In July 1943, the German army launched Operation Citadel, a massive offensive against Oryol-Kursk Bulge on the Eastern Front. But the Red Army was well prepared to at some point crush the advancing German tanks with thousands of Soviet T-34 tanks.
CHRONICLE OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK July 5-12
July 5 - 04:30 The Germans launch an artillery strike - this marked the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge.
July 6 – over 2,000 tanks from both sides took part in the battle near the villages of Soborovka and Ponyri. German tanks were unable to break through the Soviet defenses.
July 10 - Model's 9th Army was unable to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops on the northern front of the arc and went on the defensive.
July 12 - Soviet tanks hold back the attack of German tanks in the grandiose battle of Prokhorovka.
Background. Decisive bet
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In the summer of 1943, Hitler directed the entire military power of Germany to the Eastern Front to achieve a decisive victory at the Kursk Bulge.
After the surrender of German troops at Stalingrad in February 1943, it seemed that the entire southern flank of the Wehrmacht was about to collapse. However, the Germans miraculously managed to hold out. They won the battle of Kharkov and stabilized the front line. With the onset of the spring thaw, the Eastern Front froze, stretching from the suburbs of Leningrad in the north to the west of Rostov on the Black Sea.
In the spring, both sides summed up their results. The Soviet leadership wanted to resume the offensive. In the German command, in connection with the realization of the impossibility of making up for the horrific losses of the last two years, an opinion arose about the transition to strategic defense. In the spring, only 600 vehicles remained in the German tank forces. The German army as a whole was short-staffed by 700,000 men.
Hitler entrusted the revival of tank units to Heinz Guderian, appointing him chief inspector of armored forces. Guderian, one of the architects of the lightning victories at the start of the war in 1939-1941, tried his best to increase the number and quality of tanks, and also helped introduce new types of vehicles, such as the Pz.V Panther.
Supply problems
The German command was in a difficult situation. During 1943, Soviet power could only increase. The quality of Soviet troops and equipment also improved rapidly. Even for the German army to transition to defense, there were clearly not enough reserves. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein believed that, given the superiority of the Germans in the ability to wage maneuver warfare, the problem would be solved by “elastic defense” with “inflicting powerful local attacks of a limited nature on the enemy, gradually undermining his power to a decisive level.”
Hitler tried to solve two problems. At first he sought to achieve success in the East in order to induce Turkey to enter the war on the side of the Axis powers. Second, the defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa meant that the Allies would invade southern Europe in the summer. This would further weaken the Wehrmacht in the east due to the need to regroup troops to deal with the new threat. The result of all this was the decision of the German command to launch an offensive on the Kursk Bulge - that was the name of the protrusion in the front line, which was 100 km across at its base. In the operation, codenamed Citadel, German tank armadas were to advance from the north and south. A victory would thwart the plans for the Red Army's summer offensive and shorten the front line.
The plans of the German command are revealed
German plans for an offensive on the Kursk Bulge became known to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command from the Soviet resident “Luci” in Switzerland and from British codebreakers. At a meeting on April 12, 1943, Marshal Zhukov convincingly argued that instead of launching a preemptive offensive by Soviet troops, “it would be better if we exhaust the enemy on our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going on a general offensive we will finally finish off the main enemy group " Stalin agreed. The Red Army began to create a powerful defense system on the ledge.
The Germans planned to strike at the end of spring or early summer, but they were unable to concentrate attack groups. It was not until July 1 that Hitler informed his commanders that Operation Citadel would have to begin on July 5. Within 24 hours, Stalin learned from “Lutsi” that the strike would be carried out between July 3 and July 6.
The Germans planned to cut off the ledge under its base with powerful simultaneous attacks from the north and south. In the north, the 9th Army (Colonel General Walter Model) from Army Group Center was supposed to fight its way straight to Kursk and east to Maloarkhangelsk. This grouping included 15 infantry divisions and seven tank and motorized divisions. In the south, General Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army of Army Group South was to break through the Soviet defenses between Belgorod and Gertsovka, occupy the city of Oboyan, and then advance to Kursk to link up with the 9th Army. The Kempf army group was supposed to cover the flank of the 4th Panzer Army. The shock fist of Army Group South consisted of nine tank and motorized divisions and eight infantry divisions.
The northern front of the arc was defended by the Central Front of Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky. In the south, the German offensive was to be repelled by the Voronezh Front of Army General Nikolai Vatutin. Powerful reserves were concentrated in the depths of the ledge as part of the Steppe Front of Colonel General Ivan Konev. A reliable anti-tank defense was created. In the most tank-dangerous directions, up to 2,000 anti-tank mines were installed for every kilometer of the front.
Opposing parties. The Great Controversy
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In the Battle of Kursk, Wehrmacht tank divisions faced a reorganized and well-equipped Red Army. On July 5, Operation Citadel began - the experienced and battle-hardened German army went on the offensive. Its main striking force was tank divisions. Their staff at that time of the war was 15,600 people and 150-200 tanks each. In reality, these divisions included an average of 73 tanks. However, three SS tank divisions (as well as the Grossdeutschland division) each had 130 (or more) combat-ready tanks. In total, the Germans had 2,700 tanks and assault guns.
Mainly tanks of the Pz.III and Pz.IV types took part in the Battle of Kursk. The command of the German troops had high hopes for the striking power of the new Tiger I and Panther tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns. The Tigers performed well, but the Panthers showed some shortcomings, in particular those related to unreliable transmissions and chassis, as Heinz Guderian warned.
1,800 Luftwaffe aircraft took part in the battle, especially active at the beginning of the offensive. Ju 87 bomber squadrons carried out classic massive dive bombing attacks for the last time in this war.
During the Battle of Kursk, the Germans encountered reliable Soviet defensive lines of great depth. They were unable to break through or get around them. Therefore, German troops had to create a new tactical group for a breakthrough. The tank wedge - “Panzerkeil” - was supposed to become a “can opener” for opening Soviet anti-tank defense units. At the head of the strike force were heavy Tiger I tanks and Ferdinand tank destroyers with powerful anti-shell armor that could withstand hits from Soviet anti-tank defense shells. They were followed by lighter Panthers, Pz.IV and Pz.HI, dispersed along the front with intervals of up to 100 m between tanks. To ensure cooperation in the offensive, each tank wedge constantly maintained radio contact with strike aircraft and field artillery.
Red Army
In 1943, the Wehrmacht's combat power was declining. But the Red Army was rapidly turning into a new, more effective formation. A uniform with shoulder straps and unit insignia was reintroduced. Many famous units earned the title of “guards”, as in the tsarist army. The T-34 became the main tank of the Red Army. But already in 1942, modified German Pz.IV tanks were able to compare with this tank in terms of their data. With the advent of the Tiger I tanks in the German army, it became clear that the T-34's armor and armament needed to be strengthened. The most powerful combat vehicle in the Battle of Kursk was the SU-152 tank destroyer, which entered service in limited quantities. This self-propelled artillery unit was armed with a 152 mm howitzer, which was very effective against enemy armored vehicles.
The Soviet army had powerful artillery, which largely determined its successes. Anti-tank artillery batteries included 152 mm and 203 mm howitzers. Rocket artillery combat vehicles, the Katyushas, were also actively used.
The Red Army Air Force was also strengthened. The Yak-9D and La-5FN fighters negated the technical superiority of the Germans. The Il-2 M-3 attack aircraft also turned out to be effective.
Victory tactics
Although at the beginning of the war the German army had superiority in the use of tanks, by 1943 this difference had become almost imperceptible. The bravery of the Soviet tank crews and the courage of the infantry in defense also negated the experience and tactical advantages of the Germans. The Red Army soldiers became masters of defense. Marshal Zhukov realized that in the Battle of Kursk it was worth using this skill in all its glory. His tactics were simple: form a deep and developed defensive system and force the Germans to get bogged down in a labyrinth of trenches in a futile attempt to break out. Soviet troops, with the help of the local population, dug thousands of kilometers of trenches, trenches, anti-tank ditches, densely laid minefields, erected wire fences, prepared firing positions for artillery and mortars, etc.
Villages were fortified and up to 300,000 civilians, mainly women and children, were recruited to build defense lines. During the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht was hopelessly stuck in the defense of the Red Army.
Red Army |
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| Red Army groups: Central Front - 711,575 people, 11,076 guns and mortars, 246 rocket artillery vehicles, 1,785 tanks and self-propelled guns and 1,000 aircraft; Steppe Front - 573,195 soldiers, 8,510 guns and mortars, 1,639 tanks and self-propelled guns and 700 aircraft; Voronezh Front - 625,591 soldiers, 8,718 guns and mortars, 272 rocket artillery vehicles, 1,704 tanks and self-propelled guns and 900 aircraft. | ||||||||||
| Commander-in-Chief: Stalin Representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters during the Battle of Kursk, Marshal Zhukov and Marshal Vasilevsky |
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| Central Front Army General Rokossovsky 48th Army 13th Army 70th Army 65th Army 60th Army 2nd Tank Army 16th Air Army |
Steppe (Reserve) Front Colonel General Konev 5th Guards Army 5th Guards Tank Army 27th Army 47th Army 53rd Army 5th Air Army |
Voronezh Front Army General Vatutin 38th Army 40th Army 1st Tank Army 6th Guards Army 7th Guards Army 2nd Air Army |
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German army |
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| Grouping of German troops: 685,000 people, 2,700 tanks and assault guns, 1,800 aircraft. | ||||||||||
| Army Group "Center": Field Marshal von Kluge e 9th Army: Colonel General Model | ||||||||||
| 20th Army Corps General von Roman 45th Infantry Division 72nd Infantry Division 137th Infantry Division 251st Infantry Division 6th Air Fleet Colonel General Graham 1st Air Division |
46th Tank Corps General Zorn 7th Infantry Division 31st Infantry Division 102nd Infantry Division 258th Infantry Division 41st Tank Corps General Harpe 18th Panzer Division 86th Infantry Division 292nd Infantry Division |
47th Tank Corps General Lemelsen 2nd Panzer Division 6th Infantry Division 9th Panzer Division 20th Panzer Division 23rd Army Corps |
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| Army Group South: Field Marshal von Manstein 4th Panzer Army: Colonel General Hoth Army Task Force Kempf: General Kempf |
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| 11th Army Corps General Routh 106th Infantry Division 320th Infantry Division 42nd Army Corps |
3rd Tank Corps
General Bright 6th Panzer Division 7th Panzer Division 19th Panzer Division 168th Infantry Division 48th Tank Corps General Knobelsdorff 3rd Panzer Division 11th Panzer Division 167th Infantry Division Panzer Grenadier Division "Greater Germany" |
2nd SS Panzer Corps General Hausser 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" 52nd Army Corps 4th Air Fleet |
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First stage. Strike from the North
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Tanks and infantry from Model's 9th Army launched an attack on Ponyri, but ran into powerful Soviet defensive lines. On the evening of July 4, on the northern face of the arc, Rokossovsky’s troops captured a team of German sappers. During interrogation they testified that the offensive would begin in the morning at 03:30.
Taking this data into account, Rokossovsky ordered counter-artillery preparation to begin at 02:20 in the areas where German troops were concentrated. This delayed the start of the German offensive, but nevertheless, at 05:00, intense artillery shelling of the advanced units of the Red Army began.
The German infantry advanced with great difficulty through densely shot terrain, suffering serious losses from anti-personnel mines planted at a high density. By the end of the first day, for example, two divisions that were the main striking force of the group on the right flank of the German troops - the 258th Infantry, which had the task of breaking through along the Orel Kursk highway, and the 7th Infantry - were forced to lie down and dig in.
The advancing German tanks achieved more significant successes. During the first day of the offensive, the 20th Panzer Division, at the cost of heavy losses, in some places wedged 6-8 km deep into the defense line, occupying the village of Bobrik. On the night of July 5-6, Rokossovsky, assessing the situation, calculated where the Germans would attack the next day and quickly regrouped the units. Soviet sappers laid mines. The main defense center was the town of Maloarkhangelsk.
On July 6, the Germans tried to capture the village of Ponyri, as well as Hill 274 near the village of Olkhovatka. But the Soviet command appreciated the significance of this position at the end of June. Therefore, Model's 9th Army stumbled upon the most fortified section of the defense.
On July 6, German troops went on the offensive with Tiger I tanks in the vanguard, but they not only had to break through the Red Army's defensive lines, but also repel counterattacks from Soviet tanks. On July 6, 1000 German tanks launched an attack on a 10 km front between the villages of Ponyri and Soborovka and suffered serious losses on the prepared defense lines. The infantry let the tanks pass and then set them on fire by throwing Molotov cocktails onto the engine shutters. The dug-in T-34 tanks fired from short distances. The German infantry advanced with significant losses - the entire area was intensively shelled by machine guns and artillery. Although Soviet tanks suffered damage from the powerful 88-mm guns of the Tiger tanks, German losses were very heavy.
German troops were stopped not only in the center, but also on the left flank, where reinforcements that arrived in Maloarkhangelsk in time strengthened the defense.
The Wehrmacht was never able to overcome the resistance of the Red Army and crush Rokossovsky's troops. The Germans only penetrated to an insignificant depth, but every time Model thought that he had managed to break through, the Soviet troops retreated and the enemy encountered a new line of defense. Already on July 9, Zhukov gave the northern group of troops a secret order to prepare for a counteroffensive.
Particularly strong battles were fought for the village of Ponyri. As in Stalingrad, although not on the same scale, desperate battles broke out for the most important positions - a school, a water tower and a machine and tractor station. During fierce battles they changed hands many times. On July 9, the Germans threw Ferdinand assault guns into battle, but they could not break the resistance of the Soviet troops.
Although the Germans did capture most of the village of Ponyri, they suffered serious losses: more than 400 tanks and up to 20,000 soldiers. The model managed to wedge 15 km deep into the defensive lines of the Red Army. On July 10, Model threw his last reserves into a decisive assault on the heights at Olkhovatka, but failed.
The next strike was scheduled for July 11, but by then the Germans had new reasons for concern. Soviet troops undertook reconnaissance in force in the northern sector, which marked the beginning of Zhukov's counter-offensive on Orel to the rear of the 9th Army. Model had to withdraw tank units to eliminate this new threat. By noon, Rokossovsky could report to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command that the 9th Army was confidently withdrawing its tanks from the battle. The battle on the northern face of the arc was won.
Map of the battle for the village of Ponyri
July 5-12, 1943. View from southeast
Events
1. On July 5, the German 292nd Infantry Division attacks the northern part of the village and the embankment.
2. This division is supported by the 86th and 78th Infantry Divisions, which attacked Soviet positions in and near the village.
3. On July 7, reinforced units of the 9th and 18th tank divisions attack Ponyri, but encounter Soviet minefields, artillery fire and dug-in tanks. Il-2 M-3 attack aircraft strike attacking tanks from the air.
4. In the village itself there are fierce hand-to-hand fights. Particularly heated battles took place near the water tower, school, machine and tractor and railway stations. German and Soviet troops struggled to capture these key defense points. Because of these battles, Ponyri began to be called “Kursk Stalingrad.”
5. On July 9, the 508th regiment of German grenadiers, supported by several Ferdinand self-propelled guns, finally occupied height 253.3.
6. Although by the evening of July 9, German troops advanced forward, but at the cost of very heavy losses.
7. To complete the breakthrough in this sector, Model, on the night of July 10-11, throws its last reserve, the 10th Tank Division, into the assault. By this time, the 292nd Infantry Division was drained of blood. Although the Germans occupied most of the village of Ponyri on July 12, they were never able to completely break through the Soviet defenses.
Second phase. Strike from the south
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Army Group South was the most powerful formation of German troops during the Battle of Kursk. Its offensive became a serious test for the Red Army. It was possible to stop the advance of Model’s 9th Army from the north relatively easily for a number of reasons. The Soviet command expected that the Germans would deliver the decisive blow in this direction. Therefore, a more powerful group was created on the Rokossovsky front. However, the Germans concentrated their best troops on the southern front of the arc. Vatutin's Voronezh Front had fewer tanks. Due to the greater length of the front, it was not possible to create a defense with a sufficiently high density of troops. Already on initial stage German advanced units were able to quickly break through the Soviet defenses in the south.
Vatutin became aware of the exact date of the start of the German offensive, as in the north, on the evening of July 4, and he was able to organize counter-armor preparations for the German strike forces. The Germans began shelling at 03:30. In their reports, they indicated that more shells were expended in this artillery barrage than in the entire war with Poland and France in 1939 and 1940.
The main force on the left flank of the German strike force was the 48th Panzer Corps. His first task was to break through the Soviet defense line and reach the Pena River. This corps had 535 tanks and 66 assault guns. The 48th Corps was able to occupy the village of Cherkasskoye only after fierce fighting, which greatly undermined the power of this formation.
2nd SS Panzer Corps
In the center of the German group was advancing the 2nd SS Panzer Corps under the command of Paul Hausser (390 tanks and 104 assault guns, including 42 Tiger tanks out of 102 vehicles of this type as part of Army Group South). This corps was also able to advance into the first day thanks to good cooperation with aviation. But on the right flank of the German troops, the army task force "Kempf" was hopelessly stuck near the crossings of the Donets River.
These first offensive actions of the German army worried the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The Voronezh Front was reinforced with infantry and tanks.
Despite this, the next day the German SS panzer divisions continued their success. The powerful 100 mm frontal armor and 88 mm guns of the advancing Tiger 1 tanks made them almost invulnerable to fire from Soviet guns and tanks. By the evening of July 6, the Germans broke through another Soviet defense line.
Resilience of the Red Army
However, the failure of Task Force Kempf on the right flank meant that the II SS Panzer Corps would have to cover its right flank with its own regular units, which hampered the advance. On July 7, the actions of German tanks were greatly hampered by massive raids by the Soviet Air Force. Still, on July 8, it seemed that the 48th Tank Corps would be able to break through to Oboyan and attack the flanks of the Soviet defense. On that day, the Germans occupied Syrtsovo, despite persistent counterattacks by Soviet tank units. The T-34s were met by heavy fire from Tiger tanks of the elite Grossdeutschland tank division (104 tanks and 35 assault guns). Both sides suffered heavy losses.
