Situation and strengths of the parties

In the early spring of 1943, after the end of the winter-spring battles, a huge protrusion formed on the Soviet-German front line between the cities of Orel and Belgorod, directed to the west. This bend was unofficially called the Kursk Bulge. At the bend of the arc were located the troops of the Soviet Central and Voronezh fronts and the German army groups “Center” and “South”.

Some representatives of the highest command circles in Germany proposed that the Wehrmacht switch to defensive actions, exhausting the Soviet troops, restoring its own strength and strengthening the occupied territories. However, Hitler was categorically against it: he believed that the German army was still strong enough to inflict a major defeat on the Soviet Union and again seize the elusive strategic initiative. An objective analysis of the situation showed that the German army was no longer capable of attacking on all fronts at once. Therefore, it was decided to limit offensive actions to only one segment of the front. Quite logically, the German command chose the Kursk Bulge to strike. According to the plan, German troops were to strike in converging directions from Orel and Belgorod in the direction of Kursk. With a successful outcome, this ensured the encirclement and defeat of the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The final plans for the operation, codenamed "Citadel", were approved on May 10-11, 1943.

Unravel the plans of the German command regarding exactly where the Wehrmacht will advance in summer period 1943, was not difficult. The Kursk salient, extending many kilometers into the territory controlled by the Nazis, was a tempting and obvious target. Already on April 12, 1943, at a meeting at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the USSR, it was decided to move to a deliberate, planned and powerful defense in the Kursk region. The Red Army troops had to hold back the onslaught of Nazi troops, wear down the enemy, and then launch a counteroffensive and defeat the enemy. After this, it was planned to launch a general offensive in the western and southwestern directions.

In case the Germans decided not to attack in the Kursk Bulge area, a plan of offensive actions was also created with forces concentrated on this section of the front. However, the defensive plan remained a priority, and it was its implementation that the Red Army began in April 1943.

The defense on the Kursk Bulge was built thoroughly. In total, 8 defensive lines with a total depth of about 300 kilometers were created. Great attention was paid to mining the approaches to the defense line: according to various sources, the density of minefields was up to 1500-1700 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines per kilometer of front. Anti-tank artillery was not distributed evenly along the front, but was collected in so-called “anti-tank areas” - localized concentrations of anti-tank guns that covered several directions at once and partially overlapped each other’s sectors of fire. In this way, the maximum concentration of fire was achieved and shelling of one advancing enemy unit was ensured from several sides at once.

Before the start of the operation, the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts totaled about 1.2 million people, about 3.5 thousand tanks, 20,000 guns and mortars, as well as 2,800 aircraft. The Steppe Front, numbering about 580,000 people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 7.4 thousand guns and mortars, and about 700 aircraft, acted as a reserve.

On the German side, 50 divisions took part in the battle, numbering, according to various sources, from 780 to 900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 10,000 guns and approximately 2.5 thousand aircraft.

Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army had a numerical advantage. However, we should not forget that these troops were located on the defensive, and therefore, the German command had the opportunity to effectively concentrate forces and achieve the required concentration of troops in breakthrough areas. In addition, in 1943, the German army received quite a large number of new heavy tanks "Tiger" and medium tanks "Panther", as well as heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", of which there were only 89 in the army (out of 90 built) and which, however, , in themselves posed a considerable threat, provided they were used correctly in the right place.

The first stage of the battle. Defense

Both commands of the Voronezh and Central Fronts predicted the date of the German troops' transition to the offensive quite accurately: according to their data, the attack should have been expected in the period from July 3 to July 6. The day before the start of the battle, Soviet intelligence officers managed to capture “tongue,” who reported that the Germans would begin the assault on July 5.

The northern front of the Kursk Bulge was held by the Central Front of Army General K. Rokossovsky. Knowing the time of the start of the German offensive, at 2:30 a.m. the front commander gave the order to conduct a half-hour artillery counter-training. Then, at 4:30, the artillery strike was repeated. The effectiveness of this measure was quite controversial. According to reports from Soviet artillerymen, the Germans suffered significant damage. However, apparently, this was still not true. We know for sure about small losses in manpower and equipment, as well as about the disruption of enemy wire lines. In addition, the Germans now knew for sure that a surprise attack would not work - the Red Army was ready for defense.

At 5:00 am the German artillery preparation began. It had not yet ended when the first echelons of Nazi troops went on the offensive following the barrage of fire. German infantry, supported by tanks, launched an offensive along the entire defensive line of the 13th Soviet Army. The main blow fell on the village of Olkhovatka. The most powerful attack was experienced by the right flank of the army near the village of Maloarkhangelskoye.

The battle lasted approximately two and a half hours, and the attack was repulsed. After this, the Germans shifted their pressure to the left flank of the army. The strength of their onslaught is evidenced by the fact that by the end of July 5, the troops of the 15th and 81st Soviet divisions were partially surrounded. However, the Nazis had not yet succeeded in breaking through the front. In just the first day of the battle, German troops advanced 6-8 kilometers.

On July 6, Soviet troops attempted a counterattack with two tank, three rifle divisions and a rifle corps, supported by two regiments of guards mortars and two regiments of self-propelled guns. The impact front was 34 kilometers. At first, the Red Army managed to push the Germans back 1-2 kilometers, but then the Soviet tanks came under heavy fire from German tanks and self-propelled guns and, after 40 vehicles were lost, were forced to stop. By the end of the day, the corps went on the defensive. The counterattack attempted on July 6 did not have serious success. The front managed to be “pushed back” by only 1-2 kilometers.

After the failure of the attack on Olkhovatka, the Germans shifted their efforts in the direction of the Ponyri station. This station was of serious strategic importance, covering railway Orel - Kursk. Ponyri were well protected by minefields, artillery and tanks buried in the ground.

