1939-1940 (Soviet-Finnish War, known in Finland as the Winter War) - an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

Its reason was the desire of the Soviet leadership to move the Finnish border away from Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in order to strengthen the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR, and the refusal of the Finnish side to do this. The Soviet government asked to lease parts of the Hanko peninsula and some islands in the Gulf of Finland in exchange for a large area of ​​Soviet territory in Karelia, with the subsequent conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement.

From the very beginning of the war, the advantage in forces was on the side of the USSR. The Soviet command concentrated 21 rifle divisions, one tank corps, three separate tank brigades (a total of 425 thousand people, about 1.6 thousand guns, 1476 tanks and about 1200 aircraft) near the border with Finland. To support the ground forces, it was planned to attract about 500 aircraft and more than 200 ships from the Northern and Baltic fleets. 40% of Soviet forces were deployed on the Karelian Isthmus.

The grouping of Finnish troops had about 300 thousand people, 768 guns, 26 tanks, 114 aircraft and 14 warships. The Finnish command concentrated 42% of its forces on the Karelian Isthmus, deploying the Isthmus Army there. The rest of the troops covered separate areas from the Barents Sea to Lake Ladoga.

The main line of defense of Finland was the "Mannerheim Line" - unique, impregnable fortifications. The main architect of the Mannerheim line was nature itself. Its flanks rested on the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The coast of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale region on the shores of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120- and 152-mm coastal guns were created.

"Mannerheim Line" had a frontal width of 135 kilometers, a depth of up to 95 kilometers and consisted of a support strip (depth 15-60 kilometers), a main strip (depth 7-10 kilometers), a second strip 2-15 kilometers away from the main one, and the rear (Vyborg) line of defense. Over two thousand long-term firing structures (DOS) and wood-earth firing structures (DZOS) were erected, which were combined into strong points of 2-3 DOS and 3-5 DZOS in each, and the latter - into resistance nodes (3-4 point). The main line of defense consisted of 25 nodes of resistance, numbering 280 DOS and 800 DZOS. The strongholds were defended by permanent garrisons (from a company to a battalion in each). Between the strongholds and nodes of resistance were positions for field troops. The strongholds and positions of the field troops were covered by anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. Only in the security zone, 220 kilometers of wire barriers in 15-45 rows, 200 kilometers of forest debris, 80 kilometers of granite gouges up to 12 rows, anti-tank ditches, scarps (anti-tank walls) and numerous minefields were created.

All fortifications were connected by a system of trenches, underground passages and were supplied with food and ammunition necessary for a long-term autonomous battle.

On November 30, 1939, after a long artillery preparation, Soviet troops crossed the border with Finland and launched an offensive on the front from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland. In 10-13 days, they overcame the zone of operational obstacles in separate directions and reached the main strip of the Mannerheim Line. For more than two weeks, unsuccessful attempts to break through it continued.

At the end of December, the Soviet command decided to stop further offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and begin systematic preparations for breaking through the Mannerheim Line.

The front went on the defensive. The troops were regrouped. The North-Western Front was created on the Karelian Isthmus. Troops have been replenished. As a result, the Soviet troops deployed against Finland numbered more than 1.3 million people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3.5 thousand guns, and three thousand aircraft. The Finnish side by the beginning of February 1940 had 600 thousand people, 600 guns and 350 aircraft.

On February 11, 1940, the assault on the fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus resumed - the troops of the North-Western Front, after 2-3 hours of artillery preparation, went on the offensive.

Having broken through two lines of defense, on February 28, Soviet troops reached the third. They broke the resistance of the enemy, forced him to start a retreat along the entire front and, developing the offensive, captured the Vyborg grouping of Finnish troops from the northeast, captured most of Vyborg, crossed the Vyborg Bay, bypassed the Vyborg fortified area from the northwest, cut the highway to Helsinki.

The fall of the "Mannerheim Line" and the defeat of the main grouping of Finnish troops put the enemy in a difficult position. Under these conditions, Finland turned to the Soviet government with a request for peace.

On the night of March 13, 1940, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow, according to which Finland ceded about a tenth of its territory to the USSR and pledged not to participate in coalitions hostile to the USSR. On March 13, hostilities ceased.

In accordance with the agreement, the border on the Karelian Isthmus was moved away from Leningrad by 120-130 kilometers. The entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the Vyborg Bay with islands, the western and northern shores of Lake Ladoga, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas went to the Soviet Union. The Hanko Peninsula and the sea area around it were leased by the USSR for 30 years. This improved the position of the Baltic Fleet.

As a result of the Soviet-Finnish war, the main strategic goal pursued by the Soviet leadership was achieved - to secure the northwestern border. However, the international position of the Soviet Union worsened: it was expelled from the League of Nations, relations with England and France worsened, and an anti-Soviet campaign was launched in the West.

The losses of the Soviet troops in the war amounted to: irretrievable - about 130 thousand people, sanitary - about 265 thousand people. Irretrievable losses of the Finnish troops - about 23 thousand people, sanitary - over 43 thousand people.

(Additional

We will briefly talk about this war, already because Finland was the country with which the Nazi leadership then associated its plans for further advance to the east. During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. Germany, in accordance with the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, observed neutrality. It all started with the fact that the Soviet leadership, given the situation in Europe after the Nazis came to power in Germany, decided to increase the security of their northwestern borders. The border with Finland then passed only 32 kilometers from Leningrad, that is, at a distance of a long-range artillery gun.

The Finnish government pursued an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union (Ryti was then prime minister). The President of the country in 1931-1937, P. Svinhufvud, declared: "Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland."

In the summer of 1939, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, Colonel-General Halder, visited Finland. He showed particular interest in the Leningrad and Murmansk strategic directions. In Hitler's plans, the territory of Finland was given an important place in a future war. With the help of German specialists, airfields were built in the southern regions of Finland in 1939, designed to receive such a number of aircraft, which was many times more than what the Finnish air force had. In the border areas and mainly on the Karelian Isthmus, with the participation of German, British, French and Belgian specialists and financial assistance from Great Britain, France, Sweden, Germany and the United States, a powerful long-term fortification system, the Mannerheim Line, was built. It was a powerful system of three lines of fortifications up to 90 km deep. The fortifications stretched in width from the Gulf of Finland to the western shore of Lake Ladoga. Of the total number of defensive structures, 350 were reinforced concrete, 2400 were wooden and earth, well camouflaged. Sections of barbed wire fences consisted of an average of thirty (!) Rows of barbed wire. Giant "wolf pits" 7-10 meters deep and 10-15 meters in diameter were dug out at the alleged breakthrough sites. For each kilometer, 200 minutes were set.

