The Mongol-Tatar invasion is one of the most tragic events national history. Destroyed and plundered cities, thousands of dead - all this could have been avoided if the Russian princes had united in the face of a common threat. The fragmentation of the Russians made the task of the invaders much easier.

Conqueror forces

The army of Khan Batu invaded Russian lands in December 1237. Before that, it devastated Volga Bulgaria. There is no single point of view regarding the size of the Mongol army. According to Nikolai Karamzin, Batu had 500 thousand soldiers under his command. True, the historian later changed this figure to 300 thousand. In any case, the power is enormous.

A traveler from Italy, Giovanni del Plano Carpini, claims that 600 thousand people invaded Russian lands, and the Hungarian historian Simon believes that 500 thousand. They said that Batu’s army took 20 days of travel in length and 15 in width. And to completely bypass it would have taken more than two months.

Modern researchers are more modest in their estimates: from 120 to 150 thousand. Be that as it may, the Mongols outnumbered the forces of the Russian principalities, which, as historian Sergei Solovyov noted, all together (with the exception of Novgorod) were capable of fielding no more than 50 thousand soldiers.

First victim

The first Russian city to fall to the enemy was Ryazan. Her fate was terrible. For five days, the defenders, led by Prince Yuri Igorevich, heroically repelled attacks, shot arrows and poured boiling water and tar from the walls of the invaders. Fires broke out here and there in the city. On the night of December 21, the city fell. Using rams, the Mongols broke into the city and carried out a wild massacre - most of the inhabitants, led by the prince, died, the rest were taken into slavery. The city itself was completely destroyed and was never rebuilt. The current Ryazan has nothing to do with the past - it is the former Pereyaslavl-Ryazan, to which the capital of the principality was moved.

300 Kozelets

One of the most heroic episodes of resistance to the invaders was the defense of the small town of Kozelsk. The Mongols, possessing overwhelming numerical superiority and having catapults and battering rams at their disposal, could not take the city with wooden walls for almost 50 days. As a result, the Mongol-Tatars managed to climb the rampart and capture part of the fortifications. Then the Kozelites completely unexpectedly came out of the gate and furiously rushed at the enemy. 300 brave men destroyed four thousand Batu warriors, and among them were three military leaders - descendants of Genghis Khan himself. The people of Kozel fought heroically, including 12-year-old Prince Vasily, and every single one of them died. Batu, enraged by the stubborn defense of the city, ordered it to be destroyed and the ground to be sprinkled with salt. Because of its disobedience, the invaders nicknamed Kozelsk “the evil city.”

Attack of the Dead

In January 1238, Batu moved towards Vladimir. At that moment, the Ryazan boyar Evpatiy Kolovrat, who was in Chernigov, having learned about the devastation of Ryazan, rushed to his native land and gathered there a detachment of 1,700 brave men. They rushed after the army of thousands of Mongol-Tatars. Kolovrat caught up with his enemies in the Suzdal region. His detachment immediately launched an attack on the numerically superior Mongol rearguard. The invaders were in panic: they did not expect an attack from the rear. The dead rose from their graves and came for us, Batu’s soldiers said in fear.

Batu sent his brother-in-law Khostovrul against Kolovrat. He boasted that he could easily deal with the daring Ryazan man, but he himself fell from his sword. It was possible to defeat Kolovrat’s squad only with the help of catapults. As a sign of respect for the people of Ryazan, the khan released the prisoners.

All-Russian catastrophe

The harm caused by the Horde at that time was comparable to the damage caused by the Napoleonic invasion in the 19th century and by the Nazis during the Great Patriotic War in the 20th century. According to archaeologists, out of 74 cities that existed in Rus' by the middle of the 13th century, 49 did not survive Batu’s raids, another 15 turned into villages and hamlets. Only the northwestern Russian lands - Novgorod, Pskov and Smolensk - were not affected.
The exact number of those killed and taken prisoner is unknown; historians talk about hundreds of thousands of people. Many crafts were lost, which is why the level of socio-economic development of Rus' sharply decreased. From the point of view of some historians, it was the damage from the Mongol-Tatar invasion that subsequently determined the catching-up model of Russian development.

Civil strife?

There is an assumption that in reality there was no Mongol-Tatar yoke. In the opinion of Yu.D. Petukhov, there was a large-scale civil strife among the Russian princes. As evidence, he refers to the absence of the term “Mongol-Tatars” in ancient Russian chronicles. The word Mongol supposedly came from “mog”, “moz”, which means “powerful”, thus the word “Mongols” then meant not a people, but a strong army. Proponents of this version point out that the backward nomads were unable to create a huge military machine and a Eurasian empire, in addition, there is practically no evidence of the existence of even a semblance of a military industry among the Mongols, and the population of the Mongolian steppes was too small to conquer the huge Chinese empire, Central Asia and other countries. The fact that the Russians also had a decimal system of organizing troops was also cited as an argument. In addition, emphasizes V.P. Alekseev, in his work “In Search of Ancestors,” archaeologists did not find a Mongoloid element in the burial grounds of that period.

No matter how much the legendary Mongolian ruler Genghis Khan tried to conquer the whole world, he failed. But the founder of a huge empire had a worthy heir. Khan Batu continued the work of his great grandfather, leading the Horde troops in western campaigns.
It was he who conquered the Polovtsians, Volga Bulgars, Russians, and then moved his army to Poland, Hungary, the Balkan countries, and the cities of Central Europe. The Golden Horde owes its prosperity and power largely to the leadership talent of Khan Batu and his far-sighted policies.

Illustrious Mentor

Genghis Khan (between 1155 and 1162 - 1227) had an eldest son, Jochi. He inherited the richest and most promising lands in terms of future conquests - the part of the empire located west of the Irtysh. That is, the future Golden Horde or Ulus Jochi, as the Mongols themselves called this territory.

Towards the end of his life, Genghis Khan realized that he simply would not have time to implement his grandiose plan to conquer the entire world. But he hoped for heirs: they had to surpass the great glory of Alexander the Great, whom the inhabitants of Asia considered a god for many centuries.

However, Genghis Khan would not have been great if he had relied only on providence. This calculating man was accustomed to trusting only himself and his closest associates - the commanders loyal to him, among whom were real geniuses of military affairs. The most respected associate among the military elite and devoted to the ruler - practically the second person in the Horde after Genghis Khan himself - was Subedei-Baghatur (1176-1248). It was to him that the ruler entrusted an important mission: to prepare a future successor.

Subedei (Subudai - depends on the pronunciation) was the person without whom the Mongols could not have conquered half the world. The son of a simple blacksmith from the Uriankhai tribe went down in history as one of the greatest military strategists of all times. Suffice it to say that Napoleon Bonaparte highly appreciated his undoubted military talent. The commander was highly respected in the Horde; the army trusted him infinitely. Subedei-Baghatur also used his authority in politics.

Why, when determining the future conqueror, did Genghis Khan choose young Batu, and not his older brother Ordu-Ichin (Ordu-Eugene) or one of the other heirs? Now it is difficult to answer this question unambiguously. Of course, the sons of Jochi, who was never personally interested in military affairs, had priority. Maybe Orda-Ichin was not old enough to study, so Subedey-bagatur became the mentor of Batu, who was born between 1205 and 1209 - the medieval chronicles do not indicate the exact date.

As history has shown, the mentor coped with his task, preparing a great commander and ruler.

Choice between heirs

It so happened that in 1227 Batu lost both his father and grandfather. The circumstances of the death of both are quite controversial; some historians believe that the rulers were poisoned, because the throne of a huge empire is too big a stake to worry about family ties. A fierce struggle for the throne began in the Horde. The sons of Genghis Khan and his many grandchildren disputed vast possessions with each other.

The throne of the empire was taken by Ogedei (Ögedei) - one of younger brothers Jochi Khan. And promising lands in the west went to Batu. The Mongol army, renowned in battle, unconditionally recognized this young man as its new leader, of course, with the direct support of the authoritative Subedei-bagatur.

However, Batu’s elder brother, Orda-Ichin, did not lose out. He received most of the Jochi Ulus: all the rich eastern lands, including the cities of Central Asia. But Batu, who shared the western part of his father’s possessions with his younger brothers, still had to conquer his empire.

In 1235, a national kurultai (congress of official representatives of all uluses) took place in Mongolia. The clan nobility and the army elite decided to resume campaigns of conquest in a western direction. This important task was entrusted to Batu, and the above-mentioned Subedei-bagatur was appointed to him right hand. The famous commander took part in all the battles of Genghis Khan, and he also accompanied Batu on new campaigns.

Successful commander

The Great Western Campaign of the Mongols began in 1236. He was also joined by the troops of Batu’s cousins ​​- Munke, Guyuk and other descendants of Genghis Khan. First, the Polovtsians were defeated, then Volga Bulgaria was forcibly annexed to the empire.

Rus', fragmented into feudal plots, was also unable to repel the invaders. The squads of the princes simply went out “for a fair fight” in an open field, as they were used to - according to the rules of military affairs of Eastern Europe. The Mongols acted completely differently. They attacked with light cavalry, disorienting and gradually exhausting their opponents, shooting from bows, hiding behind covers. Batu valued his experienced and trained troops, which were well equipped. Captured Chinese engineers built for the Mongolian army unprecedented mechanisms for that time - battering guns, with the help of which it was possible to throw stones weighing up to 150-160 kg over several hundred meters. These machines destroyed fortress walls.

