The official reason for the start of the war is the so-called "Mainil incident". On November 26, 1939, the government of the USSR sent a note of protest to the government of Finland about the artillery shelling, which was carried out from Finnish territory. Responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities was assigned entirely to Finland. The beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war took place at 8 o'clock in the morning, November 30, 1939. On the part of the Soviet Union, the goal was to ensure the security of Leningrad. The city was only 30 km. from the border. Previously, the Soviet government had asked Finland to push back its borders in the Leningrad area, offering territorial compensation in Karelia. But, Finland refused categorically.

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 caused real hysteria among the world community. On December 14, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations with serious violations of procedure (by a minority of votes).

The troops of the Finnish army at the time of the outbreak of hostilities consisted of 130 aircraft, 30 tanks, 250 thousand soldiers. However, the Western powers pledged their support. In many ways, it was this promise that led to the refusal to change the line of the border. The Red Army at the start of the war consisted of 3900 aircraft, 6500 tanks and one million soldiers.

The Russian-Finnish war of 1939 is divided by historians into 2 stages. Initially, it was planned by the Soviet command as a short operation, which was supposed to last about 3 weeks. But, the situation is different. The first period of the war lasted from November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940 (until the Mannerheim Line broke). The fortifications of the Mannerheim Line were able to stop the Russian army for a long time. The better equipment of the Finnish soldiers and the harsher winter conditions than in Russia also played an important role. The Finnish command was able to perfectly use the features of the terrain. Pine forests, lakes, swamps seriously slowed down the movement of Russian troops. The supply of ammunition was difficult. Finnish snipers also caused serious problems.

The second period of the war dates from February 11 - March 12, 1940. By the end of 1939, the General Staff developed a new plan of action. Under the leadership of Marshal Timoshenko, the Mannerheim Line was broken through on 11 February. A serious superiority in manpower, aviation, tanks allows the Soviet troops to move forward, incurring heavy losses. The Finnish army is experiencing a severe shortage of ammunition, as well as people. The government of Finland, which did not receive the help of the West, was forced to conclude a peace treaty on March 12, 1940. Despite the disappointing results of the military campaign for the USSR, a new border is being established.

After the German attack on the Soviet Union, Finland will enter the war on the side of the Nazis.

On the eve of the war of 1941

At the end of July 1940, Germany began preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union. The ultimate goals were the seizure of territory, the destruction of manpower, political entities and the exaltation of Germany.

It was planned to strike at the formations of the Red Army, concentrated in the western regions, to move rapidly into the interior of the country and occupy all economic and political centers.

By the beginning of the aggression against the USSR, Germany was a state with a highly developed industry and the strongest army in the world.

Having set himself the goal of becoming a hegemonic power, Hitler forced the German economy, the entire potential of the occupied countries and his allies to work for his war machine.

In a short time, the production of military equipment was sharply increased. The German divisions were equipped with modern weapons and received combat experience in Europe. The officer corps was distinguished by excellent training, tactical literacy and was brought up on the centuries-old traditions of the German army. The rank and file was disciplined, and the highest spirit was supported by propaganda about the exclusivity of the German race and the invincibility of the Wehrmacht.

Realizing the inevitability of a military clash, the leadership of the USSR began preparations to repel aggression. In a country rich in useful minerals and energy resources, thanks to the heroic labor of the population, heavy industry was created. Its rapid formation was facilitated by the conditions of the totalitarian system and the highest centralization of leadership, which made it possible to mobilize the population to perform any tasks.

The economy of the pre-war period was directive, and this facilitated its reorientation to the war footing. There was a high patriotic upsurge in society and the army. Party agitators pursued a policy of "hattering" - in the event of aggression, a war was planned on foreign territory and with little bloodshed.

The outbreak of World War II showed the need to strengthen the country's armed forces. Civilian enterprises were reoriented to the production of military equipment.

For the period from 1938 to 1940. the increase in military production amounted to more than 40%. Every year, 600-700 new enterprises were put into operation, and a significant part of them were built in the depths of the country. In terms of absolute volumes of industrial production, the USSR by 1937 had taken second place in the world after the United States.

In numerous semi-prison design bureaus, the latest weapons were created. On the eve of the war, high-speed fighters and bombers (MIG-3, Yak-1, LAGG-3, PO-2, IL-2), the KB heavy tank, and the T-34 medium tank appeared. New models of small arms were developed and put into service.

Domestic shipbuilding is reoriented to the production of surface ships and submarines. The design of the first rocket launchers was completed. However, the pace of rearmament of the army was insufficient.

In 1939, the law "On universal military duty" was adopted, and the transition to a unified personnel system for recruiting troops was completed. This made it possible to increase the size of the Red Army to 5 million people.

A significant weakness of the Red Army was the low training of commanders (only 7% of officers had a higher military education).

Irreparable damage to the army was caused by the repressions of the 30s, when many of the best commanders of all levels were destroyed. The combat effectiveness of the army was negatively affected by the strengthening of the role of NKVD workers who interfered in the leadership of the troops.

Military intelligence reports, undercover data, warnings from sympathizers - everything spoke of the approach of war. Stalin did not believe that Hitler would start a war against the USSR without completing the final defeat of his opponents in the West. He delayed the start of aggression in every possible way, without giving a reason for this.

German attack on the USSR

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany attacked the USSR. Army Hitler and the allied armies delivered a swift and carefully prepared blow at several points at once, taking the Russian army by surprise. This day was the beginning of a new period in the life of the USSR - Great Patriotic War .

Prerequisites for the German attack on the USSR

After the defeat in World War I During the war, the situation in Germany remained extremely unstable - the economy and industry collapsed, there was a major crisis that the authorities could not solve. It was at this time that Hitler came to power, whose main idea was to create a single national-oriented state that would not only take revenge for losing the war, but also subordinate the entire main world to its order.

Following his own ideas, Hitler created a fascist state in Germany and in 1939 unleashed the Second World War by invading the Czech Republic and Poland and annexing them to Germany. During the war, Hitler's army rapidly advanced across Europe, seizing territories, but did not attack the USSR - a preliminary non-aggression pact was concluded.

Unfortunately, the USSR was still a tasty morsel for Hitler. The opportunity to seize territories and resources opened up an opportunity for Germany to enter into open confrontation with the United States and declare its dominance over most of the world's landmass.

Designed to attack the USSR plan "Barbarossa" - a plan for a swift treacherous military assault, which was to be carried out within two months. The implementation of the plan began on June 22 with the German invasion of the USSR

German goals

Ideological and military. Germany sought to destroy the USSR as a state, as well as to destroy the communist ideology, which it considered incorrect. Hitler sought to establish the hegemony of nationalist ideas throughout the world (the superiority of one race, one people over others).

Imperialist. As in many wars, Hitler's goal was to seize power in the world and create a powerful Empire, to which all other states would obey.

Economic. The capture of the USSR gave the German army unprecedented economic opportunities for the further conduct of the war.

Racist. Hitler sought to destroy all "wrong" races (in particular, Jews).

The first period of the war and the implementation of the plan "Barbarossa"

Despite the fact that Hitler planned a surprise attack, the command of the USSR army suspected in advance what might happen, so on June 18, 1941, some armies were put on alert, and the armed forces were pulled to the border at the places of the alleged attack. Unfortunately, the Soviet command had only vague information regarding the date of the attack, so by the time the fascist troops invaded, many military units simply did not have time to prepare properly in order to competently repel the attack.

At 4 am on June 22, 1941, German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop presented the Soviet ambassador in Berlin with a note declaring war, at the same time German troops launched an attack on the Baltic Fleet in the Gulf of Finland. Early in the morning, the German ambassador arrived in the USSR to meet with People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov and made a statement stating that the Union was carrying out subversive activities in Germany in order to establish Bolshevik power there, therefore Germany breaks the non-aggression agreement and begins hostilities . A little later on the same day Italy, Romania and later Slovakia declared official war on the USSR. At 12 noon, Molotov made an official address to the citizens of the USSR on the radio, announcing the German attack on the USSR and announcing the start of a Patriotic War. A general mobilization began.

The war has begun.

Causes and consequences of the German attack on the USSR

Despite the fact that the Barbarossa plan could not be fulfilled - the Soviet army put up good resistance, was better equipped than expected and, on the whole, fought competently, taking into account territorial conditions - the first period of the war turned out to be a losing one for the USSR. Germany in the shortest possible time managed to conquer a significant part of the territories, including Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia and Lithuania. German troops advanced inland, encircled Leningrad and began bombing Moscow.

Despite the fact that Hitler underestimated the Russian army, the surprise of the attack still played a role. The Soviet army was not ready for such a rapid onslaught, the level of training of the soldiers was much lower, the military equipment was much worse, and the leadership made a number of very serious mistakes in the early stages.

The German attack on the USSR ended in a protracted war that claimed many lives and actually brought down the country's economy, which was not ready for large-scale military operations. However, in the middle of the war, the Soviet troops managed to gain an advantage and launch a counteroffensive.

World War II 1939 - 1945 (briefly)

The Second World War was the bloodiest and most brutal military conflict in the history of mankind and the only one in which nuclear weapons were used. 61 states took part in it. The dates of the beginning and end of this war, September 1, 1939 - 1945, September 2, are among the most significant for the entire civilized world.

The causes of the Second World War were the imbalance of power in the world and the problems provoked by the results of the First World War, in particular territorial disputes. The United States, England, and France, who won the First World War, concluded the Treaty of Versailles on the most unfavorable and humiliating conditions for the losing countries, Turkey and Germany, which provoked an increase in tension in the world. At the same time, adopted in the late 1930s by Britain and France, the policy of appeasing the aggressor made it possible for Germany to sharply increase its military potential, which accelerated the transition of the Nazis to active military operations.

The members of the anti-Hitler bloc were the USSR, the USA, France, England, China (Chiang Kai-shek), Greece, Yugoslavia, Mexico, etc. From Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, Finland, China (Wang Jingwei), Thailand, Finland, Iraq, etc. participated in World War II. Many states - participants in the Second World War, did not conduct operations on the fronts, but helped by supplying food, medicines and other necessary resources.

Researchers identify the following main stages of the Second World War.

The first stage from September 1, 1939 to June 21, 1941. The period of the European Blitzkrieg of Germany and the Allies.

The second stage June 22, 1941 - approximately the middle of November 1942. The attack on the USSR and the subsequent failure of the Barbarossa plan.

The third stage the second half of November 1942 - the end of 1943 A radical turning point in the war and the loss of Germany's strategic initiative. At the end of 1943, at the Tehran Conference, in which Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill took part, a decision was made to open a second front.

The fourth stage lasted from the end of 1943 to May 9, 1945. It was marked by the capture of Berlin and the unconditional surrender of Germany.

Fifth stage May 10, 1945 - September 2, 1945. At this time, the battles are fought only in Southeast Asia and the Far East. The United States used nuclear weapons for the first time.

The beginning of World War II fell on September 1, 1939. On this day, the Wehrmacht suddenly began aggression against Poland. Despite the retaliatory declaration of war by France, Great Britain and some other countries, no real assistance was provided to Poland. Already on September 28, Poland was captured. The peace treaty between Germany and the USSR was concluded on the same day. Having thus received a reliable rear, Germany begins active preparations for war with France, which capitulated as early as 1940, on June 22. Nazi Germany begins large-scale preparations for war on the eastern front with the USSR. The Barbarossa plan was approved already in 1940, on December 18th. The Soviet top leadership received reports of the impending attack, but fearing to provoke Germany, and believing that the attack would be carried out at a later date, they deliberately did not put the border units on alert.

In the chronology of the Second World War, the period of June 22, 1941-1945, May 9, known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War, is of the utmost importance. The USSR on the eve of World War II was an actively developing state. Since the threat of a conflict with Germany increased over time, defense and heavy industry and science developed first of all in the country. Closed design bureaus were created, whose activities were aimed at developing the latest weapons. Discipline was tightened to the maximum at all enterprises and collective farms. In the 30s, more than 80% of the officers of the Red Army were repressed. In order to make up for the losses, a network of military schools and academies has been created. But for the full-fledged training of personnel, time was not enough.

The main battles of the Second World War, which were of great importance for the history of the USSR, are:

The battle for Moscow on September 30, 1941 - April 20, 1942, which became the first victory of the Red Army;

The Battle of Stalingrad July 17, 1942 - February 2, 1943, which marked a radical turning point in the war;

Battle of Kursk July 5 - August 23, 1943, during which the largest tank battle of World War II took place - near the village of Prokhorovka;

The Battle of Berlin - which led to the surrender of Germany.

But events important for the course of World War II took place not only on the fronts of the USSR. Among the operations carried out by the allies, it is worth noting in particular: the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which caused the United States to enter World War II; the opening of a second front and the landing of troops in Normandy on June 6, 1944; the use of nuclear weapons on August 6 and 9, 1945 to strike at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The date of the end of the Second World War was September 2, 1945. Japan signed the act of surrender only after the defeat of the Kwantung Army by the Soviet troops. The battles of the Second World War, according to the most rough estimates, claimed, on both sides, 65 million people. The Soviet Union suffered the greatest losses in World War II - 27 million citizens of the country were killed. It was he who took the brunt. This figure is also approximate and, according to some researchers, underestimated. It was the stubborn resistance of the Red Army that became the main reason for the defeat of the Reich.

The results of World War II horrified everyone. Military operations have put the very existence of civilization on the brink. During the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, fascist ideology was condemned, and many war criminals were punished. In order to prevent such a possibility of a new world war in the future, at the Yalta Conference in 1945 it was decided to create the United Nations (UN), which still exists today. The results of the nuclear bombing of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki led to the signing of pacts on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a ban on their production and use. It must be said that the consequences of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are felt today.

The economic consequences of the Second World War were also serious. For Western European countries, it turned into a genuine economic disaster. The influence of Western European countries has significantly decreased. At the same time, the United States managed to maintain and strengthen its position.

The significance of the Second World War for the Soviet Union is enormous. The defeat of the Nazis determined the future history of the country. According to the results of the conclusion of the peace treaties that followed the defeat of Germany, the USSR significantly expanded its borders. At the same time, the totalitarian system was strengthened in the Union. In some European countries, communist regimes were established. Victory in the war did not save the USSR from the mass repressions that followed in the 1950s.

The Finnish war lasted 105 days. During this time, over a hundred thousand Red Army soldiers died, about a quarter of a million were injured or dangerously frostbite. Historians are still arguing whether the USSR was an aggressor, and whether the losses were unjustified.

look back

It is impossible to understand the causes of that war without an excursion into the history of Russian-Finnish relations. Prior to gaining independence, the "Land of a Thousand Lakes" never had statehood. In 1808 - an insignificant episode of the twentieth anniversary of the Napoleonic Wars - the land of Suomi was conquered by Russia from Sweden.

The new territorial acquisition enjoys unprecedented autonomy within the Empire: the Grand Duchy of Finland has its own parliament, legislation, and since 1860, its own monetary unit. For a century, this blessed corner of Europe has not known wars - until 1901, the Finns were not drafted into the Russian army. The population of the principality grows from 860 thousand inhabitants in 1810 to almost three million in 1910.

After the October Revolution, Suomi gained independence. During the local civil war, the local version of the "whites" won; chasing the "reds", the hot guys crossed the old border, the First Soviet-Finnish War (1918-1920) began. Bloodless Russia, having still formidable white armies in the South and Siberia, preferred to make territorial concessions to its northern neighbor: according to the results of the Tartu Peace Treaty, Helsinki received Western Karelia, and the state border passed forty kilometers northwest of Petrograd.

How historically fair such a verdict turned out to be is difficult to say; The Vyborg province that fell to Finland belonged to Russia for more than a hundred years, from the times of Peter the Great until 1811, when it was included in the Grand Duchy of Finland, perhaps, among other things, as a token of gratitude for the voluntary consent of the Finnish Seimas to pass under the hand of the Russian Tsar.

The knots that later led to new bloody clashes were successfully tied.

Geography is judgment

Look at the map. The year is 1939, Europe smells of a new war. At the same time, your imports and exports mainly go through seaports. But the Baltic and the Black Sea are two big puddles, all the exits from which Germany and its satellites can clog in no time. The Pacific sea lanes will be blocked by another member of the Axis, Japan.

Thus, the only potentially protected channel for exports, through which the Soviet Union receives the gold so necessary to complete the industrialization, and the import of strategic military materials, is the port on the Arctic Ocean, Murmansk, one of the few year-round not freezing harbors of the USSR. The only railway to which, suddenly, in some places passes through rugged deserted terrain just a few tens of kilometers from the border (when this railway was being laid, even under the tsar, no one could have imagined that the Finns and Russians would fight on different sides barricade). Moreover, at a distance of three days from this border there is another strategic transport artery, the White Sea-Baltic Canal.