During July 10, the 48th Tank Corps continued to attack Oboyan, but by this time the German command had decided only to simulate an attack in this direction. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was ordered to attack Soviet tank units in the Prokhorovka area. Having won this battle, the Germans would have been able to break through the defenses and enter the Soviet rear into operational space. Prokhorovka was to become the site of a tank battle that would decide the fate of the entire Battle of Kursk.
Map of the defense of Cherkasy
Attack of the 48th Tank Corps on July 5, 1943 - view from the south
Events:
1. On the night of July 4-5, German sappers clear passages in Soviet minefields.
2. At 04:00, the Germans begin artillery preparation along the entire front of the 4th Tank Army.
3. New Panther tanks of the 10th Tank Brigade begin the offensive with the support of the fusilier regiment of the Grossdeutschland division. But almost immediately they stumble upon Soviet minefields. The infantry suffered heavy losses, the battle formations were mixed up, and the tanks stopped under concentrated hurricane fire from Soviet anti-tank and field artillery. Sappers came forward to remove the mines. Thus, the entire left flank of the 48th Tank Corps' offensive stood up. The Panthers were then deployed to support the main forces of the Grossdeutschland division.
4. The offensive of the main forces of the Grossdeutschland division began at 05:00. At the head of the strike group, a company of Tiger tanks from this division, supported by Pz.IV, Panther tanks and assault guns, broke through the Soviet defense line in front of the village of Cherkasskoe. In fierce battles, this area was occupied by battalions of the Grenadier Regiment; by 09:15 the Germans reached the village.
5. To the right of the Grossdeutschland division, the 11th Panzer Division breaks through the Soviet defense line.
6. Soviet troops offer stubborn resistance - the area in front of the village is filled with destroyed German tanks and anti-tank guns; A group of armored vehicles was withdrawn from the 11th Panzer Division to attack the eastern flank of the Soviet defense.
7. Lieutenant General Chistyakov, commander of the 6th Guards Army, reinforces the 67th Guards Rifle Division with two regiments of anti-tank guns to repel the German offensive. It did not help. By noon the Germans broke into the village. Soviet troops were forced to retreat.
8. Powerful defense and resistance of the Soviet troops stop the 11th Panzer Division in front of the bridge on the Psel River, which they planned to capture on the first day of the offensive.
Third stage. Battle of Prokhovka
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On July 12, German and Soviet tanks collided in a battle near Prokhorovka, which decided the fate of the entire Battle of Kursk. July 11 German offensive on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge reached its culmination. Three significant events occurred that day. First, in the west, the 48th Panzer Corps reached the Pena River and prepared for a further attack to the west. In this direction there remained defensive lines through which the Germans still had to break through. Soviet troops constantly launched counterattacks, limiting the Germans' freedom of action. Since the German troops now had to advance further east, to Prokhorovka, the advance of the 48th Tank Corps was suspended.
Also on July 11, the Army's Task Force Kempf, on the far right flank of the German advance, finally began to advance north. She broke through the Red Army's defenses between Melekhovo and Sazhnoye station. Three tank divisions of the Kempf group could advance to Prokhorovka. 300 units of German armored vehicles went to support an even larger group of 600 tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which was approaching this city from the west. The Soviet command was preparing to meet their rapid advance to the east with an organized counterattack. This German maneuver was dangerous for the entire defense system of the Soviet army, and forces were gathered in this area to prepare for the decisive battle with a powerful German armored group.
July 12th is the decisive day
Throughout the short summer night, Soviet and German tank crews prepared their vehicles for the battle that lay ahead the next day. Long before dawn, the roar of warming tank engines was heard in the night. Soon their bass roar filled the entire area.
The SS Tank Corps was opposed by the 5th Guards Tank Army (Steppe Front) of Lieutenant General Rotmistrov with attached and supporting units. From his command post southwest of Prokhorovka, Rotmistrov observed the positions of Soviet troops, which at that moment were bombed by German aircraft. Then three SS tank divisions went on the offensive: Totenkopf, Leibstandarte and Das Reich, with Tiger tanks in the vanguard. At 08:30, Soviet artillery opened fire on German troops. Following this, Soviet tanks entered the battle. Of the 900 tanks of the Red Army, only 500 vehicles were T-34s. They attacked German Tiger and Panther tanks at top speeds to prevent the enemy from exploiting the superior guns and armor of their tanks at long range. Having approached, Soviet tanks were able to hit German vehicles by firing at the weaker side armor.
A Soviet tankman recalled that first battle: “The sun helped us. It illuminated the contours of German tanks well and blinded the eyes of the enemy. The first echelon of attacking tanks of the 5th Guards Tank Army on full speed ahead crashed into the battle formations of the Nazi troops. The through tank attack was so swift that the front ranks of our tanks penetrated the entire formation, the entire battle formation of the enemy. The battle formations were mixed up. The appearance of such a large number of our tanks on the battlefield came as a complete surprise to the enemy. Control in its advanced units and subunits soon broke down. The Nazi Tiger tanks, deprived of the advantages of their weapons in close combat, were successfully shot at by our T-34 tanks from short distances, and especially when hit on the side. Essentially it was tank hand-to-hand combat. Russian tank crews went to ram. The tanks flared up like candles when hit by direct shots, scattered into pieces from the explosion of ammunition, and turrets fell off.”
Thick black oily smoke billowed over the entire battlefield. Soviet troops failed to break through the German battle formations, but the Germans were also unable to achieve success in the offensive. This situation continued throughout the first half of the day. The attack by the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions began successfully, but Rotmistrov brought in his last reserves and stopped them, albeit at the cost of significant losses. The Leibstandarte division, for example, reported that it had destroyed 192 Soviet tanks and 19 anti-tank guns, losing only 30 of its tanks. By evening, the 5th Guards Tank Army had lost up to 50 percent of its fighting vehicles, but the Germans also suffered damage to the tune of about 300 of the 600 tanks and assault guns that attacked in the morning.
Defeat of the German army
The Germans could have won this colossal tank battle if the 3rd Panzer Corps (300 tanks and 25 assault guns) had come to the rescue from the south, but they failed. The units of the Red Army opposing him skillfully and staunchly defended themselves, so that the Kempf army group did not manage to break through to Rotmistrov’s positions until the evening.
From July 13 to July 15, German units continued to conduct offensive operations, but by that time they had already lost the battle. On July 13, the Fuhrer informed the commanders of Army Group South (Field Marshal von Manstein) and Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Kluge) that he had decided to abandon the continuation of Operation Citadel.
Map of the tank battle near Prokhorovka
Hausser tank attack on the morning of July 12, 1943, as seen from the southeast.
Events:
1. Even before 08:30, Luftwaffe planes begin intensive bombing of Soviet positions near Prokhorovka. The 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" advance in a tight wedge with Tiger tanks at the head and the lighter Pz.III and IV on the flanks.
2. At the same time, the first groups of Soviet tanks emerge from camouflaged shelters and rush towards the advancing enemy. Soviet tanks crash into the center of the German armored armada at high speed, thereby reducing the advantage of the Tigers' long-range guns.
3. The clash of armored “fists” turns into a fierce and chaotic battle, breaking up into many local actions and individual tank battles at very close range (the fire was almost point-blank). Soviet tanks seek to envelop the flanks of the heavier German vehicles, while the Tigers fire from the spot. All day and even into the approaching dusk, a fierce battle continues.
4. Shortly before noon, the Totenkopf division is attacked by two Soviet corps. The Germans are forced to go on the defensive. In a fierce battle that lasted all day on July 12, this division suffered heavy losses in men and military equipment.
5. All day long the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" has been fighting very hard battles with the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. Soviet tanks steadfastly hold back the advance of the German division. By the end of the day, the battle continues even after dark. The Soviet command allegedly estimates the losses of both sides during the battle of Prokhorovka at 700 vehicles
Results of the Battle of Kursk
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The result of the victory in the battle of Kursk was the transfer of strategic initiative to the Red Army. On the outcome Battle of Kursk influenced, among other things, by the fact that a thousand kilometers to the west the Allies landed in Sicily (Operation Husky). For the German command, this meant the need to withdraw troops from the Eastern Front. The results of the German general offensive near Kursk were disastrous. The courage and tenacity of the Soviet troops, as well as the selfless work in the construction of the most powerful field fortifications ever created, stopped the selected Wehrmacht tank divisions.
As soon as the German offensive stalled, the Red Army prepared its offensive. It started in the north. Having stopped Model's 9th Army, Soviet troops immediately went on the offensive on the Oryol salient, which jutted deep into the Soviet front. It began on July 12 and became the main reason for Model’s refusal on the northern front to continue the advance, which could affect the course of the battle of Prokhorovka. The model himself had to fight desperate defensive battles. The Soviet offensive on the Oryol salient (Operation Kutuzov) failed to divert significant Wehrmacht forces, but German troops suffered heavy losses. By mid-August, they retreated to a prepared defense line (the Hagen line). In the battles since July 5, Army Group Center lost up to 14 divisions, which could not be replenished.
On the southern front, the Red Army suffered serious losses, especially in the battle of Prokhorovka, but was able to pin down the German units wedged into the Kursk ledge. On July 23, the Germans were forced to retreat to the positions they had occupied before the start of Operation Citadel. Now the Red Army was ready to liberate Kharkov and Belgorod. On August 3, Operation Rumyantsev began, and by August 22, the Germans were driven out of Kharkov. By September 15, von Manstein's Army Group South had retreated to the western bank of the Dnieper.
Losses in the Battle of Kursk are assessed differently. This is due to a number of reasons. For example, defensive battles near Kursk from July 5 to 14 smoothly flowed into the phase of the Soviet counteroffensive. While Army Group South was still trying to continue its advance at Prokhorovka on 13 and 14 July, the Soviet offensive had already begun against Army Group Center in Operation Kutuzov, which is often seen as separate from the Battle of Kursk. German reports, hastily compiled during intense fighting and then rewritten after the fact, are extremely inaccurate and incomplete, while the advancing Red Army had no time to count its losses after the battle. It also affected great value, which these data had from the point of view of propaganda of both sides.
According to some studies, for example, Colonel David Glanz, from July 5 to July 20, the 9th Army of Army Group Center lost 20,720 people, and the formations of Army Group South - 29,102 people. Total – 49,822 people. The losses of the Red Army, according to rather controversial data used by Western analysts, for some reason turned out to be more than three times higher: 177,847 people. Of these, 33,897 people were lost by the Central Front and 73,892 people by the Voronezh Front. Another 70,058 people were lost to the Steppe Front, which acted as the main reserve.
The losses of armored vehicles are also difficult to estimate. Often damaged tanks were repaired or restored the same or the next day, even under enemy fire. Taking into account the empirical law that usually up to 20 percent of damaged tanks are completely written off, in the Battle of Kursk German tank formations lost 1b12 vehicles damaged, of which 323 units were irretrievable. The losses of Soviet tanks are estimated at 1,600 vehicles. This is explained by the fact that the Germans had more powerful tank guns.
During Operation Citadel, the Germans lost up to 150 aircraft, and up to 400 more were lost during the subsequent offensive. The Red Army Air Force lost over 1,100 aircraft.
The Battle of Kursk became the turning point of the war on the Eastern Front. The Wehrmacht was no longer able to conduct general offensives. Germany's defeat was only a matter of time. That is why, since July 1943, many strategically thinking German military leaders realized that the war was lost.
Battle of Kursk |
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Central Russia, Eastern Ukraine |
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Victory of the Red Army |
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Commanders |
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Georgy Zhukov |
Erich von Manstein |
Nikolay Vatutin |
Gunther Hans von Kluge |
Ivan Konev |
Walter Model |
Konstantin Rokossovsky |
Hermann Got |
Strengths of the parties |
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By the beginning of the operation, 1.3 million people + 0.6 million in reserve, 3444 tanks + 1.5 thousand in reserve, 19,100 guns and mortars + 7.4 thousand in reserve, 2172 aircraft + 0.5 thousand in reserve reserve |
According to Soviet data - approx. 900 thousand people, according to it. according to data - 780 thousand people. 2,758 tanks and self-propelled guns (of which 218 are under repair), approx. 10 thousand guns, approx. 2050 aircraft |
Defensive phase: Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all) Irrevocable - 70,330 Sanitary - 107,517 Operation Kutuzov: Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front Irrevocable - 112,529 Sanitary - 317,361 Operation "Rumyantsev": Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front Irrevocable - 71,611 Hospital - 183,955 General in the battle for the Kursk ledge: Irrevocable - 189,652 Hospital - 406,743 In the Battle of Kursk as a whole ~ 254,470 killed, captured, missing missing 608,833 wounded and sick 153 thousand small arms 6064 tanks and self-propelled guns 5245 guns and mortars 1626 combat aircraft |
According to German sources, 103,600 were killed and missing on the entire Eastern Front. 433,933 wounded. According to Soviet sources, 500 thousand total losses in the Kursk salient. 1000 tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet data, less than 1696 aircraft |
Battle of Kursk(July 5, 1943 – August 23, 1943, also known as Battle of Kursk) in terms of its scale, the forces and means involved, tension, results and military-political consequences, it is one of the key battles of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into 3 parts: Kursk defensive operation (July 5-12); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive. The German side called the offensive part of the battle “Operation Citadel.”
After the end of the battle, the strategic initiative in the war passed to the side of the Red Army, which until the end of the war carried out mainly offensive operations, while the Wehrmacht was on the defensive.
Preparing for battle
During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion with a depth of up to 150 and a width of up to 200 km, facing the west (the so-called “Kursk Bulge”) was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front. During April - June 1943, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the parties prepared for the summer campaign.
Plans and strengths of the parties
The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk salient in the summer of 1943. It was planned to launch converging attacks from the areas of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The strike groups were supposed to unite in the Kursk area, encircling the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The operation received the code name “Citadel”. According to the information of the German general Friedrich Fangor (German. Friedrich Fangohr), at a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted at the suggestion of General Hoth: the 2nd SS Panzer Corps turns from the Oboyan direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow for a global battle with the armored reserves of the Soviet troops.
To carry out the operation, the Germans concentrated a group of up to 50 divisions (of which 18 tank and motorized), 2 tank brigades, 3 separate tank battalions and 8 assault gun divisions, with a total number, according to Soviet sources, of about 900 thousand people. The leadership of the troops was carried out by Field Marshal General Günter Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Army Group South). Organizationally, the strike forces were part of the 2nd Tank, 2nd and 9th Armies (commander - Field Marshal Walter Model, Army Group Center, Orel region) and the 4th Tank Army, 24th Tank Corps and operational group "Kempf" (commander - General Hermann Goth, Army Group "South", Belgorod region). Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th Air Fleets.
To carry out the operation, several elite SS tank divisions were deployed to the Kursk area:
- 1st Division Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler"
- 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich"
- 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (Totenkopf)
The troops received a certain amount of new equipment:
- 134 Pz.Kpfw.VI Tiger tanks (another 14 command tanks)
- 190 Pz.Kpfw.V “Panther” (11 more - evacuation (without guns) and command)
- 90 Sd.Kfz assault guns. 184 “Ferdinand” (45 each in sPzJgAbt 653 and sPzJgAbt 654)
- a total of 348 relatively new tanks and self-propelled guns (the Tiger was used several times in 1942 and early 1943).
At the same time, however, a significant number of frankly outdated tanks and self-propelled guns remained in the German units: 384 units (Pz.III, Pz.II, even Pz.I). Also during the Battle of Kursk, German Sd.Kfz.302 teletankettes were used for the first time.
The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, exhaust the enemy troops and defeat them, launching counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. For this purpose, a deeply layered defense was created on both sides of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average mining density in the direction of expected enemy attacks was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines for every kilometer of the front.
The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The coordination of the actions of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.
In the assessment of the strengths of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with different definition the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as differences in the methods of accounting and classification of military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is related to the inclusion or exclusion from the calculations of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1,500 tanks). The following table contains some estimates:
Estimates of the forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk according to various sources |
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Source |
Personnel (thousands) |
Tanks and (sometimes) self-propelled guns |
Guns and (sometimes) mortars |
Aircraft |
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about 10000 |
2172 or 2900 (including Po-2 and long-range) |
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Krivosheev 2001 |
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Glanz, House |
2696 or 2928 |
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Müller-Gill. |
2540 or 2758 |
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Zett., Frankson |
5128 +2688 “reserve rates” total more than 8000 |
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The role of intelligence
From the beginning of 1943, interceptions of secret communications from the High Command of the Nazi Army and secret directives from Hitler increasingly mentioned Operation Citadel. According to the memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, back on March 27, Stalin informed him in general detail about the German plans. On April 12, 1943, the exact text of Directive No. 6, translated from German, “On the plan for Operation Citadel,” of the German High Command, endorsed by all Wehrmacht services, but not yet signed by Hitler, who signed it only three days later, was placed on Stalin’s desk. This data was obtained by a scout working under the name "Werther". The real name of this man still remains unknown, but it is assumed that he was an employee of the Wehrmacht High Command, and the information he received came to Moscow through the Luzi agent Rudolf Rössler operating in Switzerland. There is an alternative assumption that Werther is Adolf Hitler's personal photographer.
However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G.K. Zhukov, relying on data from intelligence agencies of the Kursk fronts, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk Bulge:
Although the exact text of the "Citadel" reached Stalin's desk three days before Hitler signed it, the German plan had already become obvious to the highest Soviet military command four days earlier, and general details they knew about the existence of such a plan at least eight days before.
Kursk defensive operation
The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation - 3 o'clock in the morning (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow time as 5 o'clock in the morning), at 22:30 and 2:20 Moscow time the forces of two fronts carried out counter-artillery preparation with an amount of ammunition 0.25 ammo. German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor losses in manpower. There was also an unsuccessful air raid by the 2nd and 17th Air Armies (more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) on the enemy’s Kharkov and Belgorod air hubs.
Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 a.m. our time, the Germans also launched a bomb and artillery strike on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern front was delivered in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having failed to achieve success, the Germans moved their attack in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they were unable to break through the Soviet defense. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of its tanks, the 9th German Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main German attacks were directed towards the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.
July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkasy.
Operation Citadel - the general offensive of the German army on the Eastern Front in 1943 - was aimed at encircling the troops of the Central (K.K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (N.F. Vatutin) fronts in the area of the city of Kursk through counter attacks from the north and south under the base of the Kursk salient, as well as the destruction of Soviet operational and strategic reserves east of the main direction of the main attack (including in the area of Prokhorovka station). Main blow with southern directions were applied by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army (commander - Hermann Hoth, 48 Tank Tank and 2 Tank SS Tank) with the support of the Army Group "Kempf" (W. Kempf).