Batu's military strategy was unusual for residents European countries. His troops could attack in the middle of the night to achieve the effect of surprise. The Mongol army moved quickly, trying to completely destroy the enemy army, so as not to give the enemy the opportunity to regroup for a new attack.

Ryazan and Vladimir fell in 1238, Kyiv in 1240. After the conquest of Rus', the troops of Guyuk and Mongke returned back to Mongolia. Further advance to the west was solely the initiative of Batu himself. His army captured Alania, Poland, Moravia, Silesia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Serbia, and Dalmatia. In 1242, Batu's troops ended up in Saxony, but were soon forced to turn back. The news reached them about the death of Khan Ogedei and the convening of the next kurultai. The army returned and settled in the Lower Volga region.

Skillful politician

Supreme power in the empire went to Guyuk, Batu’s cousin, with whom he did not have a good relationship. A new struggle for the throne began, internecine strife reached unprecedented heights.

Offended by Batu's insubordination, in 1248 Guyuk and his army went to the Lower Volga to severely punish his relative. But in the Samarkand region, the supreme ruler of the empire died suddenly. There were rumors that he was poisoned by political opponents, although no one proved anything.

Meanwhile, Batu firmly established himself on his lands; around 1250, on the territory of the modern Astrakhan region, he founded the capital of the Golden Horde - the city of Sarai-Batu. Huge conquests gave impetus to the development of the state; looted goods and captured slaves contributed to economic growth. Rich gifts from vassals vying for the commander's favor marked the beginning of legendary wealth. And where there is money, there is power, influence, and recruits ready to join the winning army.

Other descendants of Genghis Khan had to reckon with the great conqueror. In 1251, Batu was proposed to become the next ruler of the empire at the kurultai. But he refused such an honor; he was more interested in strengthening his own state. Then Munke, Batu’s loyal cousin, took the throne. However, in order to support his protege, the ruler of the Golden Horde was forced to send troops to Mongolia.

Batu always demonstrated his submission to Munka, although in fact he decided everything personally. Hold political influence, skillfully attracting to your side the right people, the ruler of the Golden Horde was always helped by an extensive network of spies. And if one of the Russian princes was thinking of organizing resistance, the punitive detachments of the Horde managed to do it earlier. For example, in 1252 the troops of the Vladimir prince Andrei Yaroslavich and Daniil Romanovich Galitsky were defeated. But Batu favored Alexander Nevsky and obviously valued him as a military leader and strategist.

One way or another, the great conqueror died in 1255. Some sources say that he was poisoned, according to others, the khan was overcome by rheumatism. Both Batu's eldest son, whose name was Sartak, and his grandson Ulagchi soon left this world under very suspicious circumstances. And power in the Golden Horde was seized by Berke, one of the younger brothers of the late ruler, another son of Jochi Khan.

The historical legacy of Batu, as well as the conquests of Genghis Khan, can be treated differently. Being a skilled politician and strategist, possessing an undeniable talent as a military leader, the first ruler of the Golden Horde was a cruel, power-hungry and calculating man. Just like his legendary grandfather.

July 21st, 2012

Empire on a planetary scale

The topic of the Tatar-Mongol yoke still causes a lot of controversy, reasoning and versions. Was it or wasn’t it, in principle, what role did the Russian princes play in it, who attacked Europe and why, how did it all end? Here interesting article on the topic of Batu’s campaigns in Rus'. Let's get some more information about all this...

The historiography about the invasion of the Mongol-Tatars (or Tatar-Mongols, or Tatars and Mongols, and so on, as you like) into Rus' goes back over 300 years. This invasion has become a generally accepted fact since the end of the 17th century, when one of the founders of Russian Orthodoxy, the German Innocent Gisel, wrote the first textbook on the history of Russia - “Synopsis”. According to this book, the Russians hammered home history for the next 150 years. However, so far no historian has taken it upon himself to make a “road map” of Batu Khan’s campaign in the winter of 1237-1238 in North-Eastern Rus'.

A little background

At the end of the 12th century, a new leader appeared among the Mongol tribes - Temujin, who managed to unite most of them around himself. In 1206, he was proclaimed at the kurultai (analogous to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR) as the all-Mongolian khan under the nickname Genghis Khan, who created the notorious “state of nomads.” Without wasting a minute, the Mongols began to conquer the surrounding territories. By 1223, when the Mongol detachment of commanders Jebe and Subudai clashed with the Russian-Polovtsian army on the Kalka River, the zealous nomads managed to conquer territories from Manchuria in the east to Iran, the southern Caucasus and modern western Kazakhstan, defeating the state of Khorezmshah and capturing part of northern China along the way.

In 1227, Genghis Khan died, but his heirs continued his conquests. By 1232, the Mongols reached the middle Volga, where they waged war with the nomadic Cumans and their allies - the Volga Bulgars (ancestors of the modern Volga Tatars). In 1235 (according to other sources - in 1236), a decision was made at the kurultai on a global campaign against the Kipchaks, Bulgars and Russians, as well as further to the West. The grandson of Genghis Khan, Khan Batu (Batu), had to lead this campaign. Here we need to make a digression. In 1236-1237, the Mongols, who at that time were leading fighting in vast areas from modern Ossetia (against the Alans) to the modern Volga republics, they captured Tatarstan (Volga Bulgaria) and in the fall of 1237 began concentration for a campaign against the Russian principalities.

In general, why the nomads from the banks of Kerulen and Onon needed to conquer Ryazan or Hungary is not really known. All attempts by historians to laboriously justify such agility of the Mongols look rather pale. Regarding the Western campaign of the Mongols (1235-1243), they came up with a story that the attack on the Russian principalities was a measure to secure their flank and destroy potential allies of their main enemies - the Polovtsians (part of the Polovtsians went to Hungary, but the bulk of them became the ancestors of modern Kazakhs). True, neither the Ryazan principality, nor the Vladimir-Suzdal, nor the so-called. The “Novgorod Republic” was never allies of either the Cumans or the Volga Bulgars.

Steppe ubermensch on a tireless Mongolian horse (Mongolia, 1911)

Also, almost all historiography about the Mongols does not really say anything about the principles of forming their armies, the principles of managing them, and so on. At the same time, it was believed that the Mongols formed their tumens (field operational units), including from conquered peoples, the soldier was not paid anything for his service, and for any offense they were threatened with the death penalty.

Scientists tried to explain the successes of the nomads this way and that, but each time it turned out quite funny. Although, ultimately, the level of organization of the Mongol army - from intelligence to communications - could be envied by the armies of the most developed states of the 20th century (however, after the end of the era of wonderful campaigns, the Mongols - already 30 years after the death of Genghis Khan - instantly lost all their skills). For example, it is believed that the head of Mongolian intelligence, commander Subudai, maintained relations with the Pope, the German-Roman emperor, Venice, and so on.

Moreover, the Mongols, naturally, during their military campaigns acted without any radio communications, railways, road transport, and so on. In Soviet times, historians interspersed the then-traditional fantasy about steppe ubermenches who knew no fatigue, hunger, fear, etc., with classical ritual in the field of the class-formational approach:

With a general recruitment into the army, each ten tents had to field from one to three warriors, depending on the need, and provide them with food. In peacetime, weapons were stored in special warehouses. It was the property of the state and was issued to soldiers when they went on a campaign. Upon returning from the campaign, each warrior was obliged to surrender his weapons. The soldiers did not receive a salary, but they themselves paid the tax with horses or other livestock (one head per hundred heads). In war, each warrior had an equal right to use the spoils, a certain part of which was obliged to hand over to the khan. In the periods between campaigns, the army was sent to public works. One day a week was reserved for serving the khan.

The organization of the army was based on the decimal system. The army was divided into tens, hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands (tumyns or darkness), headed by foremen, centurions and thousands. The commanders had separate tents and a reserve of horses and weapons.

The main branch of the army was cavalry, which was divided into heavy and light. The heavy cavalry fought with the main forces of the enemy. The light cavalry carried out guard duty and conducted reconnaissance. She started a battle, disrupting the enemy ranks with arrows. The Mongols were excellent archers from horseback. Light cavalry pursued the enemy. The cavalry had a large number of clockwork (spare) horses, which allowed the Mongols to move very quickly over long distances. A feature of the Mongol army was the complete absence of a wheeled train. Only the tents of the khan and especially noble persons were transported on carts...

Each warrior had a file for sharpening arrows, an awl, a needle, thread and a sieve for sifting flour or straining muddy water. The rider had a small tent, two tursuks (leather bags): one for water, the other for kruta (dried sour cheese). If food supplies ran low, the Mongols bled their horses and drank it. In this way they could be content for up to 10 days.

In general, the term “Mongol-Tatars” (or Tatar-Mongols) itself is very bad. It sounds something like Croatian-Indians or Finno-Negros, if we talk about its meaning. The fact is that Russians and Poles, who encountered nomads in the 15th-17th centuries, called them the same - Tatars. Subsequently, the Russians often transferred this to other peoples who had nothing to do with the nomadic Turks in the Black Sea steppes. Europeans also made their contribution to this mess, who for a long time considered Russia (then Muscovy) Tatarstan (more precisely, Tartaria), which led to very bizarre constructions.

