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✪ Schlieffen Plan - geography and communications

✪ Schlieffen Plan and the First Battle of the Marne.

✪ SCHLIFFEN PLAN IN REALITY

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Purpose of the Schlieffen Plan

Since the time of Otto von Bismarck, winning a war on two fronts: with France and Russia - was considered not only impossible, but was also recognized as military suicide for Prussia, as the Empire - the unifier of the German states.

However, from 1879, the Prussian General Staff began to develop a plan that would allow the Dual Alliance to successfully fight on two fronts. The first version of the plan was ready by 1905.

The main goal of the Schlieffen Plan was to - using the difference in time required for full mobilization between France and Russia, which was estimated at approximately 2 months - to apply the principle of simultaneous war with only one enemy, defeating and forcing the surrender of France first , and then - Russia.

In a modified version, the plan envisaged achieving victory over France during the first month of the First World War. However, a number of joint countermeasures of the Entente countries, including an unplanned counterattack by France in the Battle of the Marne, the “flight to the sea”, as well as the offensive of the Russian army in East Prussia, disrupted the implementation of the Schlieffen plan, as a result of which the parties switched to a positional war that lasted for some years.

Estimates of the Schlieffen Plan are still the subject of debate among civilian and military historians.

Plan

For a long time, German troops were unable to take Paris (in 1870, the siege of Paris lasted about 6 months, as opposed to the planned 39 days), but still, after long battles, they passed through the western part of the city. The essence of the plan was not to capture the cities and commercial centers of the country, but to force the French army to surrender and capture as many soldiers as possible, that is, to repeat the course of the Franco-Prussian War.

But some of the details that subsequently led to the collapse of von Schlieffen’s plan were invisible to the German command: both Schlieffen and the plan’s executor, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, were seduced by the opportunity to surround the French army from two sides. The inspiration once again came from history, namely the crushing defeat of the army of Ancient Rome at the Battle of Cannae in 216 BC. e., and it was this battle that Schlieffen studied very meticulously. In essence, his plan was a pretty big re-imagining of Hannibal's plan.

It was expected that the mobilization of the Russian army would be very slow due to the poor organization and weak development of the Russian railway network. After the quick victory over France, Germany intended to concentrate its forces on the Eastern Front. The plan was to leave 9% of the army in France and send the remaining 91% against the Russian Empire. Kaiser Wilhelm II put it this way:

Changes to plan, 1906

After Schlieffen retired in 1906, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger became Chief of the General Staff of the Second Reich. Some of his views did not coincide with the original version of the Schlieffen plan, which seemed to him excessively risky. The plan was developed in 1905, and due to Schlieffen's miscalculations, part of the army did not want to act on this plan. For this reason, Moltke the Younger undertook to revise the plan. He decided to regroup his troops, transferring a significant part of the army from France towards the Russian borders and strengthening the left flank of the German army in the western strategic direction. Also different from the original plan was Moltke's decision not to send troops through the Netherlands. It is this decision of his that is most discussed among chroniclers. Turner described this change as follows:

This was a significant change to the Schlieffen Plan, which probably doomed the German campaign on the Western Front before it even began.

Original text (English)

"A substantial modification in the Schlieffen Plan and one which probably doomed the German campaign in the west before it was ever launched."

Turner justified this by the fact that Germany already did not have the strength to quickly capture France, and because of this, Germany immediately got involved in a war on two fronts.

At the very beginning of the war, following the directives of Plan XVII, France began to mobilize and later transfer its army to the German border in order to regain control of the province of Alsace-Lorraine. These actions fit exactly into Schlieffen’s idea of ​​a double encirclement of the French army. But due to Moltke’s decision to transfer troops to Russia in order to prevent the capture of East Prussia, the plan was thwarted.

Start of the plan and subsequent failures

• Italy's refusal to enter the war: The entry into the war of Italy, Germany's partner in the Triple Alliance, was a necessary condition for the success of the plan. Firstly, the Italian army, advanced to the border with France, was supposed to divert a significant part of the French troops. Secondly, the Italian fleet, combined with the Austrian, would pose a serious threat to Entente communications in the Mediterranean. This would force the British to maintain large naval forces there, which would ultimately lead to their loss of superiority at sea. In reality, both the German and Austrian fleets were practically locked in their bases.
• Belgium Resistance: Despite the fact that the Belgian army was only a tenth of the German army, Belgian soldiers held the country's defense for about a month. The Germans used "Big Bertha" to destroy the Belgian fortresses in Liege, Namur and Antwerp, but the Belgians did not surrender, creating a constant threat of the German army losing. Also, Germany's attack on neutral Belgium caused many neutral countries to reconsider their views regarding Germany and Kaiser Wilhelm.

• Mobilization of the Russian Army: Russia's mobilization proceeded faster, and the invasion of Russian troops into East Prussia completely discouraged the German command. These events forced the command to transfer even more troops to the eastern front. This backfired: after the victory at the Battle of Tannenberg in early September

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN FOR OPERATION BARBAROSSA

After the defeat of France, Hitler's primary target became England. He really hoped that the crushing defeat of the French army and the British Expeditionary Force would bring this country to its knees, but he had to see that his calculations were wrong. Back on June 4, 1940, when the battles in France were coming to an end, the new British Prime Minister Churchill publicly declared that England would continue to fight the Nazis “for years if necessary, alone if necessary.” Hitler soon realized that these were not empty words, and on July 16, 1940, he ordered the development of a plan for landing troops on its territory, which was code-named “Sea Lion.” He did not refuse other ways to get England out of the war. On July 19, the Fuhrer made a big speech in the Reichstag, in which proposals for peace were made. Despite the dire situation in which the British found themselves after the loss of all their allies in Europe and the loss of a large part of their trained army, as well as almost all their heavy weapons at Dunkirk, the British Foreign Secretary Halifax, on behalf of his government, publicly rejected the German peace initiative. In a speech broadcast on radio, he said:

“We never wanted this war, and certainly none of us wants it to last even one extra day. But we will not stop fighting until we secure freedom for ourselves and for others."

Meanwhile, the situation in England did not inspire optimism at all; its dependence on imports was too great. After capturing the French and Norwegian ports, the Germans significantly improved their strategic position, greatly extending the chain of the English naval blockade and thereby reducing its density. At the same time, their submarines received many convenient access to British communications. England's economic situation no longer allowed it to hope to win a long war of attrition with Germany alone. It was obvious that the British were given strength to continue the fight by hope for help from the United States or a change in the position of the USSR. America at that time adhered to a policy of isolationism and did not have a large ground army or significant trained human reserves. In addition, it was separated from Europe by the Atlantic Ocean.

But the Soviet Union posed a real potential threat to Germany. First of all, the ideologies of these countries were initially hostile, and none of their leaders from the very beginning were at all mistaken about the strength and long-term nature of the non-aggression pact concluded between the USSR and Germany on August 23, 1939. Each of them sought to extract maximum benefits from the temporary agreement with the “sworn friend” and would not hesitate to break it at the moment that he considered advantageous. Moreover, after the partition of Poland, the armies of both countries came into direct contact. Hitler had serious reasons to believe that after the destruction of Germany's last real rival on the European continent, which was then the Soviet Union, England would come to its senses and finally submit to his will. But this had to be done as quickly as possible, before the British had time to form, arm and train a large enough ground army to be able to threaten Germany with a land war on two fronts. The main goal of the Nazi leadership was to destroy their enemies one by one, and to destroy them quickly, because Germany’s limited material and human resources did not allow it to wage a long war of attrition. For the time being, this strategy brought the Germans impressive military and political successes, which intoxicated them more and more.

In the case of England, Hitler unexpectedly found himself in a strategic impasse and felt that he was losing the initiative and control over the situation. This country, due to its geographical location, was beyond the reach of the victorious German troops, and all approaches to it were reliably covered by the mighty British fleet. Something had to be done. Even on June 14, without waiting for the surrender of France, which, however, was already inevitable, Hitler ordered the start of the transfer to peacetime states of 120 divisions of the ground army, of which 20 were tanks and 10 were motorized. The task of bringing the war with England to a victorious end was assigned to the aviation and navy. At the same time, the army was reduced by 39 divisions at once, as a result of which approximately 500 thousand people were freed up to work in the military industry, which was tasked with producing as quickly as possible the maximum possible number of the latest warships and aircraft necessary for the final destruction of England.

This path to victory was quite realistic, but did not promise quick results, and Hitler did not want to wait. Apart from his understandable reluctance to give England a break and the opportunity to recover from heavy defeats, he had another important reason to act without delay. The Fuhrer sought to implement all his pre-planned plans for the conquest of Europe even before the time when the United States with its enormous economic and military potential could intervene in them. Just at that time, America clearly demonstrated to the whole world that it was beginning serious preparations for war. On July 19, 1940, President Roosevelt signed into law a warship construction program unprecedented in the history of the country. These included seven battleships, six battlecruisers, 18 aircraft carriers, 27 cruisers, 115 destroyers and 43 submarines. This was a significant addition to the American fleet, which already had 358 warships of the main classes in service and another 130 under construction. Hitler did not flatter himself with the hope that the United States would never dare to oppose him, but he correctly calculated that they would not have time to prepare for a big war before 1942. That is why it was absolutely necessary for him to put an end to both England and the Soviet Union even before this not-so-distant date. Initially, the seizure of “living space” for Germany in the East was supposed to begin only after the establishment of complete hegemony in Western Europe. But in the current situation, Hitler decided to try to catch two birds with one stone: to conquer the USSR and thereby force England to surrender or at least to peace on German terms.

On July 21, 1940, after another discussion of the details of the future landing in England, the Fuhrer instructed the commander of the German ground forces, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, to study the possibilities of war with the Soviet Union and present him with his proposals on this issue. Brauchitsch had to proceed from the following considerations:

1. Four to six weeks were allotted for the complete concentration of the invading army.

2. The military goal of the operation was the defeat of the Red Army or the capture of such a large territory of the USSR that military factories in the eastern part of Germany, especially in Berlin and Silesia, as well as oil production areas in Romania, became inaccessible to Soviet aviation. At the same time, all important industrial centers of the European part of the Soviet Union were to be within the range of the Luftwaffe.

3. The political goals of the operation included the creation of independent Ukraine, Belarus, a federation of the Baltic states and an increase in the territory of Finland.

4. To carry out the operation, forces consisting of 80-100 divisions were allocated. At the same time, the forces of the Red Army in the European part of the USSR were estimated at 50–75 combat-ready divisions. In the event of the start of a campaign against the Soviet Union in the coming autumn, part of the German aviation concentrated against England was planned to be transferred to the east.

The next day, Brauchitsch brought this information to the Chief of the Army General Staff (OKH), Colonel General Halder, and ordered him to analyze the situation and present an outline of a plan for a future campaign. He immediately asked Lieutenant Colonel Kinzel, head of the Vostok department of foreign armies, for information about the number and deployment of Soviet troops. The flywheel of preparations for the future big war in the East began to gain momentum.

Then, at the end of July, it became finally clear to the German leadership that a landing in England would become possible no earlier than mid-September 1940. Only by this time would the fleet be able to prepare sufficient forces and means for a landing on a wide front. But when this deadline approached, it turned out that the Germans had failed to create the necessary prerequisites for the implementation of Operation Sea Lion. Despite all the efforts and expended resources, the Luftwaffe was never able to defeat British aviation and gain air supremacy. Therefore, on September 17, the landing in England was postponed indefinitely. But even earlier - on July 31 at the Berghof, at the end of a meeting devoted mainly to Operation Sea Lion, Hitler for the first time announced to a wide circle of people that war with Russia would take place next spring. Halder outlined the main points of his speech in detail in his diary:

“‹…› We will not attack England, but will smash those illusions that give England the will to resist. Then we can hope for a change in her position. The war itself has been won. France fell away from the "British Lion". Italy pins down British troops. Submarine and air warfare can decide the outcome of the war, but this will last a year or two.

The hope of England is Russia and America. If hopes for Russia collapse, America will also fall away from England, since the defeat of Russia will result in the incredible strengthening of Japan in East Asia.

‹…› England is especially counting on Russia. Something has happened in London! The British had completely lost heart, but now they suddenly perked up again.

‹…› Russia is dissatisfied with the rapid developments in Western Europe. It is enough for Russia to tell England that it does not want to see Germany too [strong] for the British to cling to this statement like a drowning man at a straw, and begin to hope that in six to eight months things will turn out completely differently.

If Russia is defeated, England will lose its last hope. Then Germany will dominate Europe and the Balkans.

Conclusion: According to this reasoning, Russia must be liquidated. Deadline: spring 1941.

The sooner we defeat Russia, the better. The operation will only make sense if we destroy the entire state with one swift blow. Just capturing some part of the territory is not enough.

‹…› The existence of a second great power [Russia] in the Baltic Sea is intolerable. Beginning May 1941. The duration of the operation is five months. It would be better to start this year, but this is not suitable, since the operation must be carried out in one blow. The goal is to destroy the life force of Russia.

The operation breaks down into:

1st strike: Kyiv, exit to the Dnieper; aviation destroys crossings. Odessa.

2nd strike: Through the Baltic states to Moscow; in the future, a two-pronged attack - from the north and south; later - a private operation to capture the Baku region."