At the initial stage of the offensive, the 48th Panzer Corps (com: O. von Knobelsdorff, chief of staff: F. von Mellenthin, 527 tanks, 147 self-propelled guns), which was the most powerful formation of the 4th Panzer Army, consisting of: 3 and 11 tank divisions , mechanized (tank-grenadier) division "Greater Germany", 10th tank brigade and 911th division. assault gun division, with the support of 332 and 167 infantry divisions, had the task of breaking through the first, second and third lines of defense of units of the Voronezh Front from the Gertsovka - Butovo area in the direction of Cherkassk - Yakovlevo - Oboyan. At the same time, it was assumed that in the Yakovlevo area the 48th Tank Tank would link up with units of the 2nd SS Division (thus encircling the 52nd Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Infantry Division), change units of the 2nd SS Division Tank Division, after which the SS division units were supposed to be used against the operational reserves of the Red Army Armies in the area of the station. Prokhorovka, and 48 Tank Corps was supposed to continue operations in the main direction Oboyan - Kursk.
To complete the assigned task, units of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive (Day “X”) needed to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and 67th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A.I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoe and make a breakthrough with armored units in direction to the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th Tank Corps determined that the village of Cherkasskoye was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5th. And already on July 6, units of the 48th Tank Army. were supposed to reach the city of Oboyan.
However, as a result of the actions of Soviet units and formations, their courage and fortitude, as well as their advance preparation of defensive lines, the Wehrmacht’s plans in this direction were “significantly adjusted” - 48 Tk did not reach Oboyan.
The factors that determined the unacceptably slow pace of advance of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the area by Soviet units (from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the entire defense to radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of attack aircraft against those accumulated in front of engineering barriers to enemy tanks, competent placement of anti-tank strong points (No. 6 south of Korovin in the 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid reorganization of the battle formations of the 196th Guards Battalions .sp (Colonel V.I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassy, timely maneuver by the divisional (245 detachment, 1440 grapnel) and army (493 iptap, as well as 27 optabr colonel N.D. Chevola) anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units of 3 TD and 11 TD with the involvement of forces of 245 detachment troops (Lieutenant Colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 M3 tanks) and 1440 SUP (Lieutenant Colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), and also not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the military outpost in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 baht. 199th Guards Regiment, Captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of workers’ barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of the 11th Tank Division and 332nd Infantry Division by the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day of “X-1”, but the resistance of the combat outpost was never completely suppressed by dawn on July 5th). All of the above factors influenced both the speed of concentration of units in their initial positions before the main attack, and their progress during the offensive itself.
Also, the pace of the corps' advance was affected by the German command's shortcomings in planning the operation and poorly developed interaction between tank and infantry units. In particular, the “Greater Germany” division (W. Heyerlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and the 10 armored brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 Pz.V command tanks) in the current conditions The battle turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering barriers (it was especially difficult to overcome the swampy anti-tank ditch west of Cherkassy), and came under a combined attack from Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments of the 33 detachment (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially among officers), and was unable to deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the line Korovino - Cherkasskoe for a further attack in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that had overcome anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own firepower. So, for example, the combat group of the 3rd battalion of the Fusilier Regiment, which was at the forefront of the attack of the VG division, at the time of the first attack found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division was actually unable to bring them into battle for a long time.
The resulting congestion on the advance routes also resulted in the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th Tank Corps in firing positions, which affected the results of artillery preparation before the start of the attack.
It should be noted that the commander of the 48th Tank Tank became hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of his superiors. Knobelsdorff’s lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative impact - all divisions of the corps were brought into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, 1943, after which they were drawn into active duty for a long time. fighting.
The development of the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps on the day of July 5 was greatly facilitated by: active actions of engineer-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the proactive actions of units of the 11th TD (I. Mikl) and 911th department. division of assault guns (overcoming a strip of engineering obstacles and reaching the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy with a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).
An important factor in the success of German tank units was the qualitative leap in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles that occurred by the summer of 1943. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units was revealed when fighting both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet anti-tank tanks were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times less than the effective firing range of the latter; heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in the combined arms 6th Guards A, but also in the 1st Tank Army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).
Only after the bulk of the tanks had overcome the anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassy in the afternoon, repelling a number of counterattacks by Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11th Panzer Division were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00, Divisional Commander A.I. Baksov gave the order to withdraw units of the 196th Guards Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassy, as well as to the center of the village. When units of the 196th Guards Regiment retreated, minefields were laid. At about 21:20, a battle group of grenadiers from the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th Tank Brigade, broke into the village of Yarki (north of Cherkassy). A little later, the 3rd Wehrmacht TD managed to capture the village of Krasny Pochinok (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th Tank Tank of the Wehrmacht was a wedge into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the backdrop of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating to the east parallel to the 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. A.
Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was suppressed around midnight on July 5. However, German units were able to establish complete control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.
Thus, the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD, not possessing large tank formations (they had at their disposal only 39 American M3 tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245th detachment and 1440 saps) were held in the area of the villages of Korovino and Cherkasskoye for about a day five enemy divisions (three of them tank). In the battle of July 5, 1943 in the Cherkassy region, the soldiers and commanders of the 196th and 199th Guards especially distinguished themselves. rifle regiments of the 67th Guards. divisions. Competent and truly heroic actions of the soldiers and commanders of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner, pull up army reserves to the place where units of the 48th Tank Corps are wedged at the junction of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this area in the subsequent days of the defensive operation.
As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoe virtually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts, it was a “lunar landscape”).
The heroic defense of the village of Cherkasskoe on July 5, 1943 - one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops - unfortunately, is one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.
July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.
By the end of the first day of the offensive, the 4th TA had penetrated the defenses of the 6th Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the offensive sector of 48 TK (in the area of the village of Cherkasskoe) and at 12-13 km in the section of 2 TK SS (in the Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka area). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the entire depth of the first line of defense of the Soviet troops, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards SD (Colonel I.M. Nekrasov), and approached the 5-6 km front directly to the second line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), entering into battle with its advanced units.
However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - did not complete the task of the day on July 5, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the 4th Tank Army that had advanced forward. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to July 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely the Death's Head TD, to cover his right flank against the 375th Infantry Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units performed brilliantly in the battles of July 5 .
On July 6, the tasks of the day for units of the 2nd SS Tank Tank (334 tanks) were determined: for the Death's Head TD (Brigadeführer G. Priss, 114 tanks) - the defeat of the 375th Infantry Division and the expansion of the breakthrough corridor in the direction of the river. Linden Donets, for the Leibstandarte TD (brigadeführer T. Wisch, 99 tanks, 23 self-propelled guns) and “Das Reich” (brigadeführer W. Kruger, 121 tanks, 21 self-propelled guns) - the fastest breakthrough of the second line of defense near the village. Yakovlevo and access to the line of the bend of the Psel river - the village. Grouse.
At about 9:00 on July 6, 1943, after powerful artillery preparation (carried out by artillery regiments of the Leibstandarte, Das Reich divisions and 55 MP six-barreled mortars) with the direct support of the 8th Air Corps (about 150 aircraft in the offensive zone), the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps moved into offensive, delivering the main blow in the area occupied by the 154th and 156th Guards Regiment Regiment. At the same time, the Germans managed to identify control and communications points of the 51st Guards SD regiments and carry out a fire raid on them, which led to the disorganization of communications and control of its troops. In fact, the battalions of the 51st Guards SD repelled enemy attacks without communication with higher command, since the work of liaison officers was not effective due to the high dynamics of the battle.
The initial success of the attack by the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions was ensured due to the numerical advantage in the breakthrough area (two German divisions against two guards rifle regiments), as well as due to good interaction between the division regiments, artillery and aviation - the advanced units of the divisions, the main ramming force of which were the 13th and 8th heavy companies of the "Tigers" (7 and 11 Pz.VI, respectively), with the support of assault gun divisions (23 and 21 StuG) advanced to the Soviet positions even before the end of the artillery and air strike, finding themselves at the moment of its end several hundred meters from the trenches.
By 13:00, the battalions at the junction of the 154th and 156th Guards Regiment Regiments were driven from their positions and began a disorderly retreat in the direction of the villages of Yakovlevo and Luchki; The left-flank 158th Guards Regiment, having folded its right flank, generally continued to hold the line of defense. The withdrawal of units of the 154th and 156th Guards Regiment was carried out mixed with enemy tanks and motorized infantry and was associated with heavy losses (in particular, in the 156th Guards Regiment, out of 1,685 people, about 200 people remained in service on July 7, that is, the regiment was actually destroyed) . There was practically no general leadership of the withdrawing battalions; the actions of these units were determined only by the initiative of junior commanders, not all of whom were ready for this. Some units of the 154th and 156th Guards Regiments reached the locations of neighboring divisions. The situation was partly saved by the actions of the artillery of the 51st Guards Rifle Division and the 5th Guards Division from the reserve. Stalingrad Tank Corps - howitzer batteries of the 122nd Guards Ap (Major M. N. Uglovsky) and artillery units of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (Colonel A. M. Shchekal) fought heavy battles in the depths of the defense of the 51st Guards. divisions, slowing down the pace of the advance of the combat groups TD "Leibstandarte" and "Das Reich", in order to enable the retreating infantry to gain a foothold on new lines. At the same time, the artillerymen managed to retain most of their heavy weapons. A short but fierce battle broke out for the village of Luchki, in the area of which the 464th Guards Artillery Division and the 460th Guards Division managed to deploy. mortar battalion 6th Guards MSBR 5th Guards. Stk (at the same time, due to insufficient provision of vehicles, the motorized infantry of this brigade was still on the march 15 km from the battlefield).
At 14:20, the armored group of the Das Reich division as a whole captured the village of Luchki, and the artillery units of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade began to retreat north to the Kalinin farm. After this, right up to the third (rear) defensive line of the Voronezh Front in front of the battle group of the TD "Das Reich" there were virtually no units of the 6th Guards. army capable of holding back its advance: the main forces of the army's anti-tank artillery (namely the 14th, 27th and 28th brigade brigades) were located to the west - on the Oboyanskoye Highway and in the offensive zone of the 48th Tank Corps, which, based on the results of the battles on July 5, was assessed by the army command as the direction of the main strike by the Germans (which was not entirely correct - the strikes of both German tank corps of the 4th TA were considered by the German command as equivalent). To repel the attack of the Das Reich TD artillery of the 6th Guards. And by this point there was simply nothing left.
The offensive of the Leibstandarte TD in the Oboyan direction in the first half of the day on July 6 developed less successfully than that of Das Reich, which was due to the greater saturation of its offensive sector with Soviet artillery (the regiments of Major Kosachev’s 28th regiments were active), timely attacks by the 1st Guards. Tank Brigade (Colonel V.M. Gorelov) and 49th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel A.F. Burda) from the 3rd Mechanized Corps of the 1st TA M.E. Katukov, as well as the presence in its offensive zone of the well-fortified village of Yakovlevo, in street battles in in which the main forces of the division, including its tank regiment, got bogged down for some time.
Thus, by 14:00 on July 6, the troops of the 2nd SS Tank Tank had basically completed the first part of the general offensive plan - the left flank of the 6th Guards. A was crushed, and a little later with the capture of. Yakovlevo, on the part of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, conditions were prepared for their replacement by units of the 48th Tank Tank. The advanced units of the 2nd SS Tank Tank were ready to begin fulfilling one of the general goals of Operation Citadel - the destruction of the Red Army reserves in the area of the station. Prokhorovka. However, Hermann Hoth (commander of the 4th TA) was unable to fully implement the offensive plan on July 6, due to the slow advance of the troops of the 48th Tank Corps (O. von Knobelsdorff), which encountered the skillful defense of Katukov’s army, which entered the battle in the afternoon. Although Knobelsdorff's corps managed to encircle some regiments of the 67th and 52nd Guards SD of the 6th Guards in the afternoon. And in the area between the Vorskla and Vorsklitsa rivers (with a total strength of about a rifle division), however, having encountered the tough defense of the 3 Mk brigades (Major General S. M. Krivoshein) on the second line of defense, the corps divisions were unable to capture bridgeheads on the northern bank of the Pena River, discard the Soviet mechanized corps and go to the village. Yakovlevo for the subsequent change of units of 2nd SS Tank. Moreover, on the left flank of the corps, the battle group of the tank regiment 3 TD (F. Westhoven), which had gaped at the entrance to the village of Zavidovka, was shot by tank crews and artillerymen of the 22 Tank Brigade (Colonel N. G. Venenichev), which was part of the 6 Tank Tank Brigade (Major General A D. Getman) 1 TA.
However, the success achieved by the Leibstandarte divisions, and especially Das Reich, forced the command of the Voronezh Front, in conditions of incomplete clarity of the situation, to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough that had formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakova about the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin with his order transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad Tank (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34 and 21 are Mk.IV “Churchill”) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34 and 17 are Mk.IV Churchill) subordinate to the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves of his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards SD with the forces of the 5th Guards. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 tk SS forces of 2 guards. Ttk (directly through the battle formations of the 375th Infantry Division). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I.M. Chistyakov assigned the commander of the 5th Guards. CT to Major General A. G. Kravchenko the task of withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strong points) the main part of the corps (two of three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and a counterattack by these forces on the flank of the Leibstandarte TD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture of the village. Lucky tanks from the Das Reich division, and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the execution of this order. However, under the threat of arrest and execution, they were forced to begin implementing it. The attack by the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.
Sufficient own artillery assets of the 5th Guards. The Stk did not have it, and the order did not leave time for coordinating the actions of the corps with its neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on flat terrain and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of the Das Reich TD, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted a significant fire defeat on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After this, having brought up anti-tank artillery and organized flank maneuvers, units of the Das Reich TD, between 17 and 19 hours, managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenaps (Major Savchenko) and 464 Guards Artillery, which had withdrawn from the village of Luchki. .division and 460 Guards. mortar battalion 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade. By 19:00, units of the Das Reich TD actually managed to encircle most of the 5th Guards. Stk between the village. Luchki and the Kalinin farm, after which, building on the success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of the station. Prokhorovka, tried to capture the Belenikhino crossing. However, thanks to the proactive actions of the commander and battalion commanders, the 20th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) remaining outside the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikino from various corps units that were at hand, managed to stop the offensive of the Das Reich TD, and even forced the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without contact with corps headquarters, on the night of July 7, surrounded units of the 5th Guards. The Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and linked up with units of the 20th Tank Brigade. During July 6, 1943, units of the 5th Guards. Stk 119 tanks were irretrievably lost for combat reasons, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unknown reasons, and 19 were sent for repairs. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (the losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 even exceeded the losses of 29 tanks during the attack on July 12 at the Oktyabrsky storage farm).
After being surrounded by 5th Guards. Stk, continuing the development of success in the northern direction, another detachment of the tank regiment TD "Das Reich", taking advantage of the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of the army defense, occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin) , near the village of Teterevino, and for a short time wedged itself into the defense of the 285th infantry regiment of the 183rd infantry division, but due to the obvious insufficient strength, having lost several tanks, it was forced to retreat. The entry of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.
The offensive of the "Dead Head" TD did not receive significant development during July 6 due to the stubborn resistance of units of the 375th Infantry Division, as well as the counterattack of the 2nd Guards in its sector in the afternoon. Tatsin tank corps (Colonel A. S. Burdeyny, 166 tanks), which took place simultaneously with the counterattack of the 2nd Guards. Stk, and demanded the involvement of all the reserves of this SS division and even some units of the Das Reich TD. However, inflict losses on the Tatsin Corps even approximately comparable to the losses of the 5th Guards. The Germans did not succeed in the counterattack, even though during the counterattack the corps had to cross the Lipovy Donets River twice, and some of its units were surrounded for a short time. Losses of the 2nd Guards. The total number of tanks for July 6 was: 17 tanks burned out and 11 damaged, that is, the corps remained fully combat-ready.
Thus, during July 6, formations of the 4th TA were able to break through the second line of defense of the Voronezh Front on their right flank and inflicted significant losses on the troops of the 6th Guards. A (of the six rifle divisions, by the morning of July 7, only three remained combat-ready, and of the two tank corps transferred to it, one). As a result of the loss of control of units of the 51st Guards SD and 5th Guards. Stk, at the junction of 1 TA and 5 Guards. Stk formed an area not occupied by Soviet troops, which in the following days, at the cost of incredible efforts, Katukov had to plug with brigades of the 1st TA, using his experience of defensive battles near Orel in 1941.
However, all the successes of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, which led to the breakthrough of the second defensive line, again could not be translated into a powerful breakthrough deep into the Soviet defense to destroy the strategic reserves of the Red Army, since the troops of AG Kempf, having achieved some successes on July 6, nevertheless again failed complete the task of the day. AG Kempf was still unable to secure the right flank of the 4th Tank Army, which was threatened by the 2nd Guards. Ttk supported by the still combat-ready 375 sd. German losses in armored vehicles also had a significant impact on the further course of events. So, for example, in the tank regiment of the TD "Great Germany" 48 Tank Tank, after the first two days of the offensive, 53% of the tanks were considered uncombatable (Soviet troops disabled 59 out of 112 vehicles, including 12 "Tigers" out of 14 available), and in the 10th Tank Brigade to on the evening of July 6, only 40 combat Panthers (out of 192) were considered combat-ready. Therefore, on July 7, the 4th TA corps was given less ambitious tasks than on July 6—expanding the breakthrough corridor and securing the army’s flanks.
The commander of the 48th Panzer Corps, O. von Knobelsdorff, summed up the results of the day's battle on the evening of July 6:
Starting from July 6, 1943, not only the German command had to retreat from previously developed plans (which did this on July 5), but also the Soviet command, which clearly underestimated the strength of the German armored strike. Due to the loss of combat effectiveness and failure of the material part of most divisions of the 6th Guards. And, from the evening of July 6, general operational control of the troops holding the second and third lines of Soviet defense in the area of the breakthrough of the German 4th Tank Army was actually transferred from the commander of the 6th Guards. A I. M. Chistyakov to the commander of the 1st TA M. E. Katukov. The main framework of the Soviet defense in the following days was created around the brigades and corps of the 1st Tank Army.
