th day of mobilization (that is, until September 16), the goal of the French army was to launch a full-scale offensive against Germany. Preliminary mobilization began in France on August 26, and full-scale mobilization was announced on September 1.
The French offensive in the Rhine Valley area began on September 7, four days after France declared war on Germany. At this point, Wehrmacht forces were engaged in an offensive operation in Poland and the French had overwhelming numerical superiority along the German border. However, the French did not take any action that would be able to provide significant assistance to the Poles. Eleven French divisions advanced 32 km along a line near Saarbrücken against insignificant German opposition. The French army advanced 8 kilometers into Germany without any resistance from the enemy, capturing about 20 villages evacuated by the German army. However, this timid advance was halted after the French captured the Warndt Forest, three square miles of heavily mined German territory.
Louis Faury, head of the French military mission in Poland
The attack did not lead to the redeployment of German troops from Poland. The planned full-scale offensive against Germany was to be carried out by 40 divisions, including one armored division, three mechanized divisions, 78 artillery regiments and 40 tank battalions. On September 12, the Anglo-French Supreme War Council met for the first time at Abbeville in France. It was decided that all offensive actions were to cease immediately. By then, French units had advanced approximately eight kilometers into Germany along a 24-kilometer strip along the border in the Saarland. Maurice Gamelin ordered French troops to stop no closer than 1 km from German positions along the Siegfried Line. Poland was not notified of this decision. Instead, Gamelin reported to Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly that half of his divisions were engaged and that French successes had forced the Wehrmacht to withdraw at least six divisions from Poland. The next day, the commander of the French military mission in Poland, Louis Faury, informed the Polish chief of staff, General Waclaw Stachewicz, that the planned full-scale offensive on the western front had to be postponed from 17 September to 20 September. At the same time, French units were ordered to retreat to their barracks along the Maginot Line. This moment is considered the beginning of the “Strange War”.
3.2. Great Britain
Until mid-October, four divisions (two army corps) took up positions on the Belgian-French border between the cities of Mold and Bayel, quite far from the front line. In this area there was an almost continuous anti-tank ditch, which was covered by fire from pillboxes. This fortification system was built as a continuation of the Maginot Line in case of a breakthrough of German troops through Belgium.
On October 28, the War Cabinet approved the British strategic concept. The Chief of the British General Staff, General Edmund Ironside, described this concept as follows: “passive waiting with all the worries and anxieties that follow from this” .
After this, complete calm reigned on the Western Front. French correspondent Roland Dorgeles, who was on the front line, wrote:
“...I was surprised by the calm that reigned there. The artillerymen, who were stationed on the Rhine, calmly looked at the German trains with ammunition that were running on the opposite bank, our pilots flew over the smoking chimneys of the Saar plant without dropping bombs. Obviously, the main concern of the high command was not to disturb the enemy."
On November 21, 1939, the French government created the armed forces "entertainment service", which was required to organize leisure time for military personnel at the front. On November 30, parliament discussed the issue of additional provision of alcoholic beverages to soldiers; on February 29, 1940, Prime Minister Daladier signed a decree abolishing the tax on playing cards, "intended for the active army". After some time, it was decided to purchase 10,000 soccer balls for the army.
In December 1939, the fifth British division was formed in France, and in the first months of the next year five more divisions arrived from England. . Almost 50 airfields with cement runways were created in the rear of the British troops, but instead of bombing German positions, British planes scattered propaganda leaflets over the front line.
The strange war, namely the inaction of England and France during the German attack on Poland, is explained by the plans of the allies, which consist in the fact that “inspired by his successes, the Fuhrer will smoothly transfer the Polish-German war into a new one - the German-Soviet one.” However, the strategic pause was fully used by the German command to prepare a full-scale invasion of Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and France.
4. Plan for the invasion of France
On September 27, 1939, at a council of commanders-in-chief of the armed forces and their chiefs of staff, Hitler ordered the immediate preparation of an offensive in the west: "The goal of the war is to bring England to its knees, to defeat France". The commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Walter Brauchitsch, and the chief of the general staff, Franz Halder, opposed it. (They even prepared a plan to remove Hitler from power, but, without receiving support from the commander of the reserve army, General Fromm, they abandoned it).
