Phenomenology as a direction of modern philosophy. Phenomenological philosophy of Husserl. The meaning of the word phenomenology in the latest philosophical dictionary

Phenomenology- this is a philosophical movement, the main direction of which is the desire to free philosophical consciousness from naturalistic attitudes, to achieve in the field of philosophical analysis the reflection of consciousness about its acts and the content given in them, to identify the limiting parameters of cognition, the original foundations of cognitive activity. Phenomenology can be briefly defined as the science of objects of experience.

Phenomenology took shape as an independent philosophical direction in the 1920s. XX century in the works of E. Husserl. The starting point of phenomenology was an attempt to consider the non-experiential and non-historical structures of consciousness that ensure its real functioning and completely coincide with the ideal meanings expressed in language and psychological experiences.

For Husserl, phenomenology is, first of all, the clarification of the semantic space of consciousness, the identification of those invariant characteristics that make it possible to perceive the object of knowledge.

Phenomenology is based on the understanding of a phenomenon not as a phenomenon of something else, but as something that reveals itself and directly appears to consciousness.

The main method of phenomenology is the intuitive perception of ideal entities. There are several layers to such knowledge: 1) language means expressions; 2) mental experiences; 3) meanings as invariant structures of linguistic expressions.

Objective existence acquires meaning when correlated with consciousness. According to Husserl, this also acquires an objective meaning. The search for this correspondence is one of the main tasks of cognition. Then, when objective existence and consciousness are correlated, existence becomes a phenomenon, and consciousness cognizes existence. The phenomenon is presented in consciousness, and consciousness appears in the phenomenon as a dual unity, including cognitive acts and objective content.

The task of phenomenology in revealing the meaning of an object that is obscured by opinion, superficial judgment, inaccurate word, incorrect assessment. To achieve this, it is necessary to abandon naturalistic attitudes that oppose being to consciousness.

Subject of phenomenology– achievement of pure truths, a priori (pre-experimental) meanings, realized in language and psychological experience. These truths, conceived in consciousness, are the lot of philosophy, which is defined by Husserl as the first philosophy. This is the science of the pure principles of consciousness and knowledge, this is the universal teaching of method and methodology.

Cognition is considered as a stream of consciousness, internally organized and holistic, independent of specific mental acts, of a specific subject of cognition and his activities. This is the main phenomenological setting, and along the path of its implementation, an understanding of the subject of knowledge is achieved not as an empirical, but as a transcendental subject, as a container of generally valid a priori truths. With these truths, he seems to fill the objects of reality, which are objects of knowledge, with meaning; these objects acquire meaning and become those that correspond with consciousness, that is, they become phenomena.


About philosophy briefly and clearly: PHILOSOPHY PHENOMENOLOGY. All the basics, the most important: very briefly about the philosophy of PHENOMENOLOGY. The essence of philosophy, concepts, directions, schools and representatives.


PHENOMENOLOGY

Phenomenology is a philosophical movement, the main direction of which is the desire to free philosophical consciousness from naturalistic attitudes, to achieve in the field of philosophical analysis the reflection of consciousness about its acts and the content given in them, to identify the limiting parameters of cognition, the original foundations of cognitive activity. Phenomenology can be briefly defined as the science of objects of experience.

Phenomenology took shape as an independent philosophical direction in the 1920s. XX century in the works of E. Husserl. The starting point of phenomenology was an attempt to consider the non-experiential and non-historical structures of consciousness that ensure its real functioning and completely coincide with the ideal meanings expressed in language and psychological experiences.

For Husserl, phenomenology is, first of all, the clarification of the semantic space of consciousness, the identification of those invariant characteristics that make it possible to perceive the object of knowledge.

Phenomenology is based on the understanding of a phenomenon not as a phenomenon of something else, but as something that reveals itself and directly appears to consciousness.

The main method of phenomenology is the intuitive perception of ideal entities. There are several layers in such knowledge: 1) linguistic means of expression; 2) mental experiences; 3) meanings as invariant structures of linguistic expressions.

Objective existence acquires meaning when correlated with consciousness. According to Husserl, this also acquires an objective meaning. The search for this correspondence is one of the main tasks of cognition. Then, when objective existence and consciousness are correlated, existence becomes a phenomenon, and consciousness cognizes existence. The phenomenon is presented in consciousness, and consciousness appears in the phenomenon as a dual unity, including cognitive acts and objective content.

The task of phenomenology is to reveal the meaning of an object that is obscured by opinion, superficial judgment, inaccurate words, and incorrect assessment. To achieve this, it is necessary to abandon naturalistic attitudes that oppose being to consciousness.

The subject of phenomenology is the achievement of pure truths, a priori (pre-experimental) meanings realized in language and psychological experience. These truths, conceived in consciousness, are the lot of philosophy, which is defined by Husserl as the first philosophy. This is the science of the pure principles of consciousness and knowledge, this is the universal teaching of method and methodology.

Cognition is considered as a stream of consciousness, internally organized and holistic, independent of specific mental acts, of a specific subject of cognition and his activities. This is the main phenomenological setting, and along the path of its implementation, an understanding of the subject of knowledge is achieved not as an empirical, but as a transcendental subject, as a container of generally valid a priori truths. With these truths, he seems to fill the objects of reality, which are objects of knowledge, with meaning; these objects acquire meaning and become those that correspond with consciousness, that is, they become phenomena.


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The science of the phenomena of consciousness, or phenomenology, is an independent philosophical discipline developed by Edmund Husserl, an original German philosopher, which marked the beginning of a fundamentally new approach to understanding consciousness and its role in human life. Phenomenology (Greek phainomenon - appearing and logos - teaching) is a science, or rather, according to Husserl himself, a scientific philosophy, the object of which is consciousness, which comprehends the existence of human consciousness itself.

The doctrine of phenomena is a new philosophical system that seeks to describe events and actions as they are. In traditional philosophy, a phenomenon is usually understood as a phenomenon comprehended in sensory experience. Husserl understands by phenomenon the meanings of things, objects, and phenomena arising in consciousness. In its phenomenon, subject and object merge together. The external world appears before the subject in a natural flow of phenomena, and self-consciousness appears as the being of awareness. In general, outside the phenomena of consciousness, according to Husserl, there is no subject of philosophy, since the givenness of the human world is the sum of appearances, or phenomena, available exclusively as present in consciousness.

E. Husserl is convinced that consciousness is always active and purposeful in relation to the subject. It is intentional in essence (lat. intentio - intention, tendency, desire). Intentionality is interpreted by the philosopher not as a way of being of an object, thing, phenomenon, but as fulfillment, “assumption”, or intention. Operating with phenomena, a person intends. In other words, he always deals not only with the external, but also with his own inner world. Intention is a kind of attention that posits an object. Intentionality inextricably links consciousness and the object of consciousness, that is, it unites subject and object, since consciousness is directed towards specific item for the purpose of its semantic interpretation. This state, according to Husserl, is the innate ability of the subject, through the constant focus of his consciousness on material and spiritual objects, to give them vital meaning. “The term “intentionality” does not mean anything,” explains E. Husserl himself, “except general property consciousness to be awareness of some thing." This is the construction of an ideal order. We can figuratively say this: a person’s consciousness is likened to the beam of an electric flashlight, which illuminates objects and things in the pitch darkness, making them recognizable. At the same time, the ray purposefully searches only for those things and objects that are subject to identification.