Battle of Prokhorovka
On July 12, the largest (or one of the largest) oncoming tank battles in history took place in the Prokhorovka area.
According to data from Soviet sources, on the German side, about 700 tanks and assault guns took part in the battle, according to V. Zamulin - the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 294 tanks (including 15 Tigers) and self-propelled guns.
On the Soviet side, the 5th Tank Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks, took part in the battle. After a massive airstrike, the battle on both sides entered its active phase and continued until the end of the day.
Here is one of the episodes that clearly shows what happened on July 12: the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm and the heights. 252.2 resembled the sea surf - four tank brigades of the Red Army, three batteries of the SAP, two rifle regiments and one battalion of a motorized rifle brigade rolled in waves onto the defense of the SS grenadier regiment, but, having met fierce resistance, retreated. This went on for almost five hours until the guards drove the grenadiers out of the area, suffering colossal losses.
From the memoirs of a battle participant, Untersturmführer Gurs, commander of a motorized rifle platoon of the 2nd grp:
During the battle, many tank commanders (platoon and company) were out of action. High level of commander losses in the 32nd Tank Brigade: 41 tank commanders (36% of the total), tank platoon commander (61%), company commander (100%) and battalion commander (50%). The command level and the motorized rifle regiment of the brigade suffered very high losses; many company and platoon commanders were killed and seriously injured. Its commander, Captain I. I. Rudenko, was out of action (evacuated from the battlefield to the hospital).
A participant in the battle, deputy chief of staff of the 31st Tank Brigade, and later Hero of the Soviet Union, Grigory Penezhko, recalled the human condition in those terrible conditions:
... Heavy images remained in my memory... There was such a roar that the eardrums were pressed, blood flowed from the ears. The continuous roar of engines, the clanging of metal, the roar, the explosions of shells, the wild rattle of torn iron... From point-blank shots, turrets collapsed, guns twisted, armor burst, tanks exploded. Shots into the gas tanks instantly set the tanks on fire. The hatches opened and the tank crews tried to get out. I saw a young lieutenant, half burned, hanging from his armor. Wounded, he could not get out of the hatch. And so he died. There was no one around to help him. We lost the sense of time; we felt neither thirst, nor heat, nor even blows in the cramped cabin of the tank. One thought, one desire - while you’re alive, beat the enemy. Our tankers, who got out of their wrecked vehicles, searched the field for enemy crews, who were also left without equipment, and beat them with pistols and grappled hand-to-hand. I remember the captain who, in some kind of frenzy, climbed onto the armor of a knocked out German “tiger” and hit the hatch with a machine gun in order to “smoke out” the Nazis from there. I remember how bravely the tank company commander Chertorizhsky acted. He knocked out an enemy Tiger, but was also hit. Jumping out of the car, the tankers put out the fire. And we went into battle again |
By the end of July 12, the battle ended with unclear results, only to resume on the afternoon of July 13 and 14. After the battle, German troops were unable to advance any significantly, despite the fact that the losses of the Soviet tank army, caused by tactical errors of its command, were much greater. Having advanced 35 kilometers between July 5 and 12, Manstein’s troops were forced, after trampling on the achieved lines for three days in vain attempts to break into the Soviet defenses, to begin withdrawing troops from the captured “bridgehead.” During the battle, a turning point occurred. Soviet troops, which went on the offensive on July 23, pushed back the German armies in the south of the Kursk Bulge to their original positions.
Losses
According to Soviet data, about 400 German tanks, 300 vehicles, and over 3,500 soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield of the Battle of Prokhorovka. However, these numbers have been called into question. For example, according to G. A. Oleinikov’s calculations, more than 300 German tanks could not have taken part in the battle. According to research by A. Tomzov, citing data from the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles of July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irretrievably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV and 2 Pz.III tanks were sent for long-term repairs , in the short term - 15 Pz.IV and 1 Pz.III tanks. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS Tank Tank on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf division.
At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks.
According to the memoirs of Wehrmacht Major General F.W. von Mellenthin, in the attack on Prokhorovka and, accordingly, in the morning battle with the Soviet TA, only the Reich and Leibstandarte divisions, reinforced by a battalion of self-propelled guns, took part - in total up to 240 vehicles, including including four "tigers". It was not expected to meet a serious enemy; according to the German command, Rotmistrov’s TA was drawn into battle against the “Death’s Head” division (in reality, one corps) and the oncoming attack of more than 800 (according to their estimates) tanks came as a complete surprise.
However, there is reason to believe that the Soviet command “overslept” the enemy and the TA attack with attached corps was not at all an attempt to stop the Germans, but was intended to go behind the rear of the SS tank corps, for which its “Totenkopf” division was mistaken.
The Germans were the first to notice the enemy and managed to change formation for battle; the Soviet tank crews had to do this under fire.
Results of the defensive phase of the battle
The central front, involved in the battle in the north of the arc, suffered losses of 33,897 people from July 5-11, 1943, of which 15,336 were irrevocable, its enemy, Model’s 9th Army, lost 20,720 people during the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which took part in the battle on the southern front of the arc, lost from July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrecoverable. Including the Voronezh Front alone - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed that the losses of their front were 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irrevocable. If, contrary to Soviet documents from the war period, we consider the official numbers of the German command to be correct, then taking into account the German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides here is 4.95: 1.
According to Soviet data, in the Kursk defensive operation alone from July 5 to July 23, 1943, the Germans lost 70,000 killed, 3,095 tanks and self-propelled guns, 844 field guns, 1,392 aircraft and over 5,000 vehicles.
During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front consumed 1,079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh Front used 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.
The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front was due to the smaller massing of forces and assets in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.
According to Ivan Bagramyan, the Sicilian operation did not in any way affect the Battle of Kursk, since the Germans were transferring forces from west to east, therefore “the defeat of the enemy in the Battle of Kursk facilitated the actions of the Anglo-American troops in Italy.”
Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov)
On July 12, the Western (commanded by Colonel-General Vasily Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by Colonel-General Markian Popov) fronts launched an offensive against the 2nd Tank and 9th armies of the Germans in the area of the city of Orel. By the end of the day on July 13, Soviet troops broke through the enemy’s defenses. On July 26, the Germans left the Oryol bridgehead and began to retreat to the Hagen defensive line (east of Bryansk). On August 5 at 05-45, Soviet troops completely liberated Oryol. According to Soviet data, 90,000 Nazis were killed in the Oryol operation.
Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev)
On the southern front, the counter-offensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5 at approximately 18-00 Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway on August 11, and captured Kharkov on August 23. The German counterattacks were unsuccessful.
On August 5, the first fireworks display of the entire war was given in Moscow - in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.
Results of the Battle of Kursk
The victory at Kursk marked the transfer of strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for the attack on the Dnieper.
After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as the Watch on the Rhine (1944) or the Balaton operation (1945), were also unsuccessful.
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, subsequently wrote:
According to Guderian,
Discrepancies in loss estimates
The casualties of both sides in the battle remain unclear. Thus, Soviet historians, including Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. M. Samsonov, talk about more than 500 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners, 1,500 tanks and over 3,700 aircraft.
However, German archival data indicate that the Wehrmacht lost 537,533 people on the entire Eastern Front in July-August 1943. These figures include those killed, wounded, sick, and missing (the number of German prisoners in this operation was insignificant). In particular, based on 10 days of reports of their own losses, the Germans lost:
Total total losses of enemy troops taking part in the attack on the Kursk salient for the entire period 01-31.7.43: 83545 . Therefore, the Soviet figures for German losses of 500 thousand look somewhat exaggerated.
According to the German historian Rüdiger Overmans, in July and August 1943 the Germans lost 130 thousand 429 people killed. However, according to Soviet data, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, 420 thousand Nazis were exterminated (which is 3.2 times more than Overmans), and 38,600 were taken prisoner.
In addition, according to German documents, on the entire Eastern Front the Luftwaffe lost 1,696 aircraft in July-August 1943.
On the other hand, even Soviet commanders during the war did not consider Soviet military reports about German losses to be accurate. Thus, the chief of staff of the Central Front, Lieutenant General M.S. Malinin wrote to lower headquarters:
In works of art
- Liberation (film epic)
- "Battle for Kursk" (eng. BattleofKursk, German Die Deutsche Wochenshau) - video chronicle (1943)
- “Tanks! Battle of Kursk" Tanks!The Battle of Kursk) - documentary film produced by Cromwell Productions, 1999
- "War of the Generals. Kursk" (English) GeneralsatWar) - documentary film by Keith Barker, 2009
- “Kursk Bulge” is a documentary film directed by V. Artemenko.
- Composition Panzerkampf by Sabaton
BATTLE OF KURSK 1943, defensive (July 5 - 23) and offensive (July 12 - August 23) operations carried out by the Red Army in the area of the Kursk ledge to disrupt the offensive and defeat the strategic group of German troops.
The victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad and its subsequent general offensive in the winter of 1942/43 over a vast area from the Baltic to the Black Sea undermined Germany's military power. In order to prevent the decline in the morale of the army and the population and the growth of centrifugal tendencies within the aggressor bloc, Hitler and his generals decided to prepare and conduct a major offensive operation on the Soviet-German front. With its success, they pinned their hopes on regaining the lost strategic initiative and turning the course of the war in their favor.
It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, the Supreme Command Headquarters revised the method of planned actions. The reason for this was the data Soviet intelligence that the German command is planning to conduct a strategic offensive on the Kursk salient. The headquarters decided to wear down the enemy with a powerful defense, then go on a counter-offensive and defeat his striking forces. A rare case in the history of wars occurred when the stronger side, possessing the strategic initiative, deliberately chose to begin hostilities not with an offensive, but with a defensive one. The development of events showed that this bold plan was absolutely justified.
FROM A. VASILEVSKY’S MEMORIES ABOUT STRATEGIC PLANNING BY THE SOVIET COMMAND OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK, April-June 1943
(...) Soviet military intelligence managed to timely reveal the preparation of the Nazi army for a major offensive in the area of the Kursk ledge using the latest tank equipment on a massive scale, and then establish the time of the enemy’s transition to the offensive.
Naturally, in the current conditions, when it was quite obvious that the enemy would strike with large forces, it was necessary to make the most expedient decision. The Soviet command found itself faced with a difficult dilemma: to attack or defend, and if to defend, then how? (...)
Analyzing numerous intelligence data about the nature of the enemy's upcoming actions and his preparations for the offensive, the fronts, the General Staff and Headquarters were increasingly inclined to the idea of transitioning to deliberate defense. On this issue, in particular, there was a repeated exchange of views between me and Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief G.K. Zhukov at the end of March - beginning of April. The most specific conversation about planning military operations for the near future took place over the phone on April 7, when I was in Moscow, at the General Staff, and G.K. Zhukov was on the Kursk salient, in the troops of the Voronezh Front. And already on April 8, signed by G.K. Zhukov, a report was sent to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with an assessment of the situation and considerations on the plan of action in the area of the Kursk ledge, which noted: “I consider it inappropriate for our troops to go on the offensive in the coming days in order to forestall the enemy. Better. It will happen if we exhaust the enemy on our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going on a general offensive we will finally finish off the main enemy grouping.”
I had to be there when he received G.K. Zhukov’s report. I remember well how the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, without expressing his opinion, said: “We must consult with the front commanders.” Having given the General Staff an order to request the opinion of the fronts and obliging them to prepare a special meeting at Headquarters to discuss the plan for the summer campaign, in particular the actions of the fronts on the Kursk Bulge, he himself called N.F. Vatutin and K.K. Rokossovsky and asked them to submit their views by April 12 according to the actions of the fronts(…)
At a meeting held on the evening of April 12 at Headquarters, which was attended by I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov, who arrived from the Voronezh Front, Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and his deputy A.I. Antonov, a preliminary decision was made on deliberate defense (...)
After making a preliminary decision to deliberately defend and subsequently go on a counteroffensive, comprehensive and thorough preparations for the upcoming actions began. At the same time, reconnaissance of enemy actions continued. The Soviet command became aware of the exact timing of the start of the enemy offensive, which was postponed three times by Hitler. At the end of May - beginning of June 1943, when the enemy’s plan to launch a strong tank attack on the Voronezh and Central fronts using large groups equipped with new military equipment for this purpose was clearly emerging, the final decision was made on a deliberate defense.
Speaking about the plan for the Battle of Kursk, I would like to emphasize two points. Firstly, that this plan is the central part of the strategic plan for the entire summer-autumn campaign of 1943 and, secondly, that the decisive role in the development of this plan was played by the highest bodies of strategic leadership, and not by other command authorities (...)
Vasilevsky A.M. Strategic planning of the Battle of Kursk. Battle of Kursk. M.: Nauka, 1970. P.66-83.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Central and Voronezh Fronts had 1,336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, 3,444 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,172 aircraft. In the rear of the Kursk salient, the Steppe Military District was deployed (from July 9 - the Steppe Front), which was the reserve of Headquarters. He had to prevent a deep breakthrough from both Orel and Belgorod, and when going on a counteroffensive, increase the force of the strike from the depths.
The German side included 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions, into two strike groups intended for an offensive on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge, which amounted to about 70% of the Wehrmacht tank divisions on the Soviet-German front. In total - 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, about 2,050 aircraft. Important place The enemy's plans included the massive use of new military equipment: Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, as well as new Foke-Wulf-190A and Henschel-129 aircraft.
ADDRESS BY THE FÜHRER TO THE GERMAN SOLDIERS ON THE EVE OF OPERATION CITADEL, no later than July 4, 1943.
Today you are beginning a great offensive battle that may have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war as a whole.
With your victory, the conviction of the futility of any resistance to the German armed forces will become stronger than before. In addition, the new brutal defeat of the Russians will further shake the faith in the possibility of success of Bolshevism, which has already been shaken in many formations of the Soviet Armed Forces. Just like in the last big war, their faith in victory, no matter what, will disappear.
The Russians achieved this or that success primarily with the help of their tanks.
My soldiers! Now you finally have better tanks than the Russians.
Their seemingly inexhaustible masses of people have become so thin in the two-year struggle that they are forced to call on the youngest and the oldest. Our infantry, as always, is as superior to the Russian as our artillery, our tank destroyers, our tank crews, our sappers and, of course, our aviation.
The mighty blow that will overtake the Soviet armies this morning should shake them to their foundations.
And you should know that everything may depend on the outcome of this battle.
As a soldier, I clearly understand what I demand from you. Ultimately, we will achieve victory, no matter how cruel and difficult any particular battle may be.
German homeland - your wives, daughters and sons, selflessly united, meet enemy air strikes and at the same time work tirelessly in the name of victory; they look with ardent hope at you, my soldiers.
ADOLF GITLER
This order is subject to destruction at division headquarters.
Klink E. Das Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation “Zitadelle”. Stuttgart, 1966.
PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. THE EVE
Since the end of March 1943, the Headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command had been working on a plan for a strategic offensive, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. However, in mid-April, based on army intelligence data, it became clear to the leadership of the Red Army that the Wehrmacht command itself was planning to carry out an attack under the base of the Kursk ledge, in order to encircle our troops located there.
The idea of an offensive operation near Kursk arose at Hitler's headquarters immediately after the end of the fighting near Kharkov in 1943. The very configuration of the front in this area pushed the Fuhrer to launch attacks in converging directions. In the circles of the German command there were also opponents to such a decision, in particular Guderian, who, being responsible for the production of new tanks for the German army, was of the opinion that they should not be used as the main striking force in a major battle - this could lead to a waste of forces . The Wehrmacht strategy for the summer of 1943, according to generals such as Guderian, Manstein, and a number of others, was to become exclusively defensive, as economical as possible in terms of expenditure of forces and resources.
However, the bulk of German military leaders actively supported offensive plans. The date of the operation, codenamed "Citadel", was set for July 5, and German troops received at their disposal a large number of new tanks (T-VI "Tiger", T-V "Panther"). These armored vehicles were superior in firepower and armor resistance to the main Soviet T-34 tank. By the beginning of Operation Citadel, the German forces of Army Groups Center and South had at their disposal up to 130 Tigers and more than 200 Panthers. In addition, the Germans significantly improved the combat qualities of their old T-III and T-IV tanks, equipping them with additional armored screens and installing an 88-mm cannon on many vehicles. In total, the Wehrmacht strike forces in the area of the Kursk salient at the beginning of the offensive included about 900 thousand people, 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars. The strike forces of Army Group South under the command of Manstein, which included General Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf group, were concentrated on the southern wing of the ledge. The troops of von Kluge's Army Group Center operated on the northern wing; the core of the strike group here was the forces of the 9th Army of General Model. The southern German group was stronger than the northern one. Generals Hoth and Kemph had approximately twice as many tanks as Model.
The Supreme Command headquarters decided not to go first on the offensive, but to take a tough defense. The idea of the Soviet command was to first bleed the enemy’s forces, knock out his new tanks, and only then, bringing fresh reserves into action, go on a counteroffensive. I must say that this was a rather risky plan. Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, his deputy Marshal Zhukov, and other representatives of the high Soviet command remembered well that not once since the beginning of the war had the Red Army been able to organize defense in such a way that the pre-prepared German offensive fizzled out at the stage of breaking through Soviet positions (at the beginning of the war near Bialystok and Minsk, then in October 1941 near Vyazma, in the summer of 1942 in the Stalingrad direction).
However, Stalin agreed with the opinion of the generals, who advised not to rush into launching an offensive. A deeply layered defense was built near Kursk, which had several lines. It was specially created as an anti-tank weapon. In addition, in the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which occupied positions respectively in the northern and southern sections of the Kursk ledge, another one was created - the Steppe Front, designed to become a reserve formation and enter the battle at the moment the Red Army went on a counteroffensive.
The country's military factories worked uninterruptedly to produce tanks and self-propelled guns. The troops received both traditional “thirty-fours” and powerful SU-152 self-propelled guns. The latter could already fight with great success against the Tigers and Panthers.
The organization of Soviet defense near Kursk was based on the idea of deep echeloning of combat formations of troops and defensive positions. On the Central and Voronezh fronts, 5-6 defensive lines were erected. Along with this, a defensive line was created for the troops of the Steppe Military District, and along the left bank of the river. The Don has prepared a state line of defense. Total depth engineering equipment the terrain reached 250-300 km.