On July 6, Ponyri was attacked by about 170 German tanks and self-propelled guns, including 40 Tigers of the 505th heavy tank battalion. The Germans managed to break through the first line of defense and advance to the second. Three attacks that followed before the end of the day were repulsed by the second line. The next day, after persistent attacks, German troops managed to get even closer to the station. By 15:00 on July 7, the enemy captured the “1 May” state farm and came close to the station. The day of July 7, 1943 became a crisis for the defense of Ponyri, although the Nazis still failed to capture the station.

At the Ponyri station, German troops used the Ferdinand self-propelled guns, which turned out to be a serious problem for the Soviet troops. Soviet guns were practically unable to penetrate the 200 mm frontal armor of these vehicles. Therefore, the Ferdinanda suffered the greatest losses from mines and air raids. The last day when the Germans stormed the Ponyri station was July 12.

From July 5 to July 12, heavy fighting took place in the 70th Army's zone of action. Here the Nazis launched an attack with tanks and infantry, with German air superiority in the air. On July 8, German troops managed to break through the defense, occupying several settlements. The breakthrough was localized only by introducing reserves. By July 11, Soviet troops received reinforcements as well as air support. The dive bomber strikes caused quite significant damage to German units. On July 15, after the Germans had already been completely driven back, in the field between the villages of Samodurovka, Kutyrki and Tyoploye, military correspondents filmed damaged German equipment. After the war, this chronicle began to be mistakenly called “footage from near Prokhorovka,” although not a single “Ferdinand” was near Prokhorovka, and the Germans failed to evacuate two damaged self-propelled guns of this type from near Tyoply.

In the zone of action of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Vatutin), combat operations began in the afternoon of July 4 with attacks by German units on the positions of the front's military outposts and lasted until late at night.

On July 5, the main phase of the battle began. On the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, the battles were much more intense and were accompanied by more serious losses of Soviet troops than on the northern one. The reason for this was the terrain, which was more suitable for the use of tanks, and a number of organizational miscalculations at the level of the Soviet front-line command.

The main blow of the German troops was delivered along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. This section of the front was held by the 6th Guards Army. The first attack took place at 6 a.m. on July 5 in the direction of the village of Cherkasskoye. Two attacks followed, supported by tanks and aircraft. Both were repulsed, after which the Germans shifted the direction of the attack towards the village of Butovo. In the battles near Cherkassy, ​​the enemy almost managed to achieve a breakthrough, but at the cost of heavy losses, Soviet troops prevented it, often losing up to 50-70% of the units' personnel.

During July 7-8, the Germans managed, while suffering losses, to advance another 6-8 kilometers, but then the attack on Oboyan stopped. The enemy was looking for a weak point in the Soviet defense and seemed to have found it. This place was the direction to the still unknown Prokhorovka station.

The Battle of Prokhorovka, considered one of the largest tank battles in history, began on July 11, 1943. On the German side, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the 3rd Wehrmacht Panzer Corps took part in it - a total of about 450 tanks and self-propelled guns. The 5th Guards Tank Army under Lieutenant General P. Rotmistrov and the 5th Guards Army under Lieutenant General A. Zhadov fought against them. There were about 800 Soviet tanks in the Battle of Prokhorovka.

The battle at Prokhorovka can be called the most discussed and controversial episode of the Battle of Kursk. The scope of this article does not allow us to analyze it in detail, so we will limit ourselves to only reporting approximate loss figures. The Germans irretrievably lost about 80 tanks and self-propelled guns, the Soviet troops lost about 270 vehicles.

Second phase. Offensive

On July 12, 1943, Operation Kutuzov, also known as the Oryol offensive operation, began on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge with the participation of troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts. On July 15, troops of the Central Front joined it.

On the German side, a group of troops consisting of 37 divisions was involved in the battles. According to modern estimates, the number of German tanks and self-propelled guns that took part in the battles near Orel was about 560 vehicles. Soviet troops had a serious numerical advantage over the enemy: in the main directions, the Red Army outnumbered German troops by six times in the number of infantry, five times in the number of artillery and 2.5-3 times in tanks.

German infantry divisions defended themselves on well-fortified terrain, equipped with wire fences, minefields, machine gun nests and armored caps. Enemy sappers built anti-tank obstacles along the river banks. It should be noted, however, that work on the German defensive lines had not yet been completed when the counteroffensive began.

On July 12 at 5:10 am, Soviet troops began artillery preparation and launched an air strike on the enemy. Half an hour later the assault began. By the evening of the first day, the Red Army, waging heavy fighting, advanced to a distance of 7.5 to 15 kilometers, breaking through the main defensive line of German formations in three places. Offensive battles continued until July 14. During this time, the advance of Soviet troops was up to 25 kilometers. However, by July 14, the Germans managed to regroup their troops, as a result of which the Red Army offensive was stopped for some time. The Central Front offensive, which began on July 15, developed slowly from the very beginning.

Despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy, by July 25 the Red Army managed to force the Germans to begin withdrawing troops from the Oryol bridgehead. In early August, battles began for the city of Oryol. By August 6, the city was completely liberated from the Nazis. After this, the Oryol operation entered its final phase. On August 12, fighting began for the city of Karachev, which lasted until August 15 and ended with the defeat of the group of German troops defending this locality. By August 17-18, Soviet troops reached the Hagen defensive line, built by the Germans east of Bryansk.

The official date for the start of the offensive on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge is considered to be August 3. However, the Germans began a gradual withdrawal of troops from their positions as early as July 16, and from July 17, units of the Red Army began pursuing the enemy, which by July 22 turned into a general offensive, which stopped at approximately the same positions that Soviet troops occupied at the start of the Battle of Kursk . The command demanded the immediate continuation of hostilities, but due to the exhaustion and fatigue of the units, the date was postponed by 8 days.