To implement this vast plan, Hitler had to reverse his recent decision to reduce the ground army. On the contrary, he decided to form another 40 divisions and, together with those 20 whose personnel were temporarily put on leave, to increase its strength to 180 divisions, including 25 tank and 12 motorized, no later than the beginning of May next year. Based on the intelligence information received from Kinzel, Halder came to the conclusion that the most promising offensive looked from East Prussia and Northern Poland in the Moscow direction. If it succeeded, after the fall of Moscow, Soviet troops in Ukraine and southern Russia would have to fight with an inverted front. However, Feirabent's preliminary work, the main ideas of which were reported to Halder by his subordinates on July 27, suggested delivering the main blow in Ukraine, south of the Pripyat marshes. For this it was also planned to use 100 divisions. Halder did not like this proposal from his own staff, which ran counter to his own plan, so on July 29 he decided to invite an “outsider” to develop a plan for the campaign against the Soviet Union. He became 49-year-old Major General Erich Marx, who was specially transferred to the OKH from the post of chief of staff of the 18th Army, which had recently been transferred to the border with the USSR. And what is noteworthy: he had to work completely independently, avoiding outside influences.

On August 1, 1940, Halder discussed in detail the objectives and plans of the campaign with Marx. Both agreed that it was necessary to create two main strike groups: one to attack Moscow, the other to attack Kyiv. Halder feared that the southern group would have unsecured rears if it had to attack from Romania. He considered the capture of the Baltic states to be a secondary goal, which should not interfere with the fulfillment of the main task - the attack on Moscow. As a result of the discussion, Marx was given the task of putting his proposals on paper in detail. Already on August 5, the talented and very efficient staff officer presented Halder with his 26-page plan, called “Ost.” Below are his main theses, which were later used in the development of the well-known Barbarossa plan.

1. Company goal: the defeat of the Soviet armed forces so that the USSR could not pose a threat to Germany in the foreseeable future. It was necessary to capture territories up to the Rostov-Gorky-Arkhangelsk line in order to exclude any possibility for Soviet aviation to strike German territory. From an economic point of view, the most valuable regions were Ukraine and the Donbass, as well as the industrial areas around Moscow and Leningrad. The main goal is Moscow as the political, economic and spiritual center of the USSR. After its capture, one should expect the collapse of organized resistance.

2. Terrain. To the north and west of Moscow there are vast forests and swamps. The Pripyat swamps, which are the southern part of this massif, divide the western part of the USSR into two parts. South of Pripyat the forests are not so dense, but there the mobility of troops is greatly limited by the lack of good roads and the wide Dnieper River. To the north, the road network is denser, but impenetrable forests force military operations to be carried out only along major highways.

3. Soviet tactics. The Red Army is expected to defend itself. Only on the border with Romania can we expect Russian offensive attempts to capture oil production and refining centers, as well as attacks on them from the air. One should not expect the Russians to repeat the tactics of the War of 1812, when they avoided decisive battles for a long time. It was believed that the Red Army would take defensive positions on the line Western Dvina - Polotsk - Berezina - the eastern edge of the Pripyat marshes - Prut or Dniester, relying on powerful fortifications prepared in advance there. West of this line, only restraining actions were foreseen. The retreat of the Red Army to the Dnieper line was not excluded.

4. Calculation of forces. The German command clearly underestimated the composition of the Red Army: in the western theater of operations it had 38% more formations than the Germans expected. In Table 5.1, the German assessment of the Red Army forces in August 1940 is compared with their actual state as of September of the same year:

Based on this erroneous assessment, Marx considered it sufficient to use a total of 147 German divisions against the USSR, including 24 tank, 12 motorized, one cavalry and infantry divisions. Their readiness was expected by the spring of 1941.

5. Distribution of Russian forces. The main groupings of Soviet troops, separated by the Pripyat swamps, are divided approximately equally: to the north in the Baltic states and Belarus and to the south in Ukraine, reserves are concentrated in the Moscow region. This distribution of forces was expected in any scenario of war with Germany. It was assumed that after the breakthroughs of the Russian front stretched over a long distance, they would lose the ability to coordinate actions and would be defeated in parts.

Soviet aviation was considered a serious adversary that should not be underestimated. It was possible that its actions, directed against troops advancing along the few existing main roads, could be very effective.

6. Progress of operations. Due to the enormous size of the theater of operations (theater of operations) and its division into two parts by the Pripyat Marshes, it is unlikely that the campaign will be won by carrying out only one decisive blow. Therefore, it was planned to carry out two independent offensive operations against the main groupings of Soviet troops. In the future they could merge into one.

It is advisable to concentrate the main forces of the Wehrmacht in the northern part of the theater of operations in order to suppress any resistance in its path and capture Moscow. The main attack was planned between Brest and Gumbinen in the direction of Rogachev - Vitebsk. The smaller German forces assembled south of Pripyat were tasked with advancing towards Kyiv. Thus, it was supposed to prevent the Russian attack on Romania, and at the same time to form the southern part of the pincers, which would close east of the headwaters of the Dnieper. On the northern flank of the operations, auxiliary forces were to advance across the Baltic states in the Leningrad direction and capture Russian naval bases on the Baltic coast.

A) Advance in the south. The offensive in Ukraine had the main purpose of protecting Romanian oil. In the event of a main attack from Romania, and auxiliary ones from northeastern Hungary and southeastern Poland, this operation had a chance to develop into a major offensive across the Dnieper towards Moscow. But the political situation in the Balkans and the sparse road network of Romania and Hungary did not allow the necessary forces and resources to be concentrated in time for the start of the campaign. A strike only from south-eastern Poland in the direction of Kiev was considered possible, but remained limited due to lack of room for maneuver and the excessively long distance to Moscow.

For an offensive in the south, sufficiently large forces were needed, capable of destroying Russian troops in Western Ukraine and reaching the left bank of the Dnieper. The direction of further advance had to be coordinated with the development of the main operation in the northern part of the theater of operations. It could go to Kharkov or to the southeast, but the main target in any scenario was Kyiv. Auxiliary forces, operating from Romanian territory, were supposed to connect with the main group in the area of ​​​​the middle reaches of the Dnieper. The Romanian army was assigned a role in the occupation of Bessarabia, Odessa and Crimea.

b) Main blow. The goal of the main attack was to destroy the Russian forces located to the west of Moscow as a result of a direct attack on it. After capturing the capital and the northern part of Russia, part of the main forces was supposed to turn south and capture Ukraine in cooperation with the southern group. The main offensive was planned from East Prussia and Northern Poland to Moscow, since the decisive operation could not begin in Romania, and the initial attack in the Leningrad direction only lengthened the path to Moscow and led into the dense forests located north of Moscow. The left flank of the group advancing on Moscow was covered by troops advancing through the Western Dvina to Pskov and Leningrad. After the capture of the latter, they had to act together with the main forces.

The road and railway network west of the Russian border was sufficiently developed to supply the troops advancing on Moscow. But the terrain on the path of these troops was unfavorable. They had to cross the vast forest and lake region between the Western Dvina and the Dnieper, so the struggle for transport arteries became decisive. The airborne troops were tasked with capturing the eastern exits from the forest zone and keeping the roads open for the main forces.

V) Maneuver. Since speed and surprise were the most important prerequisites for the success of an offensive, tank and motorized troops, supported by aviation, had to break through enemy defenses, and infantry divisions would follow them without delay, encircling and isolating enemy forces. The power of the first attack was limited mainly by the capacity of the roads. In most cases, no more than two divisions could simultaneously advance along one road, so it was expected that units and formations would have to echelon in depth. The enormous width of the theater of operations dictated the need to have strong mobile reserves that could be quickly transferred to where they were needed.

7. Distribution of German troops. The troops intended for the invasion consisted of two army groups (GA), while the GA "North" was almost twice as numerous in the number of divisions as the GA "South", and in tank divisions - by three. The composition of army and reserve groups is shown in Table 5.2:

8. Tasks of the ground forces. The main goal of Army Group South was the destruction of Russian forces in western Ukraine and the capture of bridgeheads on the Dnieper, from which further advance in an eastern or northeastern direction would be possible. GA "North" was tasked with capturing Moscow. To do this, the mobile units had to break through the forests between Rogachev and Vitebsk, and the airborne troops would ensure their advance at the exit from the forests. If the Russians organized a defense between the initial areas of the German offensive and the forests or Western Dvina, they were going to be pushed back from the Moscow direction to the north. At the same time, German tank and motorized units had to quickly move forward all the way to Moscow, without waiting for the destruction of these Russian troops thrown out of their path.

9. Air Force missions. The Luftwaffe was tasked with neutralizing Soviet aviation, disrupting road and rail transport, preventing the concentration of the Red Army in forested areas, supporting the advance of advanced units with dive bombers, preparing landings and covering the most important transport hubs and troops on the march.

10. Tasks of the Navy. The fleet was obliged to neutralize the Soviet Baltic Fleet, ensure uninterrupted delivery of iron ore from Sweden and establish transport transportation through the Baltic immediately after the army captured the seaports.

11. Supply. It was planned to form a special headquarters to coordinate supplies and organize bases. It was expected that the Russians would try to carry out widespread destruction and destroy warehouses, railways and bridges. They intended to reduce this damage by speed and surprise of action. Appropriate measures were planned to seize bridges and railway stations in Ukraine, Lithuania and Latvia and prevent their destruction. All railways east of the former Polish border were to be converted to Western European gauge.

12. Time frame. The most favorable time for conducting the campaign was considered to be from mid-May to mid-October. But in the event of a mild winter, it might be possible to start it from the first days of May.

All units participating in the operation had to concentrate in a timely manner before the start of hostilities. In the event that the war began unexpectedly, the forces belonging to the GA North would need approximately 10 days to arrive in their assigned areas. For the southern group this period was nine days.

The most likely scenario for the initial phase of the campaign was to hold the Russians to a depth of up to 400 km until they reached their pre-prepared defensive positions. German infantry divisions needed three weeks to cover this distance. The tank divisions were tasked with attacking so quickly and breaking through so deeply that the Russians would not have time to occupy their fortifications. The outcome of the entire campaign depended entirely on the success of tank breakthroughs.

It was assumed that the second stage of the campaign would be dominated by the struggle for forests and rivers. Since the depth of this zone is 100–200 km, 2–4 weeks were enough for the infantry to cross it. At this stage it was planned that the German army would either achieve a decisive breakthrough or destroy piecemeal the previously defeated Russian forces.

At the third stage of the campaign, it was planned to take Moscow and Leningrad and launch an attack on the eastern part of Ukraine. To do this, it was necessary to travel 400 and 320 km, respectively. Whether it would be possible to begin this stage immediately after the end of the second depended on many factors, such as the state of the railways, the combat readiness of tracked and wheeled vehicles, and the degree of previous success. If the Russians had been defeated by that time, a few tank and motorized divisions would have been enough to prevent them from recovering. The same forces planned to capture Moscow and Leningrad and break deep into Eastern Ukraine. If there were a sufficient number of combat-ready tanks and vehicles, this required 1–2 weeks. However, if a significant part of the Red Army were still capable of organized resistance by that time, the start of the third stage would have to be postponed until sufficient supplies of material needed to continue the offensive could be brought in. In this case, this step would take 3-6 weeks, depending on the time required to replenish stocks.

In the fourth and final stage of the offensive, the Germans intended to pursue the Russians towards the Don, Volga and Northern Dvina. In this case, it was necessary to cover 400 km in the south and up to 800 km in the north and center. It was expected that the Soviet command would lose control of its troops after the loss of Kharkov, Moscow and Leningrad, but the complete occupation of all territories captured at this stage was still impossible and not necessary. It was assumed that mobile troops and infantry transported by rail would be sufficient for this operation. This stage required 2–4 weeks to complete.

It was therefore calculated that the time required to achieve all the objectives set for the campaign in the East would range from nine to 17 weeks. If the Soviet leadership had not collapsed by that time and made peace, the offensive would have had to be continued all the way to the Urals. After the destruction of their army and the loss of the most valuable European part of the country, the Soviets were considered incapable of conducting major military operations, but would still be able to organize their government in Asia and continue the war indefinitely.

Marx attached to his plan recommendations for preparing the campaign: on the organization of communications, on the construction and improvement of roads, bridges, railways and stations, on the areas where troops can be stationed, their formation, equipment and combat training, on the preparation of cartographic materials, etc.

On September 3, 1940, the OKH operations department, under the leadership of its new chief, Lieutenant General Paulus, began work on a strategic plan for the campaign against the Soviet Union, based on Marx's Ost plan. Marx himself was removed from further work at the headquarters of the ground forces.

It is interesting that planning for a future war with the USSR was carried out in parallel at the headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), which joined this work on July 29, 1940. On this day, the head of its operational department, Artillery General Jodl, informed the head of the national defense department, Colonel Warlimont, that Hitler decided to “put an end to the Bolshevik threat once and for all by a surprise attack on Soviet Russia at the first opportunity.” Since the war between Nazi and communist ideologies was sooner or later considered inevitable, the Fuhrer decided to launch an offensive immediately, in the fall of 1940. However, the OKW chief of staff, Field Marshal Keitel, managed to dissuade him from this adventurous undertaking, convincingly describing the difficulties of war on USSR territory in the winter. Another strong argument against such a hasty attack was the underdeveloped road network in the Polish lands recently captured by Germany. It made it impossible to transport and supply a sufficiently large group of troops. Hitler reluctantly agreed to delay the start of the operation until mid-May 1941.