The French view of Russia in the mid-18th century

One way or another, society learned that the “Tatars” who attacked Rus' and Europe were also Mongols only in early XIX century, when Christian Kruse published “Atlas and tables for reviewing the history of all European lands and states from their first population to our times.” Then Russian historians happily picked up the idiotic term.

Particular attention should also be paid to the issue of the number of conquerors. Naturally, no documentary data on the size of the Mongol army has reached us, and the most ancient and unquestioningly trusted source among historians is the historical work of a team of authors under the leadership of the official of the Iranian state of the Hulaguids, Rashid ad-Din, “List of Chronicles”. It is believed that it was written at the beginning of the 14th century in Persian, however, it surfaced only at the beginning of the 19th century, the first partial edition in French published in 1836. Until the middle of the 20th century, this source was not completely translated and published.

According to Rashid ad-Din, by 1227 (the year of Genghis Khan's death), the total army of the Mongol Empire was 129 thousand people. If you believe Plano Carpini, then 10 years later the army of phenomenal nomads consisted of 150 thousand Mongols themselves and another 450 thousand people recruited in a “voluntary-forced” manner from subject peoples. Pre-revolutionary Russian historians estimated the size of Batu's army, concentrated in the fall of 1237 near the borders of the Ryazan principality, from 300 to 600 thousand people. At the same time, it was taken for granted that each nomad had 2-3 horses.

By the standards of the Middle Ages, such armies look completely monstrous and implausible, we must admit. However, reproaching pundits for fantasizing is too cruel for them. It is unlikely that any of them could even imagine even a couple of tens of thousands of mounted warriors with 50-60 thousand horses, not to mention the obvious problems with managing such a mass of people and providing them with food. Since history is an inexact science, and indeed not a science at all, everyone can evaluate the range of fantasy researchers. We will use the now classic estimate of the size of Batu’s army at 130-140 thousand people, which was proposed by the Soviet scientist V.V. Kargalov. His assessment (like all the others, completely sucked from thin air, to be very serious) in historiography, however, is prevalent. In particular, it is shared by the largest modern Russian researcher of the history of the Mongol Empire, R.P. Khrapachevsky.

From Ryazan to Vladimir

In the autumn of 1237, Mongol troops, who had fought all spring and summer across vast areas from the North Caucasus, Lower Don and to the middle Volga region, converged on the general gathering place - the Onuza River. It is believed that we are talking about the modern Tsna River in the modern Tambov region. Probably, some detachments of Mongols also gathered in the upper reaches of the Voronezh and Don rivers. There is no exact date for the start of the Mongols’ offensive against the Ryazan principality, but it can be assumed that it took place in any case no later than December 1, 1237. That is, the steppe nomads with a herd of almost half a million horses decided to go camping in winter. This is important for our reconstruction. If so, then they probably had to be sure that in the forests of the Volga-Osk interfluve, still rather weakly colonized by the Russians by that time, they would have enough food for horses and people.

Along the valleys of the Lesnoy and Polny Voronezh rivers, as well as the tributaries of the Pronya River, the Mongol army, moving in one or several columns, passes through the forested watershed of the Oka and Don. The embassy of the Ryazan prince Fyodor Yuryevich arrives to them, which turned out to be ineffective (the prince is killed), and somewhere in the same region the Mongols meet the Ryazan army in a field. In a fierce battle, they destroy it, and then move upstream of the Pronya, plundering and destroying small Ryazan cities - Izheslavets, Belgorod, Pronsk, and burning Mordovian and Russian villages.

Here we need to make a small clarification: we do not have accurate data on the number of people in the then North-Eastern Rus', but if we follow the reconstruction of modern scientists and archaeologists (V.P. Darkevich, M.N. Tikhomirov, A.V. Kuza), then it was not large and, in addition, it was characterized by low population density. For example, the largest city of the Ryazan land - Ryazan, numbered, according to V.P. Darkevich, a maximum of 6-8 thousand people, another 10-14 thousand people could live in the agricultural district of the city (within a radius of 20-30 kilometers). The remaining cities had a population of several hundred people, at best, like Murom - up to a couple of thousand. Based on this, it is unlikely that the total population of the Ryazan principality could exceed 200-250 thousand people.

Of course, for the conquest of such a “proto-state” 120-140 thousand warriors were more than an excessive number, but we will stick to the classical version.

On December 16, the Mongols, after a march of 350-400 kilometers (that is, the pace of the average daily march here is up to 18-20 kilometers), reach Ryazan and begin its siege - they build wooden fence, build stone-throwing machines with which they shell the city. In general, historians admit that the Mongols achieved incredible - by the standards of that time - success in siege warfare. For example, historian R.P. Khrapachevsky seriously believes that the Mongols were able to build any stone-throwing machines on the spot from available wood in literally a day or two:

There was everything necessary to assemble stone throwers - the united army of the Mongols had enough specialists from China and Tangut..., and Russian forests abundantly supplied the Mongols with wood for assembling siege weapons.

Finally, on December 21, Ryazan fell after a fierce assault. True, an inconvenient question arises: we know that the total length of the city’s defensive fortifications was less than 4 kilometers. Most of the Ryazan soldiers died in the border battle, so it is unlikely that there were many soldiers in the city. Why did a gigantic Mongol army of 140 thousand soldiers sit for 6 whole days under its walls if the balance of forces was at least 100-150:1?

We also do not have any clear evidence of what the climatic conditions were in December 1238, but since the Mongols chose the ice of rivers as a method of transportation (there was no other way to pass through wooded areas, the first permanent roads in North-Eastern Rus' are documented only in the 14th century). century, all Russian researchers agree with this version), we can assume that it was already a normal winter with frosts, possibly snow.

An important question is also what the Mongolian horses ate during this campaign. From the works of historians and modern studies of steppe horses, it is clear that we were talking about very unpretentious, small horses - up to 110-120 centimeters tall at the withers - koniks. Their main diet is hay and grass (they did not eat grain). In their natural habitat, they are unpretentious and quite hardy, and in winter, during tebenevka, they are able to tear up snow in the steppe and eat last year’s grass.

Based on this, historians unanimously believe that thanks to these properties, the question of feeding the horses during the campaign in the winter of 1237-1238 against Rus' did not arise. Meanwhile, it is not difficult to notice that the conditions in this region (thickness of snow cover, area of ​​grass stands, as well as overall quality phytocenoses) differ from, say, Khalkha or Turkestan. In addition, the winter training of steppe horses consists of the following: a herd of horses slowly, walking a few hundred meters a day, moves across the steppe, looking for withered grass under the snow. Animals thus save their energy costs. However, during the campaign against Rus', these horses had to walk 10-20-30 or even more kilometers a day in the cold (see below), carrying luggage or a warrior. Were horses able to replenish their energy expenditure under such conditions? Another interesting question: if Mongolian horses dug through snow and found grass under it, then what should be the area of ​​their daily feeding grounds?

After the capture of Ryazan, the Mongols began to advance towards the Kolomna fortress, which was a kind of “gate” to the Vladimir-Suzdal land. Having walked 130 kilometers from Ryazan to Kolomna, according to Rashid ad-Din and R.P. Khrapachevsky, the Mongols were “stuck” at this fortress until January 5 or even 10, 1238 - that is, at least for almost 15-20 days. On the other hand, a strong Vladimir army is moving towards Kolomna, which Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich probably equipped immediately after receiving news of the fall of Ryazan (he and the Chernigov prince refused to help Ryazan). The Mongols send an embassy to him with an offer to become their tributary, but the negotiations also turn out to be fruitless (according to the Laurentian Chronicle, the prince still agrees to pay tribute, but still sends troops to Kolomna. It is difficult to explain the logic of such an act).

According to V.V. Kargalov and R.P. Khrapachevsky, the battle of Kolomna began no later than January 9 and lasted for 5 whole days (according to Rashid ad-Din). Here another logical question immediately arises - historians are sure that the military forces of the Russian principalities as a whole were modest and corresponded to the reconstructions of that era, when an army of 1-2 thousand people was standard, and 4-5 thousand or more people seemed like a huge army. It is unlikely that the Vladimir prince Yuri Vsevolodovich could have collected more (if we make a digression: the total population of the Vladimir land, according to various estimates, varied between 400-800 thousand people, but they were all scattered over a vast territory, and the population of the capital city of the earth - Vladimir, even according to the most daring reconstructions, it did not exceed 15-25 thousand people). However, near Kolomna the Mongols were pinned down for several days, and the intensity of the battle is shown by the fact of the death of Genghisid Kulkan, the son of Genghis Khan. With whom did the gigantic army of 140 thousand nomads fight so fiercely? With several thousand Vladimir soldiers?

After the victory at Kolomna in either a three- or five-day battle, the Mongols are vigorously moving along the ice of the Moscow River towards the future Russian capital. They cover a distance of 100 kilometers in literally 3-4 days (the pace of an average daily march is 25-30 kilometers): according to R.P. Khrapachevsky, the nomads began the siege of Moscow on January 15 (according to N.M. Karamzin - January 20). The nimble Mongols took the Muscovites by surprise - they did not even know about the results of the battle of Kolomna, and after a five-day siege, Moscow shared the fate of Ryazan: the city was burned, all its inhabitants were exterminated or taken prisoner.