Marshal Mannerheim was responsible for the creation of a system of defensive structures along the Soviet border in southern Finland, hence the unofficial name “Mannerheim Line”. Carl Gustav Mannerheim (1867-1951) - Finnish statesman and military figure, President of Finland in 1944-1946. During the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War, he served in the Russian army. During the Finnish Civil War (January-May 1918) he led the white movement against the Finnish Bolsheviks. After the defeat of the Bolsheviks, Mannerheim became commander in chief and regent of Finland (December 1918 - July 1919). He was defeated in the presidential election in 1919 and resigned. In 1931-1939. headed the Council of State Defense. During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. commanded the actions of the Finnish army. In 1941, Finland entered the war on the side of Nazi Germany. Having become president, Mannerheim signed a peace treaty with the USSR (1944) and spoke out against Nazi Germany.

The clearly defensive nature of the powerful fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line" near the border with the Soviet Union indicated that the Finnish leadership then seriously believed that the mighty southern neighbor would certainly attack the small three-millionth Finland. In fact, this happened, but this could not have happened if the Finnish leadership had shown more statesmanship. The outstanding Finnish statesman Urho-Kaleva Kekkonen, who was elected president of this country for four terms (1956-1981), later wrote: that it treated it rather favorably."

The situation that had developed by 1939 required that the Soviet northwestern border be moved away from Leningrad. The time for solving this problem was chosen by the Soviet leadership quite well: the Western powers were busy with the outbreak of war, and the Soviet Union concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany. The Soviet government at first hoped to resolve the issue of the border with Finland peacefully, without bringing the matter to a military conflict. In October-November 1939, negotiations were held between the USSR and Finland on issues of mutual security. The Soviet leadership explained to the Finns that the need to move the border was not caused by the possibility of Finnish aggression, but by the fear that their territory could be used in that situation by other powers to attack the USSR. The Soviet Union offered Finland to conclude a bilateral defensive alliance. The Finnish government, hoping for the help promised by Germany, rejected the Soviet offer. German representatives even guaranteed Finland that in the event of a war with the USSR, Germany would later help Finland to compensate for possible territorial losses. England, France and even America also promised their support to the Finns. The Soviet Union did not claim to include the entire territory of Finland in the USSR. The claims of the Soviet leadership mainly extended to the lands of the former Vyborg province of Russia. It must be said that these claims had a serious historical justification. Even Ivan the Terrible in the Livonian War sought to break through to the Baltic shores. Tsar Ivan the Terrible, not without reason, considered Livonia an ancient Russian fiefdom, illegally seized by the crusaders. The Livonian War lasted for 25 years (1558-1583), but Tsar Ivan the Terrible could not achieve Russia's access to the Baltic. The work begun by Tsar Ivan the Terrible was continued and, as a result of the Northern War (1700-1721), Tsar Peter I brilliantly completed. Russia received access to the Baltic Sea from Riga to Vyborg. Peter I personally took part in the battle for the fortress city of Vyborg. A well-organized siege of the fortress, which included a blockade from the sea and a five-day artillery bombardment, forced the 6,000-strong Swedish garrison of Vyborg to capitulate on June 13, 1710. The capture of Vyborg allowed the Russians to control the entire Karelian Isthmus. As a result, according to Tsar Peter I, "a strong pillow was arranged for St. Petersburg." Petersburg has now become reliably protected from Swedish attacks from the north. The capture of Vyborg created the conditions for the subsequent offensive actions of the Russian troops in Finland.

In the autumn of 1712, Peter decides on his own, without allies, to seize Finland, which was then one of the provinces of Sweden. Here is the task that Peter set for Admiral Apraksin, who should lead the operation: “To go not to ruin, but to take possession, although we don’t need it (Finland) at all, to hold, for two main reasons: first, it would be something to give in in peace, about which the Swedes are already clearly starting to talk; Another thing is that this province is the womb of Sweden, as you yourself know: not only meat and so on, but also firewood, and if God allows it to reach Abov in the summer, then the Swedish neck will bend softer. The operation to capture Finland was successfully carried out by Russian troops in 1713-1714. The final beautiful chord of the victorious Finnish campaign was the famous naval battle at Cape Gangut in July 1714. The young Russian fleet for the first time in its history won a battle with one of the strongest fleets in the world, which was then the Swedish fleet. The Russian fleet in this major battle was commanded by Peter I under the name of Rear Admiral Peter Mikhailov. For this victory, the king received the rank of vice admiral. Peter equated the Gangut battle in importance with the Battle of Poltava.

According to the Treaty of Nishtad in 1721, the Vyborg province became part of Russia. In 1809, by agreement between Emperor Napoleon of France and Emperor Alexander I of Russia, the territory of Finland was annexed to Russia. It was a kind of "friendly gift" from Napoleon to Alexander. Readers with at least some knowledge of 19th-century European history will surely know about this event. Thus, the Grand Duchy of Finland arose as part of the Russian Empire. In 1811, Emperor Alexander I annexed the Russian province of Vyborg to the Grand Duchy of Finland. So it was easier to manage this territory. This state of affairs did not cause any problems for more than a hundred years. But in 1917, the government of V.I. Lenin granted Finland state independence and since then the Russian Vyborg province has remained part of the neighboring state - the Republic of Finland. That is the background of the question.

The Soviet leadership tried to resolve the issue peacefully. On October 14, 1939, the Soviet side proposed to the Finnish side to transfer to the Soviet Union part of the territory of the Karelian Isthmus, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, and also transfer the Khanko (Gangut) peninsula on lease. All this in area was 2761 sq. km. instead of Finland, a part of the territory of Eastern Karelia was offered with a size of 5528 sq. km. however, such an exchange would have been unequal: the lands of the Karelian Isthmus were economically developed and strategically important - there were powerful fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line" providing cover for the border. The lands offered to the Finns in return were poorly developed and had neither economic nor military value. The Finnish government refused such an exchange. Hoping for the help of the Western powers, Finland counted on separating East Karelia and the Kola Peninsula from the Soviet Union by military means. But these plans were not destined to come true. Stalin decided to start a war with Finland.

The plan of military operations was developed under the leadership of the Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov.