By August 3, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts had 50 rifle divisions, about 2,400 tanks and self-propelled guns, and more than 12,000 guns. At 8 o'clock in the morning, after artillery preparation, Soviet troops began their offensive. On the first day of the operation, the advance of units of the Voronezh Front ranged from 12 to 26 km. The troops of the Steppe Front advanced only 7-8 kilometers during the day.

On August 4-5, battles took place to eliminate the enemy group in Belgorod and liberate the city from German troops. By evening, Belgorod was taken by units of the 69th Army and the 1st Mechanized Corps.

By August 10, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway. There were about 10 kilometers left to the outskirts of Kharkov. On August 11, the Germans struck in the Bogodukhov area, significantly weakening the pace of the offensive of both fronts of the Red Army. Fierce fighting continued until August 14.

The steppe front reached the near approaches to Kharkov on August 11. On the first day, the attacking units were not successful. Fighting on the outskirts of the city continued until July 17. Both sides suffered heavy losses. In both Soviet and German units, it was not uncommon to have companies numbering 40-50 people, or even less.

The Germans launched their last counterattack at Akhtyrka. Here they even managed to make a local breakthrough, but this did not change the situation globally. On August 23, a massive assault on Kharkov began; This day is considered the date of the liberation of the city and the end of the Battle of Kursk. In fact, the fighting in the city stopped completely only on August 30, when the remnants of German resistance were suppressed.

The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest and most important battles of the Great Patriotic War, which took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943.
The German command gave a different name to this battle - Operation Citadel, which, according to Wehrmacht plans, was supposed to counterattack the Soviet offensive.

Causes of the Battle of Kursk

After the victory at Stalingrad, the German army began to retreat for the first time during the Great Patriotic War, and the Soviet army launched a decisive offensive that could only be stopped at the Kursk Bulge and the German command understood this. The Germans organized a strong defensive line, and in their opinion, it should have withstood any attack.

Strengths of the parties

Germany
At the start of the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht troops numbered more than 900 thousand people. In addition to a huge amount of manpower, the Germans had a considerable number of tanks, among which were tanks of all the latest models: these are more than 300 Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as a very powerful tank destroyer (anti-tank gun) Ferdinand or Elephant "including about 50 combat units.
It should be noted that among the tank army there were three elite tank divisions, which had not suffered a single defeat before - they included real tank aces.
And in support of the ground army, an air fleet was sent with a total number of more than 1,000 combat aircraft of the latest models.

USSR
To slow down and complicate the enemy's offensive, the Soviet Army installed approximately one and a half thousand mines on every kilometer of the front. The number of infantrymen in the Soviet Army reached more than 1 million soldiers. And the Soviet Army had 3-4 thousand tanks, which also exceeded the number of German ones. However, a large number of Soviet tanks are outdated models and are not rivals to the same “Tigers” of the Wehrmacht.
The Red Army had twice as many guns and mortars. If the Wehrmacht has 10 thousand of them, then the Soviet Army has more than twenty. There were also more planes, but historians cannot give exact figures.

Progress of the battle

During Operation Citadel, the German command decided to launch a counterattack on the northern and southern wings of the Kursk Bulge in order to encircle and destroy the Red Army. But the German army failed to accomplish this. The Soviet command hit the Germans with a powerful artillery strike to weaken the initial enemy attack.
Before the start of the offensive operation, the Wehrmacht launched powerful artillery strikes on the positions of the Red Army. Then, on the northern front of the arc, German tanks went on the offensive, but soon encountered very strong resistance. The Germans repeatedly changed the direction of the attack, but did not achieve significant results; by July 10, they managed to break through only 12 km, losing about 2 thousand tanks. As a result, they had to go on the defensive.
On July 5, the attack began on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. First came a powerful artillery barrage. Having suffered setbacks, the German command decided to continue the offensive in the Prokhorovka area, where tank forces were already beginning to accumulate.
The famous Battle of Prokhorovka, the largest tank battle in history, began on July 11, but the height of the battle in the battle was on July 12. On a small section of the front, 700 German and about 800 Soviet tanks and guns collided. The tanks of both sides mixed and throughout the day many tank crews left their combat vehicles and fought in hand-to-hand combat. By the end of July 12, the tank battle began to wane. The Soviet army failed to defeat the enemy's tank forces, but managed to stop their advance. Having broken a little deeper, the Germans were forced to retreat, and the Soviet Army launched an offensive.
German losses in the Battle of Prokhorovka were insignificant: 80 tanks, but the Soviet Army lost about 70% of all tanks in this direction.
In the next few days, they were almost completely bled dry and had lost their attacking potential, while the Soviet reserves had not yet entered the battle and were ready to launch a decisive counterattack.
On July 15, the Germans went on the defensive. As a result, the German offensive did not bring any success, and both sides suffered serious losses. The number of those killed on the German side is estimated at 70 thousand soldiers, a large amount of equipment and guns. According to various estimates, the Soviet army lost up to 150 thousand soldiers, a large number of this figure being irretrievable losses.
The first offensive operations on the Soviet side began on July 5, their goal was to deprive the enemy of maneuvering his reserves and transferring forces from other fronts to this section of the front.
On July 17, the Izyum-Barvenkovsky operation began from the Soviet army. The Soviet command set the goal of encircling the Donbass group of Germans. The Soviet army managed to cross the Northern Donets, seize a bridgehead on the right bank and, most importantly, pin down German reserves on this section of the front.
During the Mius offensive operation of the Red Army (July 17 - August 2), it was possible to stop the transfer of divisions from Donbass to the Kursk Bulge, which significantly reduced the defensive potential of the arc itself.
On July 12, the offensive began in the Oryol direction. Within one day, the Soviet army managed to drive the Germans out of Orel, and they were forced to move to another defensive line. After Orel and Belgorod, the key cities, were liberated during the Oryol and Belgorod operations, and the Germans were driven back, it was decided to arrange a festive fireworks display. So on August 5, the first fireworks display during the entire period of hostilities in the Great Patriotic War was organized in the capital. During the operation, the Germans lost over 90 thousand soldiers and a large amount of equipment.
In the southern region, the offensive of the Soviet army began on August 3 and was called Operation Rumyantsev. As a result of this offensive operation, the Soviet army managed to liberate a number of strategically important cities, including the city of Kharkov (August 23). During this offensive, the Germans attempted to counterattack, but they did not bring any success to the Wehrmacht.
From August 7 to October 2, the offensive operation “Kutuzov” was carried out - the Smolensk offensive operation, during which the left wing of the German armies of the “Center” group was defeated and the city of Smolensk was liberated. And during the Donbass operation (August 13 – September 22), the Donetsk basin was liberated.
From August 26 to September 30, the Chernigov-Poltava offensive operation took place. It ended in complete success for the Red Army, since almost all of Left Bank Ukraine was liberated from the Germans.