The work of Warlimont’s group began with the drafting of a directive code-named “Construction in the East,” which Keitel approved on August 9. The directive provided for a whole range of measures aimed at creating the necessary conditions for the rapid concentration of troops on the territory of the Polish General Government and preparing the appropriate infrastructure for them - roads, airfields, barracks, warehouses, communication lines and other things. Its development was carried out in compliance with the strictest secrecy. Warlimont's greatest concern was whether England would be finally conquered by the spring of 1941, or would Germany still have to fight a war on two fronts? Jodl assured him that the campaign against the USSR would be carried out regardless of the state of affairs in the West. After completing this directive, Warlimont's group, on Jodl's orders, began to develop their own plan for a campaign against the USSR. Jodl's main goal was to test OKH proposals before they reached Hitler's desk, so all work had to be carried out without regard to army planning. Lieutenant Colonel Bernhard von Lossberg was appointed responsible for it, and after his name the plan became known as the “Lossberg Study.” Lossberg himself gave his plan the code designation "Fritz", and later suggested to Jodl a more suitable name - "Barbarossa". This is how this name first surfaced, which later became notorious.

First of all, von Lossberg analyzed all possible scenarios for the Red Army. The most likely of them were the following:

1. An unexpected attack on the Wehrmacht, which has not yet completed its deployment.

2. Defensive battle in border areas in order to retain one’s territory.

3. Retreat into the interior of the country in order to stretch the communications of the advancing German army and create supply difficulties for it, and then launch a counterattack.

Von Lossberg found the first option incredible. He did not believe in the ability of the Red Army and its command to launch a large-scale offensive in the area of ​​Poland or East Prussia. The maximum activity that he expected from the Soviet troops could be private operations against Finland or Romania. At the same time, an attack on Finland would have diverted part of the Red Army forces there, and the Wehrmacht’s entry into the Leningrad area would have created a direct threat to their rear. Actions against Romania, aimed at destroying Germany's vital fuel base, were expected mainly from Soviet aviation. It was believed that the German troops available in Romania, together with the Romanian army, were strong enough to repel this threat.

Von Lossberg believed the second option to be the most likely: the Red Army would not give up the newly acquired areas of its country without a fight. It was precisely this development of the situation that he, like Marx, considered most beneficial for the Germans. It allowed them to defeat the bulk of the enemy troops in a border battle, and then simply finish off the remnants of organized resistance.

The last option could bring the greatest trouble to the Wehrmacht. In this case, the Red Army would only conduct restraining actions at the border with rearguard forces. Under their cover, its main forces were able to freely retreat to positions convenient for defense beyond the Western Dvina and Dnieper. The Germans really did not want to face the need to break through positions that had been prepared in advance and occupied by numerous troops, and even covered by wide rivers.

"Study for Lossberg" was completed on September 15. Unlike the OKH plan von Lossberg proposed using not two, but three army groups. Two of them were recommended to deliver the main blow north of the Pripyat marshes, because it was there that the shortest route to Moscow through Smolensk lay. After the capture of the Smolensk region by the forces of the GA "Center", the further development of the operation depended on the successes of the GA "North". If the latter had been able to independently continue the attack on Leningrad, the GA “Center” would have thrown all its forces at Moscow. But if GA “North” had stalled, GA “Center” would have had to temporarily stop its offensive and help its neighbor. In Finland, it was planned to concentrate all the Finnish and German forces available there in the southern direction, and an attack on Murmansk was not planned.

On September 21, Hitler ordered the start of aerial reconnaissance and photographing of Soviet territory to a depth of 300 kilometers. The first reconnaissance flights were carried out already in October of the same year, and by June 22, 1941, more than 500 of them took place. The lion's share of these flights were carried out by He-111, Do-215, Ju-88P and Ju-86P aircraft from a special reconnaissance squadron under under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Theodor Rovel. They were equipped with high-powered engines and pressurized cabins and thanks to this they flew at an altitude of approximately nine kilometers.

Looking ahead a little, we note that on 05/22/41 Halder wrote in his diary:

“Demonstration of photographs taken by Rovel’s squadron over the Russian border areas. Extensive work to strengthen the defenses (especially the anti-tank ditches) along the border is clearly visible. Numerous trenches for cable communication lines indicate the presence of a continuous defensive line. Aerial photographs confirm our opinion of the Russians' determination to hold on to the border."

But the collection of information was carried out not only by military reconnaissance aircraft. German scheduled passenger planes flying along the Moscow-Berlin route also reconnoitered objects on their route and even deliberately deviated from the established route in order to expand the observation area. Often German planes landed at Soviet border airfields to collect information about them under the pretext of losing their bearings during training flights. Until the very beginning of the war, Soviet aviation, ground troops and border guards were strictly forbidden to open fire on German aircraft violating the state border. In the NKVD directive to border troops, this ban was justified by the fact that violations by Germany “are unintentional,” therefore, “do not use weapons when German aircraft violate our border.” Thanks to this ban, the Germans had a rare opportunity to collect intelligence information in a calm environment, like at a training ground. The German military attaché in Moscow, Kestring, was also tasked with reconnaissance of routes and communications along the lines of advance of the three army groups. The Germans used every opportunity to collect intelligence information about the USSR and its armed forces.

The OKH Operations Department completed the strategic study of the campaign and presented it to Halder on October 29. Its authors came to disappointing conclusions. The large size of the Red Army, the enormous size of the Soviet territory intended for occupation, unfavorable natural conditions and the need to complete the campaign in a short time and with a decisive result presented insoluble problems to the OKH officers.

But on the other hand, the results of the recent “Winter War” between the USSR and Finland convincingly demonstrated the rather low level of combat effectiveness of the Red Army, which contrasted with the impressive results of the German blitzkrieg in the West against a much more serious enemy, as the Germans believed. In addition, the population of the newly acquired territories was assumed to be hostile to Soviet power, and recent large-scale “purges” were considered strong evidence of widespread opposition in the USSR.

The main topics of strategic development were the following:

1. Human resources. The initial balance of forces was unfavorable for the Germans. They could field, at best, only 145 divisions, including 19 tank divisions, against some 170 Soviet divisions stationed in the western part of the USSR, to which numerous reservists would have to be added at the beginning of the war. The armies of Romania and Finland could improve this situation somewhat, but they were equipped and trained, especially the Romanians, noticeably worse than the German troops and could not compare with them in combat effectiveness. The Germans did not consider it possible to underestimate the Soviet soldier and did not expect that the Red Army would collapse after the first setbacks. It was planned to compensate for the lack of forces by creating superiority in the attack directions by weakening the rest of the front.

It was proposed to pay special attention to measures of camouflage and disinformation. The Germans were well aware that their attempts to portray the concentration of huge forces on the Soviet border, as a means of diverting the attention of the British from the final preparations for landing on their island, would not remain convincing for long. But they hoped that, in the end, only the exact date of the start of the operation and the direction of the main attacks would remain secret.

2. Terrain. The enormous size of the future theater of operations presented another major problem, especially given the limited strength of the Wehrmacht. The initial length of the front was more than 1,500 km, but as it moved east, its width grew like a funnel, and at the Astrakhan-Arkhangelsk line (line A-A) it reached 2,500 km. Thus, as we moved east, the density of troops constantly decreased, even without taking into account the inevitable battle losses and the need to leave occupying forces in the rear. Germany mobilized its army in advance, and this gave it a very important advantage at the beginning of the war. But the longer the war continued, the more it lost this advantage, because its replenishment capabilities were much more limited than those of the USSR. It was unclear whether the Red Army intended to fight a decisive battle on the border or planned to withdraw in holding battles. The success of the war largely depended on the ability of the Germans to impose their will on the enemy from the very beginning, to prevent him from retreating in an organized manner into the interior of the country and to defeat his main forces in border battles. To do this, it is necessary to carry out operations to encircle and destroy enemy troops, without giving them the opportunity to escape.

3. Time. The correct timing of the offensive was more important than ever. The season from May to October was the most suitable in terms of weather. After it, a period of thaw began in the theater of operations, followed by a harsh winter. It was therefore necessary to successfully complete the operations while the weather remained favorable. During this time, they had to cover a distance of 800 to 1000 km. From the very beginning of the campaign, time was and remained the most important factor.

4. Intelligence data. German intelligence identified two main groupings of Soviet forces: one, numbering up to 70 divisions, in Ukraine, and another in Belarus, consisting of about 60 divisions. Another 30 divisions were stationed in the Baltic states. But it was unclear whether they would want to fight on the border or retreat into the interior of the country. It was assumed, however, that the Soviet command was not planning to retreat beyond the borders of the Dnieper and Western Dvina in order to preserve its important industrial centers.

5. Theater analysis. It was noted that south of the Pripyat marshes the road network is sparse, with the main highways running along the rivers and directed from north to south. There were more roads in the north, and between Moscow and Warsaw the best roads and railways were laid from west to east - just in the direction of the German offensive.

In the Leningrad direction the roads were also relatively good. At the same time, in the south, the advancing troops had to overcome wide rivers: the Dniester, Bug and Dnieper, and in the north there was only one significant water barrier - the Western Dvina.

It was obvious that the Red Army would not give up its capital without a fight, so a strike on Moscow made it possible to achieve decisive goals. On the contrary, the territories south of Pripyat were of little military value. There, Soviet troops had the opportunity to sacrifice space, gaining time, and retreat beyond the Dnieper. On the other hand, in the south there were: Ukrainian grain, Donbass coal, and behind them Caucasian oil. But the main goal of the Wehrmacht was military victory, not material acquisitions. Winning the entire campaign made it possible to successfully solve economic problems at the same time. Therefore, the OKH Operations Department came to the conclusion that the main efforts should be concentrated north of the Pripyat marshes, and the main blow should be delivered through Smolensk to Moscow.

The OKW leadership had high hopes for the surprise of the attack. Therefore, back on September 7, 1940, Jodl gave instructions to the leadership of German intelligence about the basic principles of misleading the Soviet command:

"1. To disguise the total number of troops in the east, if possible, by spreading rumors and news about the supposedly intensive replacement of military formations located in this area. The movement of troops should be justified by their transfer to training camps, reorganization, etc.

2. C give the impression that the main direction of our movements has shifted to the southern regions(emphasis added by us. - Ed.) General Government, into the protectorate and Austria and that the concentration of troops in the north is relatively small.

5. Work to improve the network of highways, railways and airfields is explained by the need to develop the newly conquered eastern regions, citing the fact that they are being carried out at a normal pace and serve mainly economic purposes.”

The commander of the German fleet, Admiral Raeder, was a staunch supporter of bringing the war with England to a victorious end before getting involved in other serious conflicts. Not without his influence, the Nazi leadership decided to make another attempt to solve the problem of neutralizing the USSR while fighting with England through diplomatic means. The possibility of making him his military ally against Britain was not excluded. Therefore, on October 17, 1940, Stalin received a written invitation from Ribbentrop for his Soviet colleague V.M. Molotov to arrive in Berlin “to further clarify issues of decisive importance for the future of our peoples and to discuss them in a concrete form.” This implied the delimitation of spheres of influence between Germany, Italy, Japan and the USSR on a global scale.

Stalin immediately understood the transparent hint and on the evening of October 21 agreed to negotiate. On November 12, Molotov arrived in Berlin to conduct them, who at that time was not only the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, but also simultaneously served as Chairman of the Soviet government. His meetings and long conversations with Hitler, Ribbentrop, Goering and Hess lasted two days. Molotov received a tempting offer to join the “Tripartite Pact” concluded between Germany, Italy and Japan just shortly before, on September 27. At the same time, Germany was given dominance in Europe and in the area of ​​the former German colonies in Central Africa, Italy - in Northern and Northeast Africa, Japan - in East Asia, and the Soviet Union was asked to head to the south of Asia, to the Persian Gulf and towards India.

Essentially, the Germans invited the Soviet Union to participate in the division of the gigantic British Empire, considering its collapse to be an imminent and inevitable event. But Molotov had no particular desire to share the skin of a bear that had not yet been killed and preferred to talk about more pressing matters. He not only wanted confirmation that the previous German-Soviet agreement on Finland remained in force, but also demanded additional spheres of influence for the USSR. These included primarily Bulgaria and Türkiye. Molotov especially persistently raised the topic of the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. He was also interested in the future fate of Hungary and Romania and the intentions of the Axis powers regarding Yugoslavia and Greece. The Soviet People's Commissar also wished to discuss the right of exit from the Baltic to the North Sea through the straits controlled by Germany. The German leadership regarded all these requests as a serious infringement of its fundamental interests. Moreover, Molotov spoke to Hitler as an equal partner, persistently asked him uncomfortable questions and stubbornly did not yield in disputes. The Fuhrer was not used to such treatment, perceiving it as rude and irritating. The negotiations ended without results.

But the matter did not end there. On the evening of November 25, Molotov invited the German Ambassador to Moscow, Schulenburg, and gave him a written statement that said:

“The USSR agrees to accept basically the draft pact of the four powers on their political cooperation and economic mutual assistance, outlined by G. Ribbentrop in his conversation with V.M. Molotov in Berlin on November 13, 1940 and consisting of 4 points, under the following conditions:

1. If German troops are now withdrawn from Finland, which represents the sphere of influence of the USSR, in accordance with the Soviet-German agreement of 1939, and the USSR undertakes to ensure peaceful relations with Finland, as well as the economic interests of Germany in Finland (export of timber, nickel).

2. If in the coming months the security of the USSR in the Straits is ensured by concluding a mutual assistance pact between the USSR and Bulgaria, which, due to its geographical location, is located in the security sphere of the Black Sea borders of the USSR and the organization of a military and naval base of the USSR in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles area on a long-term lease basis .