But that's another half of the geographical troubles. Leningrad, the cradle of the revolution, which has concentrated a third of the country's military-industrial potential, is located within a radius of one march-throw of a potential enemy. A metropolis, on the streets of which an enemy shell has never fallen before, can be fired from heavy guns from the very first day of a probable war. The ships of the Baltic Fleet are deprived of their only base. And no, up to the Neva itself, natural defensive lines.

friend of your enemy

Today, wise and calm Finns can only attack someone in a joke. But three quarters of a century ago, when forced national building continued in Suomi on the wings of independence gained much later than other European nations, you would not be in the mood for jokes.

In 1918, Karl-Gustav-Emil Mannerheim pronounces the well-known "sword oath", publicly promising to annex Eastern (Russian) Karelia. At the end of the thirties, Gustav Karlovich (as he was called while serving in the Russian Imperial Army, where the path of the future field marshal began) is the most influential person in the country.

Of course, Finland was not going to attack the USSR. I mean, she wasn't going to do it alone. The ties of the young state with Germany were, perhaps, even stronger than with the countries of their native Scandinavia. In 1918, when intense discussions were going on in the country that had just gained independence about the form of government, by decision of the Finnish Senate, the brother-in-law of Emperor Wilhelm, Prince Friedrich-Karl of Hesse, was declared the King of Finland; for various reasons, nothing came of the Suom monarchist project, but the choice of personnel is very indicative. Further, the very victory of the “Finnish White Guards” (as the northern neighbors were called in Soviet newspapers) in the internal civil war of 1918 was also largely, if not completely, due to the participation of the expeditionary force sent by the Kaiser (numbering up to 15 thousand people, moreover, that the total number of local "reds" and "whites", significantly inferior to the Germans in combat qualities, did not exceed 100 thousand people).

Cooperation with the Third Reich developed no less successfully than with the Second. The ships of the Kriegsmarine freely entered the Finnish skerries; German stations in the area of ​​Turku, Helsinki and Rovaniemi were engaged in radio reconnaissance; from the second half of the thirties, the airfields of the "Country of a Thousand Lakes" were modernized to receive heavy bombers, which Mannerheim did not even have in the project ... It should be said that subsequently Germany already in the first hours of the war with the USSR (which Finland officially joined only on June 25, 1941 ) really used the territory and water area of ​​​​Suomi for laying mines in the Gulf of Finland and bombing Leningrad.

Yes, at that moment the idea of ​​attacking the Russians did not seem so crazy. The Soviet Union of the 1939 model did not look like a formidable adversary at all. The assets include the successful (for Helsinki) First Soviet-Finnish War. The brutal defeat of the Red Army by Poland during the Western campaign in 1920. Of course, one can recall the successful reflection of Japanese aggression on Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, but, firstly, these were local clashes far from the European theater, and, secondly, the qualities of the Japanese infantry were rated very low. And thirdly, the Red Army, as Western analysts believed, was weakened by the repressions of 1937. Of course, the human and economic resources of the empire and its former province are not comparable. But Mannerheim, unlike Hitler, was not going to go to the Volga to bomb the Urals. The field marshal had enough of one Karelia.

Negotiation

Stalin was anything but a fool. If in order to improve the strategic situation it is necessary to move the border away from Leningrad, it should be so. Another issue is that the goal cannot necessarily be achieved by military means alone. Although, honestly, right now, in the fall of the 39th, when the Germans are ready to grapple with the hated Gauls and Anglo-Saxons, I want to quietly solve my little problem with the “Finnish White Guards” - not out of revenge for the old defeat, no, in politics, following emotions leads to imminent death - and to test what the Red Army is capable of in a fight with a real enemy, small in number, but drilled by the European military school; in the end, if the Laplanders can be defeated, as our General Staff plans, in two weeks, Hitler will think a hundred times before attacking us ...

But Stalin would not have been Stalin if he had not tried to settle the issue amicably, if such a word is appropriate for a man of his character. Since 1938, the negotiations in Helsinki have been neither shaky nor fluctuating; in the fall of the 39th they were transferred to Moscow. Instead of the Leningrad underbelly, the Soviets offered twice the area north of Ladoga. Germany, through diplomatic channels, recommended that the Finnish delegation agree. But they did not make any concessions (perhaps, as the Soviet press transparently hinted, at the suggestion of "Western partners"), and on November 13 they departed for home. Two weeks left before the Winter War.

On November 26, 1939, near the village of Mainila on the Soviet-Finnish border, the positions of the Red Army came under artillery fire. The diplomats exchanged notes of protest; according to the Soviet side, about a dozen fighters and commanders were killed and wounded. Was the Mainil incident a deliberate provocation (which is evidenced, for example, by the absence of a list of names of the victims), or did one of the thousands of armed people who stood tensely for long days opposite the same armed enemy finally lose their nerve - in any case , this incident served as a pretext for the outbreak of hostilities.

The Winter Campaign began, where there was a heroic breakthrough of the seemingly indestructible "Mannerheim Line", and a belated understanding of the role of snipers in modern warfare, and the first use of the KV-1 tank - but they did not like to remember all this for a long time. The losses turned out to be too disproportionate, and the damage to the international reputation of the USSR was heavy.

A New Look

triumphant defeat.

Why hide the victory of the Red Army
in the "winter war"?
Viktor Suvorov's version.

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, called the "winter war", is known as one of the most shameful pages of Soviet military history. The huge Red Army failed to break through the defenses of the Finnish militias for three and a half months, and as a result, the Soviet leadership was forced to agree to a peace treaty with Finland.

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Finland Marshal Mannerheim - the winner of the "winter war"?

The defeat of the Soviet Union in the "winter war" is the most striking evidence of the weakness of the Red Army on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. It serves as one of the main arguments for those historians and publicists who argue that the USSR was not preparing for war with Germany and that Stalin tried by all means to delay the entry of the Soviet Union into the world conflict.
Indeed, it is unlikely that Stalin could have planned an attack on a strong and well-armed Germany at a time when the Red Army suffered such a shameful defeat in battles with such a small and weak enemy. However, is the "shameful defeat" of the Red Army in the "winter war" an obvious axiom that does not require proof? In order to understand this issue, we first consider the facts.

Preparing for War: Stalin's Plans

The Soviet-Finnish war began at the initiative of Moscow. On October 12, 1939, the Soviet government demanded that Finland cede the Karelian Isthmus and the Rybachy Peninsula, hand over all the islands in the Gulf of Finland, and lease the port of Hanko as a naval base on a long-term lease. In exchange, Moscow offered Finland a territory twice as large in size, but not suitable for economic activity and useless in a strategic sense.

A Finnish government delegation arrived in Moscow to discuss territorial disputes...

The Finnish government has not rejected the "great neighbor" claims. Even Marshal Mannerheim, who was considered a supporter of the pro-German orientation, spoke in favor of a compromise with Moscow. In mid-October, Soviet-Finnish negotiations began, which lasted less than a month. On November 9, negotiations broke down, but the Finns were ready for a new bargain. By mid-November, it seemed that the tension in the Soviet-Finnish relations was somewhat discharged. The Finnish government has even called on residents of the border areas who moved inland during the conflict to return to their homes. However, at the end of the same month, on November 30, 1939, Soviet troops attacked the Finnish border.
Naming the reasons that prompted Stalin to start a war against Finland, Soviet (now Russian!) researchers and a significant part of Western scientists indicate that the main goal of Soviet aggression was the desire to secure Leningrad. Like, when the Finns refused to exchange lands, Stalin wanted to seize part of the Finnish territory near Leningrad in order to better protect the city from attack.
This is an obvious lie! The true purpose of the attack on Finland is obvious - the Soviet leadership intended to capture this country and include it in the "Unbreakable Union ..." Back in August 1939, during the secret Soviet-German negotiations on the division of spheres of influence, Stalin and Molotov insisted on the inclusion of Finland (along with the three Baltic states) into the "Soviet sphere of influence". Finland was to become the first country in a series of states that Stalin planned to annex to his power.
The aggression was planned long before the attack. The Soviet and Finnish delegations were still discussing possible conditions for a territorial exchange, and in Moscow the future communist government of Finland, the so-called "People's Government of the Finnish Democratic Republic", was already being formed. It was headed by one of the founders of the Communist Party of Finland, Otto Kuusinen, who permanently lived in Moscow and worked in the apparatus of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

Otto Kuusinen is Stalin's candidate for the Finnish leaders.

A group of leaders of the Comintern. Standing first on the left - O. Kuusinen

Later, O. Kuusinen became a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was appointed deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and in 1957-1964 he was secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. To match Kuusinen, there were other "ministers" of the "people's government", which was supposed to arrive in Helsinki in the convoy of Soviet troops and announce the "voluntary accession" of Finland to the USSR. At the same time, under the leadership of NKVD officers, units of the so-called "Red Army of Finland" were created, which was assigned the role of "extras" in the planned performance.

Chronicle of the "winter war"

However, the performance did not work. The Soviet military planned to quickly capture Finland, which did not have a strong army. People's Commissar of Defense "Stalin's eagle" Voroshilov boasted that in six days the Red Army would be in Helsinki.
But already in the first days of the offensive, the Soviet troops ran into stubborn resistance from the Finns.

Finnish rangers are the backbone of Mannerheim's army.

Having advanced 25-60 km deep into the territory of Finland, the Red Army was stopped on the narrow Karelian Isthmus. Finnish defensive troops dug into the ground on the "Mannerheim Line" and repelled all Soviet attacks. The 7th Army, commanded by General Meretskov, suffered heavy losses. Additional troops sent by the Soviet command to Finland were surrounded by mobile Finnish detachments of skiing warriors, who made sudden raids from the forests, exhausting and bleeding the aggressors.
For a month and a half, a huge Soviet army trampled on the Karelian Isthmus. At the end of December, the Finns even tried to launch a counteroffensive, but they clearly lacked the strength.
The failures of the Soviet troops forced Stalin to take emergency measures. On his orders, several high-ranking commanders were publicly shot in the army; General Semyon Timoshenko (future People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR), close to the leader, became the new commander of the main North-Western Front. To break through the Mannerheim Line, additional reinforcements were sent to Finland, as well as detachments of the NKVD.

Semyon Timoshenko - leader of the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line"

On January 15, 1940, Soviet artillery began a massive shelling of Finnish defense positions, which lasted 16 days. In early February, 140 thousand soldiers and more than a thousand tanks were thrown into the offensive in the Karelian sector. For two weeks there were fierce battles on the narrow isthmus. Only on February 17, Soviet troops managed to break through the Finnish defenses, and on February 22, Marshal Mannerheim ordered the army to be withdrawn to a new defensive line.
Although the Red Army managed to break through the "Mannerheim Line" and capture the city of Vyborg, the Finnish troops were not defeated. The Finns managed to reinforce themselves on new frontiers. In the rear of the occupying army, mobile detachments of Finnish partisans operated, which made daring attacks on enemy units. The Soviet troops were exhausted and battered; their losses were enormous. One of Stalin's generals bitterly admitted:
- We have conquered exactly as much Finnish territory as is necessary to bury our dead.
Under these conditions, Stalin preferred to again propose to the Finnish government to settle the territorial issue through negotiations. The general secretary preferred not to mention plans for Finland's annexation to the Soviet Union. By that time, Kuusinen's puppet "people's government" and his "Red Army" had already been quietly disbanded. As compensation, the failed "leader of Soviet Finland" received the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the newly created Karelian-Finnish SSR. And some of his colleagues in the "cabinet of ministers" were simply shot - apparently, so as not to get in the way ...
The Finnish government immediately agreed to negotiations. Although the Red Army suffered heavy losses, it was clear that the small Finnish defense would not be able to stop the Soviet offensive for a long time.
Negotiations began at the end of February. On the night of March 12, 1940, a peace treaty was concluded between the USSR and Finland.

The head of the Finnish delegation announces the signing of a peace treaty with the Soviet Union.

The Finnish delegation accepted all Soviet demands: Helsinki ceded to Moscow the Karelian Isthmus with the city of Viipuri, the northeastern shore of Lake Ladoga, the port of Hanko and the Rybachy Peninsula - a total of about 34 thousand square kilometers of the country's territory.

The results of the war: victory or defeat.

So those are the basic facts. Having remembered them, now we can try to analyze the results of the "winter war".
Obviously, as a result of the war, Finland was in a worse position: in March 1940, the Finnish government was forced to make much larger territorial concessions than those demanded by Moscow in October 1939. Thus, at first glance, Finland was defeated.

Marshal Mannerheim managed to defend the independence of Finland.

However, the Finns managed to defend their independence. The Soviet Union, which unleashed the war, did not achieve the main goal - the accession of Finland to the USSR. Moreover, the failures of the offensive of the Red Army in December 1939 - the first half of January 1940 caused enormous damage to the prestige of the Soviet Union and, above all, its armed forces. The whole world made fun of the huge army, which for a month and a half trampled on the narrow isthmus, unable to break the resistance of the tiny Finnish army.
Politicians and the military were quick to conclude that the Red Army was weak. Especially closely followed the development of events on the Soviet-Finnish front in Berlin. German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary back in November 1939:
"The Russian army is worth little. Poorly led and even worse armed ..."
Hitler repeated the same thought a few days later:
"The Führer once again defines the catastrophic state of the Russian army. It is barely capable of fighting ... It is possible that the average level of Russian intelligence does not allow them to produce modern weapons."
It seemed that the course of the Soviet-Finnish war fully confirmed the opinion of the Nazi leaders. On January 5, 1940, Goebbels wrote in his diary:
"In Finland, the Russians are not advancing at all. It seems that the Red Army is not really worth much."
The theme of the weakness of the Red Army was constantly exaggerated at the Fuhrer's headquarters. Hitler himself said on January 13:
"You can't squeeze more out of the Russians anyway... It's very good for us. It's better to have a weak partner in the neighbors than an arbitrarily good comrade in the union."
On January 22, Hitler and his associates again discussed the course of hostilities in Finland and came to the conclusion:
"Moscow is very weak militarily..."

Adolf Hitler was sure that the "winter war" revealed the weakness of the Red Army.

And in March, the representative of the Nazi press at the headquarters of the Fuhrer, Heinz Lorenz, was already openly mocking the Soviet army:
"... Russian soldiers are just fun. Not a trace of discipline ..."
Not only Nazi leaders, but also serious military analysts considered the failures of the Red Army as proof of its weakness. Analyzing the course of the Soviet-Finnish war, the German General Staff in a report to Hitler made the following conclusion:
"The Soviet masses cannot resist a professional army with skillful command."
Thus, the "winter war" dealt a heavy blow to the authority of the Red Army. And although the Soviet Union achieved very significant territorial concessions in this conflict, in strategic terms it suffered a shameful defeat. In any case, almost all historians who have studied the Soviet-Finnish war believe so.
But Viktor Suvorov, not trusting the opinion of the most authoritative researchers, decided to check for himself: did the Red Army really show weakness and inability to fight during the "winter war"?
The results of his analysis were astonishing.

The historian is at war with... the computer

First of all, Viktor Suvorov decided to simulate on a powerful analytical computer the conditions in which the Red Army fought. He entered the necessary parameters into a special program:

Temperature - up to minus 40 degrees Celsius;
snow cover depth - one and a half meters;
relief - rugged terrain, forests, swamps, lakes
etc.
And each time the smart computer answered:

IMPOSSIBLE

IMPOSSIBLE
at this temperature;
with such a depth of snow cover;
with such relief
etc...

The computer refused to simulate the course of the Red Army offensive in the given parameters, recognizing them as unacceptable for conducting offensive operations.
Then Suvorov decided to abandon the simulation of natural conditions and suggested that the computer plan a breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" without taking into account climate and relief.
Here it is necessary to explain what the Finnish "Mannerheim Line" was.

Marshal Mannerheim personally oversaw the construction of fortifications on the Soviet-Finnish border.

The "Mannerheim Line" was a system of defensive fortifications on the Soviet-Finnish border, 135 kilometers long and up to 90 kilometers deep. The first strip of the line included: extensive minefields, anti-tank ditches and granite boulders, reinforced concrete tetrahedrons, barbed wire in 10-30 rows. Behind the first line was the second: reinforced concrete fortifications 3-5 floors underground - real underground fortresses made of fortified concrete, covered with armor plates and multi-ton granite boulders. In each fortress there is a warehouse of ammunition and fuel, a water supply system, a power station, rest rooms, and operating rooms. And then again - forest blockages, new minefields, scarps, barriers ...
Having received detailed information about the fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line", the computer clearly answered:

Main attack direction: Lintura - Viipuri
before the offensive - fire preparation
first explosion: air, epicenter - Kanneljärvi, equivalent - 50 kilotons,
height - 300
second explosion: air, epicenter - Lounatjoki, equivalent ...
third explosion...