The plan of the General Staff took into account the real difficulties of the upcoming breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" fortifications and provided for the forces and means necessary for this. But Stalin criticized the plan and ordered it to be redone. The fact is that K.E. Voroshilov convinced Stalin that the Red Army would deal with the Finns in 2-3 weeks, and the victory would be won with little bloodshed, as they say, let's throw hats on. The plan of the General Staff was rejected. The development of a new, "correct" plan was entrusted to the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District. A plan designed for an easy victory, which did not even provide for the concentration of at least minimal reserves, was developed and approved by Stalin. Faith in the ease of the upcoming victory was so great that they did not even consider it necessary to inform the Chief of the General Staff B.M. about the outbreak of war with Finland. Shaposhnikov, who was on vacation at the time.

To start a war, not always, but often they find, or rather, create some kind of pretext. It is known, for example, that before the attack on Poland, the German fascists staged an attack by the Poles on a German border radio station with German soldiers dressing up in the uniform of Polish military personnel, and so on. A somewhat lesser fantasy was the reason for the war with Finland, invented by Soviet artillerymen. On November 26, 1939, they fired at Finnish territory for 20 minutes from the border village of Mainila and declared that they had come under artillery fire from the Finnish side. This was followed by an exchange of notes between the governments of the USSR and Finland. In the Soviet note, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov pointed to the great danger of a provocation committed by the Finnish side and even reported on the victims to which it allegedly led. The Finnish side was asked to withdraw troops from the border on the Karelian Isthmus by 20-25 kilometers and thereby prevent the possibility of repeated provocations.

In a reply note received on November 29, the Finnish government suggested that the Soviet side come to the place and, by the location of the shell craters, make sure that it was precisely the territory of Finland that was shelled. Further, the note said that the Finnish side agreed to the withdrawal of troops from the border, but only from both sides. This ended the diplomatic preparation, and on November 30, 1939, at 8 o'clock in the morning, units of the Red Army went on the offensive. The "unknown" war began, about which the USSR did not want not only to talk, but even to mention it. The war with Finland in 1939-1940 was a cruel test of the Soviet armed forces. It showed the almost complete unpreparedness of the Red Army for waging a big war in general and a war in the difficult climatic conditions of the North in particular. It is not our task to give any complete account of this war. We will limit ourselves to describing the most important events of the war and its lessons. This is necessary because 1 year and 3 months after the end of the Finnish war, the Soviet armed forces were to experience a powerful blow from the German Wehrmacht.

The balance of power on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war is shown in the table:

The USSR threw four armies into battle against Finland. These troops were deployed along the entire length of its border. In the main direction, on the Karelian Isthmus, the 7th Army was advancing, consisting of nine rifle divisions, one tank corps, three tank brigades, and with a large amount of artillery and aviation attached. The number of personnel of the 7th Army was at least 200 thousand people. The 7th Army was still supported by the Baltic Fleet. Instead of competently disposing of this strong grouping in operational and tactical terms, the Soviet command did not find anything more reasonable than to strike head-on at the most powerful fortifications in the world at that time, which made up the Mannerheim Line. During the twelve days of the offensive, drowning in snow, freezing in a 40-degree frost, suffering huge losses, the troops of the 7th Army were only able to overcome the supply line and stopped in front of the first of the three main fortification lines of the Mannerheim Line. The army was drained of blood and could not advance further. But the Soviet command planned to end the war with Finland victoriously within 12 days.

After replenishment with personnel and equipment, the 7th Army continued the fighting, which was fierce in nature and looked like a slow, with heavy losses in people and equipment, gnawing through the fortified Finnish positions. Commander of the 7th Army, first commander of the 2nd rank Yakovlev V.F., and from December 9 - commander of the 2nd rank Meretskov K.A. (After the introduction of general ranks in the Red Army on May 7, 1940, the rank of "commander of the 2nd rank" began to correspond to the rank of "lieutenant general"). At the beginning of the war with the Finns, there was no question of creating fronts. Despite powerful artillery and air strikes, the Finnish fortifications withstood. On January 7, 1940, the Leningrad Military District was transformed into the North-Western Front, which was headed by the commander of the 1st rank S.K. Timoshenko. On the Karelian Isthmus, the 13th Army was added to the 7th Army (corporal commander V.D. Grendal). The number of Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus exceeded 400 thousand people. The Mannerheim Line was defended by the Finnish Karelian Army led by General H.V. Esterman (135 thousand people).

Before the start of hostilities, the Finnish defense system was studied superficially by the Soviet command. The troops had little idea of ​​the peculiarities of fighting in conditions of deep snow, in forests, in severe frost. Prior to the start of the fighting, senior commanders had little idea of ​​how tank units would operate in deep snow, how soldiers without skis would attack waist-deep in snow, how to organize the interaction of infantry, artillery and tanks, how to fight against reinforced concrete pillboxes with walls up to 2 meters and so on. Only with the formation of the North-Western Front, as they say, they came to their senses: reconnaissance of the fortification system began, daily training began in the methods of storming defensive structures; uniforms unsuitable for winter frosts were replaced: instead of boots, soldiers and officers were given felt boots, instead of overcoats - sheepskin coats, and so on. There were many attempts to take at least one line of enemy defense on the move, many people died during the assaults, many were blown up by Finnish anti-personnel mines. The soldiers were afraid of mines and did not go on the attack, the resulting “mine fear” quickly turned into “finophobia”. By the way, at the beginning of the war with the Finns, there were no mine detectors in the Soviet troops, the production of mine detectors began when the war was nearing its end.

The first breach in the Finnish defense on the Karelian Isthmus was broken by 14 February. Its length along the front was 4 km and in depth - 8-10 km. The Finnish command, in order to avoid the entry of the Red Army into the rear of the defending troops, took them to the second line of defense. The Soviet troops failed to break through it immediately. The front here temporarily stabilized. On February 26, the Finnish troops tried to launch a counteroffensive, but suffered significant losses and stopped the attacks. On February 28, Soviet troops resumed their offensive and broke through a significant part of the second line of the Finnish defense. Several Soviet divisions passed through the ice of the Vyborg Bay and on March 5 surrounded Vyborg, the second most important political, economic and military center of Finland. Until March 13, there were battles for Vyborg, and on March 12, representatives of the USSR and Finland signed a peace treaty in Moscow. The hard and shameful war for the USSR ended.