Aftermath of the battle

The Kursk operation became a turning point in the Great Patriotic War, after which the Soviet Army continued its offensive and liberated Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and other republics from the Germans.
The losses during the Battle of Kursk were simply colossal. Most historians agree that more than a million soldiers died on the Kursk Bulge. Soviet historians say that the losses of the German army amounted to more than 400 thousand soldiers, the Germans talk about a figure of less than 200 thousand. In addition, a huge amount of equipment, aircraft and guns were lost.
After the failure of Operation Citadel, the German command lost the ability to carry out attacks and went on the defensive. In 1944 and 45, local offensives were launched, but they did not bring success.
The German command has repeatedly said that defeat on the Kursk Bulge is a defeat on the Eastern Front and it will be impossible to regain the advantage.

Battle of Kursk became one of the most important stages on the path to victory Soviet Union over Nazi Germany. In terms of scope, intensity and results, it ranks among the largest battles of the Second World War. The battle lasted less than two months. During this time, in a relatively small area, there was a fierce clash between huge masses of troops using the most modern military equipment of that time. More than 4 million people, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and up to 12 thousand combat aircraft were involved in the battles on both sides. From the Wehrmacht side, more than 100 divisions took part in it, which accounted for over 43 percent of the divisions located on the Soviet-German front. The tank battles that were victorious for the Soviet Army were the greatest in the Second World War. " If the battle of Stalingrad foreshadowed the decline of the Nazi army, then the battle of Kursk confronted it with disaster».

The hopes of the military-political leadership did not come true " third reich» for success Operation Citadel . During this battle, Soviet troops defeated 30 divisions, the Wehrmacht lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3 thousand guns and more than 3.7 thousand aircraft.

Construction of defensive lines. Kursk Bulge, 1943

Particularly severe defeats were inflicted on the Nazi tank formations. Of the 20 tank and motorized divisions that took part in the Battle of Kursk, 7 were defeated, and the rest suffered significant losses. Nazi Germany could no longer fully compensate for this damage. To the Inspector General of the German Armored Forces Colonel General Guderian I had to admit:

« As a result of the failure of the Citadel Offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to large losses in men and equipment. Their timely restoration for conducting defensive actions on the eastern front, as well as for organizing defense in the West, in case of a landing force that the Allies threatened to land next spring, was called into question... and there were no more calm days on the eastern front. The initiative has completely passed to the enemy...».

Before Operation Citadel. From right to left: G. Kluge, V. Model, E. Manstein. 1943

Before Operation Citadel. From right to left: G. Kluge, V. Model, E. Manstein. 1943

Soviet troops are ready to meet the enemy. Kursk Bulge, 1943 ( see comments to the article)

The failure of the offensive strategy in the East forced the Wehrmacht command to seek new ways of waging war in order to try to save fascism from the impending defeat. It hoped to transform the war into positional forms, to gain time, hoping to split the anti-Hitler coalition. West German historian W. Hubach writes: " On the eastern front, the Germans made a last attempt to seize the initiative, but to no avail. The failed Operation Citadel proved to be the beginning of the end for the German army. Since then, the German front in the East has never stabilized.».

The crushing defeat of the Nazi armies on the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union. The victory at Kursk was the result of a great feat of the Soviet Armed Forces and the selfless labor of the Soviet people. This was a new triumph of the wise policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government.

Near Kursk. At the observation post of the commander of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps. From left to right: N. S. Khrushchev, commander of the 6th Guards Army, Lieutenant General I. M. Chistyakov, corps commander, Major General N. B. Ibyansky (July 1943)

Planning Operation Citadel , the Nazis had high hopes for new equipment - tanks " tiger" And " panther", assault guns " Ferdinand", airplanes " Focke-Wulf-190A" They believed that the new weapons entering the Wehrmacht would surpass Soviet military equipment and ensure victory. However, this did not happen. Soviet designers created new models of tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts, aircraft, anti-tank artillery, which in terms of their tactical and technical characteristics were not inferior to, and often surpassed similar systems enemy.

Fighting on the Kursk Bulge , Soviet soldiers constantly felt the support of the working class, the collective farm peasantry, and the intelligentsia, who armed the army with excellent military equipment and provided it with everything necessary for victory. Figuratively speaking, in this grandiose battle, a metal worker, a designer, an engineer, and a grain grower fought shoulder to shoulder with an infantryman, a tankman, an artilleryman, a pilot, and a sapper. The military feat of the soldiers merged with the selfless work of home front workers. The unity of the rear and the front, forged by the Communist Party, created an unshakable foundation for the military successes of the Soviet Armed Forces. Much credit for the defeat of the Nazi troops near Kursk belonged to the Soviet partisans, who launched active operations behind enemy lines.