3. If the center of gravity of the aspiration of the USSR is recognized as the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction to the Persian Gulf.

4. If Japan renounces its concession rights for coal and oil in Northern Sakhalin on the terms of fair compensation.

In accordance with the above, the draft protocol to the Four-Power Treaty, presented by Mr. Ribbentrop, on the delimitation of spheres of influence in the spirit of determining the center of gravity of the aspiration of the USSR in the south of Batum and Baku in the general direction to the Persian Gulf should be changed.

In the same way, the draft protocol outlined by Mr. Ribbentrop must be changed - the Agreement between Germany, Italy and the USSR on Turkey in the spirit of ensuring the military and naval base of the USSR near the Bosporus and Dardanelles on the basis of a long-term lease with a guarantee of the 3 powers of the independence and territory of Turkey in case Turkey agrees to join the four powers.

This protocol should provide that in the event of Turkey’s refusal to join the four powers, Germany, Italy and the USSR agree to develop and implement the necessary military and diplomatic measures, for which a special agreement should be concluded.

The following must also be adopted: the third secret protocol between the USSR and Germany on Finland; the fourth secret protocol between the USSR and Japan on Japan's renunciation of coal and oil concessions in Northern Sakhalin; the fifth secret protocol between the USSR, Germany and Italy with the recognition that Bulgaria, due to its geographical location, is within the security sphere of the Black Sea borders of the USSR, and therefore it is considered politically necessary to conclude a mutual assistance pact between the USSR and Bulgaria, which in no way should not affect either the internal regime of Bulgaria or its sovereignty and independence."

From Hitler's point of view, the USSR charged an exorbitantly high price for its entry into an alliance with Germany, and the Fuhrer did not agree to it. He subsequently explained his decision as follows:

“Stalin is smart and cunning. He will constantly increase his demands. From the point of view of Russian ideology, a German victory is unacceptable. Therefore, the solution is to defeat Russia as soon as possible. In two years England will have 40 divisions. This may encourage Russia to move closer to it.”

The time when Hitler was ready to make huge concessions for Stalin had already passed by that time. After the defeat of France, the Germans no longer needed to fear for their rear, and along with this, their self-confidence reached an unprecedented height. Stalin, who did not realize in time that the situation had radically changed, with his excessive demands irritated the Fuhrer, who considered Europe as a sphere of his undivided influence. Hitler was finally convinced that the Soviet problem could only be resolved by force. The day after Molotov left Berlin, Raeder learned that planning for an attack on the USSR was continuing at full speed and that his attempts to dissuade Hitler from this adventure had ended in vain. German aggression against the USSR became inevitable.

In accordance with the plan, new divisions were continuously formed, equipped and trained in Germany. In the same month, the USSR for the first time suspected that something was wrong and made an official request to the German embassy in Moscow about the excessive concentration of German forces on Polish territory adjacent to the Soviet border. The Germans responded hypocritically by assuring that the movement of troops was random in nature and was connected with their transfer for rest after the end of the campaign in the West, with the requirements of the occupation of Poland and with suitable conditions for combat training in these areas.

Finally, on December 5, Brauchitsch and Halder presented Hitler with their plan, then codenamed “Otto.” According to him, three main groupings of German ground forces were created in the East. GA "North" was supposed to advance from East Prussia to Leningrad, GA "Center" - through Smolensk to Moscow, and GA "South" - to Kyiv. The main goal of the campaign was to reach the Volga and the Arkhangelsk region. 105 infantry and 32 tank and motorized divisions were intended for the offensive. It took eight weeks to concentrate them. It is interesting to note that, according to the Germans themselves, about a month before its completion it will no longer be possible to hide preparations for the invasion from the Russians.

Hitler agreed to the plan, but stressed the importance of preventing the Russians from retreating into the interior of the country and the need to destroy their army in a border battle so that they would never be able to recover. Therefore, the main type of maneuver should have been envelopment and detour with the goal of subsequently encircling the enemy. Army Groups North and Center were to work closely together, while Army Group South was to go on the offensive later than the others, with the task of encircling and destroying Russian forces in the Ukraine. Hitler did not yet consider the capture of Moscow particularly important, so he did not make a final decision on the further direction of the German offensive after the main forces of the Red Army in the Baltics, Belarus and Ukraine were finished. To win the campaign, he believed it was enough to use 130–140 divisions.

Hitler also announced that the armies of Romania and Finland would take part in the operation together with the Wehrmacht. In the Far North, the strike was to be carried out by a group of three German divisions.

The presented plan was tested in a command and staff game conducted under the leadership of Paulus. It was attended by the heads of departments of the OKH, as well as the Luftwaffe general attached to the commander-in-chief of the army. The game was divided into three stages. The first of them began on November 29, 1940. It practiced the invasion itself and the border battle, and then “discussed operational possibilities after achieving the first operational goal.” At the second stage, which began on December 3, offensive operations were carried out until reaching the Kyiv-Minsk-Lake Peipsi line. The theme of the last, third stage, starting from December 7, was further possible options for action. After completing each stage, Paulus noted the milestones achieved, the state of the troops, the supply situation, intelligence data, etc. At the third stage, it became finally clear that the available forces were unlikely to be sufficient to hold the ever-expanding offensive front if the Red Army retained the ability to organized resistance.

The games revealed many weaknesses in German operational planning. It turned out that fulfilling the task of occupying the Baltic states could lead the North Civil Defense to a serious lag behind the Center Civil Aviation. It was also discovered that if its main forces were concentrated in Romania, GA “South” would experience considerable difficulties with deployment and problems with management. Therefore, southern Poland was chosen as the main springboard for its offensive. The main task of both of these army groups was to reliably cover the flanks of the Center Civil Aviation Unit in order to ensure its rapid advance towards the key goal - Moscow. At the same time, the Civil Aviation Center “Center” revealed a lack of infantry formations necessary for the successful creation of a “cauldron” in the Minsk region. The infantry had to form an internal encirclement front as quickly as possible in order to enable the moving units to move forward without delay.

In addition, it turned out that after completing the first stage of the offensive and reaching the Dnieper line south of Kiev, and further north along the Rogachev-Orsha-Vitebsk-Velikiye Luki-Pskov-Pyarnu line, the troops will need an operational pause of up to three weeks to recover in order after previous battles, establish supplies and bring up supplies. Then, on the 40th day of the operation, the Wehrmacht was to launch a decisive offensive against Moscow.

Paulus reported the results of the game to Halder. Around this time, a staff exercise was held to test the supply plan, which formed part of the strategic development of the campaign made by the OKH operations department. At the same time, special attention was paid to organizing the effective supply of troops in areas where they are concentrated and creating an effective storage system capable of reliably ensuring the supply of everything necessary to the army during future large-scale offensive operations.

Simultaneously with these exercises, but independently of them, the chiefs of staff of all three army groups were tasked with starting to develop plans for a campaign against the USSR. Halder brought them up to date, but did not reveal all the details of the upcoming operation, but limited their tasks to the defeat of the Red Army forces in Belarus and Western Ukraine. Paulus provided them with all the necessary information, stipulating that they must seek solutions to all problems without consulting their colleagues. The results of their work were ready in early December and carefully studied by Halder and Paulus. For a detailed discussion of all fresh ideas, a meeting of the chiefs of staff of armies and army groups was held at the OKH on December 13–14. As a result of the discussions at this meeting, it was possible to clarify many problems that could not be resolved previously. But the conclusion was, to put it mildly, overly optimistic: it would take no more than 8-10 weeks to win the campaign against the Soviet Union.

On December 6, 1940, Jodl ordered Warlimont's department to develop requirements for a campaign against Russia based on preliminary plans approved by Hitler. Six days later, the draft of the future Directive No. 21, compiled by von Lossberg, already familiar to us, was ready. On December 16, the draft directive, revised taking into account the comments received, was reported to Hitler, who made minor amendments to it regarding the tasks of Army Groups Center and North. The Fuhrer decided first of all to capture Leningrad and Kronstadt and destroy the forces of the Red Army in the Baltic states. Only then did the attack on Moscow become the main goal. However, if the Russian resistance had collapsed even earlier, the GA “Center” was allowed to simultaneously move in both directions: to Moscow and to Leningrad. In a conversation with Jodl, Hitler expressed another compelling reason why he urgently needed to end the USSR. He was convinced that “in 1941 we must solve all the continental problems in Europe, since after 1942 the United States will be in a position to enter the war.”

On December 18, 1940, after the last changes were made, Directive No. 21 was signed by Hitler, and the plan outlined in it received its final name - “Barbarossa”. Its full text is given in Appendix 1. This directive clearly shows that the German leadership was once again preparing to win in the shortest possible time. The Luftwaffe was not even tasked with conducting strategic bombing of targets in the Soviet Union. The army command and the chief of German aviation, Goering, did not consider them necessary. They had no doubt about another future success.

Only Admiral Raeder was not so optimistic. He twice tried to convince Hitler, emphasizing the danger of starting a new big war without ending England. He argued that first of all it was necessary to concentrate all the country's resources against England. This country gradually recovered from recent defeats and quickly gained new strength as a result of widespread support from the United States. She has already achieved real success in the fight against Italy in the Mediterranean. To defeat England, Germany urgently needed to use all its capabilities to strengthen its fleet and air force. Raeder categorically objected to starting a war with the USSR before the final victory over England. But his sober arguments again remained a voice crying in the desert: preparations for an attack on the USSR were in full swing. The admiral only managed to negotiate Hitler's consent to speed up the construction of submarines for the naval blockade of England.

However, the Fuhrer remained deeply convinced that he must destroy his last real rival on the European continent even before the decisive battle with the British began. At the same time, victory over England continued to be his main strategic goal. That is why, according to Hitler’s decree of September 28, 1940, first priority in the distribution of the limited resources of German industry was given to the production of weapons necessary for the siege and subsequent assault on the island state. In addition to submarines, these included torpedoes, mines, light ships, bombers and bombs for them. In second place were the means of protecting the Reich from British aviation, primarily 88-mm anti-aircraft guns and ammunition for them. The manufacture of weapons for the ground army was given only third place. The Germans seriously hoped to put an end to the Soviet Union with the forces and means they already had.

OKH OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND FURTHER PLANS OF THE GERMANS

In January 1941, the tasks in accordance with the Barbarossa plan were communicated to the army groups, at whose headquarters command and staff exercises were held to thoroughly practice the upcoming combat operations. Their results and the ideas found on them were carefully discussed at meetings in the OKH. At one of them, on January 31, Brauchitsch instructed the commanders of the army groups to proceed in their planning from the fact that the Russians would accept the battle west of the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers. When later one of them quite reasonably asked Halder on what such confidence was based, he honestly admitted: “Everything can happen differently.” The Germans could only hope that the main forces of the Russians would enter the border battle and be destroyed during it, after which the war, it seemed, was supposed to turn into an easy walk for the Wehrmacht. Based on exercises, repeated discussions and meetings, the OKH Operations Department developed the “Directive for the Strategic Concentration and Deployment of Troops.” This guiding document of January 31, 1941, which represented the practical implementation of the Barbarossa plan, was approved by Hitler on February 3.

The preamble of the directive stated that preparations for a blitzkrieg against the USSR were carried out in case of a change in its attitude towards Germany. For a quick and decisive victory over the Red Army, it was necessary to drive armored wedges deep into Soviet territory in order to destroy its main forces and not give them the opportunity to retreat. It was assumed that the Russians could try to stop the German advance by taking pre-prepared positions on the new and old border, as well as holding numerous water obstacles to the west of the Western Dvina and Dnieper. Strong resistance was expected in the Baltic states and on the Black Sea coast to protect the naval bases and airfields located there. In case of failure in these battles, the subsequent lines of Russian defense could be the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers. The directive defined tasks for army groups.

Army Group "South" was supposed to form two main strike groups: one on the Prut River in Romania, and the other in the Lublin-Jaroslav region. These forces were tasked with attacking in converging directions with the goal of encircling Russian troops on the territory of Western Ukraine. Particular attention was paid to Kyiv, which was not only the center of the largest Soviet military district, but also an important transport hub. After its capture, the further offensive of the GA “South” was to be coordinated with the actions of the GA “Center”.

The 12th Army, consisting of German and Romanian divisions, was to advance from the south through Kirovograd to the Dnieper. They planned to subordinate a motorized corps of two tank and one motorized division to it. The Northern Strike Group, whose assembly area was Lublin, consisted of the 6th Army and the 1st Tank Group (TG). These forces were supposed to carry out the most important and difficult task of the GA “South”: to break through to Kiev and seize bridgeheads on the eastern bank of the Dnieper, then turn to the southeast and connect with the 12th Army, completing the encirclement of enemy troops. In addition, they were entrusted with the task of covering the northern flank of the army group from the Pripyat swamps. The 6th Army was tasked with following the 1st TGr to Kyiv at maximum speed in readiness to allocate sufficient forces for maneuver to the southeast. Between the strike groups was the 17th Army, which did not have any mobile units. It had the task of shackling the Russian center and not giving them the opportunity to escape encirclement.