In total, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops significantly outnumbered the enemy both in men and equipment. The Central and Voronezh Fronts had about 1.3 million people, and the Steppe Front standing behind them had an additional 500 thousand people. All three fronts had at their disposal up to 5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 28 thousand guns and mortars. The advantage in aviation was also on the Soviet side - 2.6 thousand for us versus about 2 thousand for the Germans.
PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. DEFENSE
The closer the start date for Operation Citadel approached, the more difficult it was to hide its preparations. Already a few days before the start of the offensive, the Soviet command received a signal that it would begin on July 5th. From intelligence reports it became known that the enemy attack was scheduled for 3 o'clock. The headquarters of the Central (commander K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander N. Vatutin) fronts decided to carry out artillery counter-preparation on the night of July 5. It started at 1 o'clock. 10 min. After the roar of the cannonade died down, the Germans could not come to their senses for a long time. As a result of artillery counter-preparation carried out in advance in areas where enemy strike forces were concentrated, German troops suffered losses and began the offensive 2.5-3 hours later than planned. Only after some time were German troops able to begin their own artillery and aviation training. The attack by German tanks and infantry formations began at about half past six in the morning.
The German command pursued the goal of breaking through the defenses of the Soviet troops with a ramming attack and reaching Kursk. In the Central Front, the main enemy attack was taken by the troops of the 13th Army. On the very first day, the Germans brought up to 500 tanks into battle here. On the second day, the command of the Central Front troops launched a counterattack against the advancing group with part of the forces of the 13th and 2nd Tank Armies and the 19th Tank Corps. The German offensive here was delayed, and on July 10 it was finally thwarted. In six days of fighting, the enemy penetrated the defenses of the Central Front only 10-12 km.
The first surprise for the German command on both the southern and northern flanks of the Kursk salient was that the Soviet soldiers were not afraid of the appearance of new German Tiger and Panther tanks on the battlefield. Moreover, Soviet anti-tank artillery and the guns of tanks buried in the ground opened effective fire on German armored vehicles. And yet, the thick armor of German tanks allowed them to break through the Soviet defenses in some areas and penetrate the battle formations of the Red Army units. However, there was no quick breakthrough. Having overcome the first defensive line, German tank units were forced to turn to sappers for help: the entire space between the positions was densely mined, and the passages in the minefields were well covered by artillery. While the German tank crews were waiting for the sappers, their combat vehicles were subjected to massive fire. Soviet aviation managed to maintain air supremacy. More and more often, Soviet attack aircraft - the famous Il-2 - appeared over the battlefield.
On the first day of fighting alone, Model’s group, operating on the northern flank of the Kursk bulge, lost up to 2/3 of the 300 tanks that took part in the first strike. Soviet losses were also high: only two companies of German “Tigers” advancing against the forces of the Central Front destroyed 111 T-34 tanks during the period July 5-6. By July 7, the Germans, having advanced several kilometers forward, approached the large settlement of Ponyri, where a powerful battle ensued between the shock units of the 20th, 2nd and 9th German tank divisions with formations of the Soviet 2nd tank and 13th armies. The outcome of this battle was extremely unexpected for the German command. Having lost up to 50 thousand people and about 400 tanks, the northern strike group was forced to stop. Having advanced only 10 - 15 km, Model eventually lost the striking power of his tank units and lost the opportunity to continue the offensive.
Meanwhile, on the southern flank of the Kursk salient, events developed according to a different scenario. By July 8, the shock units of the German motorized formations “Grossdeutschland”, “Reich”, “Totenkopf”, Leibstandarte “Adolf Hitler”, several tank divisions of the 4th Panzer Army Hoth and the “Kempf” group managed to wedge into the Soviet defense up to 20 and more than km. The offensive initially went in the direction of the settlement of Oboyan, but then, due to strong opposition from the Soviet 1st Tank Army, 6th Guards Army and other formations in this sector, the commander of Army Group South von Manstein decided to strike further east - in the direction of Prokhorovka . It was near this settlement that the largest tank battle of the Second World War began, in which up to TWO HUNDRED TANKS and self-propelled guns took part on both sides.
The Battle of Prokhorovka is largely a collective concept. The fate of the warring parties was not decided in one day and not on one field. The theater of operations for Soviet and German tank formations represented an area of more than 100 square meters. km. And yet, it was this battle that largely determined the entire subsequent course of not only the Battle of Kursk, but also the entire summer campaign on the Eastern Front.
On June 9, the Soviet command decided to transfer from the Steppe Front to the aid of the troops of the Voronezh Front the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. Rotmistrov, who was tasked with launching a counterattack on the wedged enemy tank units and forcing them to retreat to their original positions. The need was emphasized for attempting to engage German tanks in close combat in order to limit their advantages in armor resistance and firepower of turret guns.
Concentrating in the Prokhorovka area, on the morning of July 10, Soviet tanks launched an attack. In quantitative terms, they outnumbered the enemy in a ratio of approximately 3:2, but the combat qualities of the German tanks allowed them to destroy many “thirty-fours” while approaching their positions. The fighting continued here from morning until evening. The Soviet tanks that broke through met the German tanks almost armor to armor. But this is precisely what the command of the 5th Guards Army sought. Moreover, soon the enemy battle formations were so mixed up that the “tigers” and “panthers” began to expose their side armor, which was not as strong as the frontal armor, to the fire of Soviet guns. When the battle finally began to subside towards the end of July 13, it was time to count the losses. And they were truly gigantic. The 5th Guards Tank Army has practically lost its combat striking power. But German losses did not allow them to further develop the offensive in the Prokhorovsk direction: the Germans only had up to 250 serviceable combat vehicles left in service.
The Soviet command hastily transferred new forces to Prokhorovka. The battles that continued in this area on July 13 and 14 did not lead to a decisive victory for one side or the other. However, the enemy began to gradually run out of steam. The Germans had the 24th Tank Corps in reserve, but sending it into battle meant losing their last reserve. The potential of the Soviet side was immeasurably greater. On July 15, the Headquarters decided to introduce the forces of the Steppe Front of General I. Konev - the 27th and 53rd armies, with the support of the 4th Guards Tank and 1st Mechanized Corps - on the southern wing of the Kursk salient. Soviet tanks were hastily concentrated northeast of Prokhorovka and received orders on July 17 to go on the offensive. But the Soviet tank crews no longer had to participate in the new oncoming battle. German units began to gradually retreat from Prokhorovka to their original positions. What's the matter?
Back on July 13, Hitler invited Field Marshals von Manstein and von Kluge to his headquarters for a meeting. That day, he ordered Operation Citadel to continue and not reduce the intensity of the fighting. Success at Kursk, it seemed, was just around the corner. However, just two days later, Hitler suffered a new disappointment. His plans were falling apart. On July 12, the Bryansk troops went on the offensive, and then, from July 15, the Central and left wing of the Western Fronts in the general direction of Orel (Operation ""). The German defense here could not stand it and began to crack at the seams. Moreover, some territorial gains on the southern flank of the Kursk salient were nullified after the battle of Prokhorovka.
At a meeting at the Fuhrer's headquarters on July 13, Manstein tried to convince Hitler not to interrupt Operation Citadel. The Fuhrer did not object to continuing attacks on the southern flank of the Kursk salient (although this was no longer possible on the northern flank of the salient). But the new efforts of the Manstein group did not lead to decisive success. As a result, on July 17, 1943, the command of the German ground forces ordered the withdrawal of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps from Army Group South. Manstein had no choice but to retreat.
PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. OFFENSIVE
In mid-July 1943, the second phase of the gigantic battle of Kursk began. On July 12 - 15, the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts went on the offensive, and on August 3, after the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts threw the enemy back to their original positions on the southern wing of the Kursk ledge, they began the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev "). The fighting in all areas continued to be extremely complex and fierce. The situation was further complicated by the fact that in the offensive zone of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts (in the south), as well as in the zone of the Central Front (in the north), the main blows of our troops were delivered not against the weak, but against the strong sector of the enemy defense. This decision was made in order to reduce the preparation time for offensive actions as much as possible, and to take the enemy by surprise, that is, precisely at the moment when he was already exhausted, but had not yet taken up a strong defense. The breakthrough was carried out by powerful strike groups on narrow sections of the front using a large number of tanks, artillery and aircraft.
Courage Soviet soldiers, the increased skill of their commanders, and the competent use of military equipment in battles could not but lead to positive results. Already on August 5, Soviet troops liberated Orel and Belgorod. On this day, for the first time since the beginning of the war, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow in honor of the valiant formations of the Red Army that won such a brilliant victory. By August 23, Red Army units had pushed the enemy back 140-150 km to the west and liberated Kharkov for the second time.
The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions; about 500 thousand soldiers killed, wounded and missing; 1.5 thousand tanks; more than 3 thousand aircraft; 3 thousand guns. The losses of Soviet troops were even greater: 860 thousand people; over 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns; 5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, the balance of forces at the front changed in favor of the Red Army. It had at its disposal an incomparably larger number of fresh reserves than the Wehrmacht.
The Red Army's offensive, after bringing new formations into battle, continued to increase its pace. In the central sector of the front, troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts began to advance towards Smolensk. This ancient Russian city, considered since the 17th century. gate to Moscow, was released on September 25. On the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, units of the Red Army in October 1943 reached the Dnieper in the Kyiv area. Having immediately captured several bridgeheads on the right bank of the river, Soviet troops carried out an operation to liberate the capital of Soviet Ukraine. On November 6, a red flag flew over Kiev.
It would be wrong to say that after the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the further offensive of the Red Army developed unhindered. Everything was much more complicated. Thus, after the liberation of Kyiv, the enemy managed to deliver a powerful counterattack in the area of Fastov and Zhitomir against the advanced formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front and inflict considerable damage on us, stopping the advance of the Red Army on the territory of right-bank Ukraine. The situation in Eastern Belarus was even more tense. After the liberation of the Smolensk and Bryansk regions, Soviet troops reached areas east of Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev by November 1943. However, the subsequent attacks of the Western and Bryansk Fronts against the German Army Group Center, which had taken up a tough defense, did not lead to any significant results. It took time to focus on the Minsk direction additional forces, give rest to the formations exhausted in previous battles and, most importantly, develop a detailed plan for a new operation to liberate Belarus. All this happened already in the summer of 1944.
And in 1943, victories at Kursk and then in the Battle of the Dnieper completed a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The Wehrmacht's offensive strategy suffered a final collapse. By the end of 1943, 37 countries were at war with the Axis powers. The collapse of the fascist bloc began. Among the notable acts of that time was the establishment in 1943 of military and military awards - the Order of Glory I, II, and III degrees and the Order of Victory, as well as as a sign of the liberation of Ukraine - the Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky 1, 2 and 3 degrees. A long and bloody struggle still lay ahead, but a radical change had already occurred.
In order to realize this opportunity, the German military leadership launched preparations for a major summer offensive in this direction. It hoped, by delivering a series of powerful counter-strikes, to defeat the main forces of the Red Army in the central sector of the Soviet-German front, regain the strategic initiative and change the course of the war in its favor. The plan of the operation (code name “Citadel”) was to encircle and then destroy Soviet troops by striking in converging directions from the north and south at the base of the Kursk ledge on the 4th day of the operation. Subsequently, it was planned to strike in the rear of the Southwestern Front (Operation Panther) and launch an offensive in the northeast direction in order to reach the deep rear of the central group of Soviet troops and create a threat to Moscow. To carry out Operation Citadel, the best generals of the Wehrmacht and the most combat-ready troops were involved, a total of 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized) and a large number of individual units that were part of the 9th and 2nd armies of the army group. Center (Field Marshal G. Kluge), to the 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf of Army Group South (Field Marshal E. Manstein). They were supported by aircraft of the 4th and 6th Air Fleets. In total, this group consisted of over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and about 2,050 aircraft. This amounted to about 70% of tank, up to 30% of motorized and more than 20% of infantry divisions, as well as over 65% of all combat aircraft operating on the Soviet-German front, which were concentrated in a sector that was only about 14% of its length.
In order to achieve rapid success of its offensive, the German command relied on the massive use of armored vehicles (tanks, assault guns, armored personnel carriers) in the first operational echelon. The medium and heavy tanks T-IV, T-V (Panther), T-VI (Tiger), and Ferdinand assault guns that entered service with the German Army had good armor protection and strong artillery. Their 75-mm and 88-mm cannons with a direct shot range of 1.5-2.5 km were 2.5 times greater than the range of the 76.2-mm cannon of the main Soviet T-34 tank. Due to the high initial velocity of the projectiles, increased armor penetration was achieved. The Hummel and Vespe armored self-propelled howitzers that were part of the artillery regiments of tank divisions could also be successfully used for direct fire at tanks. In addition, they were equipped with excellent Zeiss optics. This allowed the enemy to achieve a certain superiority in tank equipment. In addition, new aircraft entered service with German aviation: the Focke-Wulf-190A fighter, the Henkel-190A and Henkel-129 attack aircraft, which were supposed to ensure maintaining air superiority and reliable support for tank divisions.
The German command attached particular importance to the surprise of Operation Citadel. For this purpose, it was envisaged to carry out disinformation of the Soviet troops on a large scale. To this end, intensive preparations for Operation Panther continued in the South army zone. Demonstrative reconnaissance was carried out, tanks were deployed, transport means were concentrated, radio communications were carried out, agents were activated, rumors were spread, etc. In the Army Group Center zone, on the contrary, everything was diligently camouflaged. But although all activities were carried out with great care and method, they did not produce effective results.
In order to secure the rear areas of their strike forces, the German command in May-June 1943 undertook large punitive expeditions against the Bryansk and Ukrainian partisans. Thus, more than 10 divisions acted against 20 thousand Bryansk partisans, and in the Zhitomir region the Germans attracted 40 thousand soldiers and officers. But the enemy failed to defeat the partisans.
When planning the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) intended to carry out a broad offensive, delivering the main blow in the southwestern direction with the goal of defeating Army Group South, liberating Left Bank Ukraine, Donbass and crossing the river. Dnieper.
The Soviet command began developing a plan for upcoming actions for the summer of 1943 immediately after the end of the winter campaign at the end of March 1943. The Supreme High Command Headquarters, the General Staff, and all the front commanders defending the Kursk ledge took part in the development of the operation. The plan included delivering the main attack in the southwestern direction. Soviet military intelligence managed to timely reveal the preparations of the German army for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge and even set the start date of the operation.
The Soviet command was faced with a difficult task - to choose a course of action: to attack or defend. In his report on April 8, 1943 to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with an assessment of the general situation and his thoughts on the actions of the Red Army in the summer of 1943 in the Kursk Bulge area, the marshal reported: “I consider it inappropriate for our troops to go on the offensive in the coming days in order to forestall the enemy . It would be better if we exhaust the enemy on our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going on a general offensive we will finally finish off the main enemy group.” The Chief of the General Staff shared the same views: “A thorough analysis of the situation and anticipation of the development of events allowed us to draw the correct conclusion: the main efforts must be concentrated north and south of Kursk, bleed the enemy here in a defensive battle, and then go on a counter-offensive and defeat him.” .
As a result, an unprecedented decision was made to switch to defense in the area of the Kursk salient. The main efforts were concentrated in areas north and south of Kursk. There was a case in the history of war when the strongest side, which had everything necessary for an offensive, chose the most best option actions - defense. Not everyone agreed with this decision. The commanders of the Voronezh and Southern fronts, the generals, continued to insist on launching a pre-emptive strike in the Donbass. They were also supported by some others. The final decision was made in late May - early June, when the Citadel plan became known for sure. Subsequent analysis and the actual course of events showed that the decision to deliberately defend in conditions of significant superiority in forces in this case was the most rational type of strategic action.
The final decision for the summer and autumn of 1943 was made by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in mid-April: it was necessary to expel the German occupiers beyond the Smolensk - r. line. Sozh - the middle and lower reaches of the Dnieper, crush the so-called defensive “eastern rampart” of the enemy, as well as eliminate the enemy bridgehead in the Kuban. The main blow in the summer of 1943 was supposed to be delivered in the southwestern direction, and the second in the western direction. On the Kursk salient, it was decided to use deliberate defense to exhaust and bleed the strike groups of German troops, and then go on a counteroffensive to complete their defeat. The main efforts were concentrated in areas north and south of Kursk. The events of the first two years of the war showed that the defense of the Soviet troops did not always withstand massive enemy attacks, which led to tragic consequences.
To this end, it was planned to make maximum use of the advantages of a pre-created multi-line defense, bleed the enemy's main tank groups, exhaust his most combat-ready troops, and gain strategic air superiority. Then, launching a decisive counter-offensive, complete the defeat of enemy groups in the area of the Kursk bulge.
The defensive operation near Kursk involved mainly troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts. The Supreme Command Headquarters understood that the transition to deliberate defense was associated with a certain risk. Therefore, by April 30, the Reserve Front was formed (later renamed the Steppe Military District, and from July 9 - the Steppe Front). It included the 2nd Reserve, 24, 53, 66, 47, 46, 5th Guards Tank Armies, 1st, 3rd and 4th Guards, 3rd, 10th and 18th Tank Armies, 1st and 5th th mechanized corps. All of them were stationed in the areas of Kastorny, Voronezh, Bobrovo, Millerovo, Rossoshi and Ostrogozhsk. The front field control was located near Voronezh. Five tank armies, a number of separate tank and mechanized corps, and a large number of rifle corps and divisions were concentrated in the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters (RVGK), as well as in the second echelons of the fronts, at the direction of the Supreme High Command. From April 10 to July, the Central and Voronezh Fronts received 10 rifle divisions, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades, 13 separate anti-tank artillery regiments, 14 artillery regiments, eight guards mortar regiments, seven separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments. In total, 5,635 guns, 3,522 mortars, and 1,284 aircraft were transferred to the two fronts.
By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Central and Voronezh Fronts and the Steppe Military District numbered 1,909 thousand people, more than 26.5 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units (SPG), about 2.9 thousand .airplanes.
After achieving the goals of the strategic defensive operation, the Soviet troops were planned to launch a counteroffensive. At the same time, the defeat of the enemy’s Oryol group (Kutuzov plan) was entrusted to the troops of the left wing of the Western (Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky), Bryansk (Colonel General) and the right wing of the Central Front. The offensive operation in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction (the “Commander Rumyantsev” plan) was planned to be carried out by forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts in cooperation with the troops of the Southwestern Front (Army General R.Ya. Malinovsky). Coordination of the actions of the front troops was entrusted to representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky, colonel general of artillery, and aviation - to air marshal.