Intentionality simultaneously expresses the immanent world of human consciousness, which psychologically perceives common “ideal objects.” It creates phenomena such as mental experiences, speculative attitudes that determine the meaning and purpose of objects. The task of phenomenology is to understand the true meaning of things, for which it is necessary to clear consciousness of empirical content. As for the existence of objects and things, it finds itself only when included in human consciousness. In contrast to representatives of traditional epistemology with its subject-object dichotomy, E. Husserl believes that awareness of an object and the object of consciousness itself are inseparable from each other. The primary reality in phenomenology is not “consciousness” itself, on the one hand, and not “matter,” on the other, but a certain “life world.” It is he who reveals himself to man as a correlate of intentionally acting subjectivity, as a sphere of meanings and meanings constituted by transcendental subjectivity. Therefore, human consciousness appears in phenomenology as a certain area of ​​\u200b\u200bmeanings and meanings, which opens up the possibility for diverse interpretations and interpretations.

The transcendental philosophy of I. Kant had a great influence on the formation of E. Husserl’s phenomenology. From the latter, E. Husserl borrowed the concept of mental creativity for the purposeful “construction” of ideal objects of the world. He identified several levels in human consciousness, depending on the target orientation of consciousness and the degree of intentionality. Thus, consciousness can be directed exclusively outward, to objects and things of the objective world. In this case, its content becomes living contemplation. However, it also focuses on itself as an internal contemplation, which is called reflection. Husserl, following Kant, of the individual as a representative intelligent humanity calls it a transcendental subject.

Thus, Husserl’s phenomenology became the initial methodological basis for the irrational philosophical system as the “internal logic” of the formation of meaning of a certain spectrum of meanings of the existence of an object. There is and cannot be anything in consciousness except the meanings of real or imaginary objects.

According to Husserl, the objective world is represented in the human mind as nothing other than a constituted formation. It is connected with a certain point from which the said constitution emanates. However, the philosopher does not specifically raise the question of the factual and historical reality of this starting point: it recedes into the background, and in the foreground is a systemic analysis of material structures and the determination of the ways of their world formation. Therefore, understanding in Husserl’s philosophical teaching appears as an original way of being for man himself. By the way, it cannot be reduced to the art of interpretation and is not some kind of “method” for reviving the world of things. This is not even taking into account human motives or volitional impulses and desires, but most likely - “taking measurements” from the thing itself as a fact of consciousness. For Husserl, the world exists not outside and not apart from or independently of consciousness, as in materialism, and not in consciousness, as in subjective idealism, but in a certain perspective of consciousness, that is, in intention. The world, according to Husserl, is outside consciousness, but is permeated by it, is always meaningful by it, and only in this form is it real.

The phenomenological method of knowing and explaining the material and spiritual world is very popular today in world philosophy, as well as in natural science and especially in medicine. It is he who warns any researcher against ignoring the uniqueness and originality of the inner (spiritual) world of people. Overcoming the crisis in modern science and medicine is possible only on the basis of the phenomenological “recipes” of E. Husserl. In his work “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,” he rightly linked the tendency to “naturalize” man in natural sciences ah and in philosophy with socially dangerous manipulative attempts to treat people in approximately the same way as objects and things are treated.

The ideas of phenomenology were further developed in existentialism, personalism, philosophy of life, hermeneutics, etc. Husserl's teaching was often characterized as "existential phenomenology" because it explored in detail "the climate of modern human thought." Man is a being whose existence lies in understanding. And this is the main thesis of philosophical hermeneutics.

Phenomenology is understood, first of all, as a method based on an intuitive understanding of the essence of things (returning “to the things themselves”), through the purification of consciousness from empirical details and verbal layers. The founder of phenomenology E. Husserl, author of the works “Logical Investigations” (1901), “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology” (1936). Already in his early works he tries to identify obvious reasons scientific knowledge(mathematics). In the process of analysis, Husserl comes to the need to eliminate psychological aspects from the cognitive process and identify its absolute sources, pure logic. To purify the subject’s consciousness and identify its absolute foundations, Husserl proposes a rather complex method - phenomenological reduction, during which the object, subject, and the very act of comprehension are eliminated from consciousness. All that remains is the non-subjective structure of relationships (or “transcendental consciousness”).

An important aspect of the reduction procedure is "era"(abstention from judgments about the existence of objects). To characterize the structure of purified consciousness, Husserl uses the term "intentionality"(focus on the subject). The unnaturalness of the reduction procedure is the main difficulty of the phenomenological method. After removing from consciousness thoughts and experiences about the subject and object of knowledge, only the meanings of possible objects remain ( "noema") and relationships to these meanings ("noesis"). This structure of absolute meanings and relationships is studied by phenomenology. In essence, this is the structure of the “transcendental self”, the structure of the cultural world, universal, independent of specific experience characteristics of human experience (not only scientific, but also everyday life). There is a connection with Kantianism, but Husserl highlights the subjectless structures of any vision of the world, independent of the subject of experience. In later works he explores the relationship between different perceptions, the relationship between the “I” and the other “I”. Husserl criticizes the science of modern times as having become divorced from its foundations, from life world(the world of life meanings). He sees this as the reason for the crisis of European science and the culture based on it. The phenomenological approach is designed to overcome the one-sidedness of science and reach new horizons.



23. Hermeneutics: genesis, main ideas and representatives.

Under hermeneutics(from Greek word hermeneutike - the art of clarification, interpretation) in a broad sense understand the theory and practice of interpreting texts. It has its roots in ancient Greek philosophy, where the art of interpreting various kinds of allegories and statements containing polysemantic symbols was practiced. Christian theologians also resorted to hermeneutics to interpret the Bible.

Understanding and correct interpretation of what is understood is, in general terms, the hermeneutic method of obtaining humanitarian knowledge. Hence, comprehension and assimilation of the meaning of a text are procedures that are qualitatively different from the method of explaining natural and social laws. Since the subject basis of the humanities is text, a powerful means of its analysis is language, the word as an essential, system-forming element of culture. Hence, the hermeneutic methodology of the humanities is closely related to the analysis of culture and its phenomena.

Modern hermeneutics, as it developed in the 20th century, includes not only the specific scientific method of research used in humanitarian knowledge. This is also a special direction in philosophy. The ideas of philosophical hermeneutics were developed in the West primarily in the works of the German philosopher, representative of the philosophy of life Wilhelm Dilthey, the Italian representative of classical hermeneutics Emilio Betti (1890-1970), one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century Martin Heidegger, the German philosopher Hans Georg Gadamer (1900-2002 ).

V. Dilthey laid the foundations of philosophical hermeneutics, trying to substantiate the specificity of the spiritual sciences (that is, the humanities) in their difference from the natural sciences. He saw such a difference in the method of understanding as a direct, intuitive comprehension of some spiritual integrity (or holistic experience). If the natural sciences resort to a method of explanation that deals with external experience and is associated with the activity of the mind, then in order to comprehend the written manifestations of life, to study the culture of the past, according to Dilthey, it is necessary to understand and interpret its phenomena as moments of the integral spiritual life of one or another. of a different era, which determines the specifics of the spiritual sciences.

24. Philosophy of life.

Practical, vital activity appears in the “philosophy of life” as the basis of being. This broad, unformed movement includes the German philosophers W. Dilthey, G. Simmel, F. Nietzsche, and the French thinker A. Bergson.