But the Red Army did not have nuclear weapons in 1939!
Therefore, Suvorov introduced a new condition into the program: to attack the "Mannerheim Line" without the use of nuclear weapons.
And again the computer peremptorily answered:

Conducting offensive operations
IMPOSSIBLE

A powerful analytical computer recognized the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" in winter conditions without the use of nuclear weapons as IMPOSSIBLE four times, five times, many times ...
But the Red Army made this breakthrough! Even after long battles, even at the cost of huge human casualties - but still in February 1940, the "Russian soldiers", who were mockingly gossip at the Fuhrer's headquarters, did the impossible - they broke through the "Mannerheim Line".
Another thing is that this heroic feat did not make sense, that in general this whole war was an ill-considered adventure generated by the ambitions of Stalin and his parquet "eagles".
But militarily, the "winter war" demonstrated not the weakness, but the power of the Red Army, its ability to carry out even the IMPOSSIBLE order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. This was not understood by Hitler and the company, many military experts did not understand, and modern historians did not understand after them.

Who lost the "winter war"?

However, not all contemporaries agreed with Hitler's assessment of the results of the "winter war". So, the Finns who fought with the Red Army did not laugh at the "Russian soldiers" and did not repeat about the "weakness" of the Soviet troops. When Stalin suggested that they end the war, they very quickly agreed. And not only did they agree, but without long disputes they ceded strategically important territories to the Soviet Union - much larger than Moscow demanded before the war. And the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, spoke with great respect about the Red Army. He considered the Soviet troops modern and efficient and had a high opinion of their fighting qualities:
“Russian soldiers learn quickly, grasp everything on the fly, act without delay, easily obey discipline, are distinguished by courage and sacrifice and are ready to fight to the last bullet, despite the hopelessness of the situation,” the marshal believed.

Mannerheim had the opportunity to see the courage of the soldiers of the Red Army. Marshal at the forefront.

And the neighbors of the Finns - the Swedes - also commented with respect and admiration on the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" by the Red Army. And in the Baltic countries, too, they did not make fun of the Soviet troops: in Tallinn, Kaunas and Riga, they watched in horror the actions of the Red Army in Finland.
Victor Suvorov noted:
"The fighting in Finland ended on March 13, 1940, and already in the summer the three Baltic states: Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia surrendered to Stalin without a fight and turned into the "republics" of the Soviet Union."
Indeed, the Baltic countries drew a very clear conclusion from the results of the "winter war": the USSR has a powerful and modern army, ready to carry out any order without stopping at any sacrifice. And in June 1940, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia surrendered without resistance, and in early August "the family of Soviet republics was replenished with three new members."

Shortly after the Winter War, the three Baltic states disappeared from the world map.

At the same time, Stalin demanded from the Romanian government the "return" of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which were part of the Russian Empire before the revolution. Taking into account the experience of the "winter war", the Romanian government did not even begin to bargain: on June 26, 1940, a Stalinist ultimatum was sent, and on June 28, units of the Red Army "in accordance with the agreement" crossed the Dniester and entered Bessarabia. On June 30, a new Soviet-Romanian border was established.
Consequently, we can assume that as a result of the "winter war" the Soviet Union not only annexed the Finnish border lands, but also got the opportunity to capture three countries entirely and a large part of a fourth country without a fight. So, in strategic terms, Stalin still won this massacre.
So, Finland did not lose the war - the Finns managed to defend the independence of their state.
The Soviet Union did not lose the war either - as a result, the Baltic States and Romania submitted to the dictates of Moscow.
Who then lost the "winter war"?
Viktor Suvorov answered this question, as always, paradoxically:
"Hitler lost the war in Finland."
Yes, the Nazi leader, who closely followed the course of the Soviet-Finnish war, made the biggest mistake that a statesman can make: he underestimated the enemy. “Hitler did not understand this war, did not appreciate its difficulties, and made catastrophically wrong conclusions. For some reason he suddenly decided that the Red Army was not ready for war, that the Red Army was not capable of anything.”
Hitler miscalculated. And in April 1945 he paid with his life for this miscalculation ...

Soviet historiography
- in the footsteps of Hitler

However, Hitler very soon realized his mistake. Already on August 17, 1941, just a month and a half after the start of the war with the USSR, he told Goebbels:
- We seriously underestimated the Soviet combat readiness and, mainly, the armament of the Soviet army. We had no idea even approximately what the Bolsheviks had at their disposal. That's why it was misjudged...
- Perhaps it is very good that we did not have such an accurate idea of ​​the potential of the Bolsheviks. Otherwise, perhaps, we would have been horrified by the urgent question of the East and the proposed offensive against the Bolsheviks ...
And on September 5, 1941, Goebbels admitted - but only to himself, in his diary:
"... We misjudged the Bolshevik strength of resistance, we had the wrong numbers and based our entire policy on them."

Hitler and Mannerheim in 1942. The Fuhrer has already realized his miscalculation.

True, Hitler and Goebbels did not admit that the cause of the disaster was their self-confidence and incompetence. They tried to shift all the blame on the "cunning of Moscow." Speaking to colleagues at the Wolfschanze headquarters on April 12, 1942, the Fuhrer stated:
- The Russians ... carefully concealed everything that is somehow connected with their military power. The whole war with Finland in 1940... is nothing but a huge disinformation campaign, because Russia at one time had weapons that made it, along with Germany and Japan, a world power.
But, one way or another, Hitler and Goebbels admitted that, analyzing the results of the "winter war", they were mistaken in assessing the potential and strength of the Red Army.
However, until now, 57 years after this recognition, most historians and publicists continue to harp on about the "shameful defeat" of the Red Army.
Why do communist and other "progressive" historians so insistently repeat the theses of Nazi propaganda about the "weakness" of the Soviet armed forces, about their "unpreparedness for war", why, following Hitler and Goebbels, they describe the "inferiority" and "untrainedness" of Russian soldiers and officers?
Viktor Suvorov believes that behind all these rantings lies the desire of semi-official Soviet (now Russian!) historiography to hide the truth about the pre-war state of the Red Army. Soviet falsifiers and their Western "progressive" allies, in spite of all the facts, are trying to convince the public that on the eve of the German attack on the USSR, Stalin did not even think about aggression (as if there was no capture of the Baltic countries and part of Romania), but was only concerned with "ensuring the security of the borders" .
In fact (and the "winter war" confirms this!) The Soviet Union already at the end of the 30s had one of the most powerful armies, armed with modern military equipment and staffed with well-trained and disciplined soldiers. This powerful war machine was created by Stalin for the Great Victories of Communism in Europe, and perhaps throughout the world.
On June 22, 1941, the preparations for the World Revolution were interrupted by a sudden attack on the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany.

References.

• Bullock A. Hitler and Stalin: Life and Power. Per. from English. Smolensk, 1994
• Mary W. Mannerheim - Marshal of Finland. Per. from the Swedish M., 1997
• Picker G. Hitler's Table Talk. Per. with him. Smolensk, 1993
• Rzhevskaya E. Goebbels: Portrait against the backdrop of a diary. M., 1994
• Suvorov V. The Last Republic: Why did the Soviet Union program the Second World War. M., 1998

Read the material in the following issues
ACADEMIC PICKING
on the controversy surrounding the research of Viktor Suvorov

From September 28 to October 10, the USSR concluded mutual assistance treaties with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, according to which these countries provided the USSR with their territory for the deployment of Soviet military bases. On October 5, the USSR invited Finland to consider the possibility of concluding a similar mutual assistance pact with the USSR. The Government of Finland stated that the conclusion of such a pact would be contrary to its position of absolute neutrality. In addition, the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany has already eliminated the main reason for the demands of the Soviet Union to Finland - the danger of a German attack through the territory of Finland.

Moscow negotiations on the territory of Finland

On October 5, 1939, Finnish representatives were invited to Moscow for talks "on specific political issues." The negotiations were held in three stages: October 12-14, November 3-4 and November 9. For the first time, Finland was represented by envoy, State Councilor J. K. Paasikivi, Finnish Ambassador to Moscow Aarno Koskinen, Foreign Ministry official Johan Nykopp and Colonel Aladar Paasonen . On the second and third trips, Finance Minister Tanner was authorized to negotiate along with Paasikivi. State Councilor R. Hakkarainen was added on the third trip.

At these talks for the first time there was talk about the proximity of the border to Leningrad. Joseph Stalin remarked: We cannot do anything with geography, just like you ... Since Leningrad cannot be moved, we will have to move the border away from it". The version of the agreement presented by the Soviet side looked as follows:

Finland transfers part of the Karelian Isthmus to the USSR.

Finland agrees to lease the Hanko peninsula to the USSR for a period of 30 years for the construction of a naval base and the deployment of a 4,000-strong military contingent there for its defense.

The Soviet navy is provided with ports on the Hanko peninsula in Hanko itself and in Lappohya (Fin.) Russian.

Finland transfers the islands of Gogland, Laavansaari (now Powerful), Tyutyarsaari and Seiskari to the USSR.

The existing Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact is supplemented by an article on mutual obligations not to join groups and coalitions of states hostile to one side or the other.

Both states are disarming their fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.

The USSR transfers to Finland the territory in Karelia with a total area twice the amount received by Finland (5,529 km²).

The USSR undertakes not to object to the arming of the Åland Islands by Finland's own forces.

The USSR proposed an exchange of territories, in which Finland would receive more extensive territories in Eastern Karelia in Reboly and Porajärvi. These were the territories that proclaimed [ source unspecified 656 days] independence and tried to join Finland in 1918-1920, but according to the Tartu Peace Treaty they remained with Soviet Russia.

The USSR made its demands public before the third meeting in Moscow. Having concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR, Germany advised the Finns to agree to them. Hermann Goering made it clear to Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko that the demands for military bases should be accepted, and Germany's help should not be hoped for. The State Council did not comply with all the requirements of the USSR, as public opinion and parliament were against it. The Soviet Union was offered the cession of the islands of Suursaari (Gogland), Lavensari (Powerful), Bolshoi Tyuters and Maly Tyuters, Penisaari (Small), Seskar and Koivisto (Birch) - a chain of islands that stretches along the main shipping fairway in the Gulf of Finland and closest to Leningrad territories in Terioki and Kuokkala (now Zelenogorsk and Repino), deepened into Soviet territory. The Moscow negotiations ended on November 9, 1939. Previously, a similar proposal was made to the Baltic countries, and they agreed to provide the USSR with military bases on their territory. Finland, on the other hand, chose something else: to defend the inviolability of its territory. On October 10, soldiers were called up from the reserve for unscheduled exercises, which meant full mobilization.

Sweden made clear its position of neutrality, and there were no serious assurances of assistance from other states.

From the middle of 1939, military preparations began in the USSR. In June-July, the operational plan for an attack on Finland was discussed at the Main Military Council of the USSR, and from mid-September, the concentration of units of the Leningrad Military District along the border began.

In Finland, the Mannerheim Line was being completed. On August 7-12, major military exercises were held on the Karelian Isthmus, which practiced repelling aggression from the USSR. All military attachés were invited, except for the Soviet one.

Declaring the principles of neutrality, the Finnish government refused to accept the Soviet conditions - since, in their opinion, these conditions went far beyond the issue of ensuring the security of Leningrad - at the same time trying to achieve the conclusion of the Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and the consent of the USSR to arm the Aland Islands, whose demilitarized status was regulated by the Aland Convention of 1921. In addition, the Finns did not want to give the USSR their only defense against possible Soviet aggression - the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus, known as the Mannerheim Line.

The Finns insisted on their own, although on October 23-24, Stalin somewhat softened his position regarding the territory of the Karelian Isthmus and the size of the alleged garrison of the Hanko Peninsula. But these proposals were also rejected. “Are you trying to provoke a conflict?” /V.Molotov/. Mannerheim, supported by Paasikivi, continued to press his parliament for a compromise, stating that the army would hold out on the defensive for no more than two weeks, but to no avail.

On October 31, speaking at a session of the Supreme Council, Molotov outlined the essence of the Soviet proposals, while hinting that the hard line taken by the Finnish side was allegedly caused by the intervention of outside states. The Finnish public, having first learned about the demands of the Soviet side, categorically opposed any concessions [ source unspecified 937 days ] .

Causes of the war

According to the statements of the Soviet side, the goal of the USSR was to achieve by military means what could not be done peacefully: to ensure the security of Leningrad, which was dangerously close to the border and in the event of a war (in which Finland was ready to provide its territory to the enemies of the USSR as a springboard) would inevitably have been captured in the first days (or even hours). In 1931, Leningrad was separated from the region and became a city of republican subordination. Part of the borders of some territories subordinate to the Lensovet was at the same time the border between the USSR and Finland.

True, the very first demands of the USSR in 1938 did not mention Leningrad and did not require the transfer of the border. Demands for the lease of Hanko, located hundreds of kilometers to the west, increased the security of Leningrad. Only the following was constant in the demands: to receive military bases on the territory of Finland and near its coast and to oblige it not to ask for help from third countries.

Already during the war, two concepts developed that are still being discussed: one is that the USSR pursued its stated goals (ensuring the security of Leningrad), the second is that the Sovietization of Finland was the true goal of the USSR. M. I. Semiryaga notes that on the eve of the war in both countries there were claims to each other. The Finns were afraid of the Stalinist regime and were well aware of the repressions against Soviet Finns and Karelians at the end of the 30s, the closure of Finnish schools, etc. In the USSR, in turn, they knew about the activities of ultranationalist Finnish organizations that aimed to "return" Soviet Karelia. Moscow was also worried about Finland's unilateral rapprochement with Western countries, and above all with Germany, which Finland, in turn, went for because it saw the USSR as the main threat to itself. Finnish President P. E. Svinhufvud declared in Berlin in 1937 that "the enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland." In a conversation with the German envoy, he said: “The Russian threat to us will always exist. Therefore, it is good for Finland that Germany will be strong.” In the USSR, preparations for a military conflict with Finland began in 1936. On September 17, 1939, the USSR expressed support for Finnish neutrality, but literally on the same days (September 11-14) began partial mobilization in the Leningrad Military District, which clearly indicated the preparation of a force solutions

The course of hostilities

Military operations by their nature fell into two main periods:

First period: From November 30, 1939 to February 10, 1940, i.e. fighting until the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line.

Second period: From February 11 to March 12, 1940, i.e. combat operations to break through the "Mannerheim Line" itself.

In the first period, the most successful was the advance in the north and in Karelia.

1. The troops of the 14th Army captured the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the cities of Lillahammari and Petsamo in the Pechenga region and closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.

2. Troops of the 9th Army penetrated 30-50 km deep into the enemy defenses in North and Central Karelia, i.e. slightly, but still went beyond the state border. Further progress could not be ensured due to the complete lack of roads, dense forests, deep snow cover and the complete absence of settlements in this part of Finland.

3. The troops of the 8th Army in South Karelia went deep into enemy territory up to 80 km, but were also forced to suspend the offensive, since some units were surrounded by Finnish mobile ski units of the Shutskor, who were well acquainted with the area.

4. The main front on the Karelian Isthmus in the first period experienced three stages in the development of hostilities:

5. Waging heavy fighting, the 7th Army advanced 5-7 km per day until it approached the "Mannerheim Line", which happened in different sectors of the offensive from 2 to 12 December. During the first two weeks of fighting, the cities of Terioki, Fort Inoniemi, Raivola, Rautu (now Zelenogorsk, Privetninskoye, Roschino, Orekhovo) were taken.

During the same period, the Baltic Fleet took possession of the islands of Seiskari, Lavansaari, Suursaari (Gogland), Narvi, Soomeri.

In early December 1939, a special group of three divisions (49th, 142nd and 150th) was created as part of the 7th Army under the command of commander V.D. grendal to break through the river. Taipalenjoki and exit to the rear of the "Mannerheim Line" fortifications.

Despite the crossing of the river and heavy losses in the battles on December 6-8, the Soviet units failed to gain a foothold and build on success. The same thing was revealed during attempts to attack the "Mannerheim Line" on December 9-12, after the entire 7th Army had reached the entire 110-kilometer strip occupied by this line. Due to the huge losses in manpower, heavy fire from pillboxes and bunkers and the impossibility of advancing, operations were suspended on virtually the entire line by the end of December 9, 1939.