Again, Moscow at that time, if we take archaeological data as the basis for our reasoning, was an absolutely tiny town. Thus, the first fortifications, built back in 1156, had a length of less than 1 kilometer, and the area of ​​the fortress itself did not exceed 3 hectares. By 1237, it is believed that the area of ​​the fortifications had already reached 10-12 hectares (that is, approximately half the territory of the current Kremlin). The city had its own suburb - it was located on the territory of modern Red Square. The total population of such a city hardly exceeded 1000 people. What a huge army of Mongols, possessing supposedly unique siege technologies, did for five whole days in front of this insignificant fortress, one can only guess.

It is also worth noting here that all historians recognize the fact of the movement of the Mongol-Tatars without a convoy. They say that the unpretentious nomads did not need it. Then it remains not entirely clear how and on what the Mongols moved their stone-throwing machines, shells for them, forges (for repairing weapons, replenishing lost arrowheads, etc.), and how they drove away prisoners. Since during the entire period of archaeological excavations on the territory of North-Eastern Rus' not a single burial of “Mongol-Tatars” was found, some historians even agreed to the version that the nomads took their dead back to the steppes (V.P. Darkevich, V. .V. Kargalov). Of course, it’s not even worth raising the question of the fate of the wounded or sick in this light (otherwise our historians will come up with the fact that they were eaten, a joke)...

However, after spending about a week in the vicinity of Moscow and plundering its agricultural contado (the main agricultural crop in this region was rye and partly oats, but steppe horses accepted grain very poorly), the Mongols moved along the ice of the Klyazma River (crossing the forest watershed between this river and Moscow River) to Vladimir. Having covered over 140 kilometers in 7 days (the pace of an average daily march is about 20 kilometers), on February 2, 1238, the nomads began the siege of the capital of the Vladimir land. By the way, it was at this transition that the Mongol army of 120-140 thousand people was “caught” by a tiny detachment of the Ryazan boyar Evpatiy Kolovrat of either 700 or 1700 people, against whom the Mongols - out of powerlessness - were forced to use stone-throwing machines in order to defeat him ( It is worth considering that the legend of Kolovrat was recorded, according to historians, only in the 15th century, so... it is difficult to consider it completely documentary).

Let’s ask an academic question: what is an army of 120-140 thousand people with almost 400 thousand horses (and it’s not clear if there is a convoy?) moving on the ice of some Oka or Moscow river? The simplest calculations show that even moving with a front of 2 kilometers (in reality, the width of these rivers is significantly less), such an army is in the most ideal conditions(everyone walks at the same speed, keeping a minimum distance of 10 meters) stretches for at least 20 kilometers. If we take into account that the width of the Oka is only 150-200 meters, then the gigantic army of Batu already stretches for almost... 200 kilometers! Again, if everyone walks at the same speed, maintaining a minimum distance. And on the ice of the Moscow or Klyazma rivers, the width of which varies from 50 to 100 meters at best? For 400-800 kilometers?

It is interesting that none of the Russian scientists over the past 200 years have even asked such a question, seriously believing that giant cavalry armies literally fly through the air.

In general, at the first stage of Batu Khan’s invasion of North-Eastern Rus' - from December 1, 1237 to February 2, 1238, a conventional Mongolian horse covered about 750 kilometers, which gives an average daily rate of movement of 12 kilometers. But if we exclude from the calculations at least 15 days of standing in the Oka floodplain (after the capture of Ryazan on December 21 and the battle of Kolomna), as well as a week of rest and looting near Moscow, the pace of the average daily march of the Mongol cavalry will seriously improve - up to 17 kilometers per day.

It cannot be said that these are some kind of record paces of march (the Russian army during the war with Napoleon, for example, made 30-40-kilometer daily marches), the interesting thing here is that all this happened in the dead of winter, and such paces were maintained for quite a long time.

From Vladimir to Kozelsk

On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War XIII century

Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich of Vladimir, having learned about the approach of the Mongols, left Vladimir, leaving with a small squad for the Trans-Volga region - there, among the windbreaks on the Sit River, he set up a camp and awaited the arrival of reinforcements from his brothers - Yaroslav (father of Alexander Nevsky) and Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich. There were very few warriors left in the city, led by Yuri's sons - Vsevolod and Mstislav. Despite this, the Mongols spent 5 days with the city, shelling it with stone throwers, taking it only after the assault on February 7th. But before this, a small detachment of nomads led by Subudai managed to burn Suzdal.

After the capture of Vladimir, the Mongol army is divided into three parts. The first and largest unit under the command of Batu goes from Vladimir to the northwest through the impassable forests of the Klyazma and Volga watershed. The first march is from Vladimir to Yuryev-Polsky (about 60-65 kilometers). Next, the army is divided - part goes smoothly to the northwest to Pereyaslavl-Zalessky (about 60 kilometers), and after a five-day siege this city fell. What was Pereyaslavl like then? It was a relatively small city, slightly larger than Moscow, although it had defensive fortifications up to 2.5 kilometers long. But its population also hardly exceeded 1-2 thousand people.

Then the Mongols go to Ksnyatin (about another 100 kilometers), to Kashin (30 kilometers), then turn west and move along the ice of the Volga to Tver (from Ksnyatin in a straight line it’s a little more than 110 kilometers, but they go along the Volga, there it’s all 250- 300 kilometers).

The second part goes through the dense forests of the Volga, Oka and Klyazma watershed from Yuryev-Polsky to Dmitrov (about 170 kilometers in a straight line), then after its capture - to Volok-Lamsky (130-140 kilometers), from there to Tver (about 120 kilometers) , after the capture of Tver - to Torzhok (together with the detachments of the first part) - in a straight line it is about 60 kilometers, but, apparently, they walked along the river, so it will be at least 100 kilometers. The Mongols reached Torzhok on February 21 - 14 days after leaving Vladimir.

Thus, the first part of the Batu detachment travels at least 500-550 kilometers in 15 days through dense forests and along the Volga. True, from here you need to throw out several days of siege of cities and it turns out about 10 days of march. For each of which, nomads pass through forests 50-55 kilometers a day! The second part of his detachment covers a total distance of less than 600 kilometers, which gives an average daily march pace of up to 40 kilometers. Taking into account a couple of days for sieges of cities - up to 50 kilometers per day.

Near Torzhok, a rather modest city by the standards of that time, the Mongols were stuck for at least 12 days and took it only on March 5 (V.V. Kargalov). After the capture of Torzhok, one of the Mongol detachments advanced towards Novgorod another 150 kilometers, but then turned back.

The second detachment of the Mongol army under the command of Kadan and Buri left Vladimir to the east, moving along the ice of the Klyazma River. Having walked 120 kilometers to Starodub, the Mongols burned this city, and then “cut off” the forested watershed between the lower Oka and middle Volga, reaching Gorodets (this is about another 170-180 kilometers, if the crow flies). Further, the Mongolian detachments along the ice of the Volga reached Kostoroma (this is about 350-400 kilometers), some detachments even reached Galich Mersky. From Kostroma, the Mongols of Buri and Kadan went to join the third detachment under the command of Burundai to the west - to Uglich. Most likely, the nomads moved on the ice of the rivers (in any case, let us remind you once again, this is the custom in Russian historiography), which gives about another 300-330 kilometers of travel.

In early March, Kadan and Buri were already near Uglich, having covered a little over three weeks to 1000-1100 kilometers. The average daily pace of the march was about 45-50 kilometers for the nomads, which is close to the performance of the Batu detachment.

The third detachment of Mongols under the command of Burundai turned out to be the “slowest” - after the capture of Vladimir, he set out for Rostov (170 kilometers in a straight line), then covered another 100 kilometers to Uglich. Part of Burundai's forces made a forced march to Yaroslavl (about 70 kilometers) from Uglich. At the beginning of March, Burundai unmistakably found the camp of Yuri Vsevolodovich in the Trans-Volga forests, whom he defeated in the battle on the Sit River on March 4. The transition from Uglich to the City and back is about 130 kilometers. In total, Burundai's troops covered about 470 kilometers in 25 days - this gives us only 19 kilometers of the average daily march.

In general, the conditional average Mongolian horse clocked up “on the speedometer” from December 1, 1237 to March 4, 1238 (94 days) from 1200 (the minimum estimate, suitable only for a small part of the Mongol army) to 1800 kilometers. The conditional daily journey ranges from 12-13 to 20 kilometers. In reality, if we throw out standing in the floodplain of the Oka River (about 15 days), 5 days of the assault on Moscow and 7 days of rest after its capture, the five-day siege of Vladimir, as well as another 6-7 days for the sieges of Russian cities in the second half of February, it turns out that Mongolian horses covered an average of 25-30 kilometers for each of their 55 days of movement. These are excellent results for horses, taking into account the fact that all this happened in the cold, in the middle of forests and snowdrifts, with a clear lack of feed (it is unlikely that the Mongols could requisition a lot of feed from the peasants for their horses, especially since the steppe horses did not eat practically grain) and hard work.