Philosophical teaching F. Nietzsche (1844-1900) inconsistent and contradictory, but it is united in spirit, tendency and purpose. It is not limited to the philosophy of life. His main works: “Thus Spake Zarathustra” (1885), “Beyond Good and Evil” (1886) and others. The early Nietzsche was influenced by Schopenhauer, but unlike the latter, he paid much less attention to issues of being and knowledge. His work is mainly devoted to criticism of European culture and moral problems. Irrational will, “life” in its opposition to scientific reason, forms the original reality. The world is the world of our life. There is no world independent of us. The world is considered in a process of continuous formation, it is a world of constant struggle for existence, a clash of wills. Nietzsche, like other contemporary philosophers, biologizes the world, which for him is basically the “organic world.” Its formation is a manifestation of the will to power, which gives rise to a relatively stable order of reality, since the greater will defeats the lesser. Unlike Schopenhauer, Nietzsche proceeds from a pluralism of wills, their struggle shapes reality. “Will” is understood more specifically – as the will to power. Finally, he defends the need to strengthen the will, criticizing Schopenhauer for his desire to calm the will. It is necessary to strive not for non-existence, but for the fullness of life - this is the principle of the philosophy of F. Nietzsche. He is critical of the idea of ​​development: there is only formation and "eternal return" Periodically, an era comes nihilism, chaos reigns, there is no meaning. The need for will arises, reconciliation with oneself appears, and the world repeats itself again. Eternal return is the fate of the world, and on its basis “love of fate” is formed. Knowledge of the world is inaccessible to logic, generalizing science; knowledge is a means of mastering the world, and not obtaining knowledge about the world. Truth is only a “useful delusion.” In the process of cognition, we do not penetrate into the essence of the world, but only give an interpretation of the world; the will to power is manifested in the creation of its own “world” by the human subject.

Criticizing his contemporary culture, Nietzsche notes the special historical place of his era. This is the era when "God is dead" and Nietzsche proclaims a new era of coming superman. His Zarathustra is the prophet of this idea. Modern man is weak, he is “something that needs to be overcome.” The Christian religion, as a religion of compassion, is the religion of the weak; it weakens the will to power. Hence Nietzsche's anti-Christianity (with a high assessment of the personality of Jesus). The Christian Church, he believes, has turned everything upside down (“turned any truth into a lie”). Required "change of world view". Traditional morality is also subject to reassessment. Modern morality is the morality of the weak, “slaves”, it is a tool of their domination over the strong. One of the culprits of the moral revolution is Socrates, and therefore Nietzsche idealizes the Pre-Socratics, whose morality was not yet perverted. Nietzsche extols aristocratic morality, which is characterized by courage, generosity, and individualism. It is based on the connection between man and the earth, the joy of love, and common sense. This is the morality of the superman, the strong, free person who frees himself from illusions and realizes high level“the will to power,” returning “to the innocent conscience of the beast of prey.” The “immoralism” declared by Nietzsche is associated with the replacement of “slave morality” with “master morality”. A new morality, in essence, is a new interpretation of the world. Nietzsche's philosophy often received ambiguous assessments: ideologists of fascism tried to use it, and they saw it as the ideology of the imperialist bourgeoisie. At the same time, she influenced a number of movements in modern philosophy and culture.

Vadim Rudnev

Phenomenology - (from the ancient Greek phainomenon - being) - one of the areas of philosophy of the twentieth century, associated primarily with the names of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger.

The specificity of phenomenology as a philosophical doctrine lies in the rejection of any idealization as a starting point and the acceptance of the only prerequisite - the possibility of describing the spontaneous-semantic life of consciousness.

The main idea of ​​phenomenology is the continuity and at the same time mutual irreducibility, irreducibility of consciousness, human existence, personality and the objective world.

The main methodological technique of phenomenology is phenomenological reduction - reflective work with consciousness, aimed at identifying pure consciousness, or the essence of consciousness.

From Husserl’s point of view, any object should be grasped only as a correlate of consciousness (the property of intentionality), that is, perception, memory, fantasy, judgment, doubt, assumptions, etc. The phenomenological attitude is not aimed at the perception of known and identification of yet unknown properties or functions of an object, but on the process of perception itself as a process of formation of a certain spectrum of meanings seen in the object.

“The goal of phenomenological reduction,” writes phenomenology researcher V.I. Molchanov, “is to discover in each individual consciousness pure conceivability as pure impartiality, which calls into question any already given system of mediation between oneself and the world. Impartiality must be maintained in a phenomenological attitude not in relation to objects and processes of the real world, the existence of which is not questioned - “everything remains as it was” (Husserl), - but in relation to already acquired attitudes of consciousness. Pure consciousness is not consciousness, purified from objects, on the contrary, consciousness here for the first time reveals its essence as a semantic closure with an object. Pure consciousness is the self-purification of consciousness from the schemes, dogmas, templates of thinking imposed on it, from attempts to find the basis of consciousness in what is not consciousness. Phenomenological method - this is the identification and description of the field of direct semantic conjugation of consciousness and an object, the horizons of which do not contain hidden, unmanifested entities as meanings.”

From the point of view of phenomenology (cf. individual language in the philosophy of L. Wittgenstein), the experience of meaning is possible outside of communication - in an individual, “lonely” mental life, and therefore, linguistic expression is not identical to meaning, the sign is only one of the possibilities - along with contemplation - implementation of meaning.

Phenomenology developed its original concept of time. Time is considered here not as objective, but as temporality, the temporality of consciousness itself. Husserl proposed the following structure of temporal perception: 1) now-point (initial impression); 2) retention, that is, the primary retention of this now-point; 3) protention, that is, primary expectation or anticipation, constituting “what comes.”

Time in phenomenology is the basis for the coincidence of a phenomenon and its description, a mediator between the spontaneity of consciousness and reflection.

Phenomenology also developed its own concept of truth.

V.I. Molchanov writes about this: “Husserl calls truth, firstly, both the very certainty of being, that is, the unity of meanings that exists regardless of whether anyone sees it or not, and being itself is the “subject” , accomplishing truth." Truth is the identity of an object with itself, "being in the sense of truth": true friend, the true state of affairs, etc. Secondly, truth is the structure of an act of consciousness, which creates the possibility of seeing the state of affairs exactly as it is, that is, the possibility of identity (adequation) of the thought and the contemplated; evidence as a criterion of truth is not a special feeling that accompanies certain judgments, but the experience of this coincidence. For Heidegger, truth is not the result of a comparison of representations and not the correspondence of a representation to a real thing; truth is not the equality of knowledge and object […]. Truth as true being is rooted in the way of human being, which is characterized as openness […]. Human existence can be in truth and not in truth - truth as openness must be torn out, stolen from existence […]. Truth is essentially identical with being; the history of existence is the history of its oblivion; The history of truth is the history of its epistemology."

In recent decades, phenomenology has shown a tendency towards convergence with other philosophical directions, in particular with analytical philosophy. The closeness between them is found where we are talking about meaning, meaning, interpretation.

Bibliography

Molchanov V.I. Phenomenapogy // Modern Western Philosophy: Dictionary, - M., 1991.