The strategic goals of this war were, of course, not only in mastering the Karelian Isthmus. In addition to the two armies operating in the main direction, that is, on the Karelian Isthmus (7th and 13th), four more armies participated in the war: the 14th (division commander Frolov), the 9th (comcors M.P. Dukhanov, then V.I. Chuikov), 8th (commander Khabarov, then G.M. Stern) and 15th (commander of the 2nd rank M.P. Kovalev). These armies operated almost along the entire eastern border of Finland and in its north on the front from Lake Ladoga to the Barents Sea, more than a thousand kilometers long. According to the plan of the high command, these armies were supposed to pull off part of the Finnish forces from the area of ​​the Karelian Isthmus. If successful, Soviet troops in the southern sector of this front line could break through to the north of Lake Ladoga and reach the rear of the Finnish troops defending the Mannerheim Line. The Soviet troops of the central sector (Ukhta region), also in case of success, could go to the area of ​​the Gulf of Bothnia and cut the territory of Finland in half.

However, in both areas, the Soviet troops were defeated. How was it possible in the conditions of a harsh winter, in dense coniferous forests covered with deep snow, without a developed network of roads, without reconnaissance of the area of ​​upcoming hostilities, to advance and defeat the Finnish troops, adapted to life and combat activities in these conditions, moving quickly on skis, well equipped and armed with automatic weapons? It does not require marshal wisdom and greater combat experience to understand that it is impossible to defeat such an enemy under these conditions, and you can lose your people.

In the relatively short Soviet-Finnish war with the Soviet troops, there were many tragedies and almost no victories. During the fighting north of Ladoga in December-February 1939-1940. mobile Finnish units, small in number, using the element of surprise, defeated several Soviet divisions, some of which disappeared forever in the snowy coniferous forests. Overloaded with heavy equipment, the Soviet divisions stretched out along the main roads, having open flanks, deprived of the possibility of maneuver, fell victim to small units of the Finnish army, losing 50-70% of their personnel, and sometimes more, if you count the prisoners. Here is a concrete example. The 18th division (56th corps of the 15th army) was surrounded by the Finns in the first half of February 1940 along the road from Uoma to Lemetti. She was transferred from the Ukrainian steppes. Soldiers were not trained to act in winter conditions in Finland. Parts of this division were blocked in 13 garrisons, completely cut off from each other. Their supply was carried out by air, but was organized unsatisfactorily. The soldiers suffered from cold and malnutrition. By the second half of February, the encircled garrisons were partially destroyed, the rest suffered heavy losses. The surviving soldiers were exhausted and demoralized. On the night of February 28-29, 1940, the remnants of the 18th division, with the permission of the Headquarters, began to exit the encirclement. To break through the front line, they had to abandon equipment and seriously wounded. With heavy losses, the fighters broke out of the encirclement. The soldiers carried the seriously wounded division commander Kondrashov in their arms. The banner of the 18th division went to the Finns. As required by law, this division, which had lost its flag, was disbanded. The division commander, already in the hospital, was arrested and soon shot by the verdict of the tribunal, the commander of the 56th corps, Cherepanov, shot himself on March 8. The losses of the 18th division amounted to 14 thousand people, that is, more than 90%. The total losses of the 15th Army amounted to about 50 thousand people, which is almost 43% of the initial number of 117 thousand people. There are many similar examples from that “unknown” war.

Under the terms of the Moscow Peace Treaty, the entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the area north of Lake Ladoga, the territory in the Kuolajärvi region, as well as the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula went to the Soviet Union. In addition, the USSR acquired a 30-year lease on the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. The distance from Leningrad to the new state border is now about 150 kilometers. But the territorial acquisitions did not increase the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR. The loss of territories pushed the Finnish leadership into an alliance with Nazi Germany. As soon as Germany attacked the USSR, the Finns in 1941 threw back the Soviet troops to the pre-war lines and captured part of Soviet Karelia.

before and after the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940.

The Soviet-Finnish war became a bitter, difficult, but to some extent useful lesson for the Soviet armed forces. The troops, at the cost of great bloodshed, gained some experience in modern warfare, especially the skills of breaking through fortified areas, as well as conducting combat operations in winter conditions. The highest state and military leadership was convinced in practice that the combat training of the Red Army was very weak. Therefore, concrete measures began to be taken to improve discipline in the troops, to supply the army with modern weapons and military equipment. After the Soviet-Finnish war, there was some decline in the pace of repression against the command staff of the army and navy. Perhaps, analyzing the results of this war, Stalin saw the disastrous consequences of the repressions unleashed by him against the army and navy.

One of the first useful organizational measures immediately after the Soviet-Finnish war was the dismissal of Klim Voroshilov, a well-known political figure, Stalin's closest ally, "the favorite of the people," from the post of People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Stalin became convinced of Voroshilov's complete incompetence in military affairs. He was transferred to the prestigious position of Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, that is, the government. The position was invented specifically for Voroshilov, so he could well consider this a promotion. Stalin appointed S.K. to the post of People's Commissar of Defense. Timoshenko, who was the commander of the Northwestern Front in the war with the Finns. In this war, Timoshenko did not show special military talents, rather, on the contrary, he showed military leadership weakness. However, for the most bloody operation for the Soviet troops to break through the "Mannerheim Line", carried out illiterately in operational and tactical terms and costing incredibly large victims, Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. We do not think that such a high assessment of Timoshenko's activities during the Soviet-Finnish war found understanding among the Soviet military personnel, especially among the participants in this war.

The official data on the losses of the Red Army in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, subsequently published in the press, are as follows:

total losses amounted to 333,084 people, of which:
killed and died of wounds - 65384
missing - 19690 (of which over 5.5 thousand prisoners)
wounded, shell-shocked - 186584
frostbite - 9614
got sick - 51892

The losses of Soviet troops during the breakthrough of the "Mannerheim Line" amounted to 190 thousand people killed, wounded, captured, which is 60% of all losses in the war with the Finns. And for such shameful and tragic results, Stalin gave the front commander the Golden Star of the Hero ...

The Finns lost about 70 thousand people, of which about 23 thousand were killed.

Now briefly about the situation around the Soviet-Finnish war. During the war, England and France provided assistance to Finland with weapons and materials, and also repeatedly offered its neighbors, Norway and Sweden, to let Anglo-French troops through their territory to help Finland. However, Norway and Sweden firmly took a position of neutrality, fearing to be drawn into a global conflict. Then England and France promised to send an expeditionary force of 150 thousand people to Finland by sea. Some people from the Finnish leadership suggested continuing the war with the USSR and waiting for the arrival of the expeditionary force in Finland. But the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, soberly assessing the situation, decided to stop the war, which led his country to relatively large casualties and weakened the economy. Finland was forced to conclude the Moscow Peace Treaty on March 12, 1940.