The Mongolian steppe horse has not changed for centuries (Mongolia, 1911)

After the capture of Torzhok, the main part of the Mongol army concentrated on the upper Volga in the Tver region. They then moved in the first half of March 1238 on a broad front south into the steppe. The left wing, under the command of Kadan and Buri, passed through the forests of the Klyazma and Volga watershed, then went to the upper reaches of the Moscow River and descended along it to the Oka. In a straight line it is about 400 kilometers, taking into account the average pace of movement of fast-moving nomads - this is about 15-20 days of travel for them. So, apparently, already in the first half of April this part of the Mongol army entered the steppe. We have no information about how the melting of snow and ice on the rivers affected the movement of this detachment (the Ipatiev Chronicle only reports that the steppe inhabitants moved very quickly). There is also no information about what this detachment did the next month after entering the steppe; it is only known that in May Kadan and Buri came to the rescue of Batu, who by that time was stuck near Kozelsk.

Small Mongol detachments, probably, as V.V. believes. Kargalov and R.P. Khrapachevsky, remained on the middle Volga, plundering and burning Russian settlements. How they came out into the steppe in the spring of 1238 is not known.

Most of the Mongol army under the command of Batu and Burundai, instead of taking the shortest route to the steppe, which the detachments of Kadan and Buri took, chose a very intricate route:

More is known about Batu’s route - from Torzhok he moved along the Volga and Vazuza (a tributary of the Volga) to the interfluve of the Dnieper, and from there through the Smolensk lands to the Chernigov city of Vshchizh, lying on the banks of the Desna, writes Khrapachevsky. Having made a detour along the upper reaches of the Volga to the west and northwest, the Mongols turned south and, crossing watersheds, went to the steppes. Probably some detachments were marching in the center, through Volok-Lamsky (through the forests). Approximately, the left edge of Batu covered about 700-800 kilometers during this time, other detachments a little less. By April 1, the Mongols reached Serensk, and Kozelsk (the chronicle Kozeleska, to be precise) - April 3-4 (according to other information - already March 25). On average, this gives us about 35-40 more kilometers of daily march (and the Mongols no longer walk on the ice of rivers, but through dense forests on watersheds).

Near Kozelsk, where ice drift on Zhizdra and snow melting in its floodplain could already begin, Batu was stuck for almost 2 months (more precisely, for 7 weeks - 49 days - until May 23-25, maybe later, if we count from April 3, and according to Rashid ad-Din - generally for 8 weeks). Why the Mongols necessarily needed to besiege an insignificant, even by medieval Russian standards, town that had no strategic significance is not entirely clear. For example, the neighboring towns of Krom, Spat, Mtsensk, Domagoshch, Devyagorsk, Dedoslavl, Kursk were not even touched by the nomads.

Historians are still arguing on this topic; no sane argument has been given. The funniest version was proposed by the folk historian of the “Eurasian persuasion” L.N. Gumilev, who suggested that the Mongols took revenge on the grandson of the Chernigov prince Mstislav, who ruled in Kozelsk, for the murder of ambassadors on the Kalka River in 1223. It’s funny that the Smolensk prince Mstislav the Old was also involved in the murder of the ambassadors. But the Mongols did not touch Smolensk...

Logically, Batu had to quickly leave for the steppes, since the spring thaw and lack of food threatened him with the complete loss of, at a minimum, “transport” - that is, horses.

None of the historians was puzzled by the question of what the horses and the Mongols themselves ate while besieging Kozelsk for almost two months (using standard stone-throwing machines). Finally, it is simply difficult to believe that a town with a population of several hundred, even a couple of thousand people, a huge army of the Mongols, numbering tens of thousands of soldiers, and supposedly having unique siege technologies and equipment, could not take 7 weeks...

As a result, near Kozelsk, the Mongols allegedly lost up to 4,000 people, and only the arrival of the troops of Buri and Kadan in May 1238 from the steppes saved the situation - the town was finally taken and destroyed. For the sake of humor, it is worth saying that former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, in honor of the services of the population of Kozelsk to Russia, awarded the settlement the title of “City of Military Glory.” The humor was that archaeologists, after almost 15 years of searching, were unable to find unambiguous evidence of the existence of Kozelsk destroyed by Batu. You can talk about what passions were boiling over this issue in the scientific and bureaucratic community of Kozelsk.

If we summarize the estimated data in a first and very rough approximation, it turns out that from December 1, 1237 to April 3, 1238 (the beginning of the siege of Kozelsk), a conventional Mongol horse traveled on average from 1,700 to 2,800 kilometers. In terms of 120 days, this gives an average daily journey ranging from 15 to 23-odd kilometers. Since periods of time are known when the Mongols did not move (sieges, etc., and this is about 45 days in total), the scope of their average daily actual march spreads from 23 to 38 kilometers per day.

Simply put, this means more than intense stress on the horses. The question of how many of them survived after such transitions in rather harsh climatic conditions and an obvious lack of food is Russian historians not even discussed. As well as the question of the Mongolian losses themselves.

For example, R.P. Khrapachevsky generally believes that during the entire Western campaign of the Mongols in 1235-1242, their losses amounted to only about 15% of their original number, while historian V.B. Koshcheev counted up to 50 thousand sanitary losses during the campaign in North-Eastern Rus' alone. However, all these losses - both in people and horses, the brilliant Mongols quickly made up for at the expense of... the conquered peoples themselves. Therefore, already in the summer of 1238, Batu’s armies continued the war in the steppes against the Kipchaks, and in 1241 Europe was invaded by who knows what army - for example, Thomas of Splitsky reports that there were a huge number of... Russians, Kipchaks, Bulgars, Mordovians, etc. P. peoples It is not really clear how many of them there were “Mongols” themselves.

The events in Rus' in 1237 went down in history and affected the future of the Russian people. Historians are confident that it is necessary to pay special attention to this period of time when studying history.

Mongol invasion to Rus', the date of which dates back to 1237, marked the beginning of the Tatar yoke. The army was led by the famous commander Batu. He commanded a cavalry that many considered invincible, so the mere mention of it could strike fear into the enemies of the horde. It is noteworthy that the attack was not just successful.

The result of a losing battle for Rus' was slavery, which lasted two centuries. And although most historians agree that the relationship between enslavers and those who actually became slaves was quite simple, this is not so. In fact, the relationship between the two powers could hardly be called simple, since they were formed for quite a long time and under very strange circumstances.

It is noteworthy that Batu’s campaigns against Rus' began long before 1237. 14 years before this, the famous battle of Kalka took place. Then Mstislav stood at the head of the Russian army. The Kiev prince led a large army into battle, wanting to repel the enemy. Two military commanders became his opponents: Jebe-noyon, Subedei-bagatur.

And although the Russian military leader developed a very effective plan, he failed to defeat his enemies. His army was completely destroyed. For a while, a kind of truce reigned. But already in 1236 the horde became active again, and the Polovtsians were the first to suffer from its raids. The Polovtsians failed to contain the power of the horde, so a year later the Mongol army was already on the border with the Ryazan principality.

As soon as the Cumans fell, more than 140,000 warriors of the horde under the command of Batu Khan, who was a descendant of the great Genghis Khan, began to actively advance towards the territory under the rule of the Ryazan principality. According to some reports, the active phase of the invasion began in winter. However, historians also name another date - the autumn of this year. Unfortunately, there is no data that could confirm or refute the veracity of this information.

Note! The exact date of the attack by the Mongol army remains unknown to this day.

The cavalry, led by the grandson of Genghis Khan, quickly advanced to the very heart of Rus'. None of the princes was able to give a worthy rebuff to the enemy, so the state was defeated in record time.

Let's briefly look at the chronology of events:

• 1237 - campaign against Ryazan. The prince hoped that he would be able to hold off the enemy and wait for help. But already 6 days after the start of the siege, Ryazan found itself in the power of Batu.
• 1238 It became clear that the next goal of the Mongols was the conquest of Moscow. Prince Vladimir tried to resist. He gathered an army and entered into battle with the enemy. The battle took place near Kolomna, and it did not in any way affect the development of events. After all, after the defeat of the prince, the khan laid siege to Moscow. The city lasted only 4 days, after which it was conquered.
• 1238 The siege of the city of Vladimir turned out to be the longest. The horde stood under the city gates for exactly 8 days. After this, the city fell under the onslaught of the Horde.

Mongol conquest of Rus'

Conquering the city of Vladimir was a wise decision. Because after this the khan received enormous power. The northern and eastern lands came under his rule. This was a huge advantage. In 1238, the leader of the Horde made a tactical move. He managed to conquer Torzhok, thanks to which the path to Veliky Novgorod was opened. However, the main trick was to distract attention.

The princes expected the Mongols to move towards Novgorod. But the khan acted more wisely. He sent an army to besiege Kozelsk. The siege lasted exactly 7 days. It is unknown how many more days the brave warriors could have held out, but Batu decided to make a deal with them, and the princes accepted his terms. After all, he promised to save their lives. And although the princes fulfilled their obligations, the grandson of Genghis Khan did not keep his promise. The conquest of Kozelsk marked the end of Batu's first invasion of Rus'.

Although many believe that the Mongol conquest of Rus' was a one-stage event, it is difficult to agree with this.

Historians who have studied in detail all available materials claim that the conquest took place in two stages:

• The first stage is the battles that took place from 1237 to 1238. Numerous battles took place during these years. As a result, the Horde managed to capture not only the northern, but also the eastern lands.
• The second stage - battles dated 1239-1242. At this time, the khan carried out a large-scale offensive, which allowed him to gain power over the southern territories. It was after the end of the second stage that the yoke appeared.