Army Group Center concentrated its main forces on the flanks. The southern group, consisting of the 4th Army and the 2nd TGr, was supposed to advance along the Baranovichi-Minsk-Orsha highway. The northern group, consisting of the 9th Army and the 3rd TGr, advanced from Suwalki to Molodechno and further to Orsha. The goal of their operation was to encircle and completely destroy the Red Army forces located in the Bialystok ledge between the western border and Minsk. In the future, the 4th Army was supposed to advance after the 2nd TGr through Bobruisk and Borisov to Mogilev and further to the north. The 9th Army, using the successes of the 3rd TGr, reached the Western Dvina in the Polotsk region and upstream.

Army Group North was preparing to strike from East Prussia through Kaunas and Daugavpils in the direction south of Pskov to cut off Soviet troops in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and press them to the Baltic Sea, as well as to seize a bridgehead in the area of ​​Lake Ilmen in order to create favorable conditions for a further attack on Leningrad. The initial task of the 4th TGr was: in cooperation with the 16th Army, to break through the Soviet border fortifications in the area of ​​the Gumbinen-Kaunas highway and cross the Western Dvina at Daugavpils and downstream in order to reach the area south of Pskov as quickly as possible. In the future, move north or northeast, depending on the current situation. The 18th Army was supposed to break through the Soviet defenses along the border, cross the Western Dvina at Jekabpils and destroy the Red Army forces encircled northwest of Riga. In the future, she should have quickly advanced to Pskov in order to prevent the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the area southwest of Lake Peipsi and create conditions for the capture of Estonia and the islands of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa.

Finland had to coordinate its actions with the OKH. Its troops could attack, at their choice, east or west of Lake Ladoga, but coordinate their advance with the crossing of the forces of the GA “North” across the Western Dvina.

The German Army Norway was tasked with:

A) Protect Norway from any attempts by the British to land there. Pay special attention to the defense of the Kirkenes-Narvik region.

B) Seize the Petsamo area with its nickel mines and exert pressure in the Murmansk direction in order to capture this port as soon as the situation at the front allows the release of sufficient forces to carry out this task.

On February 2, Hitler received Field Marshal von Bock, commander of the GA Center, and discussed the future operation with him. Bock had no doubt of victory if the Russians decided to take the battle on the territory adjacent to the border. But he did not understand how he could force them to capitulate. Hitler assured his military leader that after the loss of Ukraine, Moscow and Leningrad, they simply would have no other choice. But if the Russians want to continue resistance, German mobile troops will reach the Urals. The Fuhrer expressed his complete satisfaction with the condition of the troops and the level achieved by the war economy. He rejected any possibility of resolving the brewing conflict and excitedly exclaimed: “I will fight!” But it was not he who had to fight, but others...

The next day, another meeting was held with Hitler's participation, dedicated to the campaign in the Balkans and operational planning in the East. Halder, who spoke at it, estimated the forces of the Red Army that would resist the German invasion at 100 rifle and 25 cavalry divisions, as well as 30 mechanized brigades. The Soviet rifle divisions of that time had tank battalions on their staff, but the Germans considered the quality of their tanks to be low. For the same reason, they believed that, although the Soviet tank forces had a noticeable numerical advantage over the Germans, the qualitative superiority still remained with the Germans. They considered the artillery of the Red Army to be numerous, but not very effective, with outdated equipment. Among the top Soviet military leaders, only Marshal Timoshenko received high praise from the Germans. Despite the lack of reliable information about Soviet military plans, Halder concluded that, judging by the concentration of large forces near the border and the intensive construction of fortifications, especially in the north and south, the Red Army was seriously preparing to hold the Baltic states and Ukraine.

Halder also reported on the German forces intended for the offensive. It was planned to include 72 divisions in the Army Groups “Center” and “North”, of which 50 infantry, nine motorized and 13 tank. The GA "South" was supposed to have 38 divisions, of which 30 were infantry, three motorized and five tank. The main reserves were located north of the Pripyat marshes. The six tank divisions then deployed in the Balkans were planned to be transferred to the east as soon as the situation there allowed and Turkey’s position became clearer. At this point, Hitler intervened and expressed confidence that Turkey would not lift a finger, so there was no need for special precautions. As for the plans presented by Halder, the Fuhrer expressed his complete satisfaction with them. He believed that the Russians would not cede Leningrad and Ukraine without a fight, but if they did figure out the Germans' intentions and retreat far back, then Leningrad and the Baltic states should have been captured first. This significantly improved the supply situation and allowed flank attacks to deeply cover the Russian center and prevent them from escaping into the interior of the country.

Halder continued his report with a description of Army Norway's plans of action. One and a half of its divisions were to attack Petsamo, and the other one and a half were planned to be transferred to northern Finland through Sweden. The task of these forces was to cover the north of Finland and isolate Russian forces in the Murmansk region. The Finns could allocate four corps for operations in the southern part of their country: five divisions were to advance in the direction of Leningrad, three - towards Lake Onega and two - towards Hanko. At the same time, they needed German support, since in the southern sector they were opposed by 15 Soviet divisions and another one at Murmansk.

After Hitler noted that a rapid advance from Romania was vital for the security of the oil-producing areas, Halder raised the issue of Hungary. He considered it necessary to use at least its territory, even if this country did not want to take an active part in the war. Hitler believed that it would be possible to reach an agreement with Hungary. But the time to begin negotiations on cooperation both with it and with Finland, Sweden and Slovakia should have come only after Germany’s intentions to start a war could no longer be hidden. German plans could only be revealed to the leadership of Romania, whose participation in the future campaign was no longer in doubt. Back in January 1941, Hitler hinted to its ruler Antonescu that war with the USSR was inevitable, and on June 9 or 10, the German ambassador to Romania Killinger informed him of the exact date of the attack. To the rest of the world, the concentration of the Wehrmacht in the east was to be interpreted as a large-scale ruse before the final preparations for the landings in England.

After discussing other problems, in particular air defense and transport, both road and rail, Halder explained to the audience the procedure for concentrating troops. The first echelon was to begin its advance immediately. The turn of the second echelon came in mid-March, and its forces had to be located at some distance from the border. At the beginning of April, it was already possible to ask Hungary for permission to transit troops. The movement of the third echelon was planned for mid-April, and after it began, keeping the concentration secret became already difficult. The last echelon, consisting of tank and motorized formations, was to advance in the period from April 25 to May 15. Hitler summed up the meeting with words of inspiration: “After the start of Operation Barbarossa, the whole world will hold its breath!” At that moment, the prospects for the upcoming campaign in the east seemed very rosy to him.

After receiving the operational order, the army group headquarters conducted exercises on the maps and communicated their tasks to the armies and tank groups subordinate to them. They, in turn, staged command post exercises at their level. The successful ideas and solutions found in this case were used in draft operational orders developed at the headquarters of army groups. These orders were submitted to the OKH for approval. Then came the turn of corps and division headquarters. They, in turn, analyzed the preliminary orders handed down to them from above in their own map exercises and command post exercises. This preparation ended only just before the start of the war. On June 18, all German commanders, up to and including the company, received their combat missions and became familiar with the terrain in which they were to operate.

But this happened later, and on February 5, the Chief of Staff of the GA “South”, General Sodenstern, led a command post exercise, the main purpose of which was to test that part of the operational plan that was within his competence. The chiefs of staff of the armies and corps subordinate to the group, together with the heads of their operational departments, took part in the exercises. The exercises revealed a serious problem: Soviet troops in the Pripyat area could impede the advance of the northern part of the German pincer force and thereby prevent the Red Army from reaching deep into the forces east of the Dnieper. It was also discovered that poorly chosen troop concentration areas could hinder their maneuver at the beginning of a campaign. The necessary changes were immediately made to the plans.

The Germans paid special attention to the most important problem of interaction between infantry and mobile troops at the stage of breaking through the Russian defense. A solution was found: each tank group received one army corps under temporary control before the start of hostilities. The main task of the assigned infantry was to punch holes in the Soviet front, through which it was planned to quickly introduce tank and motorized formations. Thus, complete surprise of their actions was achieved, and the striking power of the mobile forces was preserved for deep breakthroughs. After the tank groups, having advanced far forward, broke away from their infantry, they returned to their former armies.

On March 18, 1941, Hitler decided that the main blow in the South Civil Aviation sector should be delivered by the 6th Army. The intention to advance through Moldova to the northeast with the forces of the 12th Army was abandoned. German and Romanian units occupying positions along the Prut River were supposed to pin down the Soviet troops opposing them and pursue them if they retreated. This change was made after Hitler expressed concern that such a wide water barrier as the Dniester could not be overcome at once. According to the new plan, the reinforced left wing of the GA “South” was supposed to break through to Kyiv and reach the Dniester line from the rear. The forces concentrated in Moldova were tasked with preventing the advance of Soviet troops into Romania. But this threat did not seem too serious to the Germans. Brauchitsch believed that the Russians would not attack the Romanians unless they themselves were attacked from their territory. Hitler also brought to the attention of his generals that Hungary would take part in Operation Barbarossa, and assistance to Slovakia would be limited to providing its territory for the concentration of troops and their supplies.

The coup in Yugoslavia that occurred on March 26 forced Hitler to urgently transfer hostilities to the Balkans. Large Wehrmacht forces were sent there, including six tank and three motorized divisions. The large size of the new theater of operations forced the Germans, after the end of the fighting, to place an army headquarters at the head of their occupation forces. This role was assigned to the 12th Army, which directed operations in Greece. Instead, the headquarters of the 11th Army was assigned to lead the troops in Moldova.

On March 30, the commanders of armies and army groups were summoned to Hitler. At this meeting the role of the 11th Army was also discussed. Hitler ordered that its forces be divided into three separate groups capable of supporting Romanian troops if necessary. Since the army was assigned a purely defensive role, all mobile troops originally intended for it were transferred to the 1st Tank Group. The Germans intended to achieve encirclement of Soviet troops in Ukraine by deep envelopment from the north, by breaking through mobile forces to the Dnieper in the Kyiv region and south of it. Their further task was a sharp turn to the southeast in order to develop an offensive along the Dnieper riverbed to its very mouth. If successful, all Russian forces in the western part of Ukraine would fall into a trap.

As a result of the change in plans, appropriate amendments were made to Directive No. 21, including those relating to GA “South”:

“‹…› concentrates its main strike forces in the Lublin region and to the south of it for an offensive in the general direction of Kyiv. From there, reinforced tank units will make a breakthrough deep into enemy territory, enveloping Russian troops along the lower reaches of the Dnieper."

The combined German-Romanian troops in the south were supposed to ensure the security of Romania, pin down the opposing enemy forces and, as the situation developed, go into pursuit in order to prevent the organized retreat of the Russians to the Dnieper.

Corresponding amendments were made to the Directive on the Strategic Concentration and Deployment of Troops. In GA "South" it was no longer planned to have strike groups on both flanks. Instead, she was instructed to gather a powerful fist on her left wing, where mobile troops were to lead the charge on Kyiv, and after that turn to the southeast to encircle and destroy, or at least cut off, the Soviet troops located in the western parts of Ukraine. In accordance with this plan, the tasks of the 1st Tank Group and armies were changed:

The 1st TGr was supposed to break through Berdichev and Zhitomir to the Dnieper in the Kyiv area, and then turn to the southeast to cut off the retreat routes of Soviet troops in Ukraine;

The 6th Army was tasked with covering the northern flank of the GA “South” from any threat from the Pripyat swamps and advancing directly behind the 1st TG all the way to Zhitomir. After receiving the order at the right time, she needed to send her strike force in a south-easterly direction along the western bank of the Dnieper and, together with the 1st TGr, destroy Soviet troops west of this river.

The tasks of the 17th and 11th armies were similarly changed.

OKH perfectly understood the complexity of this operation, built on deep coverage of the enemy on only one side. Its plan bore undoubted traces of the influence of Manstein’s “sickle strike,” which brought the Germans such a brilliant victory in May 1940. But the scale of the planned operation could not be compared with the events in France, and the results of the operation largely depended on the ability of the Soviet command to correctly and promptly respond to developments in the situation.

In the Far North, Hitler wished to advance to Murmansk and, if the opportunity presented itself, to capture this important ice-free port. This would prevent Murmansk from being used as a base for an attack on Northern Finland and Norway and would prevent the British from landing on the Kola Peninsula. At the same time, advancing on Kandalaksha, the Germans wanted to cut the supply lines of Murmansk. Both attacks from Northern Finland were carried out in addition to three more from its southern part: across the Karelian Isthmus, east of Ladoga and towards Hanko. Initially, it was intended to subordinate the German troops in Northern Finland to the Finnish commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Mannerheim. But when he refused this, control of operations in Northern and Central Finland was entrusted to the command of the German Army Norway. Southern Finland remained the Finns' area of ​​responsibility.

In early April, immediately after the German intervention in the Balkans, the start of the campaign against the USSR was delayed by four to six weeks. The battles there ended at the very end of April with the evacuation of defeated British troops from Greece. But already in the second half of this month, most of the German divisions involved there were withdrawn for rest and replenishment, so that they could properly prepare for the war with the Soviet Union. The exception was two tank divisions - the 2nd and 5th, which, together with two mountain divisions and the SS motorized regiment "Adolf Hitler", continued the offensive to the very south of Greece. Then they had to put themselves in order for a long time. Finally, on April 30, Hitler set a new date for the invasion of the USSR - June 22, 1941.

Throughout the entire period of planning and preparation for Operation Barbarossa, Hitler and his military leadership sincerely believed in the possibility of defeating the Soviet Union within 3–5 months. Victory over the USSR gave Germany a real opportunity to once and for all solve all the serious problems caused by the British blockade. The Nazis were not at all concerned about the fate of tens of millions of people thrown into the furnace of war, especially since they were talking about Germany’s victory in the war for world domination. It was precisely this that they ultimately strove for. The seizure of Soviet resources, which Germany urgently needed to fight a long war, was to be only the next stage on this long path.