The Soviet command decided on a radical restructuring of military operations.

6. The Main Military Council of the Red Army decided to suspend the offensive and carefully prepare to break through the enemy's defensive line. The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The front section of the 7th Army was reduced from 100 to 43 km. The 13th Army was created on the front of the second half of the "Mannerheim Line", which consisted of a group of commander V.D. grendal(4 rifle divisions), and then a little later, by the beginning of February 1940, the 15th Army, operating between Lake Ladoga and the Laimola point.

7. A restructuring of command and control and a change of command was carried out.

Firstly, the Active Army was withdrawn from the control of the Leningrad Military District and passed directly under the jurisdiction of the Headquarters of the High Command of the Red Army.

Secondly, the North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus (date of formation: January 7, 1940).

Front commander: commander of the 1st rank S.K. Tymoshenko.

Chief of Staff of the Front: Commander of the 2nd rank I.V. Smorodinov

9. The main task during this period consisted in the active preparation by the troops of the theater of military operations for the assault on the "Mannerheim Line", as well as in the preparation by the command of the troops of the best conditions for the offensive.

To solve the first task, it was necessary to eliminate all obstacles in the foreground, secretly clear mines for the foreground, make numerous passes in the rubble and wire fences before attacking directly the fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line" itself. Within a month, the system of the "Mannerheim Line" itself was thoroughly explored, many hidden pillboxes and bunkers were discovered, and their destruction began by methodical daily artillery fire.

Only on the 43-kilometer sector, the 7th Army daily fired up to 12 thousand shells at the enemy. Aviation also inflicted destruction on the front line and the depth of the enemy’s defense. During the preparation for the assault, the bombers carried out over 4 thousand bombings along the front, and the fighters made 3.5 thousand sorties.10. To prepare the troops themselves for the assault, food was seriously improved, traditional uniforms (Budennovkas, overcoats, boots) were replaced with earflaps, short fur coats, felt boots. The front received 2.5 thousand mobile insulated houses with stoves. In the near rear, the troops practiced new assault techniques, the front received the latest means to undermine pillboxes and bunkers, to storm powerful fortifications, new reserves of people, weapons, and ammunition were brought up.

As a result, by the beginning of February 1940, at the front, Soviet troops had double superiority in manpower, triple superiority in artillery firepower, and absolute superiority in tanks and aircraft.

Second period of the war: Assault on the Mannerheim Line. February 11 - March 12, 1940

11. The front troops were tasked with breaking through the "Mannerheim Line", defeating the main enemy forces on the Karelian Isthmus and reaching the Kexholm - Antrea - Vyborg line. The general offensive was scheduled for February 11, 1940.

It began with a powerful two-hour artillery preparation at 8.00, after which the infantry, supported by tanks and direct-fire artillery, launched an offensive at 10.00 and broke through the enemy defenses by the end of the day in a decisive sector and by February 14 wedged into the depth of the line by 7 km, expanding the breakthrough up to 6 km along the front. These successful actions 123 sd. (lieutenant colonel F.F. Alabushev) created the conditions for overcoming the entire "Mannerheim Line". To develop success in the 7th Army, three mobile tank groups were created.12. The Finnish command pulled up new forces, trying to eliminate the breakthrough and defend an important knot of fortifications. But as a result of 3-day battles and the actions of three divisions, the breakthrough of the 7th Army was expanded to 12 km along the front and 11 km in depth. From the flanks of the breakthrough, two Soviet divisions began to threaten to bypass the Karhulsky knot of resistance, while the neighboring Khottinensky knot had already been taken. This forced the Finnish command to abandon counterattacks and withdraw troops from the main line of fortifications Muolanjärvi - Karhula - Gulf of Finland to the second defensive line, especially since at that time the troops of the 13th Army, whose tanks approached the Muola-Ilves node, also went on the offensive.

Pursuing the enemy, units of the 7th Army reached the main, second, inner line of Finnish fortifications by February 21. This caused great concern to the Finnish command, who understood that one more such breakthrough - and the outcome of the war could be decided.13. The commander of the troops of the Karelian Isthmus in the Finnish army, Lieutenant-General H.V. Esterman was suspended. On February 19, 1940, Major General A.E. was appointed to his place. Heinrichs, commander of the 3rd Army Corps. Finnish troops tried to firmly gain a foothold on the second, fundamental line. But the Soviet command did not give them time for this. Already on February 28, 1940, a new, even more powerful offensive by the troops of the 7th Army began. The enemy, unable to withstand the blow, began to retreat along the entire front from the river. Vuoksa to the Vyborg Bay. The second line of fortifications was broken through in two days.

On March 1, the bypass of the city of Vyborg began, and on March 2, the troops of the 50th Rifle Corps reached the enemy's rear, inner defense line, and on March 5, the troops of the entire 7th Army surrounded Vyborg.

14. The Finnish command expected that by stubbornly defending the large Vyborg fortified area, which was considered impregnable and in the conditions of the coming spring it had a unique system of flooding the foredfield for 30 km, Finland would be able to drag out the war for at least a month and a half, which would enable England and France to deliver to Finland 150 thousandth expeditionary force. The Finns blew up the locks of the Saimaa Canal and flooded the approaches to Vyborg for tens of kilometers. Lieutenant General K.L., Chief of the Main Staff of the Finnish Army, was appointed Commander of the Vyborg District. Ash, which testified to the confidence of the Finnish command in their forces and the seriousness of their intentions to hold back a long siege of the fortified city.

15. The Soviet command carried out a deep bypass of Vyborg from the north-west with the forces of the 7th Army, part of which was to storm Vyborg from the front. At the same time, the 13th Army advanced on Kexholm and st. Antrea, and the troops of the 8th and 15th armies were advancing in the direction of Laimola, Part of the troops of the 7th army (two corps) was preparing to force the Vyborg Bay, since the ice still withstood tanks and artillery, although the Finns, fearing an attack by Soviet troops through the bay , arranged ice-hole traps on it, covered with snow.

The offensive of the Soviet troops began on March 2 and continued until March 4. By the morning of March 5, the troops managed to gain a foothold on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay, bypassing the defenses of the fortress. By March 6, this bridgehead was expanded along the front by 40 km and in depth by 1 km. By March 11, in this area, west of Vyborg, the Red Army troops cut the Vyborg-Helsinki highway, opening the way to the capital of Finland. At the same time, on March 5-8, the troops of the 7th Army, advancing in a northeasterly direction towards Vyborg, also reached the outskirts of the city. On March 11, the Vyborg suburb was captured. On March 12, a frontal assault on the fortress began at 23:00, and on the morning of March 13 (at night) Vyborg was taken

The end of the war and the conclusion of peace

By March 1940, the Finnish government realized that, despite the demands for continued resistance, Finland would not receive any military assistance other than volunteers and weapons from the Allies. After breaking through the Mannerheim Line, Finland was obviously unable to hold back the advance of the Red Army. There was a real threat of a complete seizure of the country, followed by either joining the USSR or changing the government to a pro-Soviet one. Therefore, the Finnish government turned to the USSR with a proposal to start peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and on March 12 a peace treaty was signed, according to which hostilities ceased at 12 o'clock on March 13, 1940. Despite the fact that Vyborg, according to the agreement, retreated to the USSR, Soviet troops stormed the city on the morning of March 13. Mannerheim line(Fin. Mannerheim-linja) - a complex of defensive structures on the Finnish part of the Karelian Isthmus, created in 1920 - 1930 to deter a possible offensive strike from the USSR. The line was about 135 km long and about 90 km deep. It is named after Marshal Karl Mannerheim, on whose orders plans for the defense of the Karelian Isthmus were developed back in 1918. On his own initiative, the largest structures of the complex were created. in addition to the Finnish territory in the Leningrad region, sections in the region of northern Karelia and the Rybachy Peninsula, as well as part of the islands of the Gulf of Finland and the Hanko region, went to the USSR. Territorial changes 1. Karelian Isthmus and Western Karelia. As a result of the loss of the Karelian Isthmus, Finland lost its existing defense system and began to build at an accelerated pace 2. fortifications along the new border line (Salpa Line), thereby moving the border from Leningrad from 18 to 150 km. 3. Part of Lapland (Old Salla). 4. The Petsamo (Pechenga) region, occupied by the Red Army during the war, was returned to Finland. 5. Islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland (Gogland Island). Mannerheim line - alternative point of view Throughout the war, both Soviet and Finnish propaganda significantly exaggerated the significance of the Mannerheim Line. The first is to justify a long delay in the offensive, and the second is to strengthen the morale of the army and the population. Accordingly, the myth of the "incredibly heavily fortified" "Mannerheim Line" was firmly entrenched in Soviet history and penetrated into some Western sources of information, which is not surprising, given the chanting of the line by the Finnish side in the literal sense - in the song Mannerheimin linjalla ("On the Mannerheim Line"). It is believed that the "Mannerheim Line" consisted mainly of field fortifications. The bunkers located on the line were small, located at a considerable distance from each other and rarely had cannon weapons.

6. Expansion of the western borders of the USSR in 1939-1941. Baltic countries. Bessarabia. Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. On August 23, 1939, after three hours of negotiations in Moscow, the so-called Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was signed. A secret additional protocol was attached to the non-aggression pact, which provided for "the delimitation of spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe." Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Eastern Poland and Bessarabia were assigned to the sphere of influence of the USSR. These documents radically changed both Soviet foreign policy and the situation in Europe. From now on, the Stalinist leadership has become an ally of Germany in the division of Europe. The last obstacle to an attack on Poland, and thus to the outbreak of the Second World War, was removed. In 1939, in any case, Germany could not start a war against the USSR, since it did not have common borders on which it was possible to deploy troops and carry out an attack. Moreover, she was completely unprepared for the "big" war.

September 1, 1939 Hitler attacked Poland. The Second World War began.. On September 17, when the outcome of the battle in Poland was no longer in doubt, the Red Army occupied the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, which were part of this state.

On July 31, 1940, Hitler declared that the primary goal from now on was a war with Russia, the outcome of which was to decide the fate of England. On December 18, 1940, the plan of attack on the USSR (Plan Barbarossa) was signed. In deep secrecy, troops began to be transferred to the east. In 1939-1940. Stalin was concerned, first of all, with the annexation of the territories of Eastern Europe to the USSR, which were assigned to him under secret agreements with Nazi Germany, and further rapprochement with Hitler

On September 28, an agreement was signed ^ On friendship and the border with Germany and three secret protocols to it. In these documents, the parties pledged to wage a joint struggle against "Polish agitation" and specified their spheres of influence. In exchange for Lublin and part of the Warsaw Voivodeship, the USSR received Lithuania. Based on these agreements, Stalin demanded that the Baltic states conclude agreements on mutual assistance and deploy Soviet military bases on their territory. In September-October 1939, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were forced to agree to this. On June 14-16, 1940, after the actual defeat of France by fascist Germany, Stalin delivered an ultimatum to these Baltic states on the introduction of contingents of Soviet troops into their territory (for "ensuring security") and the formation of new governments ready to "honestly" fulfill treaties with the USSR. A few days later, "people's governments" were created in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which, with the help of local communists, established Soviet power in the Baltic states. At the end of June 1940 Stalin achieved the return of Bessarabia, occupied by Romania in 1918. At the same time, in June 1940, at the request of the USSR, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, occupied by Romania in 1918, were returned to him. In August 1940, the Moldavian SSR was formed, which included Bessarabia entered, and Northern Bukovina was included in the Ukrainian SSR. As a result of all the territorial acquisitions mentioned above, the borders of the USSR were pushed westward by 200-300 km, and the country's population increased by 23 million people.

7. German attack on the Soviet Union. Beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Activities of the Soviet government in the initial period of the war.

On June 22, at 3:30 a.m., the German army began its powerful invasion of battle along the entire border of our country from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea. The Patriotic War broke out. The invasion of the aggressor was preceded by powerful artillery preparation. Thousands of guns and mortars opened fire on border outposts, areas where troops were located, headquarters, communication centers, and defensive structures. Enemy aviation dealt the first blow to the entire frontier zone Murmansk, Liepaja, Riga, Kaunas, Smolensk, Kyiv, Zhitomir were subjected to massive air bombardments; naval bases (Kronstadt, Izmail, Sevastopol). In order to paralyze the control of the Soviet troops, saboteurs were dropped by parachute. The most powerful strikes were delivered on airfields, since air supremacy was the main task of the German Air Force. The Soviet aviation of the border districts, due to the crowded basing of units, lost about 1200 aircraft on the first day of the war. In addition, an order was given to front-line and army aviation: in no case should they fly over borders, destroy the enemy only over their territory, and keep aircraft in constant readiness to withdraw from under attack. On the very first day of the war, the Baltic, Western and Kiev special military districts were transformed into the North-West (commander General F. Kuznetsov), Western (commander General D. Pavlov), South-Western (commander General M. Kirponos) fronts. On June 24, the Leningrad Military District was transformed into the Northern Front (commander General M. Popov), and the Southern Front was formed from the 9th and 18th armies (commander General I. Tyulenev). On June 23, the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created under the chairmanship of People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S. Timoshenko (on August 8, it was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, headed by I. Stalin).

The sudden invasion of Germany into the territory of the USSR required quick and precise action from the Soviet government. First of all, it was necessary to ensure the mobilization of forces to repulse the enemy. On the day of the Nazi attack, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree on the mobilization of those liable for military service in 1905-1918. birth. In a matter of hours, detachments and subunits were formed. Soon the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council

People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution approving the mobilization national economic plan for the fourth quarter of 1941, which provided for an increase in the production of military equipment and the creation of large enterprises in the tank-building industry in the Volga region and the Urals. in a military way, which was set out in the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 29, 1941 to party, Soviet organizations in the front-line regions. The slogan "Everything for the front, everything for victory!" became the motto of the life of the Soviet people. The Soviet government and the Central Committee of the Party called on the people to give up their moods and personal desires, go over to the sacred and merciless struggle against the enemy, fight to the last drop of blood, rebuild the national economy on a war footing, and increase the output of military products. In the occupied areas, create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursue and destroy them at every step, disrupt all their activities. Among other things, conversations were held with the population on the ground. The nature and political goals of the outbreak of the Patriotic War were explained. The main provisions of the directive of June 29 were outlined in a radio speech on July 3, 1941 by I.V. Stalin. Addressing the people, he explained the current situation at the front, revealed a program for the defense of goals that had already been achieved, and expressed unshakable faith in the victory of the Soviet people against the German occupiers. Together with the Red Army, many thousands of workers, collective farmers, and intellectuals are rising to war against the attacking enemy. The millions of our people will rise.” On June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was formed for the strategic leadership of military operations. Later it was renamed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK), headed by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars I.V. Stalin, who was also appointed People's Commissar of Defense, and then Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR. A military victory over Nazi Germany and its allies would have been impossible without victory on the front of the economic confrontation with the aggressor. Germany began to surpass the USSR in total industrial production by three to four times. Under the State Defense Committee, an Operations Bureau was established to control the implementation of military orders, an evacuation council, a transport committee, and other permanent or temporary working bodies. The powers of representatives of the State Defense Committee in the field were given, if necessary, by the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union republics, regional committees, leading economic and scientific workers.

From the first days of hostilities, four main lines for creating a well-coordinated military economy were determined

Evacuation from the frontline zone to the east of industrial enterprises, material assets and people.

The transition of thousands of plants and factories of the civilian sector to the production of military equipment and other defense products.

The accelerated construction of new industrial facilities capable of replacing those lost in the first months of the war, the establishment of a system of cooperation and transport communications between individual industries and within them, disrupted as a result of the unprecedented scale of the movement of productive forces to the east.

Reliable supply of the national economy, primarily industry, with working hands in the new emergency conditions.

8. Reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the initial period of the war.

The reasons for the failures of the Red Army at the initial stage of the war were not only that the Soviet troops, attacked suddenly, were forced to engage in heavy battles without proper strategic deployment, that many of them were understaffed to wartime states, had limited material and vehicles and communications, often operated without air and artillery support. The damage suffered by our troops in the first days of the war also had a negative effect, but it cannot be overestimated, since in fact only 30 divisions of the first echelon of the covering army were subjected to attacks by the aggressor troops on June 22. The tragedy of the defeat of the main forces of the three fronts - the Western, Northwestern and Southwestern came to light later, during the counter-battles on June 23-30, 1941 between the new and old borders. The entire course of the border battles showed that our troops at all levels - from the Headquarters of the High Command to the tactical level commanders - were not prepared for the most part not only for the first, unexpected strikes of the German troops, but for war in general. The Red Army had to master the skills of conducting a modern war in the course of battles, while incurring huge losses in manpower and military equipment. The shortcomings in the combat readiness of our troops, revealed at Khalkhin Gol and during the Soviet-Finnish war, were not and could not be eliminated in a short time. The army grew in numbers, but to the detriment of the quality of training, and above all for officers and sergeants. The main emphasis in combat training was placed on the infantry: the training of armored forces and aviation was not given due attention, and therefore our troops could not become a strike force like the Wehrmacht, mainly due to the lack of personnel, professional command staff and staffs. Our troops were unable to realize their technical and human potential, which surpassed the potential of the aggressor by the beginning of the war. The disruption of constant communication between the troops and the headquarters deprived the command, up to the General Staff and Headquarters, of the opportunity to receive regular information about the state of affairs at the front. The order of the Headquarters to hold the occupied lines at all costs, even in the conditions of a deep flank bypass of the enemy, often became the reason for the substitution of entire groupings of Soviet troops under the blows of the enemy, which forced heavy battles in the encirclement, entailed heavy losses in people and military equipment, and increased panic moods in the troops. A significant part of the Soviet commanders did not have the necessary military and combat experience. The Headquarters did not have the necessary experience either, hence the most serious miscalculations at the very beginning of the war. The more successfully the campaign to the east developed, the more boastful the statements of the German command became. Noting the steadfastness of the Russian soldier, they, nevertheless, did not consider him as a decisive factor in the war. They considered their main success, in accordance with the “blitzkrieg” plan, the rapid advance of German troops, the capture of vast territories and trophies, huge human losses. The steadfastness of the Russian warrior manifested itself in the defense of the Brest Fortress. The heroism of the defenders of the fortress will appear even more obvious if we consider that the German troops possessed superiority in experience, manpower and equipment, while our fighters did not have a harsh and long school of war behind them, were cut off from their units and mandates, experienced an acute shortage of water and food, ammunition, and medicines. And yet they continued to fight the enemy.

The Red Army was not prepared for the conditions of the modern industrial war - the war of motors. This is the main reason for its defeats in the initial period of hostilities.

9. The situation on the fronts of the Soviet Union in June 1941. - November 1942 Moscow battle. On the very first day of the war, the Baltic, Western and Kiev special military districts were transformed into the North-West (commander General F. Kuznetsov), Western (commander General D. Pavlov), South-Western (commander General M. Kirponos) fronts. On June 24, the Leningrad Military District was transformed into the Northern Front (commander General M. Popov), and the Southern Front was formed from the 9th and 18th armies (commander General I. Tyulenev). On June 23, the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created under the chairmanship of People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S. Timoshenko (on August 8, it was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, headed by I. Stalin).

On June 22 at 7:15 a.m., the Main Military Council issued a directive to the Soviet troops on the start of active hostilities. When it was received at the headquarters of the fronts, the divisions of the first echelon were already drawn into defensive battles, but tank and motorized formations were not ready to deliver a quick powerful blow due to the large distance from the border. By the end of the first day of the war, a difficult situation had developed at the junction of the North-Western and Western fronts, on the left wing of the Western Front .. The corps and division commanders could not act on the situation, because they did not have data on the number of forces and military actions enemy. There was no constant relationship between the units, no one knew anything about the true losses, it was assumed that the troops raised in alarm would be combat-ready enough. But by the end of the day on June 22, under the blows of the enemy, our units were driven back from the state border by about 40 km. As a result, in just two days, with heavy losses in manpower and equipment, the troops retreated from the border by 100 km. A similar situation was noted in other sectors of the front. The operational results of the counterattacks, despite the selfless actions of our soldiers, were insignificant, and the losses incurred were incredibly high. At best, individual formations of the Western Front managed to delay the enemy’s advance only for a short time. After successful breakthroughs of the border defenses in the Western Front zone, enemy tank groups, supported by large air forces, managed to complete the encirclement and defeat of the backbone of the Western Front troops by July 9. As a result, 323 thousand people were captured by the Germans in the Bialystok-Minsk region, and the casualties of the troops of the Western Front and the Pinsk military flotilla amounted to 418 thousand people. Nevertheless, the main grouping of the Wehrmacht suffered significant damage, and the pace of its advance on Smolensk and Moscow was slowed down. Having suffered heavy losses in the first days of the war, the troops of the North-Western Front failed to organize a stable defense either on the right bank of the Western Dvina or at the last major defensive line near Pskov - the Velikaya River. Pskov was taken by the Nazis on July 9, in connection with which there was a real danger of their breakthrough to Luga and further to Leningrad, but the Wehrmacht failed to destroy the large Kra Ar forces in this direction. A more favorable situation developed on the Southwestern Front. Despite the enormous difficulties, the command managed to pull up large forces to the direction of the main attack of the enemy and quite organized, although not simultaneously, to bring them into battle. On June 23, the largest tank battle for the entire initial period of the war unfolded in the Lutsk-Brody-Rivne region. Here the enemy was not only detained for a whole week, but his plan to encircle the main forces of the front in the Lvov ledge was thwarted. Enemy aircraft delivered air strikes simultaneously on the front line and the outback. The bombing was carried out methodically and clearly, which greatly exhausted the Soviet troops. The power of the enemy crushed the hearts, desertion from the battlefield, self-mutilation, and sometimes suicide took place. By the end of June, it became obvious that the troops of the South-Western, as well as other fronts, failed to defeat the enemy grouping that had penetrated. Enemy aircraft firmly held air supremacy. Our aviation was seriously damaged; mechanized corps suffered heavy losses in personnel and tanks. The results of military operations on the Soviet-German front were disastrous for the Red Army. During the three weeks of the war, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, a significant part of Ukraine and Moldova were abandoned. During this period, the German army advanced 450-500 km inland in the north-western direction, 450-600 km in the west, and 300-350 km in the south-west. The hastily withdrawn strategic reserves of the High Command were only able to detain the enemy in certain sectors of the front for the shortest possible time, but did not eliminate the threat of his breakthrough to Leningrad, Smolensk and Kiev. Moscow battle. On September 6, 1941, Hitler issued a new directive to attack Moscow. The main stake in it was made on tank formations and aviation. Particular attention was paid to the secrecy of the preparation of the operation. At first, it was planned to defeat the Soviet troops in the areas of Vyazma and Bryansk, then, pursuing the formations of the Western Front retreating to Moscow in the strip from the upper reaches of the Volga to the Oka, to seize the capital. Bryansk Front in the Shostka area, and on October 2, the main forces of the Germans collapsed on the positions of the troops of the Western Front. The fight immediately became fierce. As a result of the breakthrough of the defense in the sector of the 43rd Army and in the center of the Western Front, the threat of encirclement loomed over the Soviet troops. An attempt to withdraw the army from the blow failed due to the rapid advance of the enemy's motorized corps, cutting off the escape route. On October 7, the Germans in the Vyazma region completed the encirclement of the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd armies. Heavy fighting broke out in the Bryansk Front. On October 3, the Germans broke into Orel and, moving along the Orel-Tula highway, on October 6 they occupied Karachev and Bryansk. The armies of the Bryansk Front were cut into pieces, and their withdrawal routes were intercepted. Units of the 3rd, 13th, and 50th armies fell into the "cauldron" near Bryansk. Tens of thousands, including volunteers of the people's militia divisions, died on the battlefield. Among the main causes of the catastrophe of this period are the superiority of the enemy in technology, the maneuverability of troops, air supremacy, possession of the initiative, the mistakes of the Headquarters and the front command in organizing defense. The absence of a solid line defense in the western direction and the necessary reserves to close the gap created a real threat of the appearance of enemy tanks near Moscow. The current situation required tough measures to control troops at all command levels, the Soviet command during this time managed to carry out urgent measures to organize defense on the Mozhaisk line, which the State Defense Committee in the current situation chose as the main springboard of resistance. To concentrate the troops that covered the approaches to Moscow and for more precise control, the Stavka transferred the armies of the Reserve Front to the Western Front. The command was assigned to G. Zhukov. Combat-ready formations transferred to Moscow from the Far East and Central Asia, as well as reserve formations from the European part of the country, hastily moved to the front, but were still at a considerable distance. Zhukov, having so far insignificant reserves at his disposal, built the defense in such a way that the most vulnerable sections along highways and railways were covered, hoping that as he moved towards Moscow, his forces would be condensed, since the capital is a major transport hub. By October 13, the troops of the Western Front deployed on the following approaches to Moscow: Volokolamsk fortified area - 16th army (commander K. Rokossovsky), Mozhaisky - 5th army (commander L. Govorov), Maloyaroslavetsky - 43rd army (commander K. Golubev ), Kaluga -49 Army (commander I. Zakharkin). To strengthen the near approaches to the capital, another line was created, including the city defense line. Particularly fierce fighting in the Moscow direction flared up on October 13-18. The Nazis rushed to Moscow with all their might. On October 18, they took Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets and Tarusa, there was a threat of their exit to Moscow. On the morning of October 17, volunteer formations began to occupy the near approaches to the capital. The fighter battalions created in July, which had previously been patrolling the city, were also advanced here. Moscow enterprises switched to work in three shifts; Increasingly, the labor of women and adolescents began to be used. On October 15, the GKO adopts a resolution “On the evacuation of the capital of the USSR, the city of Moscow,” according to which part of the party and government institutions, the entire diplomatic corps accredited to the Soviet government, are transferred to Kuibyshev. Disturbing rumors began to spread about the surrender of the capital, thousands of residents began to leave the city. The situation was aggravated by the lack of reliable information about the events at the front. The defense of the capital on the lines 100-120 km west of Moscow is entrusted to G. Zhukov. On November 15-16, the enemy resumed the attack on Moscow. The balance of power was still unequal. German troops tried to bypass Moscow from the north - through Klin and Solnechnogorsk, from the south through Tula and Kashira. Bloody battles ensued. On the night of November 28, the Germans crossed the Moscow-Volga Canal in the Yakhroma region, but their further advance on this sector of the front was thwarted. According to von Bock, the command of the Army Groups "Center" presented a further attack on Moscow as "having neither purpose nor meaning, since the moment when the forces of the group will be completely exhausted has moved very close." The end of November - the beginning of December 1941 became the culmination of the battle: it was by this time that the miscalculations of the Germans exceeded the critical mark; for the first time in the entire war, the enemy faced the fact of his powerlessness in front of the enemy; the huge losses of the ground forces had an overwhelming effect on him. In early December, about 47 divisions of the Army Group Center, continuing to rush towards Moscow, could not withstand the counterattacks of the Soviet troops and went on the defensive. Only on December 8, having received reports from the commanders of the 3rd, 4th and 2nd tank armies about the intensification of the attacks of the Red Army, Hitler gave the order for a strategic defense on the entire Eastern Front. By the beginning of December, the enemy on the near approaches to the capital was completely stopped. In the Moscow direction, the reserve armies of the Kalinin, Western and Southwestern fronts advanced to the areas of upcoming operations, due to which it was possible to create a new strategic grouping, exceeding in its composition the previous one that had begun defensive operations near Moscow. Simultaneously with the counter-offensive, our troops were actively fighting southeast of Lenin and in the Crimea, which made it impossible for the Germans to transfer reinforcements to their troops near Moscow. at dawn on December 5, the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front (commander I. Konev) dealt a powerful blow to the enemy, and in the morning of the next day, the shock groups of the Western and right wing of the Southwestern (commander S. Timoshenko) fronts went on the counteroffensive. In early February 1942, the Western Front reached the line Naro-Fo-minsk - Maloyaroslavets, further west of Kaluga to Sukhinichi and Belev.

This was the first major offensive operation of strategic importance, as a result of which the enemy strike groups were driven back 100, and in some places - _ 250 km to the west of the capital. The immediate threat to Moscow was eliminated and the Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive along the entire line of the Western Direction. The plan of Hitler's "blitzkrieg" was thwarted, during the war a turn began in favor of the USSR.

10. Battle of Stalingrad. Counteroffensive near Stalingrad on November 19, 1942. Military and international significance.

The counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad began on November 19, 1942. As part of this strategic operation (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943), November was carried out to encircle the Stalingrad enemy group ("Uranus"), Kotelnikovskaya and Srednedonskaya ( "Small Saturn") operations that deprived the enemy of the opportunity to support the grouping surrounded near Stalingrad from the west and weakened his offensive from the south, as well as Operation "Ring" to eliminate the enemy grouping surrounded by the enemy in Stalingrad itself.

The decision on the counter-offensive was taken by the Headquarters in mid-September 1942 after an exchange of views between I. Stalin, G. Zhukov and A. Vasilevsky. The plan of the military was to defeat the enemy in the Stalingrad region in a 400-kilometer zone, wrest the initiative from him and create conditions for conducting offensive operations on the southern wing,

The operation was entrusted to the troops of the newly formed Southwestern Front (commander N. Vatutin), Don and Stalingrad (commanders K. Rokossovsky and A. Eremenko). In addition, long-range aviation formations, the 6th Army and the 2nd Air Army of the neighboring Voronezh Front (front commander F. Golikov), the Volga military flotilla were involved here. The success of the operation largely depended on the suddenness and thoroughness of the preparation of the strike; all activities were carried out in the strictest secrecy. The Stavka entrusted the leadership of the counteroffensive to G. Zhukov and A. Vasilevsky. The Soviet command managed to create powerful groupings in the direction of the main strikes, superior to the enemy.

The offensive of the South-Western and right wing of the Don fronts began at 07:30 on November 19, 1942. Heavy fog and snowfall that day prevented the departure of Soviet attack aircraft, which sharply reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire. Nevertheless, on the very first day, the enemy's defense was broken through. On November 20, the troops of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. His tank and mechanized corps, without getting involved in battles for settlements and skillfully maneuvering, moved forward. Panic broke out in the enemy camp. On November 23, the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts closed in the area of ​​​​the cities of Kalach and Sovetsky. Parts of the 6th field and 4th tank armies of the enemy with a total strength of 330 thousand people. were encircled. The same fate befell the Romanian grouping of troops. In parallel with the internal encirclement of the enemy was envisaged. It was clear that the enemy would try to break out of the "boiler". Therefore, the Headquarters ordered the Don and Stalingrad fronts, in cooperation with aviation, to liquidate the enemy grouping, and the troops of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts to move the encirclement line to the west by about 150-200 km. Initially, the plan of Operation Saturn was to deliver strikes by the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts in converging directions: one to the south in the direction of Rostov, the other from east to west in the direction of Likhoi. To unlock the ring, the German command created the Gotha strike force from a tank corps, a number of infantry and remnants of cavalry divisions. On December 12, she went on the offensive from the Kotelnikovsky area along the Tikhoretsk-Stalingrad railway and on December 19, overcoming the fierce resistance of the few Soviet troops in this direction, reached the line of the Myshko-va River. On December 16, 1942, Operation Little Saturn began. As a result of 3 days of fierce fighting, the troops of the Southwestern and left wing of the Voronezh fronts broke through the heavily fortified enemy defenses in several directions, forced the Don and Bogucharka with battles. In order to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold, it was decided not to slow down the pace of the offensive, strengthening the troops of the Southwestern Front at the expense of the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front, especially tank and mechanized formations. The offensive was carried out in a harsh winter, it was difficult, however, the 24th tank corps under the command of V. Badanov advanced 240 km in depth in five days, destroying the rear of the 8th Italian army, and on December 24 took station Tatsins-kaya, destroying the airfield and capturing over 300 enemy aircraft as trophies. The most important railway communication Likhai - Stalingrad, along which the German command led the concentration of troops of the Hollidt group and supplying them with everything necessary for hostilities, was interrupted. The advance of the Gota group was put to an end. The Germans began to strengthen their positions in especially threatened sectors of the front. But by the end of December, Soviet troops advanced to a depth of about 200 km, firmly entrenched on new frontiers. As a result, the main forces of the Hollidt task force, the 8th Italian and 3rd Romanian armies were defeated. The position of the German troops near Stalingrad became hopeless. The final stage of the Battle of Stalingrad was Operation Ring. According to Rokossovsky, her plan provided for the defeat of the enemy in the western and southern parts of the encirclement, followed by the dissection of the enemy grouping into two parts and their liquidation separately. The difficulty in fulfilling the task was due to the fact that the necessary reserves were transferred by the Headquarters to other fronts, as required by the actual situation. surrounded by troops - was thwarted. Despite the enormous hardships, the German side rejected the offer of the Soviet command to surrender, on January 10, our troops launched a round-the-clock offensive and on the morning of January 15 captured the Pitomnik airfield. On January 31, 1943, the southern grouping surrendered, and on February 2, the northern grouping of the enemy. During the course of three operations - "Uranus", "Small Saturn" and "Ring" - 2 German, 2 Romanian and 1 Italian armies were defeated. The defeat at Stalingrad caused a deep political crisis in Germany. A three-day mourning was declared in the country. Faith in victory was undermined, defeatist sentiments swept wide sections of the population. The morale of the German soldier fell, he became more and more afraid of the environment, less and less to believe in victory. The defeat at Stalingrad caused a deep military-political crisis in the fascist coalition. Italy, Romania, Hungary faced serious difficulties associated with heavy losses at the front, a drop in the combat capability of the troops, and growing discontent among the masses. The victory at Stalingrad had a serious impact on the relations between the USSR, Great Britain and the USA. Both sides were well aware that the Red Army could achieve a decisive turning point in the war and defeat the Germans before the Allies transferred troops to Western France. Since the spring of 1943 taking into account the change in the military situation, the American General Staff began to set up F. Roosevelt that the United States, in the event of the defeat of Germany, should have a large military contingent in Great Britain. The victory at Stalingrad marked the beginning of a radical change in the war and had a decisive influence on it further move. The Red Army seized the strategic initiative from the enemy and held it to the end. The people believed in the final victory over fascism, although it came at the cost of heavy losses.