Useful video: the invasion of Mongol conquerors in Rus'

First stage

Batu's invasion of Rus' began with a campaign against Ryazan. And although all the warriors fought bravely, they were unable to withstand the 150,000-strong army. As soon as the Horde broke into the city, they carried out a massacre. They killed all the inhabitants of the city. Subsequently, there was another battle near Ryazan that went down in history.

Boyar Evpatiy Kolovrat managed to gather a small army under his leadership. He, together with a small army (1,700 soldiers), set off after the Mongol army. He managed to defeat the rearguard of the nomads, but no more. In an unequal battle, everyone who was under the leadership of the boyar, like himself, died.

In the autumn of 1237, a large army of Mongol-Tatars, approaching the city of Ryazan, began a siege. Ambassadors were sent to demand that the prince pay tribute. The demands of the Horde were impossible to fulfill, since they asked for a tenth of everything that Prince Yuri himself owned. As soon as the refusal was given, the city residents began to prepare for defense.

Hoping to receive support, the Ryazan prince sent a message to Yuri Vsevolodovich, who at that time was the Vladimir prince. However, help did not come on time. And so, after the invaders used special weapons to break the high walls, the fortress fell.

Second phase

When a new campaign against Rus' began, Batu’s tactics changed. This time his targets were Chernigov and Pereyaslav. Historians note that the change in battle tactics was caused by some difficulties. Now Batu could not carry out rapid attacks. And the reason for this was the game on two fronts. After all, in parallel with this, he tried to defeat the Polovtsians in the Crimean lands. As a result, the power of the horde became less impressive.

But even despite this, the princes were unable to contain the horde. Batu’s next goal was the majestic Kyiv. And although the city was one of the largest in Rus', it quickly fell. It is noted that after the conquest the city was almost completely destroyed. Having captured Kyiv, the Horde went to Galich and Vladimir-Volynsky. As soon as the new lands were captured, the Tatar-Mongols set off on a campaign against European lands.

As was written above, events during the second invasion did not develop so quickly.

And in many ways this was the reason that the capture of cities had to be carried out gradually:

1. In 1239, the second campaign of the Horde began. And again the horde is under the leadership of Batu, whose influence has increased many times over. After all, he managed to make significant progress in expanding the lands that belonged to the Tatar-Mongols. This year becomes significant, since the khan manages to conquer Chernigov and Pereyaslav.
2. Autumn 1240. The army led by the grandson of Genghis Khan is heading towards Kyiv. The siege begins.
3. December 1240. The siege of Kyiv ends. The city was unable to resist the onslaught of the mighty horde for long.

Batu's invasion of Southern Rus'

After Batu managed to capture and completely destroy Kyiv, he decided to divide the horde into two troops. This decision was caused by the need to fight on two fronts at once. After all, the leader dreamed of capturing Galich and Vladimir-Volynsky. And Batu’s dream quickly came true. As soon as he gained power over these lands, another important decision was made - to go on a military campaign to European lands.

Military forces of the Mongol-Tatars

Speaking about the beginning of the invasion, it should be noted that it was quite rapid. Although historians are somewhat surprised by the fact that Batu managed to move across the territory of Rus' quite quickly. After all, the number of his troops was very impressive.

This is interesting! It is impossible to announce the exact size of the army. According to different versions, the horde numbered 50,000, 200,000 and even 400,000 warriors. The true answer is unknown.

Of course, it cannot be said that the number of the horde was small. It must also be taken into account that the Russians fought fiercely and killed many nomads. Consequently, it was simply impossible to get by with a small number of warriors. But the question remains open: how exactly could the leader provide food for, for example, 400,000 troops?

Army of Khan Batu

The possible number of horses is also striking. As you know, nomads, going to battle, took several horses with them:

• riding - the rider constantly moved on it;
• used a pack pack when it was necessary to transport weapons;
• combat always went without load, so that the rider could enter the battle at any time on a fresh horse.

And therefore, determining whether the army really numbered more than 300,000 warriors is quite problematic. Since there is no evidence that the horde could provide food for such a number of people and horses.

Useful video: Batu’s invasion in Rus', shocking facts

Conclusion

To sum up, it is safe to say that such a large-scale battle truly changed the course of history. Of course, Batu’s merit cannot be denied in this regard. Because it was under his leadership that the nomads managed to significantly expand their own territory.

The Russian princely squads were an excellent army at that time. Their weapons were famous far beyond the borders of Rus', but these squads were small in number and numbered only a few hundred people. This was too little to organize the country’s defense against a well-prepared aggressive enemy. The princely squads were unsuitable for action in large forces under a single command, according to a single plan. The main part of the Russian army was made up of urban and rural militias, which were recruited at the moment of danger. About their weapons and vocational training we can say that they left much to be desired. Russian cities with their fortifications could not be an insurmountable obstacle to the powerful siege technology of the nomads. The population of large cities was 20-30 thousand people and in the event of an attack they could field up to 10 thousand defenders, and since the city, as a rule, resisted alone, an army of 60-70 thousand could break the resistance of the defenders within a week. Thus, the Russian state consisted of several large principalities, constantly competing with each other, not possessing one large army capable of resisting the armada of nomads.

In 1223, the 30,000-strong army of Subdey and Ocheuchi, having completed the defeat of the states of Central Asia, passed through Northern Iran, entered the Caucasus, destroying several ancient and rich cities, defeating Georgian troops, penetrated through the Shirvan Gorge into the Northern Caucasus and clashed with the Alans. The Alans united with the Cumans who were nomadic there, as the Persian historian Rashid ad-Din testifies, and fought together, “but none of them remained victorious.” Then the Mongol-Tatars persuaded the Polovtsian leaders to leave the lands of the Alans, and then “defeated the Alans, having done everything in their power in terms of robbery and murder.”

“In 1223, an unknown people appeared; an unheard of army came, the godless Tatars, about whom no one knows well who they are and where they came from, and what kind of language they have, and what tribe they are, and what kind of faith they have... The Polovtsy are not could resist them and ran to the Dnieper. Their Khan Kotyan was the father-in-law of Mstislav of Galicia; he came with a bow to the prince, his son-in-law, and to all the Russian princes..., and said: The Tatars took away our land today, and tomorrow they will take yours, so protect us; if you do not help us, then we will be cut off today, and you will be cut off tomorrow."

The princes decided to help Kotyan. The hike began in April when the rivers were in full flood. The troops were heading down the Dnieper. The command was exercised by the Kyiv prince Mstislav Romanovich the Good and Mstislav Mstislavich the Udal, who were cousins. Just before the Russian offensive, Mongol-Tatar ambassadors arrived in Rus', who assured that they would not touch the Russians if they did not go to the aid of their neighbors.

On the 17th day of the campaign, the army stopped near Olshen, somewhere on the banks of the Ros. There he was found by the second Tatar embassy. Unlike the first time, when the ambassadors were killed, these were released. Immediately after crossing the Dnieper, Russian troops encountered the enemy’s vanguard, chased it for 8 days, and on the eighth day they reached the bank of the Kalka River (now the Kalchik River, a tributary of the Kalmius River, in the Donetsk region, Ukraine). Here Mstislav the Udaloy and some princes immediately crossed the Kalka, leaving Mstislav of Kyiv on the other bank.

According to the Laurentian Chronicle, the battle took place on May 31, 1223. The troops that crossed the river were almost completely destroyed. The onslaught of the brave squad of Mstislav the Udal, who almost broke through the ranks of the nomads, was not supported by other princes and all his attacks were repulsed. The Polovtsian detachments, unable to withstand the blows of the Mongol cavalry, fled, disrupting the battle formations of the Russian army. The camp of Mstislav of Kyiv, set up on the other bank and heavily fortified, the troops of Jebe and Subedei stormed for 3 days and were able to take only by cunning and deceit, when the prince, believing the promises of Subedei, stopped resistance. As a result of this, Mstislav the Good and his entourage were brutally destroyed, Mstislav the Udaloy fled. The Russian losses in this battle were very high, six princes were killed, and only a tenth of the soldiers returned home.

The Battle of Kalka was lost not so much because of disagreements between the rival princes, but because of historical factors. Firstly, Jebe’s army was tactically and positionally completely superior to the united regiments of the Russian princes, who had in their ranks mostly princely squads, reinforced in this case by the Polovtsians. This entire army did not have sufficient unity, was not trained in combat tactics, based more on the personal courage of each warrior. Secondly, such a united army also needed a sole commander, recognized not only by the leaders, but also by the warriors themselves, and who would exercise unified command. Thirdly, the Russian troops, having made a mistake in assessing the enemy’s forces, were also unable to correctly choose the battle site, the terrain of which was completely favorable to the Tatars. However, in fairness it must be said that at that time, not only in Rus', but also in Europe, there would not have been an army capable of competing with the formations of Genghis Khan.

The army of Jebe and Subedey, having defeated the militia of the southern Russian princes on Kalka, entered the Chernigov land, reached Novgorod-Seversky and turned back, bringing fear and destruction everywhere with it. In the same 1223, Jebe and Subedey raided Volga Bulgaria, but failed. The Arab historian Ibn al-Asir described these events as follows: “The Bulgars ambushed them in several places, opposed them and, luring them until they went beyond the ambush site, attacked them from the rear.”