In September 1941, Hitler expressed his views on this issue in no uncertain terms:

“The struggle for world domination will be decided for Europe by the capture of Russian territory: this will turn Europe into the most blockade-resistant place in the world.”

He had no doubt about success...

Notes:

9 He 111 aircraft from the 4th Bomber Squadron of the 4th Air Corps took part in the raid. (Khazanov D.B. Op. op. p. 110.)

Hitler did not trust Marx because in the early 1930s he was closely associated with his political opponent General von Schleicher, who was killed by the Nazis during the “Night of the Long Knives” on June 30, 1934. Therefore, on September 16, 1940, the Fuhrer did not approve Marx’s appointment to the post of chief of staff of Army Group Center, and he was sent to the troops as a division commander.

This refers to the part of Poland occupied by the Germans.

This refers to the German-occupied part of the Czech Republic.

In fact, it was just a simple excuse. The development and implementation of the Barbarossa plan proceeded as usual in accordance with the will of the Fuhrer, despite all the efforts of the Soviet leadership to maintain good relations with Germany.

This is another example of a serious underestimation of the forces of the Red Army by the German leadership. In fact, in September 1940, 143 rifle, 16 tank, 7 motorized and 10 cavalry divisions, as well as 15 tank brigades, were stationed in the western military districts of the USSR in September 1940.

The political goal of German imperialism - the conquest of world domination - determined the nature and direction of its entire military strategy.

The leadership of Hitler's Germany believed that the method of individual lightning campaigns with significant strategic pauses designed to build up forces at the expense of the defeated would gradually achieve overall superiority over the main opponents and ensure the establishment of world domination.

This plan for waging a world war was outlined in general terms in Hitler’s book Mein Kampf. Later it was specified. Hitler's leadership had a clear and precise idea of ​​how it would conduct a future war. Analysis of documents of the Wehrmacht High Command, the command of the ground army, Hitler's directives and instructions, as well as the practical actions of the Wehrmacht leadership make it possible to identify the fascist German strategic concept of the Second World War and the successive stages of its implementation.

1. Annexation of small states of Central, Eastern, South-Eastern and Northern Europe by “peaceful” or military means in order to improve the strategic and economic positions of Germany for the subsequent struggle against the main opponents - the Soviet Union, France, England.

2. The defeat of France and the strangulation of England with the aim of capturing all of Western Europe and creating decisive preconditions for the subsequent destruction of the Soviet Union.

3. The defeat of the Soviet Union as a decisive condition for establishing the complete dominance of Nazi Germany in Europe and the subsequent struggle on other continents.

4. Creation of a German colonial empire by conquering countries in Africa, the Middle East and other parts of the world.

5. Invasion of the USA.

The German imperialists sought to create a great German Empire as a guiding core and dominant force, surrounded by dependent and colonial countries. Hitler said: “We will never be able to engage in big politics without a strong, hardened, powerful core formed by eighty or one hundred million Germans living in a closed settlement. Therefore, the first task is to create a great Germany. Around Great Germany we will create a system of small and medium-sized vassal states, which will include the Baltic states, Poland, Finland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, Ukraine and numerous southern Russian and Caucasian states. This will be a federal German Empire. These territories must be populated with German peasants, the Slavs must be partially destroyed and partially resettled in Asia, the rest must be taken away from their land and turned into servants of the dominant Germanic race. In the East we must extend our power to the Caucasus or Iran, in the West we need Flanders and Holland, but we will not give up Sweden either. Either Germany will dominate Europe, or it will disintegrate into many small states" (1565).

With particular lust, German monopoly capital planned the military seizure of important economic regions of the Soviet Union and the creation of strategic prerequisites for the subsequent struggle for world domination (1566). This is what the brother of the major German industrialist F. Rechberg wrote to the head of the imperial chancellery, G. Lammers, regarding Germany’s main goal in the war: “As an object of expansion for Germany, there are territories of Russia... which has unheard of rich opportunities for obtaining high yields and mineral reserves. If expansion in this direction makes it possible to transform Germany into an empire with a sufficiently independent agricultural and raw material base, then it would have to cover at least Russian territories up to the Urals with its colossal reserves of iron ore. At the same time, it is necessary to weigh which great powers in the event of an expansionist war against the East, on the outcome of which the existence and future of Germany depends, will be likely opponents and which allies of the Reich...” Rechberg emphasized that “only if an attempt to create a European front against Bolshevik Russia (for which now there are, in any case, more significant prerequisites and for the implementation of which it would be necessary to take new, different paths than before 1933) will finally fail, Germany can and will have to, in my opinion, take the risk of an expansionist war against the East and despite the opposition of the Western powers" (1567).

When planning a war against the Soviet Union, the German imperialists pursued more than just economic goals. They sought to wipe out the country from the face of the earth and brutally punish the peoples who dared to challenge the world of capital.

By destroying the socialist state, the German monopolists wanted to create political conditions for establishing their dominance in the world, strengthen the position of the commanding force in the imperialist camp, and finally resolve in favor of imperialism the main contradiction of the era - the contradiction between capitalism and socialism.

The Nazi leadership of Germany associated the successful implementation of the program for conquest of world domination with certain political prerequisites. The main one is preventing the formation of an anti-Hitler coalition of great powers and at the same time uniting fascist states into a single bloc.

In 1945, Hitler’s chief assistant Schmidt wrote in testimony to the International Tribunal: “The general goals of the Nazi leadership were obvious from the very beginning - the establishment of dominance on the European continent. The implementation of this main goal created the impression of improvisation. In reality, every new step was in accordance with the above-mentioned final goal" (1568).

Soon after Munich, the German government began to prepare for the seizure of Poland, initially considering it possible to solve this problem without war. When Ribbentrop presented Poland with demands for the transfer of Gdansk to Germany and granting it the right to build an extraterritorial transport route through the “Polish corridor,” the Nazis promised to transfer part of Soviet Ukraine to Poland as compensation. This promise was with a long-range aim; Poland was offered to become an accomplice in the war against the USSR.

The negative response of the Polish government did not at all follow from its previous policy. A prominent historian of the Polish People's Republic, W. Kowalski, writes in a book published in 1970: “... an unequivocal “no” put an end to all the illusions that Berlin could harbor regarding Warsaw’s position. Decisive in this was the voice of the Polish people, who, although deprived of truthful information about the actual state of affairs, nevertheless sensed the impending danger. His determination and will left no room for maneuvering and diplomatic bargaining" (1569).

Having received a negative answer, the German imperialists decided to deal with Poland by military force. An important role in making this decision was played by fears that in the event of a German invasion of France, Poland might come to the aid of its Western ally. Speaking to the commanders-in-chief on August 22, 1939, Hitler said: “First I wanted to establish acceptable relations with Poland, in order, first of all, to wage a fight against the West. However, this plan, which was attractive to me, turned out to be impracticable, as important circumstances changed. It became clear to me that in our collision with the West, Poland would attack us" (1570).

The decision to wage war against Poland was also influenced by the German conquerors’ long-standing hatred of the Polish people as one of the Slavic peoples, who constantly opposed the invaders with their unchanging will for national independence and freedom. Noting this fact, the Nazis in their secret plans called the Poles the “most dangerous” people for them, subject to complete destruction (1571).

On April 11, 1939, Hitler approved a directive on the unified preparation of the Wehrmacht for war for 1939/40. It was based on a plan for an attack on Poland, code-named Plan Weiss. The main strategic goal was to destroy the Polish armed forces through a surprise attack.

Fascist leaders considered the attack on Poland to be a preliminary stage of the war against the USSR. Hitler told Keitel: Poland should become a forward bridgehead intended for military use, for the concentration of troops (1572).

Deciding to start the war in 1939, the fascist German command proceeded from the fact that by this time it had managed to secure an advantage in the preparation, deployment and equipment of the armed forces. Goering after the war (even before his trial) admitted that Hitler considered 1939 optimal for the start of the war (1573).

On August 18, 1939, enhanced pre-mobilization measures began in Germany, and on August 25, an order was given for the covert mobilization of the main forces of the wartime ground army (1574). In accordance with the plan of the Wehrmacht command, the main forces were concentrated against Poland with the goal of quickly defeating it; in the west, against France, a minimum number of troops were left. The navy was only partially involved in operations against Poland. Significant forces of the surface and submarine fleets were prepared for military operations against naval bases, ships and communications of England and France.

During these critical days, the British government was occupied with only one question: what were the intentions of the German leadership. If the latter’s plans included an immediate attack on the USSR, Chamberlain and his entourage were ready to give Poland up to be torn to pieces without a war, as they did with Czechoslovakia. This was confirmed by Chamberlain's speech in the House of Commons on August 24, which contained a corresponding advance to Hitler. On August 25, the British Ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, had a long conversation with Hitler. The ruling circles of both countries also attached great importance to unofficial contacts through Goering’s relative, the Swedish industrialist B. Dahlerus, who, until the start of the war, scurried between both capitals like a shuttle.

The British government now wanted to obtain certain guarantees from Germany in order to provide itself with a more advantageous position for subsequent bargaining with it. It was for this purpose that on August 25 it signed an agreement on mutual assistance against aggression with the Polish government. It is characteristic that Henderson’s conversation with Hitler took place at the same hours. Chamberlain did not want to miss the moment. However, this conversation did not have quite the effect on Hitler that British diplomacy expected: he did not believe Henderson and at first accepted England’s obligations under its treaty with Poland at face value. There was confusion in Berlin.

A war on two fronts - both against Poland and against the Anglo-French bloc - was not part of the plans of the German government and military command. At the last hour, when the sword raised over Poland was already extremely difficult to hold, Hitler postponed the attack with a personal order.

Once again, both sides pressed all the levers of reconnaissance and sounding. An additional check carried out by Berlin once again confirmed that the governments of England and France do not in fact intend to provide military assistance to Poland and prefer to leave it alone with Germany. Encouraged by this, on August 31, Hitler signed Directive No. 1, which set the date for the attack on Poland as September 1, 1939.

Although the German imperialists decided to start the war by attacking Poland, they were not targeting Poland alone. Their main opponents in the capitalist world remained England and France. The war with them was a foregone conclusion, as was the war against the USSR.

During the critical days of August 1939, Anglo-German contradictions repeatedly burst into the open. On August 25, Nazi Germany issued an open challenge, interrupting air traffic, telephone and telegraph communications with England and France. Hitler's new meeting with Henderson on August 29 was devoid of even formal diplomatic politeness; the interlocutors shouted at each other at the top of their voices, listing all their previous grievances. On the night of August 31, Henderson’s conversation with Ribbentrop took place in the same style.

The British government had ample evidence of Germany's far-reaching aggressive intentions. But his decision remained unchanged: not to fight in defense of Poland. By signing the treaty on August 25, the British government was knowingly and cold-bloodedly preparing to commit treason against Poland. This, of course, was no secret to the German government, especially since there was no shortage of informants. Baron de Ropp, in a confidential conversation with Rosenberg, bluntly stated: “For England, Poland is more useful in the role of a martyr than as an existing state” (1575).

The two weeks immediately preceding the Second World War are difficult to compare with any other period of interwar history in terms of the intensity of intense diplomatic struggle, its complexity and intricacy, and the sharpness of political changes and turns. The English journalist and historian L. Mosley wrote: during these weeks, “an ominous silence reigned over Europe, broken only by the noise of torn envelopes, when statesmen opened letters and telegrams in which they either asked for help, or begged to make concessions, or put forward hypocritical proposals.” in order to evade fulfillment of previously assumed obligations" (1576). The capitalist world has come close to war.

Planning an attack on Poland with large forces from East Prussia, the OKB transferred several formations there in advance and began mobilization in this part of Germany on August 16, 1939, that is, nine days earlier than throughout the country; maneuvers and large celebrations were announced to mark the 25th anniversary of the “Battle of Tannenberg”, under the pretext of which the strategic deployment took place.

In Central Germany, large maneuvers of tank and motorized formations were carried out with the expectation of their exit directly to the initial areas for the offensive.

By the morning of September 1, 1939, 54 divisions were concentrated in combat readiness against Poland, combined into two army groups: “North”, consisting of the 3rd and 4th armies (21 divisions, including 2 tank), and “ South", which included the 8th, 10th and 14th armies (33 divisions, including 4 tank divisions). 28 aviation reconnaissance squadrons and 26 anti-aircraft artillery divisions (1577) were subordinated to the ground army.

To support ground forces in the east, two air fleets were allocated: the 4th for operations with Army Group South and the 1st with Army Group North. In total, the air fleets had about 2 thousand aircraft.

The strategic deployment in the west was carried out with the aim of covering the western borders of Germany from France, Luxembourg and Belgium. Command of all troops concentrated in the west from the lower Rhine to the Swiss border in the Basel region was entrusted to the headquarters of Army Group C. It included three armies: 1st, 5th and 7th - a total of 32 divisions. Of these, only 12 were fully equipped, the rest were significantly inferior to them in their combat capabilities. The group of troops in the west did not have tanks; it was supported by the 2nd and 3rd air fleets - more than 800 aircraft (1578) .

On September 1, 1939, the entire force of Nazi Germany in the east numbered over 1.5 million people, including Army Group North - 630 thousand, Army Group South - 886 thousand, and in the west Army Group “C” - about 970 thousand people (1579).