PHENOMENOLOGY

PHENOMENOLOGY is an influential movement in Western philosophy of the 20th century. Although the term F. itself was used by Kant and Hegel, it became widespread thanks to Husserl, who created a large-scale project of phenomenological philosophy. This project played an important role for both German and French philosophy of the first half - mid-20th century. Such philosophical works as “Formalism in Ethics and the Material Ethics of Value” by Scheler (1913/1916), “Being and Time” by Heidegger (1927), “Being and Nothingness” by Sartre (1943), “Phenomenology of Perception” by Merleau-Ponty (1945) are programmatic phenomenological studies. Phenomenological motives are also effective within the framework of non-phenomenologically oriented philosophy, as in a number of sciences, for example, literary criticism, social sciences and above all psychology and psychiatry. This is evidenced by phenomenological studies of both Husserl’s contemporaries and students, and living philosophers. The most interesting phenomenologists or phenomenologically oriented philosophers include: Heidegger, a student of Husserl, who used the phenomenological method as “a way of approaching something and a way of showing the definition of what is intended to become the topic of ontology,” i.e. human Dasein, for the description and understanding of which phenomenology must turn to hermeneutics (“Being and Time”); The “Göttingen School of Phenomenology,” initially focused on phenomenological ontology (A. Reinach, Scheler), whose representatives, together with the “Munich School” (M. Geiger, A. Pfender) and under the leadership of Husserl, founded the “Yearbook of Phenomenology” in 1913 and phenomenological research”, opened with Husserl’s programmatic work “Ideas towards pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy”, in which the already mentioned works of Scheler and Heidegger were published; E. Stein, L. Landgrebe and E. Fink - Husserl's assistants; as well as the Polish phenomenologist of aesthetics R. Ingarden, the Czech phenomenologist, human rights activist J. Patochka, the American sociologically oriented phenomenologists Gurvich and Schutz; Russian philosophers Shpet and Losev. The situation in Germany before and during World War II excluded Husserl, who was Jewish, from philosophical discussions until the mid-1950s. Its first readers were the Franciscan monk and philosopher Van Brede - the founder of the first Husserl Archive in Leuven (1939), as well as Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Ricoeur, Levinas, Derrida. The listed philosophers were strongly influenced by F., and certain periods of their work can be called phenomenological. Interest in F. today covers not only Western and Eastern Europe, but also, for example, Latin America and Japan. The first world congress on Phenomenology took place in Spain in 1988. The most interesting modern phenomenologists in Germany include Waldenfels and K. Held. Ph. in Husserl’s understanding is a description of the semantic structures of consciousness and objectivity, which is carried out in the process of “bracketing” both the fact of the existence or existence of an object, and psychological activity consciousness directed towards him. As a result of such “bracketing” or the implementation of a phenomenological epoch, the subject of study of the phenomenologist becomes consciousness, considered from the point of view of its intentional nature. The intentionality of consciousness is manifested in the direction of acts of consciousness towards an object. The concept of intentionality, borrowed by Husserl from the philosophy of his teacher Brentano and rethought in the course of the Logical Investigations. Part 2" is one of the key concepts of F.

Phenomenology (philosophy)

Husserl. In the study of intentional consciousness, the emphasis is shifted from what, or the “bracketed” existence of an object, to its how, or the variety of ways in which an object is given. The object from its point of view is not given, but is revealed or reveals itself (erscheint) in consciousness. Husserl calls this kind of phenomenon a phenomenon ( Greek phainomenon - revealing itself). F. then is the science of the phenomena of consciousness. Its slogan becomes the slogan “Back to the things themselves!”, which, as a result of phenomenological work, must directly reveal themselves to consciousness. An intentional act directed at an object must be filled (erfuehllt) with the being of this object. G. calls the filling of intention with existential content truth, and its experience in judgment - evidence. The concept of intentionality and intentional consciousness is associated in F. Husserl initially with the task of substantiating knowledge achievable within the framework of a certain new science or scientific doctrine. Gradually, the place of this science is taken by FT arr. F.'s first model can also be represented as a model of science that seeks to question the habitual position of the existence of objects and the world, designated by Husserl as a “natural attitude”, and in the course of describing the diversity of their givenness - within the framework of a “phenomenological attitude” - to come (or not to come) ) to this existence. The existence of an object is understood as identical in the variety of ways of its givenness. The concept of intentionality is then the condition of possibility of the phenomenological attitude. The ways to achieve it are, along with the phenomenological era, eidetic, transcendental and phenomenological reduction. The first leads to the study of the essences of objects; the second, close to the phenomenological era, opens up for the researcher the realm of pure or transcendental consciousness, i.e. consciousness of the phenomenological attitude; the third transforms this consciousness into transcendental subjectivity and leads to the theory of transcendental constitution. The concept of intentionality played a crucial role in the studies of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and Levinas. Thus, in Merleau-Ponty’s “Phenomenology of Perception”, this concept acts as a prerequisite for overcoming the traditional gap between mind and body in classical philosophy and psychology and allows us to talk about the “incarnated mind” as the starting point of experience, perception and knowledge. Husserl's work in the field of describing intentional consciousness leads him to such new concepts or models of this consciousness as internal time-consciousness and consciousness-horizon. Inner time-consciousness is a prerequisite for understanding consciousness as a stream of experiences. The starting point in this flow is the “now” point of the present time, around which - in the horizon of consciousness - the just-existent and possible future are collected. Consciousness at the point “now” is constantly related to its time horizon. This correlation allows us to perceive, remember and imagine something that is only possible. The problem of internal time-consciousness has evoked a response in the research of almost all phenomenologists. Thus, in “Being and Time,” Heidegger transforms Husserl’s temporality of consciousness into the temporality of human existence, the starting point in which is no longer the point “now,” but “running ahead,” the future, which is “projected” by Dasein from its possibility of being. In the philosophy of Levinas, temporality is understood “not as the fact of an isolated and lonely subject, but as the relation of the subject to the Other.” The origins of this understanding of temporality are easy to find in the model of consciousness-time and the time horizon, within the framework of which Husserl tries to build the relation of me to the Other by analogy with the relation of actual experience to the time horizon surrounding it. Within the framework of consciousness or within the framework of its noematic-noetic ( cm. NOESIS and NOEMA) unity as the unity of experiences from the point of view of their content and accomplishment, the constitution of objectivity occurs, the process as a result of which the object acquires its existential significance. The concept of constitution is another most important concept of F. The source of the constitution of the centers of accomplishment of acts of consciousness is the Self. The Being of the Self is the only being, the presence and significance of which I cannot doubt. This being is of a completely different kind than objective being. This motif is an obvious reference to Descartes, whom Husserl considers his immediate predecessor.

Another way to address the Self is to understand it as transcendental subjectivity, which connects F. Husserl with the philosophy of Kant. The introduction of the concept of “transcendental subjectivity” once again showed the specificity of philosophy as addressed not to objects and their existence, but to the constitution of this existence in consciousness. Husserl's appeal to the problem of being was taken up by subsequent phenomenologists. The first project of Heidegger's ontology is the project of F., which makes the ways and modes of human existence self-revealing (phenomenal). Sartre in “Being and Nothingness,” actively using Husserl’s concepts such as phenomenon, intentionality, and temporality, connects them with Hegel’s categories and Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. He strictly contrasts being-for-itself as consciousness (nothing) and being-in-itself as a phenomenon (being), which form a dualistic ontological reality. Sartre's phenomenological method is intended to emphasize, in contrast to Hegel's method, the mutual irreducibility of being and nothingness, reality and consciousness. Like Husserl and Heidegger, he turns to a phenomenological description of the interaction between reality and consciousness. The problem of the Self as the core or center of the accomplishments of consciousness leads Husserl to the need to describe this Self. F. acquires the features of a reflexive philosophy. Husserl speaks of a special kind of perception of the Self - internal perception. It, just like the perception of external objects, objectifies what it deals with. However, objectification is never accomplished absolutely and once and for all, since it occurs in the consciousness-horizon and opens up ever new ways of giving objects in it. What remains in the Self after its objectification by consciousness is what Husserl calls “pure Self.” In the philosophy of Husserl's followers, the non-objectified “pure I” became a prerequisite for the possible and incomplete existence of myself. The horizon-consciousness is the consciousness of my fulfillment, a connection of references stretching into infinity. This is an infinity of possibilities for the placement of objects, which I still dispose of not completely arbitrarily. The last and necessary condition for such an appeal to objects in knowledge is peace. The concept of the world, initially in the form of the “natural concept of the world”, and then as the “life world” is a separate and large theme of F. This topic was addressed by Heidegger (being-in-the-world and the concept of the worldliness of the world), Merleau-Ponty (being -to-the world), Gurvich with his project of the world of doxa and episteme, Schutz with his project of a phenomenological-sociological study of construction and structure social world. The concept of the “life world” has come into use today not only in phenomenologically oriented philosophy, but also in the philosophy of communicative action, analytical philosophy of language, and hermeneutics. In F. Husserl, this concept is closely related to such concepts as intersubjectivity, corporeality, the experience of the Alien and the teleology of the mind. Initially, the world appears as the most general correlate of consciousness or its most extensive objectivity. This, on the one hand, is the world of science and culture, on the other, the basis of any scientific idea of ​​\u200b\u200bthe world. The world is between the subjects of this world, acting as the environment for their life experience and giving this life experience certain forms. Intersubjectivity is a condition of the possibility of the world, as well as a condition of objectivity of any knowledge, which in the “life world” turns from mine, subjective, into something that belongs to everyone - objective. F. turns into a study and description of the transformation of opinions into knowledge, subjective into objective, mine into universally significant. The reflections of the late Husserl on the “life world” tie together all of his projects F. Within the framework of the “life world” and its genesis, the body of the mind itself unfolds, initially taking the form of scientific teaching. F., describing the dual nature of the “life world” as the basis of all knowledge and the horizon of all its possible modifications, puts at its basis the duality of consciousness itself, which always comes from something Alien to it and necessarily posits it. In the mouth of such a modern phenomenologist as Waldenfels, the duality of consciousness is a statement of the differences between me and the Other and a prerequisite for the existence of a multidimensional and heterogeneous world, in which building an attitude towards what is alien to my self is a prerequisite for ethics. F. in the form of F. ethics is a description of the diverse forms of the relationship between me and the Other, belonging to and alien to my self. Such philosophy is both an aesthetics and a philosophy of everyday and political life in which these forms are embodied.