The relations of the USSR with England and France deteriorated sharply because of the help of these countries to Finland and not only because of this. During the Soviet-Finnish war, England and France planned to bombard the oil fields of the Soviet Transcaucasus. Several squadrons of the British and French Air Forces from airfields in Syria and Iraq were to bomb the oil fields in Baku and Grozny, as well as the oil berths in Batumi. They only had time to take aerial photographs of targets in Baku, after which they went to the Batumi region to photograph the oil berths, but were met by Soviet anti-aircraft gunners. This happened in late March - early April 1940. In the context of the expected invasion of German troops into France, plans for the bombing of the Soviet Union by Anglo-French aviation were revised and ultimately were not implemented.

One of the unpleasant results of the Soviet-Finnish war was the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations, which lowered the authority of the Soviet country in the eyes of the world community.

© A.I. Kalanov, V.A. Kalanov,
"Knowledge is power"

The Soviet-Finnish or Winter War began on November 30, 1939, and ended on March 12, 1940. The reasons for the start, the course and results of the war are still considered very ambiguous. The instigator of the war was the USSR, whose leadership was interested in territorial acquisitions in the area of ​​the Karelian Isthmus. Western countries almost did not react to the Soviet-Finnish conflict. France England and the United States tried to adhere to the position of non-intervention in local conflicts, so as not to give Hitler a pretext for new territorial seizures. Therefore, Finland was left without the support of the Western allies.

Reason and causes of the war

The Soviet-Finnish war was provoked by a whole range of reasons, primarily related to the protection of the border between the two countries, as well as geopolitical differences.

• During 1918-1922. The Finns attacked the RSFSR twice. To prevent further conflicts in 1922, an agreement was signed on the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border, according to the same document, Finland received Petsamo or the Pecheneg region, the Rybachy Peninsula and part of the Sredny Peninsula. In the 1930s, Finland and the USSR signed a non-aggression pact. At the same time, relations between the states remained tense, the leaderships of both countries were afraid of mutual territorial claims.
• Stalin regularly received intelligence that Finland had signed secret pacts of support and assistance with the Baltic states and Poland if the Soviet Union attacked one of them.
• In the late 1930s, Stalin and his associates were also worried about the rise of Adolf Hitler. Despite the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact and the secret protocol on the division of spheres of influence in Europe, many in the USSR feared a military clash and considered it necessary to start preparing for war. One of the most strategically important cities in the USSR was Leningrad, but the city was too close to the Soviet-Finnish border. In the event that Finland decided to support Germany (and this is exactly what happened), Leningrad would be in a very vulnerable position. Shortly before the start of the war, the USSR repeatedly appealed to the leadership of Finland with a request to change part of the Karelian Isthmus to other territories. However, the Finns refused. Firstly, the lands offered in exchange were infertile, and secondly, on the site that interested the USSR, there were important military fortifications - the Mannerheim Line.
• Also, the Finnish side did not give its consent to the lease by the Soviet Union of several Finnish islands and part of the Hanko Peninsula. The leadership of the USSR planned to place its military bases in these territories.
• Soon the activities of the Communist Party were banned in Finland;
• Germany and the USSR signed a secret non-aggression pact and secret protocols to it, according to which the Finnish territory was to fall into the zone of influence of the Soviet Union. To some extent, this agreement untied the hands of the Soviet leadership regarding the regulation of the situation with Finland

The reason for the start of the Winter War was. On November 26, 1939, the village of Mainila, located on the Karelian Isthmus, was fired from Finland. The Soviet border guards, who were in the village at that time, suffered the most from the shelling. Finland denied its involvement in this act and did not want the conflict to develop further. However, the Soviet leadership took advantage of the situation and announced the start of the war.

Until now, there is no evidence confirming the guilt of the Finns in the shelling of Mainila. Although, however, there are no documents indicating the involvement of the Soviet military in the November provocation. The papers provided by both sides cannot be considered as unambiguous evidence of someone's guilt. Back in late November, Finland advocated the creation of a common commission to investigate the incident, but the Soviet Union rejected this proposal.

On November 28, the leadership of the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact (1932). Two days later, active hostilities began, which went down in history as the Soviet-Finnish war.

In Finland, the mobilization of those liable for military service was carried out, in the Soviet Union, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet were put on full combat readiness. An extensive propaganda campaign was launched against the Finns in the Soviet media. In response, Finland began to carry out an anti-Soviet campaign in the press.

From mid-November 1939, the USSR deployed four armies against Finland, which included: 24 divisions (the total number of military reached 425 thousand), 2.3 thousand tanks and 2.5 thousand aircraft.

The Finns had only 14 divisions, in which 270 thousand people served, 30 tanks and 270 aircraft were available.

Course of events

The Winter War can be divided into two phases:

• November 1939 - January 1940: the Soviet offensive in several directions at once, the fighting was quite fierce;
• February - March 1940: massive shelling of Finnish territory, attack on the Mannerheim Line, capitulation of Finland and peace negotiations.

On November 30, 1939, Stalin gave the order to advance on the Karelian Isthmus, and already on December 1, Soviet troops captured the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk).

On the occupied territory, the Soviet army established contacts with Otto Kuusinen, who was the head of the Communist Party of Finland and an active member of the Comintern. With the support of Stalin, he proclaimed the creation of the Finnish Democratic Republic. Kuusinen became its president and began to negotiate with the Soviet Union on behalf of the Finnish people. Official diplomatic relations were established between the FDR and the USSR.

The 7th Soviet Army moved very quickly towards the Mannerheim Line. The first chain of fortifications was broken in the first decade of 1939. The Soviet soldiers could not advance further. All attempts to break through the following lines of defense ended in losses and defeats. Failures on the line led to the suspension of further advance inland.

Another army - the 8th - was advancing in the north of Lake Ladoga. In just a few days, the troops covered 80 kilometers, but were stopped by a lightning attack by the Finns, as a result, half of the army was destroyed. The success of Finland was due, first of all, to the fact that the Soviet troops were tied to the roads. The Finns, moving in small mobile detachments, easily cut off equipment and people from the necessary communications. The 8th Army retreated, having lost people, but did not leave this region until the very end of the war.