Already on October 6, 1939, German troops finally completed the occupation of Poland, and on October 9, the commander of the armed forces sent Brauchitsch, Goering and Raeder “Memorandum and main instructions regarding the conduct of war in the West”. This document, based on the concept of “blitzkrieg,” outlined the strategic goals of the future campaign. It was immediately said that German troops would advance in the west, regardless of the neutrality of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Ignoring internal fears that the operation would fail, Brauchitsch instructed the General Staff to develop the “Gelb Directive on Strategic Deployment,” which he signed on October 29, 1939.
Plan "Gelb" ("Yellow") in its first version ( OKH plan), which was never implemented, stipulated that the main attack of the German troops would take place on both sides of Liege. The directive ended with an order to Army Groups “A” and Army Groups “B” to concentrate their troops in such a way that they could take up their starting positions for the offensive in six night marches. The start of the offensive was scheduled for November 12. On November 5, Brauchitsch again tried to dissuade Hitler from invading France. Hitler, in turn, once again confirmed that the offensive must be carried out no later than November 12. However, on November 7, the order was canceled due to unfavorable weather conditions. The start of the operation was delayed another 29 times.
On January 10, 1940, Hitler set the final date for the offensive - January 17. But on the same day that Hitler made this decision, a very mysterious thing happened. "happening": a plane carrying a German officer who was transporting secret documents mistakenly landed on Belgian territory and the Gelb plan fell into the hands of the Belgians.
The Germans were forced to change the operation plan. The new edition was provided by the chief of staff of Army Group A under the command of Rundstedt and Manstein. Manstein came to the conclusion that it was better to deliver the main blow through the Ardennes in the direction of Sedan, which the Allies did not expect. The main idea Manstein's plan was "luring". Manstein had no doubt that the Allies would definitely react to the invasion of Belgium. But by deploying their troops there, they will lose their free reserve (at least for several days), load the roads to capacity, and, most importantly, weaken "sliding north" operational section Dinan - Sedan.
5. Occupation of Denmark and Norway
When planning an invasion of France, the German General Staff was worried that in this case Anglo-French troops might occupy Denmark and Norway. On October 10, 1939, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Grand Admiral Raeder, first pointed out to Hitler the importance of Norway in the war at sea. Scandinavia was a good springboard for an attack on Germany. The occupation of Norway by Great Britain and France for Germany would mean a virtual blockade of the navy.
On December 14, 1939, Hitler gave the order to prepare for an operation in Norway. On March 1, 1940, a special directive was issued. Paragraph 1 of the directive stated:
“The development of events in Scandinavia requires making all preparations in order to occupy Denmark and Norway with part of the armed forces. This should prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea, securing our ore base in Sweden and expanding the starting positions against England for the navy and air force.”
On the morning of April 9, the German ambassadors in Oslo and Copenhagen presented notes with the same content to the authorities of Norway and Denmark, in which Germany’s armed action was justified by the need to protect both neutral countries from an allegedly possible attack by the British and French in the near future. The goal of the German government, the note stated, was the peaceful occupation of both countries.
Denmark submitted to German demands with almost no resistance.
The situation is different in Norway. There, on April 9-10, the Germans captured the main Norwegian ports: Oslo, Trondheim, Bergen, Narvik. On April 14, the Anglo-French landing force landed near Narvik, on April 16 - in Namsos, on April 17 - in Åndalsnes. On April 19, the Allies launched an attack on Trondheim, but were defeated and in early April were forced to withdraw their troops from central Norway. After the battles for Narvik, the Allies evacuated the northern part of the country in early June. Later, on June 10, the last units of the Norwegian army capitulate. Norway found itself under the control of the German occupation administration.
6. Completion of the Strange War
The period of the “Phantom War” ended on May 10, 1940. On this day, German troops, according to the Gelb plan, began large-scale offensive operations on the territory of neutral Belgium and Holland. Then, through the territory of Belgium, bypassing the Maginot Line from the north, German troops captured almost all of France. The remnants of the Anglo-French army were driven to the Dunkirk area, where they were evacuated to Great Britain. To sign the act of surrender of France, the same trailer in Compiegne was used in which the Compiegne Armistice of 1918 was signed, ending the First World War.
Bibliography:
On September 9 as part of the North-Eastern Front. May, E.R. A strange victory. M., 2009. pp. 508-510.