The campaign, which lasted two and a half years, allowed the Mongol-Tatars to directly become acquainted with Russian troops and the fortifications of Russian cities; they received information from prisoners about the situation inside the Russian principalities - in-depth strategic reconnaissance was carried out.

Conquest of North-Eastern Rus'

The Military Council (kurultai) of 1235 announced an all-Mongol campaign to the west. The Great Khan Udegei sent Batu, the head of the Juchi ulus, as reinforcement to conquer Volga Bulgaria, Diit-Kinchak and Rus' with the main forces of the Mongol army under the command of Subedey. In total, 14 “princes”, descendants of Genghis Khan, took part in the campaign with their hordes. All winter the Mongols gathered in the upper reaches of the Irtysh, preparing for a big campaign. In the spring of 1236, countless horsemen, countless herds, endless carts with military equipment and siege weapons moved west.

In the fall of 1236, their army attacked Volga Bulgaria.
Possessing a huge superiority of forces, they broke through the Bulgar defense line, cities were taken one after another. Bulgaria was terribly destroyed and burned. In the spring of 1237, Subedey's troops advanced into the Caspian steppes and staged a raid on the Cumans, most of whom were killed, the rest fled to Russian lands. In battles with their fast and elusive opponents, the khans used “round-up” tactics: they walked across the steppes in a wide front of small detachments, gradually encircling the Polovtsian nomads. The campaign was led by three high-ranking khans: Guyuk, Mankhe and Mengu. The war in the Polovtsian steppes dragged on throughout the summer. But as a result, the Mongol-Tatars subjugated almost all the lands between the Volga and Don rivers. The most powerful Polovtsian khan, Yuri Konchakovich, was defeated.

Another large army, led by Batu, as well as the khans Ordu, Berke, Buri and Kulman, fought on the right bank of the Middle Volga River in the lands of the Burats, Arzhans and Mordovians. The events of this campaign are little known.

Thus, the peoples of the Lower and Middle Volga region put up stubborn resistance, which delayed Batu’s advance and only by the fall of 1237 was he able to concentrate all the main forces for the invasion of North-Eastern Rus'. The Russian princes could not have been unaware of the impending offensive. They received information from Russian and Bulgarian merchants. And the situation with the conquest of the southeastern neighbors gave rise to certain thoughts. But despite this, after the battle on the Kalka River, strife between the princes did not stop. Consequently, there was no single army under a single command to repel the onslaught of a powerful enemy, and the unified defense system of the southern steppe borders was violated. Many princes hoped for strong wooden fortresses, not taking into account the complex siege technology available to the Mongol-Tatars.

In the fall of 1237, Batu was placed at the head of the united army. In December 1237, the rivers rose. On Sura, a tributary of the Volga, on Voronezh, a tributary of the Don, Batu’s troops appeared. Winter opened the road along the ice of rivers to North-Eastern Rus'.

Based on geographical and demographic considerations, as well as military calculations, it can be assumed that Batu brought 30-40 thousand horsemen to Rus'. Even such a seemingly small army, the Russian sovereign princes had nothing to oppose.

The first city that stood in the way of the conquerors was Ryazan. For the Ryazan princes this was a complete surprise. They were accustomed to raids on Rus' by the Polovtsians and other nomadic tribes in the summer-autumn period. Khan Batu, having invaded the principality, presented an ultimatum, where he demanded “tithes in everything: in princes, in horses, in people.” The prince, in order to gain time, sent his son Fyodor to Khan Batu with rich gifts, and in the meantime he himself began to quickly prepare for battle. He sent messengers to Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich of Vladimir and to Prince of Chernigov for help. But both of them refused the Ryazan prince. Despite this, the people of Ryazan decided to stand to the death for their land and to the ultimatum they replied: “If we are all gone, then everything will be yours!”

Together with the prince of Ryazan, several more “helpful” princes - the Pronsky, Murom and Kolomna principalities - moved towards the Mongol-Tatars. But their squads did not have time to reach the fortified lines on the steppe border. Khan Batu interrupted Fedor's embassy and moved his cavalry to Ryazan land. Somewhere “near the borders of Ryazan” the battle described in “The Tale of the Ruin of Ryazan” took place. During the battle, many “local princes, strong commanders and daring troops” died. With a few soldiers, Prince Yuri Igorevich broke through the ring of enemies and went to Ryazan to organize the defense of his capital. Having been defeated in battle, the Ryazan residents hoped to sit out behind strong city walls. Ryazan stood on the high right bank of the Oka River, below the mouth of the Pronya River. The city was well fortified: on three sides it was surrounded by ditches and powerful ramparts up to 10 meters high, on the fourth side a steep bank broke off towards the Oka River; wooden walls with numerous towers stood on the ramparts. The population from the surrounding villages came running under the walls of the city, and boyar detachments came from distant estates. The entire city population took up arms.

The siege of Ryazan began on December 16, 1237. The Mongol-Tatars surrounded the city so that no one could leave it. The city walls were shelled around the clock from vices (stone-throwing machines). Day and night there were attacks on the city. The well-aimed Mongol archers fired continuously. The killed Mongols were replaced by new ones, but the city never received reinforcements. On December 21, a decisive assault on Ryazan began. They managed to break through the city’s defenses in several directions at once. Heavy fighting broke out in the streets. As a result, all the warriors and most of the inhabitants were brutally destroyed. An army of nomads stood near Ryazan for ten days - they plundered the city, divided the spoils, and plundered neighboring villages.

Before Batu lay several roads into the depths of the Vladimir-Suzdal land. Since Batu was faced with the task of conquering all of Rus' in one winter, he headed to Vladimir along the Oka, through Moscow and Kolomna. On the way, they were unexpectedly attacked by a detachment led by Evpatiy Kolovrat, a Ryazan resident. His detachment numbered about 1,700 people. The nomads were so confused that they mistook them for those risen from the dead. But the 5 soldiers who were captured replied: “We are the war of Grand Duke Yuri Ingorevich - Ryazan, in the regiment of Evpatiy Kolovrat. We have been sent to honor you and honor you honestly.” Batu decided to send his brother-in-law Khoztovrul with the regiments to beat Kolovrat. But Khoztovrul lost, and then Batu sent many of his troops to Evpatiy. In the battle, Kolovrat died, and his head was given to Batu. The Khan was surprised at the courage of the Russian soldiers and ordered the release of the captured part of the squad.

The Grand Duke of Vladimir Yuri Vsevolodovich sent reinforcements to Kolomna, which covered the only convenient route to Vladimir in winter - along the Moscow and Klyazma rivers. The troops were led by the eldest son of Prince Vladimir, Vsevolod. The surviving Ryazan squads led by Prince Roman also came here. Chronicles claim that even Novgorodians came. The experienced governor of Vladimir Eremey Glebovich was also near Kolomna. The city itself was sufficiently fortified in case the troops failed in the field. In terms of the number of troops and the tenacity of the battle, the battle near Kolomna can be considered one of the most significant events of the invasion. Solovyov writes: “The Tatars surrounded them at Kolomna and fought hard; there was a great slaughter; they killed Prince Roman and the governor Eremey, and Vsevolod with a small retinue ran to Vladimir.” In the battle of Kolomna, Genghisid Khan Kulkan died - perhaps the only case in the entire history of the Mongol conquests.

Having defeated the Vladimir-Suzdal regiments near Kolomna, Batu came to Moscow, which was defended by a detachment of the son of Grand Duke Yuri - Vladimir and governor Philip Nyanka. The city was taken by storm on the 5th day. As a result, Moscow was completely destroyed. Prince Vladimir was captured and the governor was killed. On the way from Ryazan to Vladimir, the conquerors had to storm every city, repeatedly fight with Russian warriors in the “open field”; defend against surprise attacks from ambushes. The heroic resistance of the ordinary Russian people held back the conquerors.

On February 3, the vanguard of the conquerors approached Vladimir. The city of Vladimir was surrounded by high wooden walls and fortified with powerful stone towers. It was covered on three sides by rivers: from the south - the Klyazma River, from the north and east - the Lybid River. Above the western wall of the city rose the Golden Gate - the most powerful defensive structure of ancient Vladimir. Behind the outer contour of the Vladimir fortifications were interior walls and the ramparts of the Middle or Monomakh city. And finally, in the middle of the capital there was a stone Kremlin - Detinets. Thus, the enemies needed to break through three defensive lines before they could reach the city center - the Princely Court and the Assumption Cathedral. But there were not enough warriors for the numerous towers and walls. At the princely council, it was decided to leave the surviving army in the city and supplement it with the city militia, and the Grand Duke himself to go with his closest squad to the north and gather new armies. On the eve of the siege, Yuri left with his nephews Vasilko, Vsevolod and Vladimir to the Sit River and began to assemble regiments against the Tatars. The defense of the city was led by the sons of the Grand Duke - Vsevolod and Mstislav, as well as the governor Peter Oslyadyakovich.