10. Battle of Stalingrad. Counteroffensive near Stalingrad on November 19, 1942. Military and international significance. A radical turning point in the warcame under Staling. In this large industrial center named after the leader, the German motorized groups of troops met with the most fierce resistance that had never been seen before, even in this brutal war of "total destruction". If the city could not withstand the onslaught and fell, then the German troops could cross the Volga, and this, in turn, would allow them to completely surround Mos and Lenin, after which the Sov. the union would inevitably turn into a truncated northern Asian state, pushed back beyond the Ural Mountains. But Sta did not fall. The Soviet troops defended their positions, proving their ability to fight in small units. At times, the territory they controlled was so small that German aviation and artillery were afraid to bombard the city, fearing to inflict damage on their own troops. Street fighting prevented the Wehrmacht from using its usual advantages. Tanks and other equipment in the narrow streets got stuck and turned into a good target for Soviet soldiers. In addition, the German troops were now fighting in conditions of extreme overstrain of resources, which were supplied to them only by one railway line and by air. The battles for the city exhausted and bled the enemy, creating conditions for the Red Army to launch a counteroffensive. Two stages were envisaged in the offensive operation "Uranus" near Stalingrad: at the first it was supposed to break through the enemy's defenses and create a solid encirclement, at the second - to destroy the fascist troops taken into the ring if they did not accept the ultimatum to surrender. For this, the forces of three fronts were involved: the South-Western (commander - General N.F. Vatutin), the Don (General K.K. Rokossovsky) and Staling (General A.I. Eremenko). Equipping Kra Ar with new military equipment was accelerated. To its superiority over the enemy in tanks, achieved in the spring of 1942, at the end of the year was added a predominance in guns, mortars, and aircraft. The counternast began on November 19, 1942, and five days later the advanced units of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts closed up, surrounding more than 330 thousand German soldiers and officers. On January 10, Soviet troops under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky began to eliminate the group blocked in the Stal region. On February 2, her remnants surrendered. More than 90 thousand people were taken prisoner, including 24 generals led by Feldma General F. Paulus. As a result of the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad, the Nazi 6th Army and the 4th Panzer Army, the Rums of the 3rd and 4th Armies and the 8th Italian Army were defeated. During the Battle of Steel, which lasted 200 days and nights, the fascist bloc lost 25% of the forces operating at that time on the Soviet-German front. The victory at Stalingrad was of great military and political significance. It made a huge contribution to achieving a radical turning point in the war and had a decisive influence on the further course of the entire war. As a result of the Battle of Stalin, the Soviet armed forces wrested the strategic initiative from the enemy and held it until the end of the war. The outstanding significance of the Battle of Stalin was highly appreciated by the allies of the USSR in the war with Germany. In November 1943, at a conference of the leaders of the countries of the allied powers in Tehran, Prem-Min Velik, W. Churchill handed over to the Soviet delegation a sword of honor - a gift from King George VI to the citizens of Stal in commemoration of the victory over the Nazi invaders. In May 1944, US President Franklin Roosevelt sent a letter to Stalin on behalf of the American people. Owl industry by this time had launched the production of a sufficient number of tanks and other weapons of various types, and did it with unprecedented success and in huge quantities. The battle began and the victory of the Soviet troops in it contributed to the liberation of most of the North Caucasus, Rzhev, Voronezh, Kursk were liberated , most of the Donbass.

11. Military-strategic operations of the Soviet Union in 1943. Battle of Kursk . Forcing the Dnieper. Tehran conference. The question of opening a second front. In preparation for the summer campaign, Nazi strategists focused on the Kursk salient. This was the name of the ledge of the front line, facing west. It was defended by the troops of two fronts: the Central (General K. K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (General N. F. Vatutin). It was here that Hitler intended to take revenge for the defeat at Stalingrad. Two powerful tank wedges were supposed to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops at the base of the ledge, surround them and create a threat to Moscow. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, having received information from intelligence about the planned offensive in time, was well prepared for defense and response. When the Wehrmacht launched a strike on the Kursk Bulge on July 5, 1943, the Red Army managed to withstand it, and seven days later it switched to a strategic offensive along a front of 2 thousand km. The Battle of Kursk, which lasted from July 5 to July 23, 1943, and the victory in it the Soviet troops were of great military and political importance. It became the most important stage on the way to the victory of the USSR over fascist Germany. More than 4 million people participated in the battles on both sides. 30 selected enemy divisions were defeated. In this battle, the offensive strategy of the German armed forces finally collapsed. The victory at Kursk and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet troops to the Dnieper ended in a radical turning point in the course of the war. Germany and its allies were forced to go on the defensive on all fronts of World War II, which had a huge impact on its course. Under the influence of the victories of the Red Army, the resistance movement began to intensify more and more in the countries occupied by the Nazis. By this time, all the resources of the Soviet state had been mobilized as fully as could be done in a war. By a government decree of February 1942, the entire able-bodied population of the country was mobilized for military purposes. People worked 55 hours a week, with only one day off a month, and sometimes no days off at all, sleeping on the floor in the shop. As a result of the successful mobilization of all resources, by mid-1943, Soviet industry was already far superior to the German one, which, moreover, was partly destroyed by aerial bombardments. In areas where industry was still weak, shortages were made up by constant supplies from Britain and the United States under the Lend-Lease agreement. The Soviet Union received a significant amount of tractors, trucks, car tires, explosive materials, field telephones, telephone wires, food. This superiority allowed the Red Army to confidently conduct combined military operations in the same spirit as the German troops managed at the initial stage of the war. In August 1943, Orel, Belgorod, Kharkov were liberated, in September - Smolensk. At the same time, the crossing of the Dnieper began, in November the Soviet units entered the capital of Ukraine - Kyiv, and by the end of the year they moved far to the west. By mid-December 1943, Soviet troops liberated part of the Kalinin, the entire Smolensk region, part of the Polotsk, Vitebsk, Mogilev, Gomel regions; crossed the rivers Desna, Sozh, Dnieper, Pripyat, Berezina and reached Polesye. By the end of 1943, Soviet troops had liberated about 50% of the territory occupied by the enemy. Partisans inflicted great damage on the enemy. In 1943, the partisans carried out major operations to destroy communications under the code names "Rail War" and "Concert". In total, over 1 million partisans operated behind enemy lines during the war years. As a result of the victories of the Red Army, the prestige of the Soviet Union in the international arena and its role in resolving the most important issues of world politics increased immeasurably. This also manifested itself at the Tehran Conference in 1943, where the leaders of the three powers - the USSR, the USA, Great Britain - agreed on plans and terms for joint actions to defeat the enemy, as well as agreements on the opening of a second front in Europe during May 1944. The Tehran Conference was held in the capital of Iran on November 28 - December 1, 1943. One of the main topics of the conference was the question of opening a second front. By this time, a radical change had occurred on the eastern front. The Red Army went on the offensive, and the allies saw a real prospect of the appearance of a Soviet soldier in the heart of Europe, which was by no means part of their plans. This irritated the leader of Great Britain especially strongly, who did not believe in the possibility of cooperation with Soviet Russia. At the conference, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to open a second front, although the solution of this issue was not easy for them. Churchill tried to convince the Allies of the extreme importance of military operations in Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean. Stalin, on the contrary, demanded the opening of a second front in Western Europe. In choosing the direction of the main attack of the Allied forces, Stalin found support from Roosevelt. The political and military leadership of England and the USA agreed to open a second front in the spring of 1944 in Normandy. Stalin promised by that time to start a powerful offensive operation on the eastern front. The "Big Three" also discussed the future borders in Europe. The most painful issue was Polish. Stalin proposed moving the Polish border to the west, to the Oder. The Soviet-Polish border was supposed to pass along the line established in 1939. At the same time, Stalin announced Moscow's claims to Koenigsberg and new borders with Finland. The Allies decided to go along with Moscow's territorial demands. Stalin, in turn, promised to enter the war against Japan after Germany signed the act of surrender. The "Big Three" discussed the future of Germany, which, by all accounts, had to be divided. However, no specific decision was made, since each side had its own view on the future borders of the German lands. Starting with the Tehran Conference, the issue of borders in Europe became the most important for all subsequent meetings. Implementing the decisions of the Tehran Conference, with some delay, on June 6, 1944, the Allied landing in Normandy (Operation Overlord) began with simultaneous support of the Allied landing in southern France ( Operation Dragoon). On August 25, 1944, Paris was liberated by them. At the same time, the offensive of the Soviet troops launched along the entire front in the north-west of Russia, in Finland, and in Belarus continued. The joint actions of the allies confirmed the effectiveness of the coalition and led to the collapse of the fascist bloc in Europe. Of particular note is the interaction of the allies during the Ardennes counteroffensive of Germany (December 16, 1944 - January 26, 1945), when Soviet troops launched an offensive from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians at the request of the allies ahead of schedule (January 12, 1945), thereby saving Anglo-American troops from defeat in the Ardennes. It should be noted that in 1944-1945. The Eastern Front still remained the main one: 150 German divisions operated on it against 71 divisions and 3 brigades on the Western Front and 22 divisions in Italy.

12. Military-strategic operations of the Soviet Union in 1944-May 1945. Crimean (Yalta) conference. The third period of the Great Patriotic War - the defeat of the fascist bloc, the expulsion of enemy troops from the USSR, the liberation from the occupation of European countries - began in January 1944. This year was marked by a series of new grandiose and victorious operations of the Red Army. In January, the offensive of the Leningrad (General L. A. Govorov) and Volkhov (General K. A. Meretskov) fronts began, finally lifting the blockade of heroic Leningrad. In February-March, the armies of the 1st Ukrainian (General N.F. Vatutin) and the 2nd Ukrainian (General I.S. Konev) fronts, having defeated the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky and a number of other powerful enemy groupings, reached the border with Romania. In the summer, major victories were won in three strategic directions at once. As a result of the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation, the forces of the Leningrad (Marshal L. A. Govorov) and Karelian (General K. A. Meretskov) fronts drove the Finnish units out of Karelia. Finland ceased hostilities on the side of Germany, and in September the USSR signed an armistice agreement with it. In June - August, the troops of four fronts (1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian, 1st Baltic) under the command of Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, generals G.F. Zakharov, I.D. Chernyakhovsky, and I. Kh. Baghramyan expelled the enemy during the operation "Bagration" from the territory of Belarus. In August, the 2nd Ukrainian (General R. Ya. Malinovsky) and 3rd Ukrainian (General F.I. Tolbukhin) fronts, having carried out a joint Iasi-Kishinev operation, liberated Moldova. In early autumn, German troops retreated from Transcarpathian Ukraine and the Baltic states. Finally, in October, a German grouping on the extreme northern sector of the Soviet-German front was defeated by a blow to Pechenga. The state border of the USSR was restored along its entire length from the Barents to the Black Sea. In general, the Soviet armed forces conducted about 50 offensive operations in 1944, which were of great military and political significance. As a result, the main groupings of the Nazi troops were defeated. In the summer and autumn of 1944 alone, the enemy lost 1.6 million people. Nazi Germany lost almost all of its European allies, the front approached its borders, and in East Prussia stepped over them. With the opening of the second front, the military-strategic position of Germany worsened. However, the Nazi leadership launched a large-scale offensive in the Ardennes (Western Europe). As a result of the offensive of the German troops, the Anglo-American troops were in a difficult situation. In this regard, at the request of Winston Churchill, the Soviet troops in January 1945 earlier than planned, went on the offensive along the entire Soviet-German front. The offensive of the Red Army was so powerful that already in early February its individual formations reached the approaches to Berlin. In January - the first half of April 1945, the East Prussian, Vistula-Oder, Vienna, East Pomeranian, Lower Silesian and Upper Silesian offensive operations. The student needs to be told about the liberation campaign of the Red Army - the liberation of Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia. The final strategic offensive operation in the Great Patriotic War was the Berlin operation carried out by the Red Army on April 16 - May 8, 1945. On the territory of Germany, the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, the USA, Great Britain, and France fought. During the Berlin operation, Soviet troops defeated 70 infantry, 23 tank and motorized divisions, most of the aviation, took about 480 thousand people prisoner. On May 8, 1945, an act of unconditional surrender of the armed forces of Nazi Germany was signed in Karlhorst (a suburb of Berlin). With the surrender of Germany, the war in Europe ended, but the war with Japan continued in the Far East and the Pacific, waged by the United States, Great Britain and their allies . Having fulfilled its allied obligations assumed at the Crimean Conference, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8. The Manchurian strategic offensive operation lasted from August 9 to September 2, 1945. Its goal was to defeat the Japanese Kwantung Army, liberate Manchuria and North Korea, and eliminate the bridgehead of aggression and the military and economic base of Japan on the Asian continent. On September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay, on board the American battleship Missouri, Japanese representatives signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender, which led to the end of World War II. The southern part of Sakhalin and the islands of the Kuril chain went to the Soviet Union. His sphere of influence extended to North Korea and China. Successful actions in 1944 led to the need to convene a new conference of allies on the eve of the surrender of Germany. The Yalta (Crimean) conference, held on February 4-11, addressed issues primarily related to the post-war structure of Europe. An agreement was reached on the occupation of Germany, its demilitarization, denazification and demonopolization, and on German reparations. It was decided to form four occupation zones on the territory of Germany and to create a special control body of the commanders-in-chief of the three powers with headquarters in Berlin. In addition to the three great powers, France was also invited to the occupation and administration of Germany. However, having made this decision, the parties did not stipulate procedural issues and did not determine the boundaries of these zones. The Soviet delegation initiated a discussion of the reparation issue, proposing two forms: the removal of equipment and annual payments. Roosevelt supported Stalin, who proposed to determine the total amount of reparations at 20 billion dollars, of which 50% were to be paid to the Soviet Union. The focus of the conference participants was again on the Polish question. The borders of Poland, according to the decisions of the conference, passed in the east along the "Curzon Line" with compensation for territorial losses by acquisitions in the north-west at the expense of Germany. This secured the accession to the USSR of Western Belarus and Ukraine. The conference participants discussed a number of issues related to other European countries. Stalin agreed to Anglo-American influence in Italy and British influence in Greece. Despite the fact that London and Washington were not satisfied with the position of the Soviet Union on Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, where Moscow acted virtually independently, they were forced to agree to resolve these issues in the future through the usual diplomatic channels. De facto, Eastern Europe came under Soviet influence. It is precisely this result of the Yalta conference that many American researchers cannot forgive Roosevelt, although the decisions made at Yalta were the result of a compromise.