Source: Latest philosophical dictionary on Gufo.me

E.G. - German philosopher, founder of phenomenology, student of Brento.

PHENOMENOLOGY

developed the basic principles of phenomenology, the only discipline capable, in his opinion, of making philosophy a strict and exact science. Phenomenology is the science of phenomena. A phenomenon is something that appears because it appears. The human "I" and all things surrounding it are phenomena. The basis of knowledge - the principle of phenomenological reduction - lies in abstinence (epoch) from belief in the reality of the world around us. Thus, we receive the eidos of the world, its ideal value. From a point of view, reduction is eidetic. Since the phenomenon manifests itself in consciousness and only through an act of consciousness, i.e. subjective consciousness determines the state of things in reality, the reduction is also transcendental.

In the double – eidetic and transcendental – dimensions, a phenomenon, just like its manifestation to consciousness, is something absolute.

This is the essence of a thing, its being. The consciousness that carries out the reduction is self-sufficient.

Thus, according to Husserl, the only absolute being is revealed to us. Consciousness has intention, a focus on an object. G. calls the intention for an object, directly and originally given to consciousness, intuition. Intuition in phenomenology has the following meaning: to see everything that appears as truly manifested and only as manifested. To complete his theory, G. introduces the concept of “constitution.” Consciousness is a constitutive flow. The form of constitution is phenomenological temporality - the unity of the past, future and present in one intentional act of consciousness. Through constitution in the form of temporality of consciousness, the “I” has the surrounding world and itself. According to Husserl, philosophy is the highest attempt of Reason to constitute with genuine evidence the “I” and what the world of this “I” is.

Edmund Husserl(German) Edmund Husserl; April 8, 1859, Prosnitz, Moravia (Austria) - April 26, 1938, Freiburg) - German philosopher, founder of phenomenology. Came from a Jewish family. In 1876 he entered the University of Leipzig, where he began to study astronomy, mathematics, physics and philosophy, in 1878 he moved to the University of Berlin, where he continued to study mathematics with L. Kronecker and K. Weierstrass, as well as philosophy with F. Paulsen. In 1881 he studied mathematics in Vienna. On October 8, 1882, he defended his dissertation “On the Theory of the Calculus of Variations” at the University of Vienna with Leo Königsberger and began studying philosophy with Franz Brentano. In 1886, Husserl and his bride accepted the Protestant religion, in 1887 they formalized the marriage, after which Husserl got a job teaching at the university in Halle.

His first publications were devoted to problems of the foundation of mathematics (Philosophy of Arithmetic, 1891) and logic (Logical Investigations I, 1900; II, 1901). “Logical Investigations” becomes the first book of a new direction of philosophy opened by Husserl - phenomenology. Beginning in 1901, he met in Göttingen and Munich a friendly atmosphere and his first like-minded people (Reinach, Scheler, Pfänder). It was during this period that he published a programmatic article in Logos - “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” (1911) and the first volume of “Ideas towards Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy” (1913). In 1916 he received the chair at the University of Freiburg, which had been occupied by Rickert before him. Martin Heidegger, Husserl's most able student, edits his Lectures on Phenomenology inner consciousness time" (1928). Then, “Formal and transcendental logic” (1929), “Cartesian reflections” (in French, 1931), parts I and II of the work “The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology” (1936, the full text of the manuscript was published posthumously) were subsequently published. in 1954). After the Nazis came to power, Husserl was dismissed for a time as a Jew, according to the Baden land law; He was finally relieved of his post only after the adoption of the Nuremberg Laws, which deprived Jews of citizenship. Heidegger was elected rector of the university in the spring of 1933 and soon joined the NSDAP; the question of his personal involvement in the persecution of Husserl and their relationship during this period raises much controversy. Husserl was banned from participating in the 1933 and 1937 philosophical congresses, both officially and privately; his old books were not removed from libraries, but the publication of new ones was impossible. Despite the hostility that surrounded him under the Nazi regime, Husserl did not emigrate (his children went to the United States). He died in Freiburg in 1938 from pleurisy almost completely alone. A Belgian Franciscan monk and graduate student at the Higher Institute of Philosophy, Hermann Leo Van Breda, fearing Hitler's anti-Semitism, transported Husserl's library and unpublished works to Louvain, and also helped the philosopher's widow and students leave Germany. If not for Van Breda’s intervention, Husserl’s widow would have faced deportation to a concentration camp, and his archive would have faced confiscation and destruction. Thus, the Husserl-Archive was founded in Louvain, a center for the study of Husserl’s legacy, which still exists today. The disassembled archive of Edmund Husserl in Louvain contains forty thousand unpublished sheets (partially transcripts), which are published in the complete works - Husserliana.

Husserl's philosophical evolution, despite his passionate devotion to one idea (or perhaps precisely because of this), underwent a number of metamorphoses. However, the commitment to the following remained unchanged:

  1. The ideal of rigorous science.
  2. Liberation of philosophy from random premises.
  3. Radical autonomy and responsibility of the philosophizer.
  4. The "miracle" of subjectivity.

Husserl appeals to philosophy, which, in his opinion, is capable of restoring the lost connection with the deepest human concerns. He is not satisfied with the rigor of the logical and deductive sciences and sees the main reason for the crisis of science, as well as of European humanity, in the inability and unwillingness of contemporary science to address problems of value and meaning. The radical rigor that is implied here is an attempt to get to the “roots” or “beginnings” of all knowledge, avoiding everything that is doubtful and taken for granted. Those who decided to do this had to have a deep understanding of their responsibility. This responsibility cannot be delegated to anyone. Thus, she demanded the complete scientific and moral autonomy of the researcher.

As Husserl wrote, “a true philosopher cannot help but be free: the essential nature of philosophy consists in its extremely radical autonomy.” Hence the attention to subjectivity, to the irreducible and fundamental world of consciousness, which understands its own existence and the existence of others. Life and scientific activity Husserl fully complied with the strictest requirements of personal autonomy, criticism of thought and responsibility to the era. These strong qualities impressed many students, in whose fruitful collaboration the phenomenological movement took shape. All the students maintained an unwavering respect for the one to whom they owed the beginning of their thinking, although none of them followed Husserl for a long time.

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Phenomenology

consciousness of something

The meaning and significance of an object correlates with how it is grasped by consciousness. Thus, phenomenology is focused not on identifying previously unknown knowledge about the world and bringing it into line with what is already known, but on presenting the very process of perceiving the world - that is, showing the conditions and possibilities of knowledge as a process of forming meanings that are perceived in the properties and functions of an object.