The most unsuccessful campaign of the Red Army during the Winter War is considered to be the attack on Central Karelia. Stalin sent the 9th Army here, which successfully advanced from the first days of the war. The troops were tasked with capturing the city of Oulu. This was supposed to cut Finland in two, demoralize and disorganize the army in the northern regions of the country. Already on December 7, 1939, the soldiers managed to capture the village of Suomussalmi, but the Finns were able to surround the division. The Red Army switched to all-round defense, repulsing the attacks of Finnish skiers. The Finnish detachments carried out their actions suddenly, moreover, the main striking force of the Finns was the almost elusive snipers. The clumsy and insufficiently mobile Soviet troops began to suffer huge human losses, equipment also broke down. The 44th rifle division was sent to help the encircled division, which also fell into the Finnish encirclement. Due to the fact that two divisions were under constant fire, the 163rd Rifle Division began to gradually fight its way back. Almost 30% of the personnel died, more than 90% of the equipment was left to the Finns. The latter almost completely destroyed the 44th division and returned the state border in Central Karelia under their control. In this direction, the actions of the Red Army were paralyzed, and the Finnish army received huge trophies. The victory over the enemy raised the morale of the soldiers, but Stalin repressed the leadership of the 163rd and 44th rifle divisions of the Red Army.

In the area of ​​the Rybachy Peninsula, the 14th Army advanced quite successfully. Within a short time, the soldiers captured the city of Petsamo with its nickel mines and went straight to the border with Norway. Thus, Finland was cut off from access to the Barents Sea.

In January 1940, the Finns encircled the 54th Infantry Division (in the Suomussalmi region, in the south), but did not have the strength and resources to destroy it. Soviet soldiers were surrounded until March 1940. The same fate awaited the 168th Rifle Division, which tried to advance in the Sortavala area. Also, a Soviet tank division fell into the Finnish encirclement near Lemetti-Yuzhny. She managed to get out of the encirclement, losing all the equipment and more than half of the soldiers.

The Karelian Isthmus has become a zone of the most active hostilities. But by the end of December 1939, the fighting stopped here. This was due to the fact that the leadership of the Red Army began to understand the futility of strikes along the Mannerheim line. The Finns tried to use the lull in the war to the maximum advantage and go on the attack. But all operations ended unsuccessfully with huge human casualties.

By the end of the first stage of the war, in January 1940, the Red Army was in a difficult situation. She fought in an unfamiliar, practically unexplored territory, it was dangerous to move forward due to numerous ambushes. In addition, the weather complicated the planning of operations. The position of the Finns was also unenviable. They had problems with the number of soldiers and lacked equipment, but the population of the country had tremendous experience in guerrilla warfare. Such tactics made it possible to attack with small forces, inflicting significant losses on large Soviet detachments.

Second period of the Winter War

Already on February 1, 1940, on the Karelian Isthmus, the Red Army began a massive shelling that lasted 10 days. The purpose of this action was to damage the fortifications on the Mannerheim Line and the troops of Finland, to exhaust the soldiers, to morally break their spirit. The actions taken achieved their goals, and on February 11, 1940, the Red Army launched an offensive inland.

Very fierce battles began on the Karelian Isthmus. At first, the Red Army planned to strike the main blow at the settlement of Summa, which was located in the Vyborg direction. But the army of the USSR began to get stuck on foreign territory, incurring losses. As a result, the direction of the main attack was changed to Lyakhda. In the area of ​​​​this settlement, the Finnish defenses were broken through, which allowed the Red Army to pass the first strip of the Mannerheim Line. The Finns began to withdraw troops.

By the end of February 1940, the Soviet army also crossed the second line of defense of Mannerheim, breaking through it in several places. By the beginning of March, the Finns began to retreat, because they were in a difficult position. The reserves were depleted, the morale of the soldiers was broken. Another situation was observed in the Red Army, the main advantage of which was the huge stocks of equipment, materiel, replenished personnel. In March 1940, the 7th Army approached Vyborg, where the Finns put up stiff resistance.

On March 13, hostilities were stopped, which was initiated by the Finnish side. The reasons for this decision were as follows:

• Vyborg was one of the largest cities in the country, its loss could have a negative impact on the morale of citizens and the economy;
• After the capture of Vyborg, the Red Army could easily reach Helsinki, which threatened Finland with a complete loss of independence and independence.

Peace negotiations began on March 7, 1940 and took place in Moscow. As a result of the discussion, the parties decided to stop hostilities. The Soviet Union received all the territories on the Karelian Isthmus and the cities: Salla, Sortavala and Vyborg, located in Lapland. Stalin also achieved that he was given the Hanko peninsula for a long lease.

• The Red Army lost about 88 thousand people who died from wounds and frostbite. Almost 40 thousand more people were missing, 160 thousand were injured. Finland lost 26 thousand people dead, 40 thousand Finns were injured;
• The Soviet Union achieved one of its key foreign policy objectives - it ensured the security of Leningrad;
• The USSR strengthened its positions on the Baltic coast, which was achieved by acquiring Vyborg and the Hanko Peninsula, where Soviet military bases were moved;
• The Red Army gained vast experience in conducting military operations in difficult weather and tactical conditions, having learned to break through fortified lines;
• In 1941, Finland supported Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR and allowed German troops through its territory, who managed to establish a blockade of Leningrad;
• The destruction of the Mannerheim Line became fatal for the USSR, as Germany was able to quickly capture Finland and pass into the territory of the Soviet Union;
• The war showed Germany that the Red Army in difficult weather conditions is unfit for combat. The same opinion was formed by the leaders of other countries;
• Finland, under the terms of the peace agreement, was to build a railway track, with the help of which it was planned to connect the Kola Peninsula and the Gulf of Bothnia. The road was supposed to pass through the settlement of Alakurtia and connect with Tornio. But this part of the agreement was never carried out;
• On October 11, 1940, another treaty was signed between the USSR and Finland, which concerned the Åland Islands. The Soviet Union received the right to place a consulate here, and the archipelago was declared a demilitarized zone;
• The international organization League of Nations, created following the results of the First World War, excluded the Soviet Union from its membership. This was due to the fact that the international community reacted negatively to the Soviet intervention in Finland. The reasons for the exclusion were also constant aerial bombardments of Finnish civilian targets. Incendiary bombs were often used during the raids;

Thus, the Winter War became an occasion for Germany and Finland to gradually draw closer and interact. The Soviet Union tried to resist such cooperation, restraining the growing influence of Germany and trying to establish a loyal regime in Finland. All this led to the fact that with the outbreak of World War II, the Finns joined the Axis countries in order to free themselves from the USSR and return the lost territories.

Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-40 (another name is winter war) took place from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940.

The formal reason for the hostilities was the so-called Mainil incident - shelling from the Finnish territory of Soviet border guards in the village of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus, which occurred, according to the Soviet side, on November 26, 1939. The Finnish side categorically denied any involvement in the shelling. Two days later, on November 28, the USSR denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact, concluded in 1932, and on November 30 began hostilities.