Battle of Kursk was of great importance for the course and outcome of events on the Soviet-German front in 1943. It created favorable conditions for the general offensive of the Soviet Army.

had the greatest international significance. It had a great influence on the further course of the Second World War. As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces, favorable conditions were created for the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy in early July 1943. The defeat of the Wehrmacht at Kursk directly influenced the plans of the fascist German command related to the occupation of Sweden. The previously developed plan for the invasion of Hitler's troops into this country was canceled due to the fact that the Soviet-German front absorbed all the enemy's reserves. Back on June 14, 1943, the Swedish envoy in Moscow stated: “ Sweden understands perfectly well that if it still remains out of the war, it is only thanks to the military successes of the USSR. Sweden is grateful to the Soviet Union for this and speaks directly about it».

Increased losses on the fronts, especially in the East, the severe consequences of total mobilization and the growing liberation movement in European countries affected the internal situation in Germany, the morale of German soldiers and the entire population. Distrust in the government increased in the country, critical statements against the fascist party and government leadership became more frequent, and doubts about achieving victory grew. Hitler further intensified repression to strengthen the “internal front.” But neither the bloody terror of the Gestapo nor the colossal efforts of Goebbels’s propaganda machine could neutralize the impact that the defeat at Kursk had on the morale of the population and the Wehrmacht soldiers.

Near Kursk. Direct fire at the advancing enemy

Huge losses of military equipment and weapons placed new demands on the German military industry and further complicated the situation with human resources. Attraction to industry, Agriculture and transport of foreign workers, to whom Hitler’s “ new order"was deeply hostile, undermined the rear of the fascist state.

After the defeat in Battle of Kursk Germany's influence on the states of the fascist bloc weakened even more, the internal political situation of the satellite countries worsened, and the foreign policy isolation of the Reich increased. The catastrophic result of the Battle of Kursk for the fascist elite predetermined the further cooling of relations between Germany and neutral countries. These countries have reduced supplies of raw materials and materials " third reich».

Victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk raised the authority of the Soviet Union even higher as a decisive force opposing fascism. The whole world looked with hope at the socialist power and its army, bringing deliverance to humanity from the Nazi plague.

Victorious completion of the Battle of Kursk strengthened the struggle of the peoples of enslaved Europe for freedom and independence, intensified the activities of numerous groups of the Resistance movement, including in Germany itself. Under the influence of the victories at Kursk, the peoples of the countries of the anti-fascist coalition began to demand even more decisively for the rapid opening of a second front in Europe.

The successes of the Soviet Army affected the position of the ruling circles of the USA and England. In the midst of the Battle of Kursk President Roosevelt in a special message to the head of the Soviet government he wrote: “ During a month of gigantic battles, your armed forces, with their skill, their courage, their dedication and their tenacity, not only stopped the long-planned German offensive, but also launched a successful counter-offensive, which has far-reaching consequences..."

The Soviet Union can be justly proud of its heroic victories. In the Battle of Kursk The superiority of Soviet military leadership and military art manifested itself with renewed vigor. It showed that the Soviet Armed Forces are a well-coordinated organism in which all types and types of troops are harmoniously combined.

The defense of Soviet troops near Kursk withstood severe tests and achieved my goals. The Soviet Army was enriched with the experience of organizing a deeply layered defense, stable in anti-tank and anti-aircraft terms, as well as the experience of decisive maneuver of forces and means. Pre-created strategic reserves were widely used, most of which were included in the specially created Steppe District (front). His troops increased the depth of defense on a strategic scale and took an active part in the defensive battle and counter-offensive. For the first time in Great Patriotic War the total depth of the operational formation of fronts in defense reached 50–70 km. The massing of forces and assets in the directions of expected enemy attacks, as well as the overall operational density of troops in defense, have increased. The strength of defense has increased significantly due to the saturation of troops with military equipment and weapons.

Anti-tank defense reached a depth of up to 35 km, the density of artillery anti-tank fire increased, barriers, mining, anti-tank reserves and mobile barrage units found wider use.

German prisoners after the collapse of Operation Citadel. 1943

German prisoners after the collapse of Operation Citadel. 1943

A major role in increasing the stability of the defense was played by the maneuver of second echelons and reserves, which was carried out from the depths and along the front. For example, during the defensive operation on the Voronezh Front, the regrouping involved about 35 percent of all rifle divisions, over 40 percent of anti-tank artillery units and almost all individual tank and mechanized brigades.

In the Battle of Kursk For the third time during the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces successfully carried out a strategic counteroffensive. If the preparation for a counteroffensive near Moscow and Stalingrad took place in a situation of heavy defensive battles with superior enemy forces, then different conditions developed near Kursk. Thanks to the successes of the Soviet military economy and targeted organizational measures to prepare reserves, the balance of forces had already developed in favor of the Soviet Army by the beginning of the defensive battle.

During the counteroffensive, Soviet troops showed high skill in organizing and conducting offensive operations in summer conditions. The correct choice of the moment of transition from defense to counteroffensive, close operational-strategic interaction of five fronts, a successful breakthrough of the enemy’s defense prepared in advance, the skillful conduct of a simultaneous offensive on a wide front with strikes in several directions, the massive use of armored forces, aviation and artillery - all this had of enormous importance for the defeat of the strategic groupings of the Wehrmacht.

In the counteroffensive, for the first time during the war, second echelons of fronts began to be created as part of one or two combined arms armies (Voronezh Front) and powerful groupings of mobile troops. This allowed the front commanders to build up attacks of the first echelon and develop success in depth or towards the flanks, break through intermediate defensive lines, and also repel strong counterattacks of Nazi troops.

In the battle of Kursk it became rich military art all types of armed forces and branches of the military. In defense, artillery was more decisively massed in the direction of the enemy's main attacks, which ensured the creation of higher operational densities compared to previous defensive operations. The role of artillery in the counteroffensive increased. The density of guns and mortars in the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops reached 150 - 230 guns, and the maximum was 250 guns per kilometer of front.

Soviet tank troops in the Battle of Kursk successfully solved the most complex and varied tasks both in defense and offensive. If until the summer of 1943 tank corps and armies were used in defensive operations primarily to carry out counterattacks, then in the Battle of Kursk they were also used to hold defensive lines. This achieved greater depth of operational defense and increased its stability.