The troops of the Central, Voronezh Fronts and the Steppe Military District created a powerful defense, which included 8 defensive lines and lines with a total depth of 250-300 km. The defense was built as anti-tank, anti-artillery and anti-aircraft with deep echeloning of combat formations and fortifications, with a widely developed system of strong points, trenches, communication passages and barriers.
A state defense line was established along the left bank of the Don. The depth of the defense lines was 190 km on the Central Front and 130 km on the Voronezh Front. Each front had three army and three front defensive lines, equipped in engineering terms.
Both fronts had six armies: Central Front - 48, 13, 70, 65, 60th combined arms and 2nd tank; Voronezh - 6th, 7th Guards, 38th, 40th, 69th Combined Arms and 1st Tank. The width of the defense zones of the Central Front was 306 km, and that of the Voronezh Front was 244 km. On the Central Front, all combined arms armies were located in the first echelon; on the Voronezh Front, four combined arms armies were located.
The commander of the Central Front, General of the Army, having assessed the situation, came to the conclusion that the enemy would deliver the main blow in the direction of Olkhovatka in the defense zone of the 13th Combined Arms Army. Therefore, it was decided to reduce the width of the 13th Army’s defense zone from 56 to 32 km and increase its composition to four rifle corps. Thus, the composition of the armies increased to 12 rifle divisions, and its operational structure became two-echelon.
To the commander of the Voronezh Front, General N.F. It was more difficult for Vatutin to determine the direction of the enemy’s main attack. Therefore, the defense line of the 6th Guards Combined Arms Army (it was the one that defended in the direction of the main attack of the enemy’s 4th Tank Army) was 64 km. Given the presence of two rifle corps and one rifle division, the army commander was forced to build the army troops into one echelon, allocating only one rifle division to the reserve.
Thus, the depth of defense of the 6th Guards Army initially turned out to be less than the depth of the 13th Army's zone. This operational formation led to the fact that the commanders of the rifle corps, trying to create a defense as deep as possible, built a battle formation in two echelons.
Great importance was attached to the creation of artillery groups. Special attention addressed the massing of artillery in the likely directions of enemy attacks. On April 10, 1943, the People's Commissar of Defense issued a special order on the use of artillery from the reserve of the High Command in battle, the assignment of reinforcement artillery regiments to the armies, and the formation of anti-tank and mortar brigades for the fronts.
In the defense zones of the 48th, 13th and 70th armies of the Central Front, in the expected direction of the main attack of Army Group Center, 70% of all guns and mortars of the front and 85% of all artillery of the RVGK were concentrated (taking into account the second echelon and reserves of the front). Moreover, 44% of the artillery regiments of the RVGK were concentrated in the zone of the 13th Army, where the spearhead of the attack of the main enemy forces was aimed. This army, which had 752 guns and mortars with a caliber of 76 mm and above, was reinforced by the 4th Breakthrough Artillery Corps, which had 700 guns and mortars and 432 rocket artillery installations. This saturation of the army with artillery made it possible to create a density of up to 91.6 guns and mortars per 1 km of front (including 23.7 anti-tank guns). Such a density of artillery had not been seen in any of the previous defensive operations.
Thus, the desire of the Central Front command to solve the problems of the insurmountability of the defense being created already in the tactical zone, without giving the enemy the opportunity to break out beyond its boundaries, was clearly visible, which significantly complicated the further struggle.
The problem of using artillery in the defense zone of the Voronezh Front was solved somewhat differently. Since the front troops were built in two echelons, the artillery was distributed between the echelons. But even on this front, in the main direction, which made up 47% of the entire front line of defense, where the 6th and 7th Guards armies were stationed, it was possible to create a sufficiently high density - 50.7 guns and mortars per 1 km of front. 67% of the front's guns and mortars and up to 66% of the artillery of the RVGK (87 out of 130 artillery regiments) were concentrated in this direction.
The command of the Central and Voronezh Fronts paid great attention to the use of anti-tank artillery. They included 10 anti-tank brigades and 40 separate regiments, of which seven brigades and 30 regiments, that is, the vast majority of anti-tank weapons, were located on the Voronezh Front. On the Central Front, more than one-third of all artillery anti-tank weapons became part of the artillery anti-tank reserve of the front, as a result, the commander of the Central Front K.K. Rokossovsky was able to quickly use his reserves to fight enemy tank groups in the most threatened areas. On the Voronezh Front, the bulk of anti-tank artillery was transferred to the armies of the first echelon.
Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy group opposing them near Kursk in personnel by 2.1 times, in artillery by 2.5 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns by 1.8 times, and in aircraft by 1.4 times.
On the morning of July 5, the main forces of the enemy strike forces, weakened by the preemptive artillery counter-training of the Soviet troops, went on the offensive, throwing up to 500 tanks and assault guns against the defenders in the Oryol-Kursk direction, and about 700 in the Belgorod-Kursk direction. German troops attacked the entire defense zone of the 13th Army and the adjacent flanks of the 48th and 70th armies in a 45 km wide zone. The enemy's northern group delivered the main blow with the forces of three infantry and four tank divisions on Olkhovatka against the troops of the left flank of the 13th Army of the general. Four infantry divisions advanced against the right flank of the 13th Army and the left flank of the 48th Army (commander - general) towards Maloarkhangelsk. Three infantry divisions attacked the right flank of the general's 70th Army in the direction of Gnilets. The advance of ground forces was supported by air strikes. Heavy and stubborn fighting ensued. The command of the 9th German Army, which did not expect to encounter such powerful resistance, was forced to re-conduct an hour-long artillery preparation. In increasingly fierce battles, warriors of all branches of the military fought heroically.
Defensive operations of the Central and Voronezh fronts during the Battle of Kursk
But the enemy tanks, despite the losses, continued to stubbornly move forward. The front command promptly reinforced the troops defending in the Olkhovat direction with tanks, self-propelled artillery units, rifle formations, field and anti-tank artillery. The enemy, intensifying the actions of its aviation, also brought heavy tanks into the battle. On the first day of the offensive, he managed to break through the first line of defense of the Soviet troops, advance 6-8 km and reach the second line of defense in the area north of Olkhovatka. In the direction of Gnilets and Maloarkhangelsk, the enemy was able to advance only 5 km.
Having encountered stubborn resistance from the defending Soviet troops, the German command brought almost all of the formations of the strike group of Army Group Center into the battle, but they were unable to break through the defenses. In seven days they managed to advance only 10-12 km, without breaking through the tactical defense zone. By July 12, the enemy's offensive capabilities on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge had dried up, he stopped attacks and went on the defensive. It should be noted that in other directions in the defense zone of the troops of the Central Front, the enemy did not carry out active offensive operations.
Having repelled enemy attacks, the troops of the Central Front began to prepare for offensive actions.
On the southern front of the Kursk salient, in the Voronezh Front, the struggle was also extremely intense. As early as July 4, the forward detachments of the 4th German Tank Army tried to shoot down the military outpost of the 6th Guards Army of the general. By the end of the day they managed to reach the front line of the army's defense at several points. On July 5, the main forces began to operate in two directions - towards Oboyan and Korocha. The main blow fell on the 6th Guards Army, and the auxiliary blow fell on the 7th Guards Army from the Belgorod area to Korocha.
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Memorial "The beginning of the Battle of Kursk on the southern ledge." Belgorod region
The German command sought to build on the success achieved by continuing to increase its efforts along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. By the end of July 9, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps not only broke through to the army (third) defense line of the 6th Guards Army, but also managed to wedge into it approximately 9 km southwest of Prokhorovka. However, he failed to break into operational space.
On July 10, Hitler ordered the commander of Army Group South to achieve a decisive turning point in the battle. Convinced of the complete impossibility of breaking the resistance of the troops of the Voronezh Front in the Oboyan direction, Field Marshal E. Manstein decided to change the direction of the main attack and now attack Kursk in a roundabout way - through Prokhorovka. At the same time, an auxiliary strike force attacked Prokhorovka from the south. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which included selected divisions “Reich”, “Totenkopf”, “Adolf Hitler”, as well as units of the 3rd Panzer Corps, were brought to the Prokhorovsk direction.
Having discovered the enemy’s maneuver, the front commander, General N.F. Vatutin advanced the 69th Army in this direction, and then the 35th Guards Rifle Corps. In addition, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to strengthen the Voronezh Front at the expense of strategic reserves. On July 9, she ordered the commander of the troops of the Steppe Front, the general, to advance the 4th Guards, 27th and 53rd armies to the Kursk-Belgorod direction and transfer the subordination of General N.F. Vatutin 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Army. The troops of the Voronezh Front were supposed to disrupt the enemy’s offensive by delivering a powerful counterattack (five armies) against his group, which had wedged itself in the Oboyan direction. However, on July 11 it was not possible to launch a counterattack. On this day, the enemy captured the line planned for the deployment of tank formations. Only by introducing four rifle divisions and two tank brigades of the 5th Guards Tank Army into the battle did the general manage to stop the enemy two kilometers from Prokhorovka. Thus, oncoming battles of forward detachments and units in the Prokhorovka area began already on July 11.
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Tankers, in cooperation with infantry, counterattack the enemy. Voronezh Front. 1943
On July 12, both opposing groups went on the offensive, striking in the Prokhorovsk direction on both sides of the Belgorod-Kursk railway. A fierce battle ensued. The main events took place southwest of Prokhorovka. From the north-west, Yakovlevo was attacked by formations of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank armies. And from the northeast, from the Prokhorovka area, the 5th Guards Tank Army with attached two tank corps and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Combined Arms Army attacked in the same direction. East of Belgorod, the attack was launched by rifle formations of the 7th Guards Army. After a 15-minute artillery raid, the 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tank Corps attached to it on the morning of July 12 went on the offensive in the general direction of Yakovlevo.
Even earlier, at dawn, on the river. Psel, in the defense zone of the 5th Guards Army, the Totenkopf tank division launched an offensive. However, the divisions of the SS Panzer Corps "Adolf Hitler" and "Reich", which were directly opposed to the 5th Guards Tank Army, remained on the occupied lines, having prepared them for defense overnight. In a rather narrow area from Berezovka (30 km northwest of Belgorod) to Olkhovatka, a battle between two tank strike groups took place. The battle lasted all day. Both sides suffered heavy losses. The fight was extremely fierce. The losses of Soviet tank corps were 73% and 46%, respectively.
As a result of a fierce battle in the Prokhorovka area, neither side was able to solve the tasks assigned to it: the Germans - to break through to the Kursk area, and the 5th Guards Tank Army - to reach the Yakovlevo area, defeating the opposing enemy. But the enemy’s path to Kursk was closed. The motorized SS divisions “Adolf Hitler”, “Reich” and “Totenkopf” stopped attacks and consolidated their positions. On that day, the 3rd German Tank Corps, advancing on Prokhorovka from the south, was able to push back the formations of the 69th Army by 10-15 km. Both sides suffered heavy losses.
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The collapse of hopes.
German soldier on the Prokhorovsky field
Despite the fact that the counterattack of the Voronezh Front slowed down the enemy’s advance, it did not achieve the goals set by the Supreme Command Headquarters.
In fierce battles on July 12 and 13, the enemy strike force was stopped. However, the German command did not abandon its intention to break through to Kursk bypassing Oboyan from the east. In turn, the troops participating in the counterattack of the Voronezh Front did everything to fulfill the tasks assigned to them. The confrontation between the two groups - the advancing German and the counterattacking Soviet - continued until July 16, mainly on the lines they occupied. During these 5-6 days (after July 12), there were continuous battles with enemy tanks and infantry. Attacks and counterattacks followed each other day and night.
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On the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. Broken enemy equipment after a Soviet air raid
On July 16, the 5th Guards Army and its neighbors received orders from the commander of the Voronezh Front to switch to a tough defense. The next day, the German command began to withdraw its troops to their original positions.
One of the reasons for the failure was that the most powerful group of Soviet troops struck the most powerful group of the enemy, but not in the flank, but in the forehead. The Soviet command did not use the advantageous configuration of the front, which made it possible to strike at the base of the enemy wedge in order to encircle and subsequently destroy the entire group of German troops operating north of Yakovlevo. In addition, Soviet commanders and staffs, the troops as a whole, did not yet properly master combat skills, and military leaders did not properly master the art of attack. There were also omissions in the interaction of infantry with tanks, ground troops with aviation, and between formations and units.
On the Prokhorovsky field, the number of tanks fought against their quality. The 5th Guards Tank Army had 501 T-34 tanks with a 76-mm cannon, 264 T-70 light tanks with a 45-mm cannon, and 35 heavy Churchill III tanks with a 57-mm cannon, received by the USSR from England. This tank had very low speed and poor maneuverability. Each corps had a regiment of SU-76 self-propelled artillery units, but not a single SU-152. The Soviet medium tank had the ability to penetrate 61 mm thick armor at a distance of 1000 m with an armor-piercing shell and 69 mm at a distance of 500 m. The armor of the tank was: frontal - 45 mm, side - 45 mm, turret - 52 mm. The German medium tank T-IVH had armor thickness: frontal - 80 mm, side - 30 mm, turret - 50 mm. The armor-piercing shell of its 75-mm cannon at a range of up to 1500 m penetrated armor of more than 63 mm. The German heavy tank T-VIH "tiger" with an 88-mm cannon had armor: frontal - 100 mm, side - 80 mm, turret - 100 mm. Its armor-piercing projectile penetrated 115 mm thick armor. It penetrated the armor of the thirty-four at a range of up to 2000 m.
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A company of American M3s General Lee tanks, supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease, is moving to the front line of defense of the Soviet 6th Guards Army. July 1943
The 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which opposed the army, had 400 modern tanks: about 50 heavy Tiger tanks (88 mm gun), dozens of high-speed (34 km/h) medium Panther tanks, modernized T-III and T-IV ( 75-mm cannon) and Ferdinand heavy assault guns (88-mm cannon). To hit a heavy tank, the T-34 had to get within 500 m of it, which was not always possible; the rest of the Soviet tanks had to come even closer. In addition, the Germans placed some of their tanks in caponiers, which ensured their invulnerability from the side. It was possible to fight with any hope of success in such conditions only in close combat. As a result, losses mounted. At Prokhorovka, Soviet troops lost 60% of their tanks (500 out of 800), and German troops lost 75% (300 out of 400; according to German data, 80-100). For them it was a disaster. For the Wehrmacht, such losses turned out to be difficult to replace.
The repulsion of the most powerful attack by the troops of Army Group South was achieved as a result of the joint efforts of formations and troops of the Voronezh Front with the participation of strategic reserves. Thanks to the courage, perseverance and heroism of soldiers and officers of all branches of the military.
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Church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul on Prokhorovsky Field
The counteroffensive of the Soviet troops began on July 12 with attacks from the northeast and east of the formations of the left wing of the Western Front and the troops of the Bryansk Front against the German 2nd Tank Army and the 9th Army of Army Group Center defending in the Oryol direction. On July 15, troops of the Central Front launched attacks from the south and southeast on Kromy.
Soviet counteroffensive during the Battle of Kursk
Concentric strikes by the front troops broke through the enemy's deeply layered defenses. Advancing in converging directions towards Orel, Soviet troops liberated the city on August 5. Pursuing the retreating enemy, by August 17-18 they reached the Hagen defensive line, prepared in advance by the enemy on the approaches to Bryansk.
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As a result of the Oryol operation, Soviet troops defeated the enemy’s Oryol group (they defeated 15 divisions) and advanced westward up to 150 km.
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Residents of the liberated city of Oryol and Soviet soldiers at the entrance to the cinema before the screening of the newsreel documentary film “The Battle of Oryol.” 1943
The troops of the Voronezh (from July 16) and Steppe (from July 19) fronts, pursuing the retreating enemy troops, by July 23 reached the lines occupied before the start of the defensive operation, and on August 3 launched a counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction.
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Crossing of the Seversky Donets by soldiers of the 7th Guards Army. Belgorod. July 1943
With a swift blow, their armies defeated the troops of the German 4th Tank Army and Task Force Kempf, and liberated Belgorod on August 5.
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Soldiers of the 89th Belgorod-Kharkov Guards Rifle Division
pass along the street of Belgorod. August 5, 1943
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The Battle of Kursk was one of the largest battles of World War II. On both sides, more than 4 million people, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and up to 12 thousand aircraft were involved in it. Soviet troops defeated 30 divisions (including 7 tanks) of the enemy, whose losses amounted to over 500 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, over 3.7 thousand aircraft . The failure of Operation Citadel forever buried the myth created by Nazi propaganda about the “seasonality” of the Soviet strategy, that the Red Army could attack only in winter. The collapse of the Wehrmacht's offensive strategy once again showed the adventurism of the German leadership, which overestimated the capabilities of its troops and underestimated the strength of the Red Army. The Battle of Kursk led to a further change in the balance of forces at the front in favor of the Soviet Armed Forces, finally secured their strategic initiative and created favorable conditions to launch a general offensive on a broad front. The defeat of the enemy at the “Fire Arc” became an important stage in achieving a radical turning point in the course of the war, the overall victory of the Soviet Union. Germany and its allies were forced to go on the defensive in all theaters of World War II.
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Cemetery of German soldiers near Glazunovka station. Oryol region
As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces on the Soviet-German front, more favorable conditions were created for the deployment of American-British troops in Italy, the disintegration of the fascist bloc began - the Mussolini regime collapsed, and Italy came out of the war on the side of Germany. Under the influence of the victories of the Red Army, the scale of the resistance movement in the countries occupied by German troops increased, and the authority of the USSR as the leading force of the anti-Hitler coalition strengthened.