Consciousness, in other words, is indifferent to whether objects really exist or whether they are an illusion or a mirage, because in the reality of consciousness there is an interweaving of experiences, just as streams of water twist and intertwine in a common stream. There is nothing in consciousness except the meanings of real, illusory or imaginary objects.

Phenomenology has undergone significant changes both in the concept of its founder Husserl and in many modifications, so that its history, notes the famous French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, can be presented as the history of Husserl’s “heresies.”

Phenomenology

Husserl begins with the idea of ​​​​creating a science of science - a philosophical science. Philosophy, he writes, “is called upon to be a rigorous science and, moreover, one that would satisfy the highest theoretical needs, and in an ethical and religious sense would make possible a life governed by the pure norms of reason.” The philosopher wants to clearly answer the question of what essentially “things”, “events”, “laws of nature” are, and therefore asks about the essence of the theory and the very possibility of its existence.

At the beginning of its development, phenomenology claimed precisely to build philosophy as a strict science. This is exactly what “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” is called one of Husserl’s main works of the early period.

The discovery of this obvious truth presupposes a special method of moving towards it. Husserl begins with a position he calls natural installation Natural world

phenomenological reduction

The first stage of phenomenological reduction is identic reduction, in which the phenomenologist “brackets” the entire real world and refrains from any assessments and judgments. Husserl calls this operation « era» « era»

(noema) and aspect of consciousness (noesis)

Consciousness in this case, as it were, opens up to meet the objective world, seeing in it not random features and characteristics, but objective universality.

Moreover, the phenomenon is not an element of the real world - it is created and controlled by the phenomenologist for the most complete penetration into the stream of perceiving consciousness and discovery of its essence.

intersubjectivity

"life world"

Further development of the phenomenological tradition in the works of M. Heidegger (1889-1976), G. Späth (1879-1940), R. Ingarden (1893-1970), M. Scheler (1874-1928), M. Merleau-Ponty (1908- 1961), J. - P. Sartre (1905-1980) is associated, on the one hand, with the assimilation of her method, and on the other hand, with criticism of Husserl’s basic theses. M. Heidegger, developing and transforming the idea of ​​intentionality, defined human existence itself as the inseparability of the world and man, therefore the problem of consciousness, to which Husserl paid so much attention, recedes into the background. In this case, we will not be talking about the variety of phenomena, but about the only fundamental phenomenon - human existence. Truth appears as the correctness of representation revealed to man.

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Phenomenological philosophy of science.

In a broad sense, phenomenology is a branch of philosophy that studies phenomena (gr. - “the study of phenomena”). This concept was used by many philosophers - Goethe, Kant, Hegel, Breptapo. In a narrower sense, this is the name of the philosophical teaching of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), which was created at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. and is actively developed by his followers (M. Heidegger, O. Becker, E. Fipk - Germany, M. Merleau-Popty, E. Levipas, M. Dufreppe - France, A. Schutz, M. Nathanson, A. Gurvich - America and etc.).

one of the leading themes in the phenomenological philosophy of E. Husserl and his followers. The task of an irrefutable, unconditionally reliable substantiation of the possibility of scientific knowledge represents an essential stage in Husserl’s program of transforming philosophy into a strict science. It should be noted that science here is understood not on the model of actually existing sciences, but rather as a truly rational type of research in its utmost capabilities. Characteristic feature Ph.D. there is a desire to radically clarify the foundations of scientific knowledge and the very possibility of knowledge on the basis of the phenomenological method of revealing the self-givenness of “the things themselves” in phenomenological experience. Phenomenology considers “objective” knowledge of the positive sciences to be naive, since the very possibility of such knowledge remains unclear, and the connection between the mental process of knowledge and the object of knowledge transcendental to it remains a mystery.

The actual experience of consciousness, which mediates any objective scientific experience, always turns out to be “reviewed” by positive science. This means that all positive scientific knowledge and its methodology are relative. Guided by the principle of non-presupposition, phenomenology turns directly to the original sources of experience and sees the essence of cognitive connection in the intentionality (direction of consciousness towards an object) of consciousness. Penetrating into the essence of knowledge, phenomenology declares itself as a universally substantiating science, as a scientific doctrine. Husserl puts forward the idea of ​​a unified system of scientific and philosophical knowledge, in which phenomenology, or “first philosophy,” which acts as a universal methodology, is called upon to play a fundamental role. All other scientific disciplines are divided into eidetic (“second philosophy”) and positive in accordance with the fundamental difference between the two sides of the object of study: essential (necessary) and factual (accidental). IN common system scientific knowledge, the eidetic sciences, examples of which include mathematics and “pure” natural science, turn out to be link between transcendental (going beyond reason) phenomenology and the positive sciences, they are assigned the role of a theoretical foundation for the rationalization and transcendental understanding of the factual material of the positive sciences. The method of eidetic sciences is ideation within the limits of eidetically reduced experience. Clarifying the essential structures of various kinds of reality, eidetic sciences form ontologies: a formal ontology containing a priori forms of objectivity in general and prescribing a formal structure for particular sciences, as well as regional, or material, ontologies that unfold the concepts of formal ontology on the material of two main regions of existence: nature and spirit. Ontology (science, studying the problems of being) of nature is in turn divided into the ontology of physical nature and the ontology of organic nature. Each regional ontology is considered as an autonomous sphere of a certain objectivity with unique essential structures, comprehended in ideation (contemplation of the essence). Eidetic sciences make it possible to clarify the fundamental concepts of regions, such as “space”, “time”, “causality”, “culture”, “history”, etc., as well as to establish the essential laws of these regions. At the level of research into factual material, each regional ontology corresponds to a group of positive sciences in which the semantic