On September 9, as part of Army Group C. May, E.R. A strange victory. M., 2009. pp. 507-508.
Liddell Hart B. G. Second World War. - M.: AST, St. Petersburg: Terra Fantastica, 1999, p. 56. (Russian)
Max Lagarrigue, 99 questions… La France sous l’Occupation, Montpellier, CNDP, 2007, p. 2. C’est l'écrivain et reporteur de guerre Roland Dorgelès qui serait à l’origine de cette expression qui est passé à la postérité. (French)
Układ o pomocy wzajemnej między Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Zjednoczonym Królestwem Wielkiej Brytanii i Irlandii Północnej (Polish)
Müller-Hillebrand B. German Land Army 1933-1945. M., 2002. S. 153, 161.
Shishkin K. German Armed Forces. 1939-1945. Directory. St. Petersburg, 2003. P. 57.
Gunsburg, Jeffery A. Divided and conquered. The French High Command and the Defeat of the West, 1940. 1979, p. 88.
French mobilization events in August-September 1939
pp. 1-2. (French)
Kaufmann, J. E.; Kaufmann, H. W. Hitler's Blitzkrieg Campaigns: The Invasion and Defense of Western Europe, 1939-1940. 1993, pp. 110-111.
Directive No. 1 on the conduct of war (Translation - USSR Ministry of Defense, 1954) (Russian)
Weisung des Obersten Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht Adolf Hitler für den Angriff auf Polen. ("Fall Weiß") Vom 31. August 1939. (German)
The Ironside Diaries 1937-1940. London, 1963, p. 174. (English)
A. Kesselring. Gedanken zum zweiten Weltkrieg. Bonn, 1955, S. 183. B. Dorgeles. (German)
L. F. Ellis. The War in France and Flanders, 1939-1940, Vol. 2, London, 1953, p. 15 (English)
Starikov N.V. Who forced Hitler to attack Stalin.. - St. Petersburg: Peter, 2008. - P. 368. - 4000 copies.
"Military Historical Journal", 1968, No. 1, pp. 76-78. (Russian)
Operational directive for Operation Weserübung (Russian)
75 years ago, in October 1939, an incomprehensible calm suddenly established itself on the fronts of World War II. During this period it was called the “Strange War”. Researchers and journalists are still arguing about the background of this phenomenon. Well, let's try to understand the reasons for the “strangeness”.
To begin with, let us note a well-known pattern - the general staffs of various powers often turn out to be “ready for the last war.” For example, all participating armies planned the First World War as maneuverable - deep strikes, field battles. They planned based on the experience of the 19th century. Although qualitative changes in the field of weapons and equipment, significant adjustments were made to strategic developments. Rifles became quick-firing, machine guns appeared, and the lethality of artillery increased. Even field defenses made from ordinary earthen trenches became extremely difficult to overcome. And they learned to strengthen it with reinforced concrete structures, mines, barbed wire. The war, unexpectedly for the fighting parties, turned out to be positional. Armies dug into the ground and built up systems of trenches and trenches. A huge number of guns were concentrated for the offensive. Artillery bombardments battered enemy positions with soldiers for several days, or even weeks.
True, at the same time new means of breaking through fortified zones appeared - tanks, bombers. But they remained very imperfect. It is curious that the German military at first completely ignored the tanks, considering them a worthless toy. Over time, new types of weapons became more reliable and powerful. However, European military science was confident: the next war would again be positional. All countries that feared their neighbors built powerful fortifications along their borders. The Czechs built a powerful defense in the Sudetenland, the Finns “Mannerheim Line”, Soviet Union"Stalin's line"
Well, France was a rich country, could afford significant expenses, and built the Maginot Line along its eastern border. She was considered unapproachable. Concrete casemates bristling with heavy artillery barrels, scatterings of pillboxes, dugouts and underground barracks. The Germans also built and built the Siegfried Line along the French border. It was much weaker than the French one. It began to be built only in 1936, and the scale was much more modest. The Germans invested in the development of aviation, tanks, engineering structures there wasn't enough money.
Although at first it was the Germans, not the French, who needed fortifications. When Hitler attacked Poland, Germany was far from its maximum power. The industry of all Europe has not yet worked for it. She had not yet recruited reinforcements from the Poles, French, and Belgians. To crush Poland, the Germans had to throw almost all their troops against it. In the West, only 23 divisions remained to cover against 110 French. As Keitel testified: “If the French attacked, they would only encounter a weak screen, and not a real defense.”