13.Entry of the USSR into the war with Japan. Strategic operations of the Red Army. End of World War II . In the spring of 1945, the redeployment of the troops of the USSR and its allies to the Far East began. The forces of the United States and England were quite enough to defeat Japan. But the political leadership of these countries, fearing possible losses, insisted on the entry of the USSR into the war on Dal Vos. The goal of the C Arm was to destroy the striking force of the Japanese - the Kwantung Army, stationed in Manchuria and Korea and numbering about a million people. In accordance with the allied duty, on April 5, 1945, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty of 1941 and on August 8 declared war on Japan. (commander - Marshal K.A. Meretskov) and 2nd (commander - General M.A. Purkaev) Far Fron, as well as Tikho Fleet (commander - Admiral I.S. Yumashev) and Amur military flotilla (commander - counter- Admiral N.V. Antonov), numbering 1.8 million people, launched hostilities. For the strategic leadership of the armed struggle, on July 30, the High Command of the Soviet troops on Da Vo was created, which was headed by Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky. The offensive of the Soviet fronts developed quickly and successfully. For 23 days of stubborn battles on a front with a length of over 5 thousand km, Soviet troops and fleet forces, successfully advancing during the Manchurian, South Sahal and Kuril landing operations, liberated Northeast China, North Korea, the southern part of Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands. -va. Together with the Soviet troops, the soldiers of the Mongolian People's Army also participated in the war with Japan. Soviet troops captured about 600 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, many weapons and equipment were captured. The losses of the enemy almost doubled those suffered by the Soviet army. The entry of the USSR into the war finally broke the resistance of Japan. On August 14, her government decided to ask for surrender. On September 2, 1945, in Tokyo Bay, on board the American battleship Missouri, Japanese representatives signed the Act of Unconditional Surrender. This meant the end of World War II. The victory of the USSR and the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition over Nazi Germany and Milit Japan in World War II was of world-historical significance, had a huge impact on the entire post-war development of mankind. Fatherland was its most important component. The Soviet Voore Forces defended the freedom and independence of the Motherland, participated in the liberation of the peoples of 11 European countries from fascist oppression, expelled the Japanese occupiers from Northeast China and Korea. During the four-year armed struggle (1,418 days and nights) on the Soviet-German front, the main forces of the fascist bloc were defeated and captured: 607 divisions of the Wehrmacht and its allies. In battles with the Soviet Vooru Forces, Nazi Germany lost over 10 million people (80% of all military losses), over 75% of all military equipment. In a fierce battle with fascism, the question was about the life and death of the Slavic peoples. At the cost of colossal efforts, the Russian people, in alliance with all other large and small peoples of the USSR, were able to defeat the enemy. However, the price of the victory of the Soviet people over fascism was enormous. More than 29 million people passed through the war in the ranks of the Sov Vooru Force. The war claimed more than 27 million lives of our fellow citizens, including 8,668,400 military casualties. Correspondingly, the losses of Kra Ar and the Wehrmacht are defined as 1.3: 1. About 4 million partisans and underground fighters died behind enemy lines and in the occupied territories. About 6 million Soviet citizens ended up in fascist captivity. The USSR lost 30% of its national wealth. The invaders destroyed 1,710 Soviet cities and towns, over 70,000 villages and villages, 32,000 industrial enterprises, 98,000 collective farms and 2,000 state farms, 6,000 hospitals, 82,000 schools, 334 universities,

14. Culture during the Great Patriotic War . From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, all the achievements of national culture, science and technology were placed at the service of victory and the defense of the Motherland. The country turned into a single fighting camp. All spheres of culture had to submit to the tasks of fighting the enemy. Cultural figures fought with weapons in their hands on the fronts of the war, worked in the front-line press and propaganda teams. Representatives of all areas of culture contributed to the victory. Many of them gave their lives for their Motherland, for victory. It was an unprecedented social and spiritual uplift of the entire people. (See additional illustrative material.) The war with fascist Germany required the restructuring of all spheres of society, including culture. At the first stage of the war, the main efforts were aimed at explaining the nature of the war and the goals of the USSR in it. Preference was given to operational forms of cultural work, such as radio, cinematography, and the press. From the first days of the war, the importance of mass information, mainly radio, increased. Information Bureau reports were broadcast 18 times a day in 70 languages. Using the experience of the political education of the Civil War period - "Windows of ROSTA", posters "Windows of TASS" began to be published. A few hours after the declaration of war, a poster of the Kukryniksy appeared (Kukryniksy is a pseudonym (according to the first syllables of their surnames) of a creative team of graphic artists and painters: M.V. Kupriyanov, P.F. Krylov and N.A. Sokolov). "We will ruthlessly crush and destroy the enemy!", which was reproduced in the newspapers of 103 cities. A large emotional charge was carried by the poster of I.M. Toidze "The Motherland Calls!", stylistically associated with the poster by D.S. Civil War Moora "Have You Signed Up as a Volunteer?" Posters by V.B. Koretsky "Warrior of the Red Army, save!" and Kukryniksov "I lost my ring", depicting Hitler, who "dropped the ring" from 22 divisions defeated at Stalingrad. Posters were an effective means of mobilizing the people to fight the enemy. Since the beginning of the war, there has been an intensive evacuation of cultural institutions. By November 1941, about 60 theaters in Moscow, Leningrad, Ukraine and Belarus were evacuated to the eastern regions of the country. Only in the Uzbek SSR were evacuated 53 universities and academic institutions, about 300 creative unions and organizations. Kustanai houses the collections of the Historical Museum, the Museum of the Revolution, the most valuable part of the funds of the Library. IN AND. Lenin, the Library of Foreign Languages ​​and the Historical Library. The treasures of the Russian Museum and the Tretyakov Gallery were taken to Perm, and the Hermitage to Sverdlovsk. The Union of Writers and the Literary Fund moved to Kazan, and the Union of Artists of the USSR and the Art Fund moved to Sverdlovsk. Soviet art devoted itself entirely to the cause of saving the Fatherland. Soviet poetry and song reached an extraordinary sound during this period. The song "Holy War" by V. Lebedev-Kumach and A. Aleksandrov became the true anthem of the people's war. The songs of composers A. Aleksandrov, V. Solovyov-Sedoy, M. Blanter, A. Novikov, B. Mokrousov, M. Fradkin, T. Khrennikov and others were very popular. One of the leading genres of literature was the martial lyrical song. "Dugout", "Evening on the Road", "Nightingales", "Dark Night" - these songs entered the golden treasury of Soviet song classics. During the war years, one of the greatest musical works of the 20th century was created. - 7th symphony by D. Shostakovich, dedicated to the heroic defenders of Leningrad. At one time, L. Beethoven liked to repeat that music should strike fire from a courageous human heart. It was these thoughts that were embodied by D. Shostakovich in his most significant work.D. Shostakovich began to write the 7th Symphony a month after the start of the Great Patriotic War and continued to work in Leningrad besieged by the Nazis. On the original score of the symphony, the composer's notes "BT" are visible - meaning "air raid alert". When it came, D. Shostakovich interrupted work on the symphony and went to drop incendiary bombs from the roof of the conservatory. The first three parts of the symphony were completed by the end of September 1941, when Leningrad was already surrounded and subjected to severe artillery shelling and air bombardment. The victorious finale of the symphony was completed in December, when the fascist hordes stood on the outskirts of Moscow. "I dedicate this symphony to my native city of Leningrad, our struggle against fascism, our future victory" - this was the epigraph to this work. In 1942, the symphony was performed in the USA and in other countries of the anti-fascist coalition. The musical art of the whole world does not know of another such work that would receive such a powerful public resonance. During the war years, Soviet dramaturgy created genuine masterpieces of theatrical art. In the initial period of the war, L. Leonov's "Invasion", K. Simonov's "Russian People", A. Korneichuk's "Front", which quickly became popular, were published. Such well-known and beloved by many even today works of Russian literature as the chapters of the novel by M. Sholokhov "They fought for the Motherland", "The science of hatred", story by V. Vasilevskaya "Rainbow". The Battle of Stalingrad is dedicated to the story of K. Simonov "Days and Nights" and V. Grossman "The Direction of the Main Strike". The heroism of home front workers was described in the works of M.S. Shaginyan and F.V. Gladkov. During the war, the first chapters of A. Fadeev's novel "The Young Guard" were published. The journalism of those years is represented by articles by K. Simonov, I. Ehrenburg. In the form of an oath, crying, cursing, direct appeal, military lyrics by M. Isakovsky, S. Shchipachev, A. Tvardovsky, A. Akhmatova, A. Surkov, N. Tikhonov, O. Bergholz, B. Pasternak, M. Svetlov, K. Simonov. So, the images of the defenders of Leningrad were created by O. Berggolts in the "Leningrad Poem" and V. Inber in the poem "Pulkovo Meridian". The poem by A.T. Tvardovsky "Vasily Terkin", a poem by M.I. Aliger "Zoya". More than a thousand writers and poets in the ranks of the army worked as war correspondents. Ten writers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: Musa Jalil, P.P. Vershigora, A. Gaidar, A. Surkov, E. Petrov, A. Beck, K. Simonov, M. Sholokhov, A. Fadeev, N. Tikhonov. The coming to power in a number of countries of fascism and the beginning of the Great Patriotic War revived the Russian patriotic theme in cinema ("Alexander Nevsky", "Suvorov", "Kutuzov"). On the basis of the evacuated film studios "Lenfilm" and "Mosfilm" in Alma-Ata, the Central United Film Studio (TsOKS) was created. During these years, film directors S. Eisenstein, V. Pudovkin, the Vasiliev brothers, F. Ermler, I. Pyryev, G. Roshal worked at the film studio. About 80% of all domestic feature films during the war years were staged at this film studio. In total, 34 full-length films and almost 500 film magazines were created during the war years. Among them is the "Secretary of the District Committee" I.A. Pyrieva, "Invasion" by A. Room, "Rainbow" by M.S. Donskoy, "Two fighters" L.D. Lukova, "She defends the Motherland" F.M. Ermler, documentary film "The defeat of German troops near Moscow" by L. Varlamov and I. Kopalin. There were more than 150 cameramen on the front line and in partisan detachments.

For the cultural service of the front, front-line brigades of artists, writers, artists and front-line theaters were created (by 1944 there were 25 of them). The first of these was the theater "Iskra" from the actors of the theater. Lenin Komsomol - volunteers of the people's militia, then the front-line branches of the Maly Theater, the Theater. E. Vakhtangov and the Komsomol Theater of GITIS. During the war years, more than 40,000 art workers were part of such brigades at the fronts. Among them were the luminaries of the Russian stage I.M. Moskvin, A.K. Tarasova, N.K. Cherkasov, M.I. Tsarev, A.A. Yablochkina and others. During the war years, the concerts of the Leningrad Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra under the direction of E. Mravinsky, the Song and Dance Ensemble of the Soviet Army under the direction of A. Alexandrov, the Russian Folk Choir. M. Pyatnitsky, soloists K. Shulzhenko, L. Ruslanova, A. Raikin, L. Utesov, I. Kozlovsky, S. Lemeshev and many others. The 13-meter statue of a Soviet soldier-liberator with a girl in her arms and a lowered sword, erected after the war in Berlin in Treptow Park (sculptor - E.V. Vuchetich), became a sculptural symbol of the war years and the memory of the fallen wars. War, the heroism of the Soviet people are reflected in the canvases of artists A.A. Deineka "Defense of Sevastopol", S.V. Gerasimov "Mother of the Partisan", painting by A.A. Plastov "The Fascist flew by" and others. Assessing the damage to the cultural heritage of the country, the Extraordinary State Commission for the Investigation of the Atrocities of the Invaders named 430 museums out of 991 in the occupied territory, 44 thousand palaces of culture and libraries among the looted and destroyed. The house-museums of L.N. Tolstoy in Yasnaya Polyana, I.S. Turgenev in Spassky-Lutovinovo, A.S. Pushkin in Mikhailovsky, P.I. Tchaikovsky in Klin, T.G. Shevchenko in Kanev. Frescoes of the 12th century turned out to be irretrievably lost. in the Sophia Cathedral of Novgorod, manuscripts by P.I. Tchaikovsky, canvases by I.E. Repin, V.A. Serov, I.K. Aivazovsky, who died in Stalingrad. Ancient architectural monuments of ancient Russian cities - Novgorod, Pskov, Smolensk, Tver, Rzhev, Vyazma, Kyiv were destroyed. The suburban architectural ensembles-palaces of St. Petersburg, the architectural monastic complexes of the Moscow region suffered. The human losses were irreplaceable. All this affected the development of national culture after the war. Thus, despite the period of totalitarianism in the history of the country preceding the Great Patriotic War, severe ideological pressure on the entire domestic culture, in the face of tragedy, the danger of foreign conquest, ideologized vocabulary leaves genuine culture and comes to the fore eternal, deep, truly national values ​​are put forward. Hence the striking unity of the culture of those years, the desire of people to protect their Earth and its traditions.

15. International significance of the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War. Sources of victory. Results. Berlin (Potsdam Conference).

The victory over fascist Germany and its allies was won by the joint efforts of the states of the anti-fascist coalition, the peoples who fought against the invaders and their accomplices. But the decisive role in this armed clash was played by the Soviet Union. It was the Soviet country that was the most active and consistent fighter against the fascist invaders who sought to enslave the peoples of the whole world.

The world-historical significance of the Victory lies in the fact that it was the Soviet people and its Armed Forces that blocked the path of German fascism to world domination, bore on their shoulders the brunt of a war unprecedented in the history of mankind, and made a decisive contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany and its allies.

The victory over fascist Germany was the result of the joint efforts of all countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. But the main burden of the struggle against the shock forces of world reaction fell to the lot of the Soviet Union. It was on the Soviet-German front that the most fierce and decisive battles of World War II took place.

The Great Patriotic War ended with a complete military-political, economic and ideological victory for the Soviet Union. This predetermined the outcome of World War II as a whole. The victory over fascism is an event of world-historical significance. What are the most important results of the war?

The main result of the victorious conclusion of the Great Patriotic War is that, in the most difficult trials, the Soviet people crushed fascism - the most gloomy offspring of the era, defended the freedom and independence of their state. Having overthrown fascism, together with the armies of other states of the anti-Hitler coalition, the Soviet Union saved humanity from the threat of enslavement.

The victory of the Soviet people over German fascism had a tremendous impact on the entire subsequent course of world history, on the solution of the fundamental social problems of our time.

The war imposed on the Soviet Union had unforeseen socio-political consequences for its organizers. The hopes of the reactionary circles of the Western powers for the weakening of our country have collapsed. The USSR emerged from the war even stronger politically and militarily, and its international prestige rose immeasurably. Governments and peoples listened to his voice, without his participation, in essence, not a single important problem affecting the fundamental interests of the world was solved. This found expression, in particular, in the establishment and restoration of diplomatic relations with many states. So, if in 1941 26 countries maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, then in 1945 there were already 52 states.

The victory in the war brought the USSR into the ranks of the leading powers of the post-war world, created a real basis for a new stage in international relations. First of all, this is the creation of the United Nations, joint measures to eradicate Nazism and militarism in Germany, the formation of international mechanisms for discussing post-war problems, and so on.

The moral, political and spiritual unity of Soviet society was of great importance for achieving victory. Attacking the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany also staked on the fact that the Soviet multinational state would not withstand severe military tests, anti-Soviet, nationalist forces would become more active in the country, and a “fifth column” would appear.

The coordinated organizational work of the political and military leadership of the country played a huge role in achieving victory. Thanks to purposeful and well-coordinated work in the center and in the field, the country was quickly turned into a single military camp. A scientifically substantiated and understandable to the majority of the population program for defeating the enemy was set out already in the first documents and speeches of state leaders: the appeal of the Soviet government to the people on June 22, the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions of June 29, the speech of I. IN. Stalin on the radio July 3, 1941. They clearly defined the nature and goals of the war, called the most important measures aimed at repelling aggression and defeating the enemy. The most important source of victory in the Great Patriotic War was the powerful potential of the Soviet Armed Forces. The victory in the Great Patriotic War showed the superiority of Soviet military science and military art, the high level of strategic leadership and combat skill of our military personnel and the military organization as a whole.

The victory in the war was also achieved thanks to the high patriotism of the Soviet soldiers, their love for their Fatherland, loyalty to the constitutional duty. These qualities were laid down in the minds of military personnel in the prewar years in the course of a well-established system of patriotic and military-patriotic education, which permeated all layers of Soviet society, accompanied a citizen at all stages of his life path - at school, in the army, at work. Soviet losses on the fronts , according to various estimates, vary from 8.5 to 26.5 million people. The total material damage and military costs are estimated at 485 billion dollars. 1,710 cities and towns, more than 70 thousand villages were destroyed. But the USSR defended its independence and contributed to the complete or partial liberation of a number of European and Asian countries - Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria , Yugoslavia, China and Korea. He made a huge contribution to the overall victory of the anti-fascist coalition over Germany, Italy and Japan: on the Soviet-German front, 607 Wehrmacht divisions were defeated and captured, almost 3/4 of all German military equipment was destroyed. The USSR played an important role in the post-war peace settlement; its territory expanded to include East Prussia, Transcarpathian Ukraine, the Petsamo region, southern Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands. It became one of the leading world powers and the center of a whole system of communist states on the Euro-Asian continent.