The military-political leadership of Japan considered their immediate goal to be the conquest of dominance in Asia and the Pacific by seizing China, the Asian and Pacific colonial possessions of Western European powers and the United States, and the Soviet Far East. It was assumed that dominion over many hundreds of millions of people, their enslavement and the transformation of occupied territories into military-economic springboards for further struggle for world domination would lead to the creation of a grandiose colonial empire.

Japan's strategic plans provided primarily for northern (against the USSR) and southern (against France, Great Britain and the USA) directions of aggression, the choice of which depended on the presence of favorable conditions. Bound by the “anti-Comintern Pact” with Germany and Italy, Japan took into account the plans of these fascist states in its strategic plans.

Italian imperialism intended to profit from the “lightning war” that Germany would carry out. However, due to the economic weakness and unpreparedness of the armed forces, Italy at the first stage was going to limit itself to the role of an observer, and after the defeat of the British and French in Europe, it would be easy to seize many of the territories that belonged to them.

The peculiarity of the bloc of fascist states was the incomplete coordination of political and military actions; its participants did not develop a common plan of joint action. It was assumed that the war against the same opponents would not proceed in unity, but as if in parallel. This was explained by the presence of mutual contradictions. Both of the strongest countries of the fascist bloc - Germany and Japan - strove for world domination, which made them not only allies, but also rivals who were distrustful of each other. Each of them assumed in the future to subjugate its ally even through war. The Nazis considered Italy as a future province of Germany, and its Duce was assigned the role of the German Gauleiter.

On the eve of the war, the British government became convinced that the British Empire and France were threatened by German-Italian aggression. Therefore, in the spring of 1939, the military leadership of both countries took a step towards developing a strategic plan for the war. The matter did not go further than agreeing on the most general guidelines, according to which England and France were to repel the attack of Germany, and subsequently prepare and launch an offensive against it.

The agreement between the English and French headquarters stated: “We will have to deal with opponents who will be more prepared for total war than we are... Under these conditions, we must be ready to repel a broad offensive against France or against Great Britain or simultaneously against both states. Therefore, at the initial stage of the war we will have to concentrate all our efforts to repel such an attack; therefore, during this period our strategy will be generally defensive... Our subsequent policy should be aimed at containing Germany and delivering decisive blows to Italy, while at the same time increasing our forces so as to be able to take an offensive against Germany.” (1580) .

In the matter of providing assistance to Poland, England and France proceeded primarily from the political calculation that after its defeat, German fascism would attack the Soviet Union. In the meantime, they will deploy their armed forces and subsequently launch a decisive offensive against Germany. Based on this, the British and French headquarters came to a unanimous decision that “the fate of Poland will be determined by the overall results of the war, and the latter in turn will depend on the ability of the Western powers to ultimately defeat Germany, and not on whether they can relieve German pressure on Poland at the very beginning" (1581).

The French plan was based on the idea of ​​positional defense. It was envisaged that France would mobilize its reserves and form the maximum number of divisions, concentrating them in defensive positions along the French and Belgian eastern borders, where they would await the advance of enemy troops. “Thus,” writes Charles de Gaulle, “it was thought that an armed nation, taking refuge behind this barrier, would hold the enemy, waiting until, exhausted by the blockade, he would collapse under the onslaught of the free world” (1582).

In the event of Japan's entry into the war, the British and French headquarters considered the main task of their armed forces in Southeast Asia to be the retention of the Singapore naval base. For this purpose, it was planned to send additional military reinforcements to this area. The joint document of the general staffs took into account the interdependence of the possible fronts of the Second World War: “If the allied powers were defeated in the West, then their complete defeat in the Far East would follow automatically” (1583).

By the time France entered the war, the mobilization and deployment of the French armed forces had not been completed. On the border with Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium, troops of the northeastern front under the command of General Georges (three army groups) occupied fortified positions. The front grouping consisted (including 13 serf, reserve and colonial formations) of 78 divisions (of which 7 were under formation), 17,500 guns and mortars, about 2 thousand tanks (excluding light reconnaissance vehicles).

The southeastern front (one army), which had 16 divisions, 5,426 guns and mortars, and 200 tanks, was deployed against Italy and on the Mediterranean coast, also in previously prepared positions.

In the French possessions - Algeria, Tunisia (on the border with the Italian colony of Libya) and Morocco - 14 divisions, 3,620 guns and mortars, 227 tanks (1,584) were deployed.

To ensure air defense of ground forces at airfields

At least 1,400 modern combat aircraft were concentrated in France, and 335 aircraft in the colonies. There were 1,600 aircraft (1,585) in reserve.

Large French naval forces, including 3 battleships, 10 cruisers, 20 destroyers and 53 submarines, were concentrated in the Mediterranean at the naval bases of Toulon, Marseille, Oran and Bizerte, the rest of the forces were based at Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient and Saint-Nazaire, in the English Channel and in the Bay of Biscay (1586).

Thus, the governments and military commands of Great Britain and France considered Europe to be the main theater of military operations. England had high hopes for the armed forces of France and the military assistance of the United States of America.

Aggressive actions of Germany in Europe in 1938 - 1939. significantly changed the political situation. Not only Great Britain, whose alliance with which ensured the US dominance in the Atlantic Ocean, was under threat, but also the direct interests of the States themselves. In this regard, at the end of the 30s, a noticeable rapprochement between the United States and England began, and the foundation of their coalition strategy was laid.

In June 1939, the US Joint Planning Committee provided guidance for the development of five versions of a new war plan, code-named Rainbow (1587).

The Rainbow 1 plan provided for the defense of the Western Hemisphere from Brazil and Greenland in the east to Midway Island (in the Pacific Ocean) in the west. The plans "Rainbow 2" and "Rainbow 3", which aimed the main US efforts at the Pacific direction, after Germany and Italy began to threaten the allies, turned out to be unacceptable. The Rainbow 4 plan outlined the concentration of the main US military efforts on the European continent (1588). The Rainbow 5 plan, which determined the composition of the coalition, was most consistent with the balance of power in the Second World War. It provided for active cooperation between the United States and Great Britain and France. It was envisaged that American forces would quickly move across the Atlantic Ocean into Africa and Europe with the goal of inflicting a decisive defeat on Germany or Italy, or both. This plan laid down the concept that became the basis of US military strategy in World War II. The essence of the strategic calculation was that the main enemy in the war would be Germany in alliance with its European Axis partners and Japan. The main US efforts were planned to be concentrated in Europe.

At the same time, the US imperialists, under the pretext of protecting their continent, intensified their actions to finally seize sales markets and sources of raw materials in the Western Hemisphere, which were under the control of British and other monopolies. They intended to use the country's enormous military-economic potential to establish their complete dominance in the area.

Poland was going through a difficult time. After Nazi Germany presented a demand for the transfer of Gdansk and the provision of an extraterritorial highway and railway in the “Polish corridor,” the political and military leaders of this country began direct strategic planning for the war. Considering the economic and military weakness of their country, they made strategic plans with the expectation of successfully waging war in a coalition with strong allies - England and France. In May 1939, Poland and France agreed that in the event of Nazi aggression against Wormwood, on the fifteenth day after the announcement of general mobilization by France, it would launch an offensive against Germany “with its main forces.” French aviation pledged to allocate 60 aircraft for bombing German targets with a range of 1,500 km and a bomb load of 1,500 kg per aircraft (1,589). The English government also took upon itself the obligation to begin bombing German territory and military operations in the waters in the very first days of the war (1590).

The development of a war plan against Germany, codenamed “West” (“Zahud”), was started by the Polish command in March 1939. The strategic concept of the plan was as follows: to defend the operational zone necessary for waging war, inflicting the greatest possible damage to the enemy with counterattacks, to prevent defeat of their forces before the start of the Allied operation in the West, with the start of their hostilities and the diversion of part of the enemy forces from the Polish front to the western front, to act depending on the developing situation (1591).

By the end of August 1939, the troops intended to achieve the main strategic goal were consolidated into seven combined arms armies and four operational groups (1592). In total, 30 infantry and 9 reserve infantry divisions, 11 cavalry and 2 motorized brigades (1593), as well as sea coast defense troops and the navy (1594) were supposed to be allocated for combat operations in the initial period of the war. The deployment of armed forces of up to 1.5 million people (1595) was envisaged, that is, compared to peacetime, the army increased by almost 3.5 times.

The main defensive grouping of the Polish armed forces consisted of one strategic echelon (six armies and one separate operational group) and a reserve of the main command. On the northern wing of the Polish front along the borders of East Prussia and in the zone of the “Polish corridor” at the border of Puszcza Augustowska, the Biebrza, Narev, Bug, and Vistula rivers, a separate operational group “Narev”, the armies “Modlin” and “Pomoże” were deployed. On the entire remaining section of the Polish-German border, facing west, from the Warta River to the Czechoslovak border, the armies of Poznan, Lodz, and Krakow were deployed in a line. On the southern wing of the front in the foothills of the Carpathians, on a 350-kilometer front, the Carpathian Army was located (two mountain brigades and several border units), as well as three operational reserve groups. The reserve of the main command, the basis of which was the Prussian army, was concentrated in the area of ​​​​Radom, Lodz, Kielce.

At the beginning of the war, naval bases in Gdynia and on the Hel Peninsula were not reliably protected either from the sea, or from the air, or from land. The Polish command had no real opportunity to provide naval ships with fuel (1596). Therefore, when developing a plan for the war against Germany, it was decided to send three destroyers to England (1597). The remaining ships were given the task: in cooperation with parts of the sea coast, to defend the Hel Peninsula, to prevent the Nazis from landing, to lay minefields in territorial waters before the start of the war, and during it - on the enemy’s sea communications (1598).

The mobilization deployment of the Polish armed forces was carried out according to plan “B” (1599), adopted in April 1938 (1600). It provided for mainly covert mobilization in peacetime.

The strategic deployment of the Polish armed forces was extremely slow (1601). General mobilization was announced and started on August 31, 1939.

By the morning of September 1, 1939, Poland had the following forces ready for military operations: 21 infantry divisions, 3 reserve divisions, a motorized brigade, 8 cavalry brigades. 3 mountain rifle brigades and 56 national defense battalions, as well as units of border troops and sea coast guards. The planned reserve of the main command was in the process of mobilization and formation.

Poland concentrated about 70 percent of the forces intended to conduct the strategic operation in the border areas. There were about 840 thousand soldiers (1602) in the first operational echelon. Army aviation, the aviation reserve of the commander-in-chief of the Polish troops and naval aviation (1603) were created. The directorates of aviation regiments were abolished. The armies were assigned units of fighter and reconnaissance aircraft, as well as observation aircraft (17 - 53 aircraft per army) (1604).

The reserve of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish troops consisted of fighter (56 aircraft) and bomber (86 aircraft) brigades (1605). Aviation was used in a decentralized manner, which led to its dispersion along the entire front.

There is no doubt that the working people and all the progressive forces of Poland could oppose the aggressor with a nationwide war, in which their patriotism would be demonstrated in full force. But the ruling bourgeois-landowner circles were incapable of such a war and were afraid of it, afraid of their people. Their main hope of helping England and France also turned out to be flawed. All this doomed Poland to inevitable defeat and the horrors of the Nazi occupation.

The strategic plans and goals of the states of the two capitalist coalitions had both a certain commonality and significant differences. The general thing was that their plans lacked an accurate account of the balance of forces on the world stage, the possible prospects of war, and the role of the masses; a hostile attitude towards the USSR as a country of socialism manifested itself. What was also common was that both capitalist coalitions were preparing for war with each other for dominance in the world. The difference was that the bloc of Germany, Italy, Japan focused on an offensive, fleeting war, the coalition of England, France, the USA, Poland - on a long positional war, relegating offensive operations to the final stage of the war. If the military leadership of Germany and Japan used the latest achievements in military technology and operational art, but clearly exaggerated their offensive capabilities, the military leadership of England, France and Poland turned out to be unable to take into account new things in military affairs, underestimated the strength of the upcoming fascist offensive and overestimated their defensive capabilities.

Not only the Russian and French, but also the German strategy had significant flaws. The German Empire opposed Russia and its Western allies to the Schlieffen Plan. Count Alfred von Schlieffen was Chief of the General Staff from 1891 to 1906, a fanatically dedicated professional, who participated in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871.

Schlieffen Plan

Based on the experience of wars in the 19th century, German theorists aimed the army at victory in one general battle. Having planned to throw all their forces into battle at once and win, the Germans underestimated the role of strategic reserves.

Schlieffen developed the theory of encircling and destroying the enemy through crushing blows on his flanks (or one of them) followed by a move to the rear. The operational idea of ​​the Schlieffen plan finally crystallized in 1905. The essence of the plan was to decide the outcome of the entire war with one strategic offensive operation (general battle). They planned to envelop the enemy army, in this case France, from the right flank, squeeze it into a “bag” and destroy it. Deprived of an army, France was forced to capitulate. The main blow was delivered through the territory of Belgium. Due to natural conditions, the French border was inconvenient for a massive invasion; a number of forested mountains and hills ran along it - the Ardennes, Argonne, Vosges. In addition, convenient passages were blocked by powerful fortresses, which could greatly slow down the invasion and generally bury the plan for a quick war. While the German troops were tinkering with the fortresses, the French could complete mobilization and launch a counteroffensive. Therefore, Schlieffen wanted to deliver the main blow through the plain of Flanders (Belgium).