But France was an ally of Warsaw. By joint plans in the event of a German attack, it was supposed to immediately provide air support, and on the 15th day of mobilization go on the offensive. The Germans will have to transfer troops to the west, and the Poles will be saved... But politics superimposed. Including dirty shadow politics. The behind-the-scenes circles of England and France turned a blind eye to Germany's armament, clearly aiming it at the Soviet Union. Hitler was pushed to the east, they openly encouraged him by giving him Austria and Czechoslovakia. It was assumed that he should enter into an anti-Soviet alliance with the Poles. But he crossed out the scenario outlined in the West. He entered into an alliance with Stalin and attacked Poland.
But even now, among English and French politicians, a strong wing stood out that believed there was no need to fight. It is better to sacrifice Poland in the same way as Czechoslovakia. The main “peacemaker” himself, British Prime Minister Chamberlain, hesitated. But his entire policy of appeasement failed too shamefully! A scandal broke out in parliament. Hitler spat in London's face, but they made smiles at him. Opposition leader Emery said: “How long will we engage in idle chatter when Britain and all that it holds dear, and civilization itself, are under threat?... It is our duty to stand with the French.” Chamberlain's cabinet hung in the balance, and he had to agree to act “along with the French.”
But the fact of the matter is that it was even more difficult to force the French to speak out! Oh, how they didn’t want to fight! The British sat on the islands, and the immediate fighting fell to the share of France! Disputes arose between Paris and London regarding the ultimatum to the Germans. Is it worth presenting it? When? As a result, England and France declared war on Germany only on September 3, when the armed forces of Poland were thoroughly defeated.
But even the belated intervention of the Western powers caused panic in Berlin. Hitler gambled that the British and French would remain on the sidelines - but they did not! They will rush on the offensive, and that’s the end! And this offensive really began. Even earlier than what was promised to the Poles under allied obligations. On September 7, two French armies crossed the border and entered the German Saar. The thin German barriers did not take the fight and retreated to the fortifications of the Siegfried Line.
However, on September 12, a meeting of the French-British War Council was held in Abbeville with the participation of the heads of state, Chamberlain and Daladier. They discussed and discussed, and made a very peculiar decision on “maximum mobilization of funds before the start of major ground operations, as well as limiting the actions of the Air Force.” That is, do not do anything until the “maximum” amount of strength and resources has accumulated! Even curtail air strikes, not bomb military and industrial facilities in Germany (which the Germans were also very afraid of). And the units that had already entered German territory were ordered to return. In short, France and England started the war only so that politicians could save face. For check. And Poland was discounted. After all, behind it lay the Soviet Union! So the Germans and Russians will clash...
They didn't clash. IN this moment It was more profitable for Hitler to pretend to be friends with Moscow. He was planning a scenario similar to the notorious “Schlieffen Plan”. To smash one by one, first the Western powers, and then concentrate all forces against the USSR. Therefore, from October 1939, the war acquired a “strange” character. Mobilization was underway in France. Reservists were called up from the reserves. Railway trains transferred new divisions to the border. They unloaded, settled down, and settled in. Under the cover of the Maginot Line fortifications, 5 million soldiers and officers deployed! Yesterday's civilians took pictures in uniform and sent brave photographs to their wives and brides - from the front! It was beautiful, fresh, and seemingly safe. Pretend to be commanders and soldiers. And the governments will convene another conference. Will they really not come to an agreement with Hitler? Everyone believed that they would come to an agreement. After all, we always agreed before.
But now Hitler himself did not intend to negotiate with France and England. Already on September 25, 1939, Chief of the General Staff Halder wrote in his diary about “the Fuhrer’s plan to launch an offensive in the West.” And on September 27, Hitler set his military leaders the task of “attacking in the West as quickly as possible, since the Franco-British army is not yet prepared.” Although it soon became clear that it probably wouldn’t work out! After the battles with the Poles, only a third of the ammunition was left in stock - it was necessary to accumulate it again. There was not enough fuel. It also had to be accumulated and transported from oil refineries to new theaters of combat. Moreover, the Germans did not have spare tanks. And the military equipment that participated in the Polish campaign turned out to be 90% unusable! If the shells spared it, then it had exhausted its service life and failed due to breakdowns on the broken-down Polish roads. It needed repairs and routine maintenance.