The underlying causes of the conflict were based on a number of factors, not the least of which was the fact that in 1918-22 Finland twice attacked the territory of the RSFSR. According to the results of the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 and the Moscow Agreement on the adoption of measures to ensure the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border of 1922 between the governments of the RSFSR and Finland, the primordially Russian Pecheneg region (Petsamo) and part of the Sredny and Rybachy peninsulas were transferred to Finland.

Despite the fact that in 1932 a non-aggression pact was signed between Finland and the USSR, relations between the two countries were rather tense. In Finland, they feared that sooner or later the Soviet Union, which had strengthened many times since 1922, would want to return its territories, and in the USSR they were afraid that Finland, as in 1919 (when British torpedo boats attacked Kronstadt from Finnish ports), could provide its territory to another hostile country to attack. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the second most important city in the USSR - Leningrad - was only 32 kilometers from the Soviet-Finnish border.

During this period, the activities of the Communist Party were banned in Finland and secret consultations were held with the governments of Poland and the Baltic countries on joint actions in the event of a war with the USSR. In 1939, the USSR signed the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In accordance with the secret protocols to it, Finland retreats to the zone of interests of the Soviet Union.

In 1938-39, during lengthy negotiations with Finland, the USSR tried to achieve an exchange of part of the Karelian Isthmus for twice the area, but less suitable for agricultural use, in Karelia, as well as the transfer of the USSR to lease several islands and part of the Hanko Peninsula for military bases. Finland, firstly, did not agree with the size of the territories given to it (not least because of the unwillingness to part with the line of defensive fortifications built in the 30s, also known as the Mannerheim Line (see Fig. And ), and secondly, she tried to achieve the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and the right to arm the demilitarized Aland Islands.

The negotiations were very difficult and were accompanied by mutual reproaches and accusations (see: ). The last attempt was the proposal of the USSR on October 5, 1939 to conclude a Mutual Assistance Pact with Finland.

Negotiations dragged on and reached an impasse. The parties began to prepare for war.

On October 13-14, 1939, general mobilization was announced in Finland. And two weeks later, on November 3, the troops of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet received directives to start preparing for hostilities. Newspaper article "Truth" on the same day reported that the Soviet Union intended to ensure its security at any cost. A massive anti-Finnish campaign began in the Soviet press, to which the opposite side immediately responded.

Less than a month remained before the Mainilsky incident, which served as a formal pretext for war.

Most Western and a number of Russian researchers believe that the shelling was a fiction - either it did not exist at all, and there were only allegations of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, or the shelling was a provocation. Documents confirming this or that version have not been preserved. Finland proposed a joint investigation of the incident, but the Soviet side firmly rejected the proposal.

Immediately after the start of the war, official relations with the Ryti government were terminated, and on December 2, 1939, the USSR signed an agreement on mutual assistance and friendship with the so-called "People's Government of Finland", formed from communists and led by Otto Kuusinen. At the same time, in the USSR, on the basis of the 106th Mountain Rifle Division, began to form "Finnish People's Army" from Finns and Karelians. However, she did not take part in the hostilities and was eventually disbanded, like the Kuusinen government.

The Soviet Union planned to deploy military operations in two main directions - the Karelian Isthmus and north of Lake Ladoga. After a successful breakthrough (or bypassing the line of fortifications from the north), the Red Army got the opportunity to make the most of the advantage in manpower and the overwhelming advantage in technology. In terms of time, the operation had to meet the period from two weeks to a month. The Finnish command, in turn, counted on the stabilization of the front on the Karelian Isthmus and active containment in the northern sector, believing that the army would be able to independently hold the enemy up to six months and then wait for help from Western countries. Both plans turned out to be an illusion: the Soviet Union underestimated the strength of Finland, while Finland placed too much on the help of foreign powers and on the reliability of its fortifications.

As already mentioned, by the beginning of hostilities in Finland, general mobilization took place. The USSR, however, decided to confine itself to parts of the LenVO, believing that additional involvement of forces would not be required. At the start of the war, the USSR concentrated 425,640 personnel, 2,876 guns and mortars, 2,289 tanks, and 2,446 aircraft for the operation. They were opposed by 265,000 people, 834 guns, 64 tanks and 270 aircraft.

As part of the Red Army, units of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies advanced on Finland. The 7th army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th - north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th - in Karelia, the 14th - in the Arctic.

The most favorable situation for the USSR developed on the front of the 14th Army, which, interacting with the Northern Fleet, occupied the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, the city of Petsamo (Pechenga) and closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea. The 9th Army penetrated the Finnish defenses to a depth of 35-45 km and was stopped (see. ). The 8th Army initially began to successfully move forward, but was also stopped, and part of its forces were surrounded and forced to withdraw. The most difficult and bloody battles unfolded in the sector of the 7th Army, advancing on the Karelian Isthmus. The army was to storm the Mannerheim Line.

As it turned out later, the Soviet side had fragmentary and extremely scarce data about the enemy opposing it on the Karelian Isthmus, and, most importantly, about the line of fortifications. The underestimation of the enemy immediately affected the course of hostilities. The forces allocated to break through the Finnish defenses in this area turned out to be insufficient. By December 12, units of the Red Army, with losses, were able to overcome only the support strip of the Mannerheim Line and stopped. Until the end of December, several desperate attempts to break through were made, but they were not crowned with success. By the end of December, it became obvious that it was pointless to attempt an offensive in this style. There was a relative calm at the front.

Having understood and studied the reasons for the failure in the first period of the war, the Soviet command undertook a serious reorganization of forces and means. Throughout January and early February, there was a significant strengthening of the troops, their saturation with large-caliber artillery capable of fighting fortifications, replenishment of material reserves, and reorganization of units and formations. Methods were developed to deal with defensive structures, mass exercises and training of personnel were carried out, assault groups and detachments were formed, work was carried out to improve the interaction of military branches, to raise morale (see. ).

The USSR learned quickly. To break through the fortified area, the North-Western Front was created under the command of the commander of the 1st rank Timoshenko and a member of the military council of the LenVO Zhdanov. The front included the 7th and 13th armies.

Finland at that moment also carried out measures to increase the combat capability of its own troops. Both captured in battles and new equipment and weapons delivered from abroad, the units received the necessary replenishment.

Both sides were ready for the second round of the fight.

At the same time, fighting in Karelia did not stop.