In the Battle of Kursk, the level of military art of the Soviet troops increased. In the field of strategy, the Soviet Supreme High Command took a creative approach to planning the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. Feature decision taken was expressed in the fact that the side with strategic initiative and overall superiority in forces went on the defensive, deliberately giving an active role to the enemy in the initial phase of the campaign. Subsequently, within the framework of a single process of conducting a campaign, following the defense, it was planned to transition to a decisive counter-offensive and deploy a general offensive in order to liberate Left Bank Ukraine, Donbass and overcome the Dnieper. The problem of creating an insurmountable defense on an operational-strategic scale was successfully solved. Its activity was ensured by the saturation of the fronts with a large number of mobile troops (3 tank armies, 7 separate tank and 3 separate mechanized corps), artillery corps and artillery divisions of the RVGK, formations and units of anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery. It was achieved by conducting artillery counter-preparation on the scale of two fronts, wide maneuver of strategic reserves to strengthen them, and launching massive air strikes against enemy groups and reserves. The Supreme High Command headquarters skillfully determined the plan for conducting a counteroffensive in each direction, creatively approaching the choice of directions for the main attacks and methods of defeating the enemy. Thus, in the Oryol operation, Soviet troops used concentric attacks in converging directions, followed by fragmentation and destruction of the enemy group in parts. In the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the main blow was delivered by adjacent flanks of the fronts, which ensured the rapid breaking of the enemy’s strong and deep defenses, the dissection of his group into two parts and the exit of Soviet troops to the rear of the enemy’s Kharkov defensive region.
In the Battle of Kursk, the problem of creating large strategic reserves and their effective use was successfully resolved, and strategic air supremacy was finally won, which was held by Soviet aviation until the end of the Great Patriotic War. The Supreme High Command headquarters skillfully carried out strategic interaction not only between the fronts participating in the battle, but also with those operating in other directions (troops of the Southwestern and Southern fronts on the Seversky Donets and Mius pp. constrained the actions of German troops on a wide front, which made it difficult for the Wehrmacht command to transfer from here of his troops near Kursk).
The operational art of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk for the first time solved the problem of creating a deliberate positional insurmountable and active operational defense up to 70 km deep. The deep operational formation of the front forces made it possible to firmly hold the second and army defense lines and front lines during a defensive battle, preventing the enemy from breaking through into the operational depth. High activity and greater stability of the defense were given by the wide maneuver of second echelons and reserves, artillery counter-preparation and counter-attacks. During the counter-offensive, the problem of breaking through the enemy's deeply echeloned defense was successfully resolved through the decisive massing of forces and means in the breakthrough areas (from 50 to 90% of their total number), the skillful use of tank armies and corps as mobile groups of fronts and armies, and close cooperation with aviation , which carried out a full front-scale air offensive, which largely ensured the high rate of advance of the ground forces. Valuable experience was gained in conducting tank battles both in a defensive operation (near Prokhorovka) and during the offensive when repelling counterattacks of large enemy armored groups (in the Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka areas). The problem of ensuring sustainable command and control of troops in operations was solved by bringing control points closer to the combat formations of troops and the widespread introduction of radio equipment into all organs and control points.
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Memorial complex "Kursk Bulge". Kursk
At the same time, during the Battle of Kursk, there were also significant shortcomings that negatively affected the course of hostilities and increased the losses of Soviet troops, which amounted to: irrevocable - 254,470 people, sanitary - 608,833 people. They were partly due to the fact that by the beginning of the enemy’s offensive, the development of a plan for artillery counterpreparation in the fronts had not been completed, because reconnaissance was unable to accurately identify the locations of troop concentrations and target locations on the night of July 5. Counterpreparations began prematurely, when the enemy troops had not yet completely occupied their starting position for the offensive. In a number of cases, the fire was conducted over areas, which allowed the enemy to avoid heavy losses, put the troops in order in 2.5-3 hours, go on the offensive and on the first day penetrate 3-6 km into the defense of the Soviet troops. The counterattacks of the fronts were prepared hastily and were often launched against an enemy who had not exhausted its offensive potential, so they did not reach the final goal and ended with the counterattacking troops going over to the defensive. During the Oryol operation, there was excessive haste in going on the offensive, which was not determined by the situation.
In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet soldiers showed courage, perseverance and mass heroism. Over 100 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, 231 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 132 formations and units received the Guards rank, 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachev.
Material prepared by the Research Institute
(military history) Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
(Used illustrations from the book Arc of Fire. Battle of Kursk July 5 - August 23, 1943 Moscow and / d Belfry)
Battle of Kursk, 1943
Since March 1943, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) had been working on a strategic offensive plan, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, based on information that the Wehrmacht command was planning to launch an offensive near Kursk, it was decided to bleed the German troops with a powerful defense and then launch a counteroffensive. Possessing strategic initiative, the Soviet side deliberately began military operations not with an offensive, but with a defense. The development of events showed that this plan was correct.
Since the spring of 1943, Nazi Germany has launched intense preparations for the offensive. The Nazis established mass production of new medium and heavy tanks and increased the production of guns, mortars and combat aircraft compared to 1942. Due to total mobilization, they almost completely made up for the losses suffered in personnel.
The fascist German command decided to conduct a major offensive operation in the summer of 1943 and again seize the strategic initiative. The idea of the operation was to encircle and destroy Soviet troops in the Kursk salient with powerful counter strikes from the areas of Orel and Belgorod to Kursk. In the future, the enemy intended to defeat Soviet troops in the Donbass. To carry out the operation near Kursk, called “Citadel,” the enemy concentrated enormous forces and appointed the most experienced military leaders: 50 divisions, among others. 16 tanks, Army Group Center (commander Field Marshal G. Kluge) and Army Group South (commander Field Marshal E. Manstein). In total, the enemy strike forces included over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2,000 aircraft. An important place in the enemy's plan was given to the use of new military equipment - Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as new aircraft (Focke-Wulf-190A fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft).
The Soviet command countered the offensive of fascist German troops against the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge, which began on July 5, 1943, with a strong active defense. The enemy, attacking Kursk from the north, was stopped four days later. He managed to wedge 10-12 km into the defense of the Soviet troops. The group advancing on Kursk from the south advanced 35 km, but did not reach its goal.
On July 12, Soviet troops, having exhausted the enemy, launched a counteroffensive. On this day, in the area of the Prokhorovka railway station, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place (up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns on both sides). Developing the offensive, Soviet ground forces, supported by air strikes from the 2nd and 17th Air Armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23 pushed the enemy back 140-150 km to the west, liberating Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov.
The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The balance of forces at the front changed sharply in favor of the Red Army, which provided it with favorable conditions for the deployment of a general strategic offensive.
Having revealed the offensive plan of the fascist German command, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided to exhaust and bleed the enemy’s strike forces through deliberate defense, and then complete their complete defeat with a decisive counteroffensive. The defense of the Kursk ledge was entrusted to the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts. Both fronts numbered more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3,300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (48, 13, 70, 65, 60th combined arms armies, 2nd tank army, 16th air army, 9th and 19th separate tank corps) under the command of General K. K. Rokossovsky should were to repel the enemy's attack from Orel. In front of the Voronezh Front (38th, 40th, 6th and 7th Guards, 69th Armies, 1st Tank Army, 2nd Air Army, 35th Guards Rifle Corps, 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps) , commanded by General N.F. Vatutin, was tasked with repelling the enemy’s attack from Belgorod. In the rear of the Kursk ledge, the Steppe Military District was deployed (from July 9 - Steppe Front: 4th and 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, 53rd Armies, 5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Air Army, 1 Rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized, 3 cavalry corps), which was the strategic reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters.
Enemy troops: in the Oryol-Kursk direction - the 9th and 2nd armies of Army Group "Center" (50 divisions, including 16 motorized tank divisions; commander - Field Marshal G. Kluge), in the Belgorod-Kursk direction - 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf of Army Group South (commander - Field Marshal General E. Manstein).
The commander of the central front considered Ponyri and Kursk the most likely direction of action for the enemy's main forces, and Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets as auxiliary forces. Therefore, he decided to concentrate the main forces of the front on the right wing. The decisive massing of forces and assets in the direction of the expected enemy attack made it possible to create high densities in the 13th Army zone (32 km) - 94 guns and mortars, of which more than 30 anti-tank artillery guns, and about 9 tanks per 1 km of front.
The commander of the Voronezh Front determined that the enemy’s attack could be in the directions of Belgorod and Oboyan; Belgorod, Korocha; Volchansk, Novy Oskol. Therefore, it was decided to concentrate the main forces in the center and on the left wing of the front. Unlike the Central Front, the armies of the first echelon received wide areas of defense. However, here, in the zone of the 6th and 7th Guards armies, the density of anti-tank artillery was 15.6 guns per 1 km of front, and taking into account the assets located in the second echelon of the front, up to 30 guns per 1 km of front.
Based on our intelligence data and the testimony of prisoners, it was established that the enemy offensive would begin on July 5. Early in the morning of this day, artillery counter-preparation, planned in the fronts and armies, was carried out on the Voronezh and central fronts. As a result, it was possible to delay the enemy’s advance for 1.5 - 2 hours and somewhat weaken his initial blow.
On the morning of July 5, the Oryol enemy group, under the cover of artillery fire and with the support of aviation, went on the offensive, delivering the main blow to Olkhovatka, and auxiliary blows to Maloarkhangelsk and Fatezh. Our troops met the enemy with exceptional resilience. The Nazi troops suffered heavy losses. Only after the fifth attack did they manage to break into the front line of defense of the 29th Rifle Corps in the Olkhovat direction.
In the afternoon, the commander of the 13th Army, General N.P. Pukhov, moved several tank and self-propelled artillery units and mobile barrage units to the main line, and the front commander moved howitzer and mortar brigades to the Olkhovatka area. Decisive counterattacks by tanks in cooperation with rifle units and artillery stopped the enemy’s advance. On this day, fierce battles also broke out in the air. The 16th Air Army supported the fighting of the defending troops of the central front. By the end of the day, at the cost of huge losses, the enemy managed to advance 6-8 km in the Olkhovat direction. In other directions his attacks were unsuccessful.
Having determined the direction of the enemy's main efforts, the front commander decided on the morning of July 6 to launch a counterattack from the Olkhovatka area to Gnilusha in order to restore the position of the 13th Army. The 17th Guards Rifle Corps of the 13th Army, the 2nd Tank Army of General A.G. Rodin and the 19th Tank Corps were involved in the counterattack. As a result of the counterattack, the enemy was stopped in front of the second line of defense and, having suffered heavy losses, was unable to continue the offensive in all three directions in the following days. After delivering a counterattack, the 2nd Tank Army and the 19th Tank Corps went on the defensive behind the second line, which strengthened the position of the troops of the Central Front.
On the same day, the enemy launched an offensive in the direction of Oboyan and Korocha; The main blows were taken by the 6th and 7th Guards, 69th Army and 1st Tank Army.
Having failed to achieve success in the Olkhovat direction, the enemy launched an attack on Ponyri on the morning of July 7, where the 307th Rifle Division was defending. During the day she repelled eight attacks. When enemy units broke into the northwestern outskirts of the Ponyri station, the division commander, General M.A. Enshin, concentrated artillery and mortar fire on them, then launched a counterattack with the forces of the second echelon and the attached tank brigade and restored the situation. On July 8 and 9, the enemy continued attacks on Olkhovatka and Ponyri, and on July 10, against the troops of the right flank of the 70th Army, but all his attempts to break through the second line of defense were thwarted.
Having exhausted their reserves, the enemy was forced to abandon the offensive and on July 11 went on the defensive.
German soldiers in front of a Tiger tank, during the Battle of Kursk in June-July 1943
The enemy also launched a general offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front on the morning of July 5, delivering the main attack with the forces of the 4th Tank Army on Oboyan, and with the auxiliary operational group Kempf on Korocha. The fighting became especially fierce in the Oboyan direction. In the first half of the day, the commander of the 6th Guards Army, General I.M. Chistyakov, moved to the first line of defense part of the anti-tank artillery brigade, two tank and one self-propelled artillery regiments and a tank brigade. By the end of the day, the troops of this army inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and stopped his attacks. The main line of our defense was broken through only in certain areas. In the Korochan direction, the enemy managed to cross the Northern Donets south of Belgorod and seize a small bridgehead.
In the current situation, the front commander decided to cover the Oboyan direction. To this end, on the night of July 6, he moved the 1st Tank Army of General M.E. Katukov, as well as the 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, operationally subordinate to the 6th Guards Army, to the second line of defense. In addition, the army was reinforced with front-line artillery.
On the morning of July 6, the enemy resumed the offensive in all directions. In the Oboyan direction, he repeatedly launched attacks from 150 to 400 tanks, but each time he met powerful fire from infantry, artillery and tanks. Only towards the end of the day did he manage to break into the second line of our defense.
On this day, the enemy managed to complete a breakthrough in the Korochan direction main page defense, but its further advance was stopped.
Heavy German tanks "Tiger" (Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger I") at the attack line, south of Orel. Battle of Kursk, mid-July 1943
On July 7 and 8, the Nazis, bringing fresh reserves into the battle, again tried to break through to Oboyan, expand the breakthrough towards the flanks and deepen it in the direction of Prokhorovka. Up to 300 enemy tanks were rushing to the northeast. However, all enemy attempts were paralyzed by the active actions of the 10th and 2nd Tank Corps, advanced from the reserves of the Headquarters to the Prokhorovka area, as well as by the active actions of the 2nd and 17th Air Armies. In the Korochan direction, enemy attacks were also repulsed. The counterattack carried out on July 8 by formations of the 40th Army on the left flank of the enemy’s 4th Tank Army, and by units of the 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps on its left flank, significantly eased the position of our troops in the Oboyan direction.
From July 9 to July 11, the enemy brought additional reserves into the battle and at any cost sought to break through along the Belgorod highway to Kursk. The front command promptly deployed part of its artillery to help the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies. In addition, to cover the Oboyan direction, the 10th Tank Corps was regrouped from the Prokhorovka area and the main aviation forces were targeted, and the 5th Guards Tank Corps was regrouped to strengthen the right flank of the 1st Tank Army. Through the joint efforts of ground forces and aviation, almost all enemy attacks were repulsed. Only on July 9, in the Kochetovka area, enemy tanks managed to break through to the third line of our defense. But two divisions of the 5th Guards Army of the Steppe Front and advanced tank brigades of the 5th Guards Tank Army were advanced against them, which stopped the advance of enemy tanks.
SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf", Kursk, 1943.
There was clearly a crisis brewing in the enemy's offensive. Therefore, the chairman of the Supreme Command headquarters, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky and the commander of the Voronezh Front, General N. F. Vatutin, decided on the morning of July 12 to launch a counterattack from the Prokhorovka area with the forces of the 5th Guards Army of General A. S. Zhdanov and the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. A. Rotmistrov, as well as the forces of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies in the general direction of Yakovlevo with the goal of the final defeat of the wedged enemy group. From the air, the counterattack was to be provided by the main forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies.
On the morning of July 12, the troops of the Voronezh Front launched a counterattack. The main events took place in the area of the Prokhorovka railway station (on the Belgorod - Kursk line, 56 km north of Belgorod), where the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place between the advancing enemy tank group (4th Tank Army, Task Force Kempf ") and the Soviet troops that launched a counterattack (5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Guards Army). On both sides, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in the battle. Air support for the enemy strike force was provided by aviation from Army Group South. Air strikes against the enemy were carried out by the 2nd Air Army, units of the 17th Air Army, and long-range aviation (about 1,300 sorties were carried out). During the day of battle, the enemy lost up to 400 tanks and assault guns, over 10 thousand people. Having failed to achieve the intended goal - to capture Kursk from the southeast, the enemy (advanced on the southern front of the Kursk ledge to a maximum of 35 km) went on the defensive.
On July 12, a turning point occurred in the Battle of Kursk. By order of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Hitler's command was forced to abandon offensive plans and on July 16 began to withdraw its troops to their original position. The troops of the Voronezh, and from July 18 and the Steppe fronts began to pursue the enemy and by the end of July 23 they had mostly reached the line they occupied at the beginning of the defensive battle.
Source: I.S. Konev "Notes of the Front Commander, 1943-1945", Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1989.
The Oryol salient was defended by troops of the 2nd Tank and 9th Field Armies, which were part of the Center group. They consisted of 27 infantry, 10 tank and motorized divisions. Here the enemy created a strong defense, the tactical zone of which consisted of two stripes with a total depth of 12 - 15 km. They had a developed system of trenches, communication passages and a large number of armored firing points. A number of intermediate defensive lines were prepared in the operational depth. The total depth of its defense on the Oryol bridgehead reached 150 km.
The Oryol group of the enemy was ordered by the Supreme Command Headquarters to defeat the troops of the left wing of the Western Front and the main forces of the Bryansk and Central Fronts. The idea of the operation was to cut the enemy group into separate parts and destroy it with counter strikes from the north, east and south in the general direction of Oryol.
The Western Front (commanded by General V.D. Sokolovsky) received the task of delivering the main blow with the troops of the 11th Guards Army from the area southwest of Kozelsk to Khotynets, preventing the withdrawal of Nazi troops from Orel to the west and, in cooperation with other fronts, destroying them; with part of the forces, together with the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front, encircle and destroy the Bolkhov enemy group; carry out an auxiliary strike by troops of the 50th Army on Zhizdra.
The Bryansk Front (commanded by General M. M. Popov) was supposed to deliver the main blow with the troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies from the Novosil area to Orel, and the auxiliary blow with the forces of the 61st Army to Bolkhov.
The Central Front had the task of eliminating the wedged enemy group north of Olkhovatka, subsequently developing an attack on Kromy and, in cooperation with the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts, completing the defeat of the enemy in the Oryol salient.
Preparations for the operation at the fronts were carried out taking into account the fact that they had to break through the enemy’s prepared and deeply echeloned defenses for the first time and develop tactical success at a high pace. For this purpose, a decisive massing of forces and means was carried out, the combat formations of troops were echeloned deeper, success development echelons were created in the armies, consisting of one or two tank corps, the offensive was to be carried out day and night.
For example, with the total width of the 11th Guards Army's offensive zone being 36 km, a decisive massing of forces and assets was achieved in the 14-kilometer breakthrough area, which ensured an increase in operational-tactical densities. The average artillery density in the army breakthrough area reached 185, and in the 8th Guards Rifle Corps - 232 guns and mortars per 1 km of front. If the offensive zones of the divisions in the counteroffensive near Stalingrad fluctuated within 5 km, then in the 8th Guards Rifle Regiment they were narrowed to 2 km. What was new compared to the counteroffensive at Stalingrad was that the battle formation of rifle corps, divisions, regiments and battalions was formed, as a rule, in two and sometimes in three echelons. This ensured an increase in the force of the strike from the depths and the timely development of the emerging success.