34. Social epistemology.

Epistemology (from ancient Greek ἐπιστήμη - “scientific knowledge, science”, “reliable knowledge” and λόγος - “word”, “speech”); epistemology (from ancient Greek γνῶσις - “cognition”, “knowledge” and λόγος - “word”, “speech”) - theory of knowledge, section of philosophy. SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY (English social epistemology, German soziale Erkenntnistheorie) is one of the modern areas of research at the intersection of philosophy, history and sociology of science, science studies. Over the past 30 years, it has been actively developing, producing new approaches and generating discussions. Proponents of classical epistemology believed that there were three sources of knowledge. This is, firstly, an object that is the focus of cognitive interest; secondly, the subject himself with his inherent cognitive abilities; thirdly, the social conditions of cognition. At the same time, the positive content of knowledge was seen mainly in the object; the subject is a source of interference and illusions, but at the same time ensures the creative and constructive nature of cognition; social conditions are entirely responsible for prejudices and errors. A number of modern epistemologists have taken a significantly different position. They argue that all three sources of knowledge are actually reducible to one thing - to the social conditions of knowledge. Both subject and object are social constructions; only what is part of the human world is known, and in the way that social norms and rules dictate. Thus, both the content and form of knowledge are social from beginning to end - this is the point of view of some (but not all) supporters of social science. Status of the issue. Within the framework of S. e. three main directions can be distinguished, respectively associated with the names of their representatives: D. Bloor (Edinburgh), S. Fuller (Warwick) and E. Goldman (Arizona). Each of them is positioned in its own way in relation to classical epistemology and philosophy in general. So, Bloor in the spirit of the “naturalistic trend” gives the status of a “true theory of knowledge” to cognitive sociology, designed to replace the philosophical analysis of knowledge. G oldman recognizes the importance of many scientific disciplines for the theory of knowledge, but emphasizes that it should not be simply their empirical unification. Epistemology should maintain its distinction from the “positive sciences”; not only the description of the cognitive process, but also its normative assessment in relation to truth and validity constitutes the essence of his “social epistemics” as a variant of the analytical theory of knowledge. Fulle r takes an intermediate position and follows the path of synthesizing the philosophy of K. Popper, J. Habermas and M. Foucault. He considers S. e. not just as one version of modern epistemology, but as its global and integrative perspective, closely related to what is called “science and technology studies”. A thorough (although not without bias, does not mention the work of D. Bloor with the subtitle “Social Theory of Knowledge”) analysis of SE is given by E. Goldman in the article of the same name in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. He defines it as the study of the social dimensions of knowledge or information, but finds significantly different opinions about what the term “knowledge” covers, what the scope of the “social” is and what kind of socio-epistemological research should be and its purpose. According to some authors, SE should preserve the basic attitude of classical epistemology, taking into account, however, that the latter was too individualistic. According to other authors, SE should be a more radical departure from the classical one and at the same time generally replace it as a given discipline. Prospects social epistemology Some representatives of social epistemology consider the concepts of rationality, truth, and normativity to be generally alien to the social-epistemological approach. This is the path to minimizing philosophy in epistemology, to turning the latter into a branch of sociology or psychology. But even so, it is difficult to completely abandon some of the basic norms of rational discourse that limit the freedom of permissiveness in theoretical consciousness. They form the basis of the version of social epistemology that the author of these lines and his colleagues are developing. We designate the first fundamental thesis as anthropologism: man has a mind that distinguishes him from other natural phenomena, endows him with special abilities and special responsibility. Anthropologism is opposed to total ecologism and biologism, which assert the equality of all biological species and the primacy of human natural conditioning over sociocultural ones. The second thesis - the thesis of reflexivity - emphasizes the difference between image and object, knowledge and consciousness, method and activity and indicates that the normative approach applies only to the first members of these dichotomies. This thesis is opposed to extreme descriptivism in the style of L. Wittgenstein, which exaggerates the importance of case studies and the practice of participant observation. Criticism is the third thesis of the new social epistemology. It involves radical questioning, the application of Occam's razor to the results of interpretation, intuitive insight and creative imagination. The cutting edge of criticism is aimed at mystical intuitionism as an epistemological practice of connecting to the “stream of world consciousness.” This is not meant to limit epistemological analysis scientific knowledge. Forms of extra-scientific knowledge should, of course, be studied using objective sources - the results of religious studies, ethnographic, and cultural studies. And finally, the regulatory ideal of truth should be preserved as a condition for theoretical knowledge and its analysis. At the same time, it is necessary to construct a typological definition of truth that would allow operational use in the context of a variety of types of knowledge and activity. This position is opposed to both naive realism and relativism. About the subject S. e. Despite the obviousness of the central question - what is sociality? - it is rarely stated explicitly and just as rarely purposefully addressed in foreign works on S. e. a banal definition of sociality as interests, political forces, the sphere of the irrational, interactions, groups and communities. It turns out that S. e. simply borrows an element of the subject area from sociology, cultural studies, history and social psychology, which fits well into the naturalistic orientation of a number of trends in modern philosophy. However, philosophical thinking itself, as a rule, assumes a different position.

Philosophy gives independent definitions of man and the world, based precisely on their correlation and constructing a specific concept of “the world of man.” Therefore, one of the main tasks of S. e. today - to understand what kind of sociality we are talking about in the context of the philosophical analysis of knowledge. Specify general her understanding of relationships the understanding of knowledge to sociality and the relationship of sociality to knowledge - allows, the typology of sociality. The first type of sociality is the permeation of knowledge by forms of activity and communication, the ability to express them in a specific way, by assimilating and displaying their structure. This is the “internal sociality” of cognition, a property that is inherent in a person’s cognitive activity, even if he is excluded from all existing social connections (Robinson Crusoe). The ability of a subject to think, generalizing his practical acts and subjecting to reflection the procedures of thinking itself, is a sociocultural product embedded in a person by education and experience. At the same time, the subject produces ideal schemes and conducts thought experiments, creating conditions for the possibility of activity and communication. The second type of sociality - “external sociality” - appears as the dependence of the spatio-temporal characteristics of knowledge on the state social systems(speed, breadth, depth, openness, hiddenness). Social systems also form requirements for knowledge and criteria for its acceptance. The cognizing subject uses images and analogies gleaned from his contemporary society. Natural scientific atomism was inspired by individualistic ideology and morality. Within the mechanistic paradigm, God himself received the interpretation of the “supreme watchmaker.” The methodology of empiricism and experimentalism is indebted to travel and adventure in the context of great geographical discoveries. All these are signs that knowledge belongs to the era of the New Time. The third type of sociality is represented by “open sociality.” It expresses the inclusion of knowledge in cultural dynamics, or the fact that the total sphere of culture is the main cognitive resource of a person. A person’s ability to take down a randomly chosen book from a library shelf and become dependent on the thoughts he read is a sign of his belonging to a culture. Culture is the source of creativity, creativity is the openness of knowledge to culture, one can only create by standing on the shoulders of titans. The same circumstance that knowledge exists in many different cultural forms and types is another manifestation of open sociality. A specific study of the types of sociality presupposes the involvement of the results and methods of the social sciences and humanities in the epistemological circulation.

Hence the importance of the interdisciplinary orientation of S. e. Methods S. e. Among the specific methods of S. e. the leading place is occupied by borrowings from the social sciences and humanities. The practice of case studies and “field” studies of laboratories is adopted from the history and sociology of science. Rhetorical theory is applied as an approach to the analysis of scientific discourse. Another analytical method, used in SE, is the theory of probability. For example, it can be used to prescribe rational changes in the degree of conviction of a cognitive subject, in assessing the degree of trust in other subjects and their degree of conviction (see: Lehrer K., Wagner C. Rational Consensus in Science and Society. Dordrecht, 1981) . Some methods of economic analysis and game theory can also be useful for social epistemology. As the most typical method, S. e.

31. Phenomenology as a direction of modern philosophy

case studies. The idea of ​​case studies is the most complete and theoretically unloaded description of a specific cognitive episode in order to demonstrate (“show”) the sociality of cognition. The goal is to show how social factors determine the fundamental decisions of the cognizing subject (formation, promotion, justification, choice of idea or concept).

Phenomenology

Phenomenology is one of the leading and most influential trends in philosophy and culture of the twentieth century. The ideas of the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), had a huge impact on all major movements in philosophy, as well as on law and sociology, political science, ethics, aesthetics, psychology and psychiatry. The spread of phenomenology is not limited by the boundaries of European philosophizing: having emerged in Germany, it developed and continues to actively develop in other countries, including Russia.

The main idea of ​​phenomenology is intentionality (from the Latin intentio - striving), which presupposes the inseparability and at the same time irreducibility of consciousness and being - human existence and the objective world. Intentionality expresses Husserl’s original thesis “Back to the objects themselves,” which means the reconstruction of directly experienced life meanings that arise between consciousness and the object.

From the point of view of phenomenology, posing the question of the world itself is completely incorrect - objects must be understood as correlated with consciousness. The objectivity of the world is correlative - objects are always correlated with memory, fantasy, judgment, that is, objectivity is always experienced. Consciousness is always consciousness of something Therefore, phenomenological analysis is an analysis of the consciousness itself, in which the world is represented.

The meaning and significance of an object correlates with how it is grasped by consciousness. Thus, phenomenology is focused not on identifying previously unknown knowledge about the world and bringing it into line with what is already known, but on presenting the very process of perceiving the world - that is, showing the conditions and possibilities of knowledge as a process of forming meanings that are perceived in the properties and functions of an object. Consciousness, in other words, is indifferent to whether objects really exist or whether they are an illusion or a mirage, because in the reality of consciousness there is an interweaving of experiences, just as streams of water twist and intertwine in a common stream. There is nothing in consciousness except the meanings of real, illusory or imaginary objects.