During the counteroffensive, armored and mechanized troops were used en masse, being the main means of front and army commanders in completing a breakthrough of enemy defenses and developing tactical success into operational success. At the same time, the experience of combat operations in the Oryol operation showed the inexpediency of using tank corps and armies to break through positional defenses, since they suffered heavy losses in carrying out these tasks. In the Belgorod-Kharkov direction, the completion of the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone was carried out by advanced tank brigades, and the main forces of tank armies and corps were used for operations in operational depth.

Soviet military art in the use of aviation has risen to a new level. IN Battle of Kursk The massing of front-line and long-range aviation forces in the main axes was carried out more decisively, and their interaction with ground forces improved.

A new form of using aviation in a counteroffensive was fully applied - an air offensive, in which attack and bomber aircraft continuously impacted enemy groups and targets, providing support to ground forces. In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet aviation finally gained strategic air supremacy and thereby contributed to the creation favorable conditions for subsequent offensive operations.

Successfully passed the test at the Battle of Kursk organizational forms combat arms and special forces. The tank armies of the new organization, as well as artillery corps and other formations, played an important role in achieving victory.

In the Battle of Kursk, the Soviet command demonstrated a creative, innovative approach to solving the most important tasks of the strategy , operational art and tactics, its superiority over the Nazi military school.

Strategic, front-line, army and military logistics agencies have acquired extensive experience in providing comprehensive support to troops. A characteristic feature of the organization of the rear was the approach of rear units and institutions to the front line. This ensured an uninterrupted supply of troops with material resources and timely evacuation of the wounded and sick.

The enormous scope and intensity of the fighting required a large amount of material resources, primarily ammunition and fuel. During the Battle of Kursk, the troops of the Central, Voronezh, Steppe, Bryansk, Southwestern and left wing of the Western Fronts by rail 141,354 wagons with ammunition, fuel, food and other supplies were supplied from central bases and warehouses. By air, 1,828 tons of various supplies were delivered to the troops of the Central Front alone.

The medical service of fronts, armies and formations has been enriched with experience in carrying out preventive and sanitary and hygienic measures, skillful maneuver of the forces and means of medical institutions, and the widespread use of specialized medical care. Despite the significant losses suffered by the troops, many wounded during the Battle of Kursk, thanks to the efforts of military doctors, returned to duty.

Hitler's strategists for planning, organizing and leading Operation Citadel used old, standard methods and methods that did not correspond to the new situation and were well known to the Soviet command. This is recognized by a number of bourgeois historians. So, the English historian A. Clark at work "Barbarossa" notes that the fascist German command again relied on a lightning strike with widespread use new military equipment: Junkers, short intensive artillery preparation, close interaction between the mass of tanks and infantry... without due consideration of the changed conditions, except for a simple arithmetic increase in the relevant components." West German historian W. Goerlitz writes that the attack on Kursk was basically carried out “in in accordance with the scheme of previous battles - tank wedges acted to cover from two directions».

Reactionary bourgeois researchers of the Second World War made great efforts to distort events near Kursk . They are trying to rehabilitate the Wehrmacht command, gloss over its mistakes and all the blame for failure of Operation Citadel blamed on Hitler and his closest associates. This position was put forward immediately after the end of the war and has been stubbornly defended to this day. Thus, the former chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Colonel General Halder, was still at work in 1949 "Hitler as a commander", deliberately distorting the facts, claimed that in the spring of 1943, when developing a war plan on the Soviet-German front, “ The commanders of army groups and armies and Hitler's military advisers from the main command of the ground forces tried unsuccessfully to overcome the great operational threat created in the East, to direct him to the only path that promised success - the path of flexible operational leadership, which, like the art of fencing, lies in rapid alternation of cover and strike and compensates for the lack of strength with skillful operational leadership and high fighting qualities of the troops...».

Documents show that miscalculations in planning the armed struggle on the Soviet-German front were made by both the political and military leadership of Germany. The Wehrmacht intelligence service also failed to cope with its tasks. Statements about the non-involvement of the German generals in the development of the most important political and military decisions contradict the facts.

The thesis that the offensive of Hitler’s troops near Kursk had limited goals and that failure of Operation Citadel cannot be considered as a phenomenon of strategic importance.

IN last years Works have appeared that give a fairly close to objective assessment of a number of events in the Battle of Kursk. American historian M. Caidin in the book "Tigers" are burning" characterizes the Battle of Kursk as " greatest land battle ever fought in history”, and does not agree with the opinion of many researchers in the West that it pursued limited, auxiliary” goals. " History deeply doubts, - writes the author, - in German statements that they did not believe in the future. Everything was decided at Kursk. What happened there determined the future course of events" The same idea is reflected in the annotation to the book, where it is noted that the battle of Kursk “ broke the back of the German army in 1943 and changed the entire course of the Second World War... Few outside Russia understand the enormity of this stunning clash. In fact, even today the Soviets feel bitterness as they see Western historians downplaying the Russian triumph at Kursk».

Why did the last attempt of the fascist German command to carry out a major victorious offensive in the East and regain the lost strategic initiative fail? The main reasons for failure Operation Citadel the increasingly stronger economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union, the superiority of Soviet military art, and the boundless heroism and courage of Soviet soldiers appeared. In 1943, the Soviet military economy produced more military equipment and weapons than the industry of Nazi Germany, which used the resources of the enslaved countries of Europe.

But the growth of the military power of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces was ignored by Nazi political and military leaders. Underestimating the capabilities of the Soviet Union and overestimating its own strengths were an expression of the adventurism of the fascist strategy.