The most famous in the historiography of the Soviet-Finnish war during that period was the encirclement of the 163rd and 44th rifle divisions of the 9th army near Suomussalmi. From mid-December, the 44th division advanced to help the encircled 163rd division. In the period from January 3 to 7, 1940, its units were repeatedly surrounded, but, despite the difficult situation, they continued to fight, having superiority in technical equipment over the Finns. In conditions of constant fighting, in a rapidly changing situation, the division command misjudged the current situation and gave the order to leave the encirclement in groups, leaving behind heavy equipment. This only made the situation worse. Parts of the division still managed to break out of the encirclement, but with heavy losses ... Subsequently, the division commander Vinogradov, the regimental commissar Pakhomenko and the chief of staff Volkov, who left the division at the most difficult moment, were sentenced by a military tribunal to capital punishment and shot in front of the ranks.

It is also worth noting that since the end of December, the Finns have been trying to counterattack on the Karelian Isthmus in order to disrupt the preparations for a new Soviet offensive. Counterattacks were not successful and were repulsed.

On February 11, 1940, after a massive multi-day artillery preparation, the Red Army, together with units of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga military flotilla, launched a new offensive. The main blow fell on the Karelian Isthmus. Within three days, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the Finns and introduced tank formations into the breakthrough. On February 17, Finnish troops, by order of the command, retreated to the second lane due to the threat of encirclement.

On February 21, the 7th Army reached the second line of defense, and the 13th Army - to the main line north of Muolaa. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front launched an offensive along the entire length of the Karelian Isthmus. Finnish troops retreated, putting up fierce resistance. In an attempt to stop the advancing units of the Red Army, the Finns opened the floodgates of the Saimaa Canal, but this did not help either: on March 13, Soviet troops entered Vyborg.

Parallel to the fighting, there were also battles on the diplomatic front. After the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line and the entry of Soviet troops into the operational space, the Finnish government understood that there was no chance of continuing the struggle. Therefore, it turned to the USSR with a proposal to start peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and on March 12 a peace treaty was signed.

As a result of the war, the Karelian Isthmus and the large cities of Vyborg and Sortavala, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Finnish territory with the city of Kuolajärvi, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas went to the USSR. Lake Ladoga became an inland lake of the USSR. The Petsamo (Pechenga) region captured during the fighting was returned to Finland. The USSR leased part of the Khanko (Gangut) peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there.

At the same time, the reputation of the Soviet state in the international arena suffered: the USSR was declared an aggressor and expelled from the League of Nations. Mutual distrust between the Western countries and the USSR reached a critical point.

Recommended literature:
1. Irincheev Bair. Forgotten front of Stalin. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008. (Series: Unknown Wars of the XX century.)
2. Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 / Comp. P. Petrov, V. Stepakov. SP b .: Polygon, 2003. In 2 volumes.
3. Tanner Väinö. Winter war. Diplomatic confrontation between the Soviet Union and Finland, 1939-1940. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003.
4. "Winter War": work on the mistakes (April-May 1940). Materials of the commissions of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on the generalization of the experience of the Finnish campaign / Ed. comp. N. S. Tarkhova. SP b., Summer Garden, 2003.

Tatiana Vorontsova

The armed conflict between the Soviet state and Finland is increasingly being assessed by contemporaries as one of the components of the Second World War. Let's try to isolate the true causes of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940.
The origins of this war are in the very system of international relations that had taken shape by 1939. At that time, war, destruction and violence brought by it, were considered as an extreme, but quite acceptable method of achieving geopolitical goals and protecting the interests of the state. Large countries were building up armaments, small states were looking for allies and concluded agreements with them on assistance in case of war.

Soviet-Finnish relations from the very beginning could not be called friendly. Finnish nationalists wanted to return Soviet Karelia under the control of their country. And the activities of the Comintern, directly funded by the CPSU (b), was aimed at the speedy establishment of the power of the proletariat throughout the globe. It is most convenient to start the next campaign to overthrow bourgeois governments from neighboring states. This fact should already make the rulers of Finland worry.

The next aggravation began in 1938. The Soviet Union predicted the imminent outbreak of war with Germany. And in order to prepare for this event, it was necessary to strengthen the western borders of the state. The city of Leningrad, which was the cradle of the October Revolution, was a major industrial center in those years. The loss of the former capital during the first days of hostilities would have been a serious blow to the USSR. Therefore, the leadership of Finland received a proposal to lease their Hanko peninsula to create military bases there.

The permanent deployment of the armed forces of the USSR on the territory of a neighboring state was fraught with a violent change of power to the "workers' and peasants'". The Finns well remembered the events of the twenties, when Bolshevik activists tried to create a Soviet republic and annex Finland to the USSR. The activities of the Communist Party were banned in this country. Therefore, the Finnish government could not agree to such a proposal.

In addition, the well-known Mannerheim defensive line, which was considered insurmountable, was located on the Finnish territories designated for transfer. If it is voluntarily handed over to a potential enemy, then nothing can hold back the Soviet troops from moving forward. A similar trick had already been done in Czechoslovakia by the Germans in 1939, so the Finnish leadership clearly understood the consequences of such a step.

On the other hand, Stalin had no good reason to believe that Finland's neutrality would remain unshakable during the coming big war. The political elites of the capitalist countries generally saw the USSR as a threat to the stability of European states.
In a word, the parties in 1939 could not and, perhaps, did not want to agree. The Soviet Union needed guarantees and a buffer zone in front of its territory. Finland needed to maintain its neutrality in order to be able to quickly change its foreign policy and lean on the side of the favorite in the upcoming big war.

Another reason for a military solution to the current situation is a test of strength in a real war. The Finnish fortifications were stormed in the harsh winter of 1939-1940, which was a severe test for both military personnel and equipment.

Part of the community of historians cite the desire for the "Sovietization" of Finland as one of the reasons for the start of the Soviet-Finnish war. However, such assumptions are not supported by facts. In March 1940, the Finnish defensive fortifications fell, the imminent defeat in the conflict became obvious. Without waiting for help from the Western allies, the government sent a delegation to Moscow to conclude a peace agreement.

For some reason, the Soviet leadership turned out to be extremely accommodating. Instead of a quick end to the war with the complete defeat of the enemy and the annexation of his territory to the Soviet Union, as was done, for example, with Belarus, a peace treaty was signed. By the way, this agreement also took into account the interests of the Finnish side, for example, the demilitarization of the Aland Islands. Probably, in 1940, the USSR focused on preparing for war with Germany.

The formal reason for the start of the war of 1939-1940 was the artillery shelling of the positions of Soviet troops near the Finnish border. What, of course, the Finns were accused of. For this reason, Finland was asked to withdraw troops 25 kilometers in order to avoid similar incidents in the future. When the Finns refused, the outbreak of war became inevitable.

This was followed by a short but bloody war, which ended in 1940 with the victory of the Soviet side.