The Mongol-Tatars approached from the west. Before this, the conquerors took Suzdal by storm, and without any particular difficulties. On February 4th, a small detachment arrived and offered to surrender. In response, arrows and stones flew. Then the Mongols surrounded the city on all sides, cutting it off from the outside world, and the siege of the city began. On February 6, the installation of heavy throwing weapons and shelling began. They managed to break through the walls in some places, but the Mongols were unable to penetrate the city. Early in the morning of February 7, a general assault on the city of Vladimir began. The main blow came from the west. As a result of the shelling, the wooden wall south of the Golden Gate was destroyed and the Mongol-Tatars broke into the city. They broke through the Irininy, Copper and Volga gates to Detinets, where there were almost no soldiers left. The princely family, boyars and townspeople took refuge in the Assumption Cathedral. They categorically surrendered to the mercy of the winner and were burned. The city of Vladimir itself was completely ruined.

Yuri Vsevolodovich stood with his troops near Yaroslavl. Having learned about the death of the capital and the death of his loved ones, the prince, according to the chronicle, “cry out with a great voice with tears, crying for the orthodox Christian faith and the Church.” “It would be better for me to die than to live in the world,” he said, “for which reason I was left alone.” Vasilko, who arrived in time with the Rostov squad, strengthened him for a feat of arms.

Vladimir was the last city of North-Eastern Rus', which was besieged by the united forces of Batu Khan. The Mongol-Tatars had to make a decision so that three tasks would be completed at once: to cut off Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich from Novgorod, defeat the remnants of the Vladimir forces and pass along all river and trade routes, destroying cities - centers of resistance. Batu's troops were divided into three parts: The first moved north to Rostov and further to the Volga (Rostov surrendered without a fight, as did Uglich); Separate detachments advanced to the Volga River and defeated Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Ksnyatin, Kashin and other cities. The second part went east along the ice of the Klyazma River, defeated the city of Starodub and reached the middle Volga - to the city of Gorodets; the third moved to the northwest through Pereyaslavl-Zalesky, Yuryev, Dimitrov, Volok-Lamsky to Tver and Torzhok. As a result of the February campaigns of 1238, the Mongol-Tatars destroyed Russian cities in the territory from the Middle Volga to Tver (fourteen cities in total).

By the beginning of March, the invaders' detachments reached the border of the Middle Volga. Yuri Vsevolodovich, who was gathering troops on the Sit River, found himself in close proximity to these detachments. The unexpected attack of the Mongol-Tatars predetermined the outcome of this battle (March 4, 1238). Few of the Russian soldiers left this terrible battle alive, but the enemies paid a heavy price for the victory. Saint Yuri was hacked to pieces in a desperate battle. Vasilko, wounded, was brought to Batu’s headquarters.
The Tatars forced him to “follow the Nogai custom, to be in their will and to fight for them.” The holy prince angrily rejected the idea of ​​betraying his Motherland and Orthodoxy. “You will never take me away from the Christian faith,” said the holy prince, remembering the ancient Christian confessors. “And having tormented him much, he put him to death, throwing him into the Shern forest.” Thus, the holy Prince Vasilko of Rostov gave up his soul to God, becoming in his death like the holy passion-bearer Boris, the first of the princes of Rostov, whom he imitated in life. Like Saint Boris, Vasilko was not yet thirty years old.
Bishop Kirill of Rostov, coming to the battlefield, buried the dead Orthodox soldiers, found the body of Saint Prince Yuri (only his severed head could not be found in the piles of prostrate bodies), and transferred the honorable remains to Rostov - to the Assumption Cathedral. The body of Saint Vasilko was found in the Shernsky forest by the son of a priest and brought to Rostov. There the prince's wife, children, Bishop Kirill and all the people of Rostov met the body of their beloved prince with bitter tears and buried him under the arches of the cathedral church.

At the end of March 1238, a “roundup” of invaders moved from the Volga to the south, towards Novgorod. Torzhok, standing on Batu’s way, lasted 2 weeks and was taken only on March 23. From there Batu moved further along the Seliger route, but before reaching Novgorod a hundred miles he turned south (from the place called “Ignach-Cross” in the chronicle) and went to Smolensk.

The turn away from Novgorod is usually explained by spring floods. But there are other explanations: firstly, the campaign did not fit into the deadlines, and secondly, Batu was unable to defeat the united forces of North-Eastern Rus' in one or two battles, using numerical and tactical superiority. The difficult and bloody campaign against the northeastern principalities exhausted and bled the Mongol-Tatars. It is likely that Batu did not dare to fight with intact and full-blooded Novgorod and Pskov.

The Mongols failed to take Smolensk. On the approaches to the city, the enemy was met by Smolensk regiments and pushed back. Batu decided to turn northeast and went to the city of Kozelsk. The chronicles do not contain the exact date of the Mongol-Tatars’ approach to this city, and most scientists claim that it was besieged back in April 1238. Kozelsk defended for 51 days, but was taken. Batu called it “Evil City” and ordered it to be razed to the ground.

Batu did not reach Vologda, Beloozero, or Veliky Ustyug, and behind him all of Chud Zavolotskaya and Novgorod possessions remained untouched.

The defeat of Southern Rus' and Eastern Europe

In 1239, the Mongol-Tatars invaded Southern Rus'. At the same time, they followed the path in which the Polovtsy raided. Pereyaslavl-Yuzhny was taken, which no one had ever achieved before. The city was well fortified: it was surrounded on three sides by the high banks of the Trubezh and Alta rivers, as well as high ramparts and walls. But the Tatars managed to take and plunder the city and completely destroy the Church of St. Michael.

The next blow was aimed at the Principality of Chernigov. The Chernigov Detinets (Kremlin), located on a high hill at the confluence of the Strizhen River with the Desna, was surrounded by a “roundabout city”, behind which stretched a three-kilometer rampart covering the “suburb”. By the autumn of 1239 the Tatars surrounded the city of Chernigov. They were met with an army by Prince Mstislav Glebovich (cousin of Mikhail of Chernigov). There was a “fierce battle,” but the Russians lost. October 18, 1239 Chernigov was taken, after which the Tatars destroyed the cities of Putivl, Glukov, Vyr, Rylsk.

Batu began the invasion of Southern Rus' and Eastern Europe in the fall of 1240, again gathering under his command all the people devoted to himself. Batu approached Kyiv in November 1240. “Batu came to Kyiv in heavy force, the Tatar force surrounded the city, and nothing was heard from the creaking of carts, from the roar of camels, from the neighing of horses; the Russian land was filled with warriors.” Kyiv was then reigned by Daniil Romanovich Galitsky, who left the city, leaving governor Dmitry to defend the city. The Tatars, from the side where the forest adjoined the city gates, fired at the walls with stone-throwing guns around the clock. As a result, the walls collapsed and the Mongol-Tatars burst into the city in the evening. Overnight, the Kievans built a new wall around the Tithe Church, but the Tatars broke through the defenses of Kiev and after a 9-day siege and assault on December 6, 1240, Kyiv fell.

After this, Batu’s main forces moved further west to Vladimir-Volynsky. The invaders were unable to take the cities of Kremenets, Danilov and Kholm. The fortified towns were excellently suited for defense. Vladimir-Volynsky was taken by the Mongol-Tatars after a short siege. All the cities of the Volyn and Galician lands were subjected to a terrible defeat. (For more details, see "Biography of Daniil Galitsky").

In the spring of 1241, hordes of Mongol-Tatars crossed the border of Rus' and invaded Hungary. The Hungarians offered fierce resistance in the passes of the Carpathians. But Batu crossed the mountains in April 1241. At this time, the Hungarian king Bela II gathered 60 thousand soldiers and set out from Pest. On April 11, a battle began near the Sayo River. The king did not receive any support and was defeated. After a 3-day siege, the city of Pest fell, and then the cities of Arat, Perth, Egres, and Temeshever were devastated.

That same spring, the Mongol-Tatars moved to Poland. At the head of the Mongol army were Batu's brothers - Baydar and Ordu. The nomads captured the cities of Lublin, Zavichos, Sandomierz. On the way to the large city of Krakow, they fought with the Krakow and Sandomor regiments (near Krakow). The Mongol-Tatars won and captured the city itself, but according to legend, a handful of brave men took refuge in the Cathedral of St. Andrew and were never defeated. They also failed to capture the city of Wroclaw.

Czech King Wenceslas I sent 40 thousand soldiers to help the Poles. On April 9, 1241, the allied forces were defeated near Legnica, but the Mongols failed to take the towns of Legnica and Ratibozh. The Czech Republic was preparing for a bitter struggle; in the Battle of Olomouc in 1242, the Mongol-Tatars were defeated.

Then the invaders invaded the lands of Bukovina, Moldova and Romania. Slovakia, which was under Hungarian rule, suffered seriously from their attack. Batu still advanced west to the Adriatic Sea, invaded Silesia and defeated the Duke of Silesia. Thus, the path to Germany was open, but the troops were exhausted and the khan turned his troops back to the east, never reaching the “Sea of ​​the Franks” (according to the will of Genghis Khan).

However, the danger of new invasions has not disappeared. Batu, returning from an unsuccessful campaign to the West, founded the state of the Golden Horde on the borders of Rus'. In 1243, Batu “granted and approved” Grand Duke Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, after this prince other princes - Uglitsky, Rostov, Yaroslavl - flocked to the Horde. The Mongol-Tatar yoke was established.

"From Ancient Rus' to the Russian Empire." Shishkin Sergey Petrovich, Ufa.