From a purely military point of view, complete failure of Operation Citadel to a certain extent was due to the fact that the Wehrmacht failed to achieve surprise in the attack. Thanks to the efficient work of all types of reconnaissance, including airborne, the Soviet command knew about the impending offensive and took the necessary measures. The military leadership of the Wehrmacht believed that no defense could resist powerful tank rams, supported by massive air operations. But these predictions turned out to be unfounded; at the cost of huge losses, the tanks only slightly wedged themselves into the Soviet defenses north and south of Kursk and got stuck on the defensive.

An important reason collapse of Operation Citadel The secretiveness of the preparation of Soviet troops for both a defensive battle and a counteroffensive was revealed. The fascist leadership did not have a complete understanding of the plans of the Soviet command. In preparation for July 3, that is, the day before German offensive near Kursk, department for the study of the armies of the East “Assessment of enemy actions during Operation Citadel there is not even a mention of the possibility of a counteroffensive by Soviet troops against Wehrmacht strike forces.

The major miscalculations of fascist German intelligence in assessing the forces of the Soviet Army concentrated in the area of ​​the Kursk salient are convincingly evidenced by the report card of the operational department of the General Staff of the German Army Ground Forces, prepared on July 4, 1943. It even contains information about the Soviet troops deployed in the first operational echelon are reflected inaccurately. German intelligence had very sketchy information about the reserves located in the Kursk direction.

At the beginning of July, the situation on the Soviet-German front and possible solutions The Soviet command was assessed by the political and military leaders of Germany, essentially, from the same positions. They firmly believed in the possibility of a major victory.

Soviet soldiers in the battles of Kursk showed courage, resilience and mass heroism. The Communist Party and the Soviet government highly appreciated the greatness of their feat. The banners of many formations and units sparkled military orders, 132 formations and units received the guards rank, 26 formations and units were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachev. More than 100 thousand soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals were awarded orders and medals, over 180 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, including private V.E. Breusov, division commander Major General L.N. Gurtiev, platoon commander Lieutenant V.V. Zhenchenko, battalion Komsomol organizer Lieutenant N.M. Zverintsev, battery commander Captain G.I. Igishev, private A.M. Lomakin, platoon deputy commander, senior sergeant Kh.M. Mukhamadiev, squad commander Sergeant V.P. Petrishchev, gun commander Junior Sergeant A.I. Petrov, Senior Sergeant G.P. Pelikanov, Sergeant V.F. Chernenko and others.

Victory of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased role of party political work. Commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol organizations helped the personnel understand the significance of the upcoming battles, their role in defeating the enemy. By personal example, the communists attracted the fighters with them. Political agencies took measures to maintain and replenish party organizations in their divisions. This ensured continuous party influence over all personnel.

An important means of mobilizing soldiers for military exploits was the promotion of advanced experience and the popularization of units and subunits that distinguished themselves in battle. The orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, declaring gratitude to the personnel of the distinguished troops, had great inspiring power - they were widely promoted in units and formations, read out at rallies, and distributed through leaflets. Extracts from the orders were given to each soldier.

The increase in the morale of Soviet soldiers and confidence in victory was facilitated by timely information from personnel about events in the world and in the country, about the successes of the Soviet troops and the defeats of the enemy. Political agencies and party organizations, carrying out active work to educate personnel, played an important role in achieving victories in defensive and offensive battles. Together with their commanders, they held high the banner of the party and were bearers of its spirit, discipline, steadfastness and courage. They mobilized and inspired soldiers to defeat the enemy.

« Giant battle on Oryol-Kursk Bulge summer 1943, noted L. I. Brezhnev , – broke my back Hitler's Germany and incinerated her armored shock troops. The superiority of our army in combat skills, weapons, and strategic leadership has become clear to the whole world.».

The victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk opened up new opportunities for the fight against German fascism and the liberation of Soviet lands temporarily captured by the enemy. Firmly holding the strategic initiative. The Soviet Armed Forces increasingly launched a general offensive.

On July 5, 1943, the Battle of Kursk, also known as Battle of Kursk. This is one of the key battles of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War, which finally consolidated the radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War, which began at Stalingrad. The offensive was launched by both sides: both the Soviet and the German. The Wehrmacht's summer strategic offensive on the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk bridgehead was called Operation Citadel.

According to Soviet and Russian historiography, the battle lasted 49 days, it included: Kursk strategic defensive operation (July 5 - 23), Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3 - 23) strategic offensive operations.

What about the Oryol-Kursk arc? Is that also more correct?

In various sources you can find references to the events of July 5 - August 23, 1943 as the “Battle of Oryol-Kursk” and the “Oryol-Kursk Bulge”. For example, in his report at a ceremonial meeting in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War on May 8, 1965, L. I. Brezhnev says:

"Giant Battle" on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge in the summer of 1943 I broke my back...".

How often did this spelling occur? We'll find out a little later.

The arc was located between the Oryol and Kursk regions, which means it should be called that - Oryol-Kursk

An arc is a section of a curve between two of its points. The southern point of the bulge that formed at the front by July 5, 1943 is Belgorod, now the Belgorod region, the northern point is the Maloarkhangelsk station, now the Oryol region. Based on the names of the extreme points, we will give the name: Belgorod-Oryol arc. So?

• On June 13, 1934, Belgorod was included in the newly formed Kursk region.
• On June 13, 1934, after the liquidation of the Central Black Earth Region, Maloarkhangelsk District became part of the newly formed Kursk Region.

For a contemporary of the Battle of Kursk, it would be completely natural to call the arc the Kursk-Kursk Bulge. That is... just the Kursk Bulge. That's what they called her.

Where did they call her that?