The Potsdam Conference of 1945, the Berlin Conference, the conference of the heads of government of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain: Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I. V. Stalin, US President G. Truman, British Prime Minister W. Churchill, who was replaced on July 28 by the new Prime Minister C. Attlee . It took place from July 17 to August 2 at the Cecilienhof Palace in Potsdam, near Berlin. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, military advisers and experts took part in the work of the P. to. The decisions of P. k. were a development of the decisions of the Crimean Conference of 1945.

Questions connected with the demilitarization, denazification, and democratization of Germany, as well as many other important aspects of the German problem, occupied a central place in the work of the German Communist Party.

The participants in the P. to. reached an agreement on the question of the main directions of the general policy towards Germany, which was considered as a single economic and political entity. The Potsdam Agreements provided for the complete disarmament of Germany, the dissolution of its armed forces, the destruction of monopolies and the liquidation in Germany of all industry that could be used for: military production, the destruction of the National Socialist Party, organizations and institutions controlled by it, the prevention of all Nazi and militaristic activities or propaganda in the country. The conference participants signed a special agreement on reparations confirming the right of the peoples affected by the Germans. aggression, compensation and determining the sources of reparation payments. An agreement was reached on the establishment of central German administrative departments (finance, transport, communications, etc.).

At the conference, a system of four-sided occupation of Germany was finally agreed upon, which was supposed to serve its demilitarization and democratization; it was envisaged that during the occupation the supreme power in Germany would be exercised by the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France, each in his own zone of occupation; on matters affecting Germany as a whole, they were to act jointly as members of the Control Council.

The Potsdam Agreement defined a new Polish-German border along the Oder-Western Neisse line, the establishment of which was reinforced by the decision of P. K. to evict the German population remaining in Poland, as well as in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The P. to. confirmed the transfer to the Soviet Union of Konigsberg (since 1946 - Kaliningrad) and the area adjacent to it. She established the Council of Foreign Ministers (CMFA), entrusting it with the preparation of a peace settlement with Germany and her former allies.

At the suggestion of the Soviet delegation, the question of the fate of the German fleet was discussed at the conference, and a decision was made to divide the entire German surface, naval and merchant fleet equally between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. At the suggestion of Great Britain, it was decided to sink most of the German submarine fleet, and to divide the remainder equally.

The Soviet government proposed extending the competence of the Austrian provisional government to the entire country, i.e., also to those regions of Austria that were occupied by the troops of the Western powers. As a result of negotiations, it was decided to study this issue after the entry of US and British troops into Vienna.

Three governments confirmed their intention to bring the main war criminals to trial at the International Military Tribunal at the P.C. The participants in the P.C. expressed their opinions on certain other issues of international life: the situation in the countries of Eastern Europe, the Black Sea straits, the attitude of the United Nations toward the Franco regime in Spain, and others.

76 years ago, on March 13, 1940, the Soviet-Finnish war ended. Before presenting a photo selection dedicated to this event, some factual material from the famous historian Igor Pykhalov, briefly and thesis.

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In Russian historiography, the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, or, as it is called in the West, the Winter War, was actually forgotten for many years. This was facilitated by its not too successful results, and a kind of “political correctness” practiced in our country. Official Soviet propaganda was more than afraid to offend any of the "friends", and after the Great Patriotic War Finland was considered an ally of the USSR.

Over the past 15 years, the situation has changed radically. Contrary to the well-known words of A. T. Tvardovsky about the “unknown war”, today this war is very “famous”. One after another, books dedicated to her are published, not to mention the many articles in various magazines and collections. Here are just a "celebrity" this is very peculiar. The authors, who have made it their profession to denounce the Soviet "evil empire", cite in their publications an absolutely fantastic ratio of our and Finnish losses. Any reasonable reasons for the actions of the USSR are completely denied ...

By the end of the 1930s, there was a state clearly unfriendly to us near the northwestern borders of the Soviet Union. It is very significant that even before the start of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. The identification mark of the Finnish Air Force and tank troops was a blue swastika. Those who claim that it was Stalin who, by his actions, pushed Finland into the Nazi camp, prefer not to remember this. As well as why the peaceful Suomi needed a network of military airfields built by the beginning of 1939 with the help of German specialists, capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force had. However, in Helsinki they were ready to fight against us both in alliance with Germany and Japan, and in alliance with England and France.

Seeing the approach of a new world conflict, the leadership of the USSR sought to secure the border near the second largest and most important city in the country. Back in March 1939, Soviet diplomacy probed the issue of transferring or leasing a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, but in Helsinki they answered with a categorical refusal.

The accusers of the “crimes of the Stalinist regime” like to rant about the fact that Finland is a sovereign country that controls its own territory, and therefore, they say, it was not at all obliged to agree to an exchange. In this regard, we can recall the events that took place two decades later. When Soviet missiles began to be deployed in Cuba in 1962, the Americans had no legal basis to impose a naval blockade of the Island of Freedom, much less to launch a military strike on it. Both Cuba and the USSR are sovereign countries, the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons concerned only them and fully complied with the norms of international law. Nevertheless, the US was ready to start World War 3 if the missiles were not removed. There is such a thing as a "sphere of vital interests." For our country in 1939, such a sphere included the Gulf of Finland and the Karelian Isthmus. Even the former leader of the Kadet Party P. N. Milyukov, who was by no means sympathetic to the Soviet regime, in a letter to I. P. Demidov expressed the following attitude towards the outbreak of war with Finland: “I feel sorry for the Finns, but I am for the Vyborg province.”

On November 26, a well-known incident occurred near the village of Mainila. According to the official Soviet version, at 15:45 Finnish artillery shelled our territory, as a result of which 4 Soviet servicemen were killed and 9 wounded. Today it is considered good form to interpret this event as the work of the NKVD. The statements of the Finnish side that their artillery was deployed at such a distance that its fire could not reach the border are taken as indisputable. Meanwhile, according to Soviet documentary sources, one of the Finnish batteries was located in the Jaappinen area (5 km from Mainila). However, whoever organized the provocation at Mainila, it was used by the Soviet side as a pretext for war. On November 28, the government of the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact and recalled its diplomatic representatives from Finland. On November 30, hostilities began.

I will not describe in detail the course of the war, since there are already enough publications on this topic. Its first stage, which lasted until the end of December 1939, was generally unsuccessful for the Red Army. On the Karelian Isthmus, Soviet troops, having overcome the forefield of the Mannerheim Line, reached its main defensive zone on December 4-10. However, attempts to break it were unsuccessful. After bloody battles, the parties switched to positional struggle.

What are the reasons for the failures of the initial period of the war? First of all, in underestimating the enemy. Finland mobilized in advance, increasing the size of its Armed Forces from 37 to 337 thousand (459). Finnish troops were deployed in the border zone, the main forces occupied defensive lines on the Karelian Isthmus and even managed to carry out full-scale maneuvers at the end of October 1939.

Soviet intelligence was also not up to par, which could not reveal complete and reliable information about the Finnish fortifications.

Finally, the Soviet leadership harbored unfounded hopes for the "class solidarity of the Finnish working people." It was widely believed that the population of the countries that had entered the war against the USSR would almost immediately "revolt and go over to the side of the Red Army", that the workers and peasants would come out to greet the Soviet soldiers with flowers.

As a result, the proper number of troops was not allocated for combat operations and, accordingly, the necessary superiority in forces was not ensured. So, on the Karelian Isthmus, which was the most important sector of the front, the Finnish side had in December 1939 6 infantry divisions, 4 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade and 10 separate battalions - a total of 80 settlement battalions. On the Soviet side, they were opposed by 9 rifle divisions, 1 rifle and machine gun brigade and 6 tank brigades - a total of 84 calculated rifle battalions. If we compare the number of personnel, then the Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus numbered 130 thousand, the Soviet - 169 thousand people. In general, 425 thousand soldiers of the Red Army acted along the entire front against 265 thousand Finnish troops.

Defeat or victory?

So, let's sum up the results of the Soviet-Finnish conflict. As a rule, such a war is considered won, as a result of which the winner is in a better position than he was before the war. What do we see from this point of view?

As we have already seen, by the end of the 1930s, Finland was a country that was clearly unfriendly to the USSR and ready to enter into an alliance with any of our enemies. So in this regard, the situation has not worsened at all. On the other hand, it is known that an unbelted hooligan understands only the language of brute force and begins to respect the one who managed to beat him. Finland was no exception. On May 22, 1940, the Society for Peace and Friendship with the USSR was established there. Despite the persecution of the Finnish authorities, by the time it was banned in December of that year, it had 40,000 members. Such a mass character indicates that not only supporters of the communists joined the Society, but also simply sane people who believed that it was better to maintain normal relations with a great neighbor.

According to the Moscow Treaty, the USSR received new territories, as well as a naval base on the Hanko Peninsula. This is a clear plus. After the start of the Great Patriotic War, Finnish troops were able to reach the line of the old state border only by September 1941.

It should be noted that if during the negotiations in October-November 1939 the Soviet Union asked for less than 3 thousand square meters. km, and even in exchange for twice the territory, then as a result of the war he acquired about 40 thousand square meters. km without giving anything in return.

It should also be taken into account that in the pre-war negotiations, the USSR, in addition to territorial compensation, offered to reimburse the value of the property left by the Finns. According to the calculations of the Finnish side, even in the case of the transfer of a small piece of land, which she agreed to cede to us, it was about 800 million marks. If it came to the cession of the entire Karelian Isthmus, the bill would have gone to many billions.

But now, when on March 10, 1940, on the eve of the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, Paasikivi started talking about compensation for the transferred territory, remembering that Peter I paid Sweden 2 million thalers in the Nystadt peace, Molotov could calmly answer: “Write a letter to Peter the Great. If he orders, we will pay compensation.”.

Moreover, the USSR demanded an amount of 95 million rubles. as compensation for equipment removed from the occupied territory and damage to property. Finland also had to transfer to the USSR 350 sea and river vehicles, 76 locomotives, 2 thousand wagons, a significant number of cars.

Of course, during the hostilities, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to the name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126,875 soldiers of the Red Army were killed, died or went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops amounted, according to official figures, to 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure of Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43,000 wounded.

Be that as it may, Soviet losses are several times higher than Finnish ones. This ratio is not surprising. Take, for example, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. If we consider the fighting in Manchuria, the losses of both sides are approximately the same. Moreover, often the Russians lost more than the Japanese. However, during the assault on the fortress of Port Arthur, the losses of the Japanese far exceeded the Russian losses. It would seem that the same Russian and Japanese soldiers fought here and there, why is there such a difference? The answer is obvious: if in Manchuria the parties fought in an open field, then in Port Arthur our troops defended a fortress, even if it was unfinished. It is quite natural that the attackers suffered much higher losses. The same situation developed during the Soviet-Finnish war, when our troops had to storm the Mannerheim Line, and even in winter conditions.

As a result, the Soviet troops gained invaluable combat experience, and the command of the Red Army got a reason to think about the shortcomings in the training of troops and about urgent measures to increase the combat capability of the army and navy.

Speaking in parliament on March 19, 1940, Daladier declared that for France “The Moscow Peace Treaty is a tragic and shameful event. For Russia, this is a great victory.”. However, do not go to extremes, as some authors do. Not very big. But still a victory.

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1. Parts of the Red Army cross the bridge to the territory of Finland. 1939

2. Soviet fighter guarding a minefield in the area of ​​the former Finnish border outpost. 1939

3. Artillery crew at their guns in a firing position. 1939

4. Major Volin V.S. and boatswain Kapustin I.V., who landed with a landing force on the island of Seiskaari, to inspect the coast of the island. Baltic Fleet. 1939

5. The soldiers of the rifle unit are attacking from the forest. Karelian isthmus. 1939

6. Outfit of border guards on patrol. Karelian isthmus. 1939

7. Border guard Zolotukhin at the post at the outpost of the Finns Beloostrov. 1939

8. Sappers on the construction of a bridge near the Finnish border outpost Japinen. 1939

9. Fighters deliver ammunition to the front line. Karelian isthmus. 1939

10. Soldiers of the 7th Army are firing at the enemy with rifles. Karelian isthmus. 1939

11. The reconnaissance group of skiers receives the task of the commander before leaving for reconnaissance. 1939

12. Horse artillery on the march. Vyborgsky district. 1939

13. Fighters-skiers on a hike. 1940

14. Red Army soldiers in combat positions in the combat area with the Finns. Vyborgsky district. 1940

15. Fighters for cooking in the woods at the stake in between fights. 1939

16. Cooking lunch in the field at a temperature of 40 degrees below zero. 1940

17. Anti-aircraft guns in position. 1940

18. Signalers for the restoration of the telegraph line, destroyed by the Finns during the retreat. Karelian isthmus. 1939

19. Fighters - signalmen restore the telegraph line, destroyed by the Finns in Terioki. 1939

20. View of the railway bridge blown up by the Finns at Terioki station. 1939

21. Soldiers and commanders talk with the inhabitants of Terioki. 1939

22. Signalers on the negotiating front line in the area of ​​Kemyar station. 1940

23. Rest of the Red Army after the battle in the Kemerya area. 1940

24. A group of commanders and soldiers of the Red Army is listening to a radio broadcast at a radio horn on one of the streets of Terioki. 1939

25. View of the Suoyarva station, taken by the Red Army. 1939

26. Soldiers of the Red Army are guarding a gas station in the town of Raivola. Karelian isthmus. 1939

27. General view of the destroyed Mannerheim Fortification Line. 1939

28. General view of the destroyed Mannerheim Fortification Line. 1939

29. A rally in one of the military units after the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" during the Soviet-Finnish conflict. February 1940

30. General view of the destroyed Mannerheim Fortification Line. 1939

31. Sappers for the repair of the bridge in the Boboshino area. 1939

32. A Red Army soldier lowers a letter into a field mail box. 1939

33. A group of Soviet commanders and fighters inspects the banner of Shutskor recaptured from the Finns. 1939

34. Howitzer B-4 on the front line. 1939

35. General view of the Finnish fortifications at a height of 65.5. 1940

36. View of one of the streets of Koivisto, taken by the Red Army. 1939

37. View of the destroyed bridge near the town of Koivisto, taken by the Red Army. 1939

38. A group of captured Finnish soldiers. 1940

39. Red Army soldiers at the captured guns left after the battles with the Finns. Vyborgsky district. 1940

40. Trophy ammunition depot. 1940

41. Remote-controlled tank TT-26 (217th separate tank battalion of the 30th chemical tank brigade), February 1940.

42. Soviet soldiers on a pillbox taken on the Karelian Isthmus. 1940

43. Parts of the Red Army enter the liberated city of Vyborg. 1940

44. Soldiers of the Red Army on the fortifications in the city of Vyborg. 1940

45. The ruins of the city of Vyborg after the fighting. 1940

46. ​​Soldiers of the Red Army clear the streets of the liberated city of Vyborg from snow. 1940

47. Icebreaking ship "Dezhnev" during the transfer of troops from Arkhangelsk to Kandalaksha. 1940

48. Soviet skiers move to the forefront. Winter 1939-1940.

49. Soviet attack aircraft I-15bis taxis to take off before a sortie during the Soviet-Finnish war.

50. Finnish Foreign Minister Weine Tanner speaks on the radio with a message about the end of the Soviet-Finnish war. 03/13/1940

51. The crossing of the Finnish border by Soviet units near the village of Hautavaara. November 30, 1939

52. Finnish prisoners are talking with a Soviet political worker. The picture was taken in the Gryazovets camp of the NKVD. 1939-1940

53. Soviet soldiers are talking with one of the first Finnish prisoners of war. November 30, 1939

54. Finnish aircraft Fokker C.X. shot down by Soviet fighters on the Karelian Isthmus. December 1939

55. Hero of the Soviet Union, platoon commander of the 7th pontoon-bridge battalion of the 7th Army, Junior Lieutenant Pavel Vasilyevich Usov (right) unloads a mine.

56. The calculation of the Soviet 203-mm howitzer B-4 fires at the Finnish fortifications. December 2, 1939

57. The commanders of the Red Army are considering the captured Finnish tank Vickers Mk.E. March 1940

58. Hero of the Soviet Union Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Mikhailovich Kurochkin (1913-1941) at the I-16 fighter. 1940

59. View of the ruined street in Vyborg. 1940

60. The commander of the Soviet submarine S-1 Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant Commander Alexander Vladimirovich Tripolsky (1902-1949) at the periscope. February 1940