Characteristic of the use of artillery was the creation in armies of destruction and long-range artillery groups, groups of guards mortars and anti-aircraft artillery groups. The artillery training schedule in some armies began to include a period of shooting and destruction.
There have been changes in the use of tanks. For the first time, self-propelled artillery regiments were included in the tank groups for direct infantry support (NIS), which were supposed to advance behind the tanks and support their actions with the fire of their guns. Moreover, in some armies, NPP tanks were assigned not only to the rifle divisions of the first, but also to the second echelon of the corps. Tank corps constituted mobile army groups, and tank armies were intended to be used for the first time as mobile groups of fronts.
The combat operations of our troops were to be supported by more than 3 thousand aircraft of the 1st, 15th and 16th Air Armies (commanded by Generals M.M. Gromov, N.F. Naumenko, S.I. Rudenko) of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts, and also long-range aviation.
Aviation was assigned the following tasks: to cover the troops of strike groups of the fronts during the preparation and conduct of operations; suppress resistance centers at the front line and in the immediate depths and disrupt the enemy command and control system for the period of aviation training; from the beginning of the attack, continuously accompany the infantry and tanks; ensure the introduction of tank formations into battle and their operations in operational depth; fight against suitable enemy reserves.
The counter-offensive was preceded by a lot of preparatory work. On all fronts, the initial areas for the offensive were well equipped, troops were regrouped, and large reserves of material and technical resources were created. A day before the offensive, reconnaissance in force was carried out on the fronts by the forward battalions, which made it possible to clarify the true outline of the front line of the enemy’s defense, and in some areas to capture the front trench.
On the morning of July 12, after powerful air and artillery preparation, which lasted about three hours, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive. The greatest success was achieved in the direction of the main attack of the Western Front. By mid-day, the troops of the 11th Guards Army (commanded by General I. Kh. Bagramyan), thanks to the timely entry into battle of the second echelons of rifle regiments and separate tank brigades, broke through the main enemy defense line and crossed the Fomina River. In order to quickly complete the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical zone, on the afternoon of July 12, the 5th Tank Corps was introduced into the battle in the direction of Bolkhov. On the morning of the second day of the operation, the second echelons of rifle corps entered the battle, which, together with tank units, bypassing strong strongholds of the enemy, with the active support of artillery and aviation, completed the breakthrough of the second line of its defense by mid-July 13.
After completing the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone, the 5th Tank Corps and its 1st Tank Corps, introduced into the breakthrough to the right, together with the advanced detachments of rifle formations, proceeded to pursue the enemy. By the morning of July 15, they reached the Vytebet River and crossed it on the move, and by the end of the next day they cut the Bolkhov-Khotynets road. To delay their advance, the enemy pulled up reserves and launched a series of counterattacks.
In this situation, the commander of the 11th Guards Army regrouped the 36th Guards Rifle Corps from the left flank of the army and moved here the 25th Tank Corps, transferred from the front reserve. Having repelled enemy counterattacks, the troops of the 11th Guards Army resumed the offensive and by July 19 advanced up to 60 km, expanding the breakthrough to 120 km and covering the left flank of the Bolkhov enemy group from the southwest.
In order to develop the operation, the Supreme High Command Headquarters strengthened the western front with the 11th Army (commanded by General I. I. Fedyuninsky). After a long march, on July 20, an incomplete army was immediately introduced into battle at the junction between the 50th and 11th Guards Armies in the direction of Khvostovichi. In five days, she broke the stubborn resistance of the enemy and advanced 15 km.
In order to completely defeat the enemy and develop the offensive, the commander of the Western Front in the middle of the day on July 26 brought into battle in the zone of the 11th Guards Army the 4th Tank Army transferred to him from the Headquarters reserve (commander General V.M. Badanov).
Having an operational formation in two echelons, the 4th Tank Army, after a short artillery preparation with the support of aviation, launched an offensive on Bolkhov, and then struck at Khotynets and Karachev. In five days she advanced 12 - 20 km. She had to break through intermediate defensive lines previously occupied by enemy troops. Through its actions, the 4th Tank Army contributed to the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front in the liberation of Bolkhov.
On July 30, the troops of the left wing of the Western Front (11th Guards, 4th Tank, 11th Army and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps) in connection with the preparation of the Smolensk offensive operation were transferred to the subordination of the Bryansk Front.
The offensive of the Bryansk Front developed much more slowly than that of the Western Front. The troops of the 61st Army under the command of General P. A. Belov, together with the 20th Tank Corps, broke through the enemy’s defenses and, repelling his counterattacks, liberated Bolkhov on July 29.
The troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies, with the 1st Guards Tank Corps introduced into the battle in the middle of the second day of the offensive, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone by the end of July 13. By July 18, they approached the Oleshnya River, where they encountered fierce enemy resistance at the rear defensive line.
In order to speed up the defeat of the enemy's Oryol group, the Supreme High Command Headquarters transferred the 3rd Guards Tank Army (commanded by General P. S. Rybalko) from its reserve to the Bryansk Front. On the morning of July 19, with the support of formations of the 1st and 15th Air Armies and long-range aviation, it went on the offensive from the Bogdanovo, Podmaslovo line and, repelling strong counterattacks of the enemy, by the end of the day broke through its defenses on the Oleshnya River. On the night of July 20, the tank army, having regrouped, struck in the direction of Otrada, assisting the Bryansk Front in defeating the Mtsensk enemy group. On the morning of July 21, after a regrouping of forces, the army attacked Stanovoy Kolodez and captured it on July 26. The next day it was transferred to the Central Front.
The offensive of the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts forced the enemy to pull back part of the forces of the Oryol group from the Kursk direction and thereby created a favorable situation for the troops of the right wing of the Central Front to launch a counteroffensive. By July 18, they had restored their previous position and continued to advance in the direction of Krom.
By the end of July, troops on three fronts captured the enemy’s Oryol group from the north, east and south. The fascist German command, trying to prevent the threat of encirclement, on July 30 began the withdrawal of all its troops from the Oryol bridgehead. Soviet troops began pursuit. On the morning of August 4, the troops of the left wing of the Bryansk Front broke into Oryol and by the morning of August 5 liberated it. On the same day, Belgorod was liberated by the troops of the Steppe Front.
Having captured Orel, our troops continued the offensive. On August 18 they reached the Zhizdra, Litizh line. As a result of the Oryol operation, 14 enemy divisions were defeated (including 6 tank divisions)
3. Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (August 3 - 23, 1943)
The Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead was defended by the 4th Tank Army and the Kempf task force. They consisted of 18 divisions, including 4 tank divisions. Here the enemy created 7 defensive lines with a total depth of up to 90 km, as well as 1 contour around Belgorod and 2 around Kharkov.
The idea of the Supreme High Command headquarters was to use powerful blows from troops from adjacent wings of the Voronezh and steppe fronts to cut the opposing enemy group into two parts, subsequently deeply envelop it in the Kharkov region and, in cooperation with the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front, destroy it.
The troops of the Voronezh Front delivered the main blow with the forces of two combined arms and two tank armies from the area northeast of Tomarovka to Bogodukhov, Valki, bypassing Kharkov from the west, an auxiliary attack, also by the forces of two combined arms armies, from the Proletarsky area in the direction of Boromlya, in order to cover the main groups from the West.
The steppe front under the command of General I. S. Konev delivered the main blow with troops of the 53rd and part of the forces of the 69th armies from the area north-west of Belgorod to Kharkov from the north, an auxiliary blow was delivered by the forces of the 7th Guards Army from the area south-east of Belgorod to west direction.
By decision of the commander of the Southwestern Front, General R. Ya. Malinovsky, the 57th Army launched a strike from the Martovaya area to Merefa, covering Kharkov from the southeast.
From the air, the offensive of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts was ensured by the 2nd and 5th air armies of generals S.A. Krasovsky and S.K. Goryunov, respectively. In addition, part of the long-range aviation forces was involved.
To achieve success in breaking through the enemy’s defenses, the command of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts decisively massed forces and assets in the directions of their main attacks, which made it possible to create high operational densities. Thus, in the zone of the 5th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front, they reached 1.5 km per rifle division, 230 guns and mortars and 70 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of front.
There were characteristic features in planning the use of artillery and tanks. Artillery destruction groups were created not only in armies, but also in corps operating in the main directions. Separate tank and mechanized corps were to be used as mobile army groups, and tank armies - as a mobile group of the Voronezh Front, which was new in the art of war.
The tank armies were planned to be brought into battle in the offensive zone of the 5th Guards Army. They were supposed to operate in the directions: 1st Tank Army - Bogodolov, 5th Guards Tank Army - Zolochev, and by the end of the third or fourth day of the operation, reach the Valka, Lyubotin area, thereby cutting off the retreat of the Kharkov enemy group to the west.
Artillery and engineering support for the entry of tank armies into battle was assigned to the 5th Guards Army.
For aviation support, each tank army was allocated one assault and fighter aviation division.
In preparing for the operation, it was instructive to disinform the enemy about the true direction of the main attack of our troops. From July 28 to August 6, the 38th Army, operating on the right wing of the Voronezh Front, skillfully imitated the concentration of a large group of troops in the Sumy direction. The fascist German command not only began bombing areas of false troop concentrations, but also kept a significant number of its reserves in this direction.
A special feature was that the operation was prepared in a limited time. Nevertheless, the troops of both fronts were able to prepare for the offensive and provide themselves with the necessary material resources.
Hiding behind destroyed enemy tanks, the soldiers move forward, Belgorod direction, August 2, 1943.
On August 3, after powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, front troops, supported by a barrage of fire, went on the offensive and successfully broke through the first enemy position. With the introduction of second echelons of regiments into battle, the second position was broken through. To increase the efforts of the 5th Guards Army, advanced tank brigades of the corps of the first echelon of tank armies were brought into battle. They, together with rifle divisions, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defense line. Following the advanced brigades, the main forces of the tank armies were brought into battle. By the end of the day, they had overcome the second line of enemy defense and advanced 12 - 26 km in depth, thereby separating the Tomarov and Belgorod centers of enemy resistance.
Simultaneously with the tank armies, the following were introduced into the battle: in the zone of the 6th Guards Army - the 5th Guards Tank Corps, and in the zone of the 53rd Army - the 1st Mechanized Corps. They, together with rifle formations, broke the enemy’s resistance, completed the breakthrough of the main defensive line, and by the end of the day approached the second defensive line. Having broken through the tactical defense zone and destroyed the nearest operational reserves, the main strike group of the Voronezh Front began pursuing the enemy in the morning of the second day of the operation.
On August 4, troops of the 1st Tank Army from the Tomarovka area began to develop an offensive to the south. Its 6th Tank and 3rd Mechanized Corps, with reinforced tank brigades ahead, advanced 70 km by mid-day on August 6th. In the afternoon of the next day, the 6th Tank Corps liberated Bogodukhov.
The 5th Guards Tank Army, bypassing the enemy's centers of resistance from the west, struck at Zolochev and broke into the city on August 6.
By this time, the troops of the 6th Guards Army had captured the enemy’s strong defense center of Tomarovka, surrounded and destroyed his Borisov group. The 4th and 5th Guards Tank Corps played a major role in this. Developing an offensive in the southwestern direction, they bypassed the Borisov group of Germans from the west and east, and on August 7, with a swift strike, they broke into Grayvoron, thereby cutting off the enemy’s escape routes to the west and south. This was facilitated by the actions of the auxiliary group of the Voronezh Front, which went on the offensive on the morning of August 5 in its direction.
The troops of the Steppe Front, having completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone on August 4, captured Belgorod by storm by the end of the next day, after which they began to develop an offensive against Kharkov. By the end of August 7, the breakthrough front of our troops had reached 120 km. Tank armies advanced to a depth of 100 km, and combined arms armies - up to 60 - 65 km.
Kislov Photos
The troops of the 40th and 27th armies, continuing to develop the offensive, reached the Bromlya, Trostyanets, Akhtyrka line by August 11. A company of the 12th Guards Tank Brigade, led by Captain I.A. Tereshchuk, broke into Akhtyrka on August 10, where it was surrounded by the enemy. For two days, Soviet tank crews, without communication with the brigade, were in besieged tanks, repelling the fierce attacks of the Nazis who tried to capture them alive. Over two days of fighting, the company destroyed 6 tanks, 2 self-propelled guns, 5 armored cars and up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers. With two surviving tanks, Captain Tereshchuk fought out of the encirclement and returned to his brigade. For decisive and skillful actions in battle, Captain I. A. Tereshchuk was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
By August 10, the main forces of the 1st Tank Army reached the Merchik River. After capturing the city of Zolochev, the 5th Guards Tank Army was reassigned to the Steppe Front and began regrouping in the Bogodukhov area.
Advancing behind the tank armies, the troops of the 6th Guards Army reached northeast of Krasnokutsk by August 11, and the 5th Guards Army captured Kharkov from the west. By this time, the troops of the Steppe Front had approached the outer defensive perimeter of Kharkov from the north, and the 57th Army, transferred to this front on August 8, from the east and southeast.
The fascist German command, fearing the encirclement of the Kharkov group, by August 11 concentrated three tank divisions east of Bogodukhov (Reich, Death's Head, Viking) and on the morning of August 12 launched a counterattack on the advancing troops of the 1st Tank Army in the general direction on Bogodukhov. An oncoming tank battle unfolded. During its course, the enemy pushed back the formations of the 1st Tank Army by 3-4 km, but was unable to break through to Bogodukhov. On the morning of August 13, the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank, 6th and 5th Guards armies were brought into battle. The main forces of front-line aviation were also sent here. It conducted reconnaissance and carried out operations to disrupt the railway and road transport of the Nazis, assisted combined arms and tank armies in repelling counterattacks of the Nazi troops. By the end of August 17, our troops finally thwarted the enemy’s counterattack from the south on Bogodukhov.
Tankers and machine gunners of the 15th Guards Mechanized Brigade advance on the city of Amvrosievka, August 23, 1943.
However, the fascist German command did not abandon its plan. On the morning of August 18, it launched a counterattack from the Akhtyrka area with three tank and motorized divisions and broke through the front of the 27th Army. Against this enemy grouping, the commander of the Voronezh Front advanced the 4th Guards Army, transferred from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, the 3rd mechanized and 6th tank corps of the 1st Tank Army from the Bogodukhov area, and also used the 4th and 5th separate guards tank corps. These forces, by striking the enemy’s flanks by the end of August 19, stopped his advance from the west to Bogodukhov. Then the troops of the right wing of the Voronezh Front struck at the rear of the Akhtyrka group of Germans and completely defeated it.
At the same time, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began the assault on Kharkov. On the night of August 23, formations of the 69th and 7th Guards armies captured the city.
Soviet soldiers inspect a German heavy tank "Panther" destroyed on the Prokhorovsky bridgehead, Belgorod region. 1943
Photo - A. Morkovkin
The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts defeated 15 enemy divisions, advanced 140 km in the southern and southwestern direction, and came close to the Donbass enemy group. Soviet troops liberated Kharkov. During the occupation and battles, the Nazis destroyed about 300 thousand civilians and prisoners of war in the city and region (according to incomplete data), about 160 thousand people were driven to Germany, they destroyed 1,600 thousand m2 of housing, over 500 industrial enterprises, all cultural and educational , medical and communal institutions.
Thus, Soviet troops completed the defeat of the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group and took an advantageous position to launch a general offensive with the aim of liberating Left Bank Ukraine and Donbass.
4. Main conclusions.
The counteroffensive of the Red Army near Kursk ended in an outstanding victory for us. Irreversible losses were inflicted on the enemy, and all his attempts to hold strategic bridgeheads in the Orel and Kharkov areas were thwarted.
The success of the counteroffensive was ensured primarily by the skillful choice of the moment when our troops went on the offensive. It began in conditions when the main German attack groups suffered huge losses and a crisis was defined in their offensive. Success was also ensured by the skillful organization of strategic interaction between groups of fronts attacking in the western and southwestern, as well as in other directions. This did not allow the fascist German command to regroup troops in areas that were dangerous to them.
The success of the counteroffensive was greatly influenced by the large strategic reserves of the Supreme High Command Headquarters previously created in the Kursk direction, which were used to develop the offensive of the fronts.
For the first time, Soviet troops solved the problem of breaking through the enemy’s previously prepared, deeply echeloned defense and subsequent development of operational success. This was achieved thanks to the creation of powerful strike groups in the fronts and armies, the massing of forces and means in breakthrough areas and the presence of tank formations in the fronts, and large tank (mechanized) formations in the armies.
Before the start of the counteroffensive, reconnaissance in force was carried out more widely than in previous operations, not only by reinforced companies, but also by advanced battalions.
During the counteroffensive, the fronts and armies gained experience in repelling counterattacks from large enemy tank formations. It was carried out with close cooperation between all branches of the military and aviation. In order to stop the enemy and defeat his advancing troops, fronts and armies with part of their forces switched to a tough defense while simultaneously delivering a powerful blow to the flank and rear of the enemy’s counterattack group. As a result of the increase in the number of military equipment and reinforcement means, the tactical densities of our troops in the counteroffensive near Kursk increased by 2 - 3 times in comparison with the counteroffensive near Stalingrad.
What was new in the field of offensive combat tactics was the transition of units and formations from single-echelon to deeply echeloned combat formations. This turned out to be possible due to the narrowing of their sectors and offensive zones.
In the counteroffensive near Kursk, the methods of using military branches and aviation were improved. On a larger scale, tank and mechanized troops were used. The density of NPP tanks compared to the counteroffensive at Stalingrad increased and amounted to 15 - 20 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of front. However, when breaking through a strong, deeply layered enemy defense, such densities turned out to be insufficient. Tank and mechanized corps became the main means of developing the success of combined arms armies, and tank armies of a homogeneous composition became the echelon for developing the success of the front. Their use to complete the breakthrough of a previously prepared positional defense was a necessary measure, often leading to significant tank losses and weakening of tank formations and formations, but in specific conditions the situation justified itself. For the first time, self-propelled artillery regiments were widely used near Kursk. Experience has shown that they were an effective means of supporting the advance of tanks and infantry.
There were also peculiarities in the use of artillery: the density of guns and mortars in the direction of the main attack increased significantly; the gap between the end of artillery preparation and the beginning of support for the attack was eliminated; army artillery groups by number of corps