Whether you like it or not, you had to refuse an immediate blow. And for thorough preparation, the state of the “strange war” suited the Germans perfectly. In order not to disturb this state, the Fuhrer even forbade his submarines to sink British ships. Hitler clarified his plans for attacks on the French and British, but during these same days he suddenly burst out with a whole bunch of proposals for peace. He transmitted them through the Swedish businessman Dalerus, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ciano. He voiced these proposals in speeches before the Reichstag: “If the British really want peace, they can find it in two weeks, and without any humiliation.” Why quarrel? Is it really because of some Poland? The Fuhrer also feigned politeness and friendliness when addressing France. He officially announced that Germany has no claims against her, and will not even demand the return of Alsace and Lorraine.
However, there was no need to talk seriously about any of Hitler’s peace initiatives. Throwing out fountains of the most tempting offers, he didn’t even wait for an answer! On October 10, the Fuhrer gathered his generals and read to them Directive No. 6 on the development of an operation against France. The annex to this directive emphasized that the possibilities of peace should not be considered. “Germany’s goal in the war should... be to finally deal with the West by military means, i.e. destroy the strength and ability of the Western powers to once again resist state consolidation and further development of the German people in Europe."
True, Chamberlain and Daladier did not take the bait about reconciliation. They disgraced themselves too much with the Munich “appeasement”, they fell into a puddle too obscenely in front of the whole world. It was now impossible for them to unconditionally encourage Hitler, and they responded evasively - if Germany wants peace, “deeds, not just words” are needed. Well, for the Fuhrer this was a good reason to blame England and France. The Germans sincerely strive for peace, but Western countries are against it! So who are the culprits of the war? Let them blame themselves!
In general, the French-German border was now called a front, but no one was shooting there, no one was attacking. The soldiers sat in their fortifications and looked at the opposite side. They whiled away the time playing football. In the well-appointed dugouts and barracks of the Maginot Line, they listened to the radio, gramophone records, and looked at obscene magazines. Popular artists came to the front line with concerts. The number of troops grew. In addition to the French divisions, British ones began to arrive. And the Germans were supplemented by their comrades-in-arms, transferred from Poland. Well, heads of state and diplomats “maneuvered” and looked for ways out of the impasse. In France, not only politicians, but also the majority of military leaders advocated that it was not too late to reconcile with Germany. Reconciliation is simply necessary - if it becomes “predictable” again. That is, it will turn against the USSR.
Informal negotiations were held. In Germany, the “general opposition” joined them. However, historians have long noted: the so-called “general’s opposition” was not worth a damn. She did not go beyond chatter in narrow circles of acquaintances and washing the bones of the Fuhrer. But the war scared the generals. They predicted a defeat like in the First World War. At first it was predicted that the capture of Austria would turn into a disaster. Then they were afraid of the seizure of Czechoslovakia and an attack on Poland. When we won, we forgot about our fears and became proud of our victories. But the clash with England and France clearly looked like a repetition of the First World War with all the ensuing consequences!
Envoys of the opposition generals, Abwehr chief Canaris, and State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry Weizsäcker appeared in Switzerland, Sweden, and Rome. We established contacts with the British. We worked out conditions on which reconciliation could be made. But in such a way as not to return already conquered countries. And not only conquered ones! They pointed out that Germany should be given “free hands” in Eastern and Central Europe.
Western political circles were not at all against it. The British ambassador to the Vatican, Osborne, stated that the captured states could be left to the Germans. For reconciliation, it is only necessary to guarantee that the Germans “will not take any offensive actions in the West” (while significantly keeping silent about actions in the East). He named another desirable condition, the removal of Hitler from power, because he turned out to be so insidious, he deceived London and Paris. Pope Pius XII joined such negotiations. He went even further, he was ready to act as a mediator in concluding peace. At this time, the Nazis were in full swing against the Catholic clergy in Poland, but the pontiff, apparently, was not concerned. For reconciliation in the West, he was ready to contribute to the “settlement of the eastern question in favor of Germany.” That is, let the Germans in Eastern Europe– let them fight with the Russians as much as they want.