See the titles of some materials from different years:

• Markin I. I. On the Kursk Bulge. - M.: Voenizdat, 1961. - 124 p.
• Antipenko, N. A. On the main direction (Memoirs of the deputy front commander). - M.: Nauka, 1967. Chapter “ On the Kursk Bulge»
• O. A. Losik - Head of the Military Academy of Armored Forces, professor, colonel general. From a speech on July 20, 1973 at the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense at a scientific session dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the defeat of the Nazi troops on the Kursk Bulge
• Even Brezhnev, in his speech at the ceremonial meeting dedicated to the presentation of the Order of Lenin to Georgia, at the Sports Palace in Tbilisi on November 1, 1966, noted, as if he had not said anything about Orel in 1965:
  

  ... stood to the death at the walls of the legendary Stalingrad and on Kursk Bulge…

• Etc.

There will be some interesting statistics below.

In 1944, the Maloarkhangelsk region returned to the Oryol region, and Belgorod became the administrative center of the newly formed Belgorod region only in 1954. The Belgorod arc never became, and the Oryol part was sometimes added - without any visible system.

The arc is fine. Well, is it really the Oryol-Kursk battle? Okay, Kursko-Orlovskaya?

J.V. Stalin, who read a report on November 6, 1943 ceremonial meeting Moscow Council of Working People's Deputies with party and public organizations city ​​of Moscow, says:

From a purely military point of view, the defeat of the German troops on our front by the end of this year was predetermined by two most important events: the battle of Stalingrad and battle of Kursk.

Textbooks from different years also keep up:

History of the USSR. Part 3. 10th grade. (A. M. Penkratova. 1952), p. 378.

The Germans hoped to strike from two sides - from the Oryol bridgehead in the north and from the Belgorod region in the south - to encircle and destroy the Soviet troops concentrated in the bend Kursk Bulge, and then launch an attack on Moscow.

§10. Battle of Kursk. Completion of a radical turning point in the war

Methodological manual on modern history. Bogolyubov, Izrailovich, Popov, Rakhmanova. - 1978, p. 165. 2nd question for the lesson:

What was the historical significance of the largest battles of the Second World War - Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursky?

No matter what, everything they have is Kursk.

Maybe the Battle of Oryol never happened?

According to Soviet and Russian historiography, there was an Oryol strategic offensive operation as part of the Battle of Kursk.

It’s still correct - Battle of Oryol-Kursk

If you compare the frequency of mentions on the Internet, the difference is striking:

• “Oryol-Kursk battle”- 2 thousand results;
• “Battle of Kursk” - Oryol- 461 thousand results;

• “Oryol-Kursk arc”- 6 thousand results;
• “Kursk Bulge” - Orlovsko- 379 thousand results;

• “Oryol arc”- 946 results. Indeed, why not.

So not all documents are uploaded to the Internet

There are no “underloaded” documents in quantities that can compensate for a two-hundred-fold difference.

So, the Battle of Kursk and the Kursk Bulge?

Yes, the Battle of Kursk and the Kursk Bulge. But if for some reason you want to name events, adding the Oryol component, no one minds. Formally, a small piece of the Oryol region was part of the ledge even in 1943.

In the spring of 1943, relative calm established itself on the Soviet-German front. The Germans carried out a total mobilization and increased production military equipment at the expense of the resources of all Europe. Germany was preparing to take revenge for the defeat at Stalingrad.

A lot of work was done to strengthen the Soviet army. Design bureaus improved old ones and created new types of weapons. Thanks to the increase in production, it was possible to form a large number of tank and mechanized corps. Aviation technology was improved, the number of aviation regiments and formations increased. But the main thing is that afterwards the troops were instilled with confidence in victory.

Stalin and Stavka initially planned to organize a large-scale offensive in the southwest. However, marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky were able to predict the place and time of the future Wehrmacht offensive.

The Germans, having lost the strategic initiative, were not able to conduct large-scale operations along the entire front. For this reason, in 1943 they developed Operation Citadel. Having gathered together the forces of the tank armies, the Germans were going to attack the Soviet troops on the bulge of the front line, which had formed in the Kursk region.

By winning this operation he planned to change the overall strategic situation in his favor.

Intelligence accurately informed the General Staff about the location of the concentration of troops and their number.

The Germans concentrated 50 divisions, 2 thousand tanks, and 900 aircraft in the Kursk Bulge area.

Zhukov proposed not to preempt the enemy’s attack with an offensive, but to organize a reliable defense and meet the German tank wedges with artillery, aviation and self-propelled guns, bleed them and go on the offensive. On the Soviet side, 3.6 thousand tanks and 2.4 thousand aircraft were concentrated.

Early in the morning of July 5, 1943, German troops began to attack the positions of our troops. They unleashed the most powerful tank strike of the entire war on the Red Army formations.

Methodically breaking down the defenses, while suffering huge losses, they managed to advance 10-35 km in the first days of fighting. At certain moments it seemed that the Soviet defense was about to be broken through. But at the most critical moment, fresh units of the Steppe Front struck.

On July 12, 1943, near the small village of Prokhorovka, the largest tank battle. At the same time, up to 1.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns met in a counter battle. The battle lasted until late at night and so bled the German divisions that the next day they were forced to retreat to their original positions.

In the most difficult offensive battles, the Germans lost a huge amount of equipment and personnel. Since July 12, the nature of the battle has changed. Soviet troops took offensive actions, and the German army was forced to go on the defensive. The Nazis failed to contain the attacking impulse of the Soviet troops.

On August 5, Oryol and Belgorod were liberated, and on August 23, Kharkov. The victory in the Battle of Kursk finally turned the tide; the strategic initiative was wrested from the hands of the fascists.

By the end of September, Soviet troops reached the Dnieper. The Germans created a fortified area along the river - the Eastern Wall, which was ordered to be held with all their might.

However, our advanced units, despite the lack of watercraft, began crossing the Dnieper without artillery support.

Suffering significant losses, detachments of miraculously surviving infantrymen occupied bridgeheads and, after waiting for reinforcements, began to expand them, attacking the Germans. The crossing of the Dnieper became an example of selfless sacrifice Soviet soldiers with their lives in the name of the Fatherland and victory.