Phenomenology has undergone significant changes both in the concept of its founder Husserl and in many modifications, so that its history, notes the famous French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, can be presented as the history of Husserl’s “heresies.” Husserl begins with the idea of ​​​​creating a science of science - a philosophical science. Philosophy, he writes, “is called upon to be a rigorous science and, moreover, one that would satisfy the highest theoretical needs, and in an ethical and religious sense would make possible a life governed by the pure norms of reason.” The philosopher wants to clearly answer the question of what essentially “things”, “events”, “laws of nature” are, and therefore asks about the essence of the theory and the very possibility of its existence. At the beginning of its development, phenomenology claimed precisely to build philosophy as a strict science. This is exactly what “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science” is called one of Husserl’s main works of the early period.

In his early works, Husserl was especially active in opposing psychologism, which grew out of claims to accuracy. experimental psychology. Psychologism developed such an idea of ​​logic and logical thinking, in which it was based on the forms of people’s life behavior - the truth in this case turned out to be relative and subjectivized, since it acted as a result of a person’s “feeling” of his experiences in the world of objects.

Rightly pointing out the closeness of psychologism with the idea of ​​Protagoras, according to which man is the measure of all things , Husserl will develop his scientific doctrine as a doctrine of a single truth that overcomes all temporality. And this ideal truth must undoubtedly have universal bindingness and the property of self-evidence.

The discovery of this obvious truth presupposes a special method of moving towards it.

The meaning of the word PHENOMENOLOGY in the Newest Philosophical Dictionary

Husserl begins with a position he calls natural installation, in which the philosopher, like every person, is turned to the fullness of human life - its natural course, in the process of which humanity purposefully transforms the world in acts of will and action. Natural world is understood in this case as the entire totality of things, living beings, social institutions and forms of cultural life. The natural attitude is nothing more than a form of implementation of the total life of humanity, which proceeds naturally and practically. But the true philosophical position, which Husserl calls transcendental, is carried out in opposition to the natural attitude - what is significant for everyday life must be eliminated from philosophical knowledge. The philosopher should not turn the natural attitude into the starting point of his analysis; he should only preserve the idea of ​​the givenness of the world in which a person lives.

It is necessary, therefore, to identify the generic essence of thinking and cognition, and for this to carry out a special cognitive action, which is called phenomenological reduction . The natural attitude must be overcome by the transcendental understanding of consciousness.

The first stage of phenomenological reduction is identic reduction, in which the phenomenologist “brackets” the entire real world and refrains from any assessments and judgments.

Husserl calls this operation « era» . All statements that arise in the process of natural installation are the result « era» overcome. Freeing himself at the first stage from using any judgments concerning the spatio-temporal existence of the world, the phenomenologist at the second stage of phenomenological reduction brackets all the judgments and thoughts of an ordinary person about consciousness and spiritual processes.

Only after the purification operation is consciousness able to engage in the consideration of phenomena - integral elements of the perception of the world, grasped in intuitive acts. This stream of consciousness cannot be observed from the outside, it can only be experienced - and in this experience, each person establishes for himself the undoubted truth of the essences of the world. The meaning of life is, as it were, directly grasped by the experiencing consciousness of the phenomenologist.

In phenomenological intentional analysis, a holistic sequence of perceptions is built, the main positions of which are acts of the objective aspect (noema) and aspect of consciousness (noesis) . The unity of the noematic and noetic aspects of conscious activity ensures, according to Husserl, the synthesis of consciousness: the integrity of the object is reproduced by the integral consciousness. The representative of the philosophy of existentialism, J. P. Sartre, who was strongly influenced by Husserl’s ideas, writes that “Husserl again introduced charm into things themselves. He returned to us the world of artists and prophets: frightening, hostile, dangerous, with refuges of the grace of love.” In other words, phenomenology restores trust in the things themselves without dissolving them in the perceiving consciousness. There are grounds for such a statement: the phenomenological method is interpreted as a way of intuitively contemplative “perception of essence” through phenomena. That is, the givens of consciousness through which this or that reality or semantic content represents itself.

Husserl denotes the phenomenon with the following words: “itself-through-itself-revealing, revealing.” The peculiarity of the phenomenon is that it is multi-layered and includes both direct evidence and experience, as well as meanings and meanings that are posited through the object. It is in meanings that the relationship to an object is constructed: it turns out that using statements in accordance with the meaning and, with the help of a statement, entering into a relationship with an object mean one and the same thing.

Consciousness in this case, as it were, opens up to meet the objective world, seeing in it not random features and characteristics, but objective universality. Moreover, the phenomenon is not an element of the real world - it is created and controlled by the phenomenologist for the most complete penetration into the stream of perceiving consciousness and discovery of its essence.

Phenomenological reflection means nothing more than an appeal to the analysis of the essential principles of individual consciousness, in which introspection, introspection, and self-reflection are very important. A phenomenologist must learn to imagine - to discern essences in the world and to freely navigate the world of “self-revealing essences” he creates. In this case, the structure of perception is temporal or temporal: now the point is connected with retention (remembering) and protention (expectation). Let us note that in this case Husserl develops the understanding of time that had already developed in medieval philosophy with Augustine: we are not talking about objective time, but about the time of experience. Ultimately, the phenomenological understanding of consciousness and time turns out to be oriented towards extreme attention to the world and is expressed in the imperative: “Look!”

Subsequently, phenomenology evolved from an empirical or descriptive orientation towards transcendentalism, seeking to correlate the idea of ​​intentionality and phenomenon with the structure of the real world as a universe of life connections. In the works 20-30 years. Husserl addresses problems intersubjectivity, which raises the question of the socio-historical prerequisites for the development of consciousness. In other words, the problem of interaction and understanding of phenomenological subjects is solved, because the procedure of “bracketing” in a certain sense led to the loss of the possibilities of understanding and communication.

Justifying this sphere of interaction, Husserl introduces the concept "life world" , which is understood as the sphere and totality of “primary evidence” and is the basis of all knowledge. A person carries out a certain perception of himself as immersed in the world and preserves this perception in its constant significance and further development. The life world is pre-scientific in the sense that it was given before science and continues to exist in this originality. The life world is primordial and primary to all possible experience. The task of phenomenology in this case is to give value to the original primordial right of vital evidence and to recognize the life world as an undoubted priority compared to the values ​​of objective-logical evidence.

Further development of the phenomenological tradition in the works of M. Heidegger (1889-1976), G. Späth (1879-1940), R. Ingarden (1893-1970), M. Scheler (1874-1928), M. Merleau-Ponty (1908- 1961), J. - P. Sartre (1905-1980) is associated, on the one hand, with the assimilation of her method, and on the other hand, with criticism of Husserl’s basic theses. M. Heidegger, developing and transforming the idea of ​​intentionality, defined human existence itself as the inseparability of the world and man, therefore the problem of consciousness, to which Husserl paid so much attention, recedes into the background. In this case, we will not be talking about the variety of phenomena, but about the only fundamental phenomenon - human existence.

Truth appears as the correctness of representation revealed to man.

Russian phenomenologist G. Shpet turned to the study of problems of ethnic psychology as an irreducible given of ideological integrity and experience. J. - P. Sartre presents a description of the existential structures of consciousness, deprived of the possibility of understanding and identification. Polish phenomenologist R. Ingarden studied the problems of life, cultural (cognitive, aesthetic and social) and moral values ​​and customs, understanding by values ​​cultural entities that mediate between man and the world. For the French phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty, the source of the meaning of existence is in the human animate body, which acts as an intermediary between consciousness and the world.

Having developed ideas about the existence of consciousness, phenomenology has had and continues to influence most philosophical and cultural movements of the twentieth century. The problems of meaning, significance, interpretation, interpretation and understanding are actualized precisely by the phenomenological tradition, the advantage of which is that in the phenomenological doctrine of consciousness the extreme possibilities of diverse methods of meaning-making are revealed.