But the opposition did not have any real forces and powers. But Hitler himself had no intention of leaving his post or making peace. He was already in full swing preparing for the “blitzkrieg”. Directive No. 6 of October 9, 1939 on preparing an attack on France ordered: “On the northern flank of the Western Front, prepare offensive operations through Luxembourg-Belgian-Dutch territory. This offensive must be carried out with as large a force as possible...” By the way, the Fuhrer did not come up with anything new here. He again repeated the idea of the old “Schlieffen Plan”, drawn up at the beginning of the century. Gather a more powerful fist and move it through neutral countries, thus bypassing the French border fortifications.
During the First World War this plan was partly successful. Until the last moment, the Allied command did not suspect that the German avalanche would rush around. She crushed the Belgians and scattered the hastily rushed formations of the French and British. Only during the subsequent breakthrough to Paris did the German columns break away from the rear, run out of steam, and the Russians intervened and forced the Germans to transfer their corps to Eastern front. Together, these factors made it possible to defeat and push back the presumptuous enemy in the Battle of the Marne.
But even now the German command began to prepare a similar operation. It was automatically assumed that the opponents would repeat the same gross mistakes as in 1914. True, Rundstedt, Manstein and Guderian argued the opposite: would the British and French really step on the same rake twice? You can't repeat yourself! However, their objections were brushed aside; the authorities did not even want to listen to dissent. It is difficult to say how such an operation would have ended. Because the General Staff of England and France reasoned exactly like this: if the Germans dare to attack, they will act according to the old scenarios, through Belgium. However, they reasoned purely theoretically. No one believed in the very possibility of a strike. Will they really dare?
However, Hitler believed that “providence” was leading and would not abandon him. He scheduled the attack for November. No, the generals again cooled the leader. They reported that they obviously wouldn’t have time to be ready by November. Tanks were of particular concern; replenishing tank divisions with equipment was neither quick nor easy. The start of the operation was postponed from November 1939 to January 1940. And then an accident occurred. Shortly before the appointed time, a plane with German staff officers carrying maps and plans landed in Belgium. Hitler was beside himself with anger. He ordered that both the crew and passengers of the ill-fated plane be shot.
Although the reaction of the Western powers turned out to be as stupid and inconsistent as the whole “strange war”. Now they have received irrefutable proof“Hitler does not intend to make peace; we must expect an attack.” However, the Allies did not change their views or course of action at all. More precisely, inaction. The guns on the Maginot Line were still silent, and no reconnaissance searches were even undertaken. A skirmish can unwittingly develop into a battle, and a battle into a battle - higher headquarters strictly ordered subordinates to avoid such frivolity. If you don't shoot, they won't shoot at you. There are governments, and they will try to ensure that the war ends in a more civilized way.
As for the grounded plane, the French and British military reasoned thoughtfully - after all, this could be a provocation. Or misinformation. Can you believe that the Allies got hold of the real German plans? And Belgium and Holland received evidence that Hitler did not intend to respect their neutrality and was preparing an invasion. Logic dictated that we urgently needed to arm ourselves, enter into an alliance with England and France, and invite their troops to defend our territory. Where there! The governments of both states also reasoned in their own way - what if this was a provocation? Especially so that they violate neutrality. If they violate it, then Germany will have an excuse to attack them. Instead of organizing defense, the Belgians and Dutch turned to Hitler with further peace initiatives and offered their mediation in resolving the conflict.
But the Fuhrer also decided to change the deadlines that had become known to the enemy. And if it works out, then change your plans. He convened a meeting of military leaders, and then Runstedt and Manstein came to the rescue. Slipped directly to the Fuhrer own version, rejected by their superiors. Their version called for breaking through the front not on the flank, but in the center, in the Ardennes. Here in the mountains, the French relied on natural obstacles. An offensive by large forces was considered impossible, and the fortifications were weak. But Runstedt and Manstein argued that the tanks would get through, and one could play on the fact that in the last war the invasion was carried out through Belgium, that such plans became known to the enemy. We must strike a diversionary blow on the flank! The French and British will rush to repel it, and they will be hit in the Ardennes. The very group that gathers at the Belgian borders can be cut off, pressed to the sea and destroyed. Hitler liked the plan and was approved. And the offensive was scheduled for March. Later it was moved to May.
All these reasons ensured the seven months of the “strange war”. On the one hand – political prostitution and intrigues of the West, on the other – just technical delays.