The left wing at this time was supposed to pin down the enemy in battle. It was noted that if the left wing of the German army, under pressure from the advancing forces of the French army, which planned to deliver the main blow in the center of the front, retreats, then this will even be beneficial in order to more successfully envelop the enemy. The penetration of the French army into German territory will lead to even more catastrophic consequences for it, after the completion of the envelopment of the right flank. Schlieffen believed that the enemy would not get further than the Ardennes, a wooded and hilly area. And then the main forces will go to the rear of the French strike group and the result will be a huge “Cannes”, the French will be forced to capitulate.

In the east they planned to leave a slight barrier. The German command counted on the slow mobilization of the Russian army: in Germany it was planned to be completed in 10 days, but in Russia it then lasted 30 days. After the defeat of France, they were going to transfer troops to the Eastern Front, using the developed network of German railways. Kaiser Wilhelm II said: “We will have lunch in Paris and dinner in St. Petersburg.” On the Eastern Front they also dreamed of repeating “Cannes”: delivering converging attacks - the Germans from the north, and the Austrians from the south, from Krakow. Allied forces meet in the Warsaw area, encircling the Russian army in Poland. The defeat and surrender of the main forces of the Russian army should have led to the defeat of Russia. The result is complete victory in the West and East. And in the shortest possible time.

Schlieffen did not count on a strong alliance with Italy, although this country was part of the bloc of the Central Powers. In 1882, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy signed the secret Treaty of the Triple Alliance. In 1887 and 1891 the treaty was renewed, and was automatically extended in 1902 and 1912. However, there was little hope for a lasting alliance with Italy. Italy wanted significant territorial concessions from Austria-Hungary and already in 1902 entered into an agreement with France, pledging to remain neutral in the event of a German attack on France. This forced Schlieffen to abandon the idea of ​​conducting two flank attacks, with the participation of the Italian army.

According to Schlieffen's theoretical calculations, it was necessary to deploy 35 army corps (70 infantry divisions) and 8 cavalry divisions against France; in the second echelon there were another 8 reserve corps (16 divisions). They united into 7 armies. German troops, with the Metz, Diedenhofen (Thionville) area as their axis of entry, had to deeply bypass the enemy’s left flank to Amiens or further west to Abbeville and even along the sea coast of France, covering Paris from the northwest. Corps of 5 armies (1-5) took part in the attack, one army held the right flank. The troops remaining in Alsace and Lorraine (about 4 1/2 corps - 10 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions) could retreat under enemy pressure to the line of Metz, Strasbourg and even to the Rhine. This drew the French armies into encirclement. The French troops planned to be destroyed approximately in the Alsace region or pressed towards Switzerland.

In total, Schlieffen planned to deploy 48 corps (96 infantry divisions) and 11 cavalry divisions against France. But that was in theory. In fact, by 1905 Germany had 62 infantry and 10 cavalry divisions. According to the 1905 plan, the ratio of forces north and south of Metz was 7:1. It was a risk. Thus, criticizing the balance of forces between the right and left flanks of the German army, Schlieffen’s student Ludendorff noted in his memoirs: “Such limited forces, which Schlieffen left in Alsace-Lorraine without any compulsory basis, could create a danger unnecessary for success, which was the most dangerous strategic game.” . The French army, with skillful leadership and a certain determination, could put the German army in a very difficult situation by intercepting the communications routes of the German wings.

In addition, the question arose about supplying the huge mass of troops on the right flank of the German army. So, already two weeks after the start of the offensive operation, the right wing began to feel a significant shortage of supplies, and this despite the fact that the army group was significantly weakened when the plan was improved by the new Chief of the General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke. In addition, Schlieffen assumed that German troops would reach the Franco-Belgian border by 30 days from the start of mobilization. But during this significant period of time, the French should have learned about the movement of huge masses of German troops on their left flank and, taking advantage of their powerful French railway network, regrouped their armies, depriving the enemy of their operational advantage.

Alfred von Schlieffen (1833 - 1913)

Moltke's changes

Despite the significant shortcomings of the Schlieffen plan, it was still retained, although significant changes were made to it. Helmuth Johann Ludwig von Moltke (Moltke the Younger), who in 1906 headed the Great General Staff of the German Empire, under pressure from disgruntled military leaders and Kaiser Wilhelm II, improved the Schlieffen Plan. Schlieffen's ideas were considered too risky, for fear of leaving too weak a group on the left flank of the Western Front.

The main idea of ​​​​the main attack on the right flank through Belgium was retained. However, the left wing was significantly strengthened to the detriment of the strike force on the right flank. Moltke's deployment plan, with which the German Empire entered the war in 1914, was as follows. In the Metz area and north of it, they planned to deploy 26 1/2 corps, including reserve ones (and Schlieffen proposed deploying 35 and a half corps), almost all cavalry units and 17 landwehr brigades. This army group was supposed to bypass the left flank of the French armies with its right wing, advancing through Belgium, and provide its left wing with the fortified area of ​​Metz and Didenhofen. There were 11 corps (400 thousand soldiers) in the German center; after taking Luxembourg, they covered the right flank of the main strike force. The main strike group - 16 corps (700 thousand people) was supposed to pass through Belgium, crushing two powerful fortresses of Liege and Namur along the way, cross the Meuse River, take Brussels on the 19th day of mobilization and cross the Belgian-French border on the 28th day. Then the troops were to advance to the west and south, reaching Paris from the north on the 39th day. Moltke promised the Austrians that on the 40th day the German command would begin transferring troops to the east in order to crush Russia together with the Austro-Hungarian army.

The left wing of the German army was significantly strengthened: 8 army corps were deployed in Alsace and Lorraine - 320 thousand people (according to the Schlieffen plan there were 4 and a half). As a result, the ratio of forces between the northern and southern groups became 3:1 (for Schlieffen it was 7:1). Although these troops were hardly capable of containing the bulk of the French troops. But this one was not required of them. Retreating, they had to lengthen the lines of communication of the French strike forces, complicate their interaction in mountainous and wooded areas, lure the largest possible number of French troops into an area that did not decide anything in the general course of the war, and then slam the trap.

Thus, there was a significant weakening of the right wing of the German army, a significant strengthening of the Alsace-Lorraine group. These were the most significant differences between the 1914 plan and the Schlieffen plan. In addition, if Schlieffen on the Eastern Front was going to limit himself to defense with the help of Landwehr formations, then Moltke the younger sent 3 field and 1 reserve corps to the Russian border, not counting reserve divisions, Landwehr and reinforced garrisons of fortresses.

Helmut Johann Ludwig von Moltke (1848 - 1916)

The main reasons that forced the German command to change the Schlieffen plan were the following:

1) the threat of a strong blow on the left flank and the general lack of forces did not allow a radical strengthening of the right wing of the German army. The German command did not take risks, since with an active offensive by the French army, the entire rear of the German armies was threatened, the French could intercept communications and disrupt the offensive on the right wing;

2) industrial circles feared severe destruction and devastation of the Alsace-Lorraine region, which had become very important in industrial terms. In 1905, when the Schlieffen Plan was drawn up, it had not yet risen to the same height as in 1914. They wanted to save the area from destruction, so it could not be given to the enemy, as Schlieffen proposed;

3) under pressure from the Prussian Junkers (nobility), the high command decided to divert quite significant forces for the defense of East Prussia. The 8th Army under the command of General Maximilian von Prittwitz (200 thousand people) was deployed against the Russian Empire in East Prussia. Military considerations were sacrificed to the economic interests of the German Junkers;

4) an assessment of Germany’s transport capabilities to supply such a huge mass of troops, which Schlieffen intended to concentrate on the right flank, showed that during the offensive it would be impossible to provide it with everything necessary.

In addition to the objective lack of forces, one can see the great influence on the German command of the German industrial bourgeoisie, as well as the Junker landowners. The German military could not help but take into account the interests of the nobility and the big bourgeoisie. As a result, the German Empire entered the war in 1914 with high hopes of achieving its goals, but the Second Reich simply did not have enough strength and resources to achieve all its goals. In addition, the German military-political leadership underestimated the opponents, the forces and means of Russia, France and England, which concealed the prerequisites for the future defeat of the German Empire.

It should be noted that a number of researchers believe that when implementing the original Schlieffen plan, the German army had a chance of success. And the 1914 plan led to a dispersal of forces, which deprived the German army of any chance of success in the 1914 campaign. Other historians believe that Moltke’s “mistakes” were not the reasons for the failure of the German blitzkrieg. There were many objective reasons for the failure, including the technical unpreparedness of the armies of that time for such a rapid movement, the inability to calculate all factors, including the rapid and successful offensive of Russian troops in East Prussia. The German plan was smooth only on paper; it did not take into account many factors.

Planning for German aggression against the Soviet Union began long before the war. Back in the mid-30s, as can be judged from documents, the political and military leadership of Germany, in resolving a number of issues, proceeded from option “A”, which meant war

against the USSR. At that time, Hitler's command was already accumulating information about the Soviet Army, studying the main operational directions of the eastern campaign and outlining possible options for military action.

The war against Poland began, and then the campaigns in Northern and Western

Western Europe temporarily switched German staff thought to others

problems. But even at this time, preparations for war against the USSR did not escape the attention of the Nazis. The German General Staff resumed planning for the War, specific and comprehensive, after the defeat of France, when, in the opinion of the fascist leadership, the rear of the future war was secured and Germany had at its disposal enough resources to wage it.

Compiegne, the option of “strike force in the East” was discussed. On June 28, “new tasks” were considered. On June 30, Halder wrote in his office diary: “The main focus is on the East.”

On July 21, 1940, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, General Field Marshal V. Brauchitsch, received an order to begin developing a detailed plan for the war in the east.

Hitler's strategic views on waging war against the USSR

The guidelines were developed gradually and refined in every detail.

in the highest military authorities: in the headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht, in the general headquarters of the ground forces, air force

and at the headquarters of the navy.

On July 22, Brauchitsch instructed the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Halder, to comprehensively consider various options “concerning the operation against Russia.”

Halder energetically set about carrying out the received order. He was convinced that "an offensive launched from the concentration area in

East Prussia and the northern part of Poland in the general direction of Moscow will have the greatest chance of success." Halder saw the advantage of this strategic plan in the fact that, in addition to the direct threat created by Moscow, an offensive from these directions puts Soviet troops in Ukraine at a disadvantage, forcing lead them defensively

battles with a front turned to the north.

For the specific development of the plan for the eastern campaign, the chief of staff of the 18th Army, General E. Marx, who was considered an expert on the Soviet Union and enjoyed special confidence of Hitler, was seconded to the general headquarters of the ground forces. On July 29, Halder informed him in detail about the essence of the planned campaign against the USSR, and the general immediately began planning it.

This stage of developing the plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union ended on July 31, 1940. On this day, a meeting of the leadership of the armed forces of Nazi Germany was held at Berghof, at which the goals and plan of the war were clarified, and its timing was outlined. Speaking at the meeting, Hitler justified the need to defeat the Soviet Union by the desire to gain dominance in Europe. “In accordance with this...” he said, “Russia must be liquidated. The deadline is the spring of 1941.”

The fascist military leadership considered this period of attack on

USSR as the most favorable, hoping that by the spring of 1941 Co-

The Soviet Armed Forces will not have time to complete the reorganization and will not be ready to repel the invasion. The duration of the war was determined to be several weeks. It was planned to be completed by the autumn of 1941.

It was planned to inflict two powerful blows on the Soviet Union: southern -

to Kyiv and to the bend of the Dnieper with a deep bypass of the Odessa region and northern - through the Baltic states to Moscow. In addition, it was provided

carrying out independent operations in the south to capture Baku, and in the north - a strike by German troops concentrated in Norway, in the direction of Murmansk.

Hitler's command, preparing for war with the Soviet Union,

attached great importance to the political and operational-strategic camouflage of aggression. It was planned to hold a series of major events that were supposed to create the impression of the Wehrmacht's preparations

to operations in Gibraltar, North Africa and England. A very limited circle of people knew about the idea and plan of the war against the USSR.

At a meeting in the Berghof on July 31, it was decided to find out whether Finland and Turkey would be allies in the war against the USSR. In order to drag these countries into the war, it was planned to give them some territories of So-

Soviet Union after the successful completion of the campaign. Considerations for the settlement of Hungarian-Romanian relations and

guarantees of Romania.

According to the fascist leadership, the Soviet Army by August

• 1940 had 151 rifle and 32 cavalry divisions,
• 38 mechanized brigades, of which 119 divisions and 28 brigades were in the west and were divided into approximately equal parts by Polesie; reserves were located in the Moscow region. By the spring of 1941, an increase

The Soviet Armed Forces were not expected. It was assumed that the Soviet

The Union will conduct defensive actions along the entire western border, with the exception of the Soviet-Romanian section, where the transition of the Co-

The Soviet Army launched an offensive to capture the Romanian oil fields. It was believed that Soviet troops would not shy away from decisive

battles in the border areas, they will not be able to immediately retreat deep into their territory and repeat the maneuver of the Russian army of 1812.

Based on this assessment, the Nazi command planned to deliver the main blow of the ground forces from Northern Poland and East Prussia to

direction to Moscow. Since the concentration of German troops in Romania at this time was impossible, the southern direction was not accepted in

calculation A maneuver north of the Moscow direction was also excluded, which would lengthen the troops' communications and ultimately lead them into a difficult-to-pass wooded area north-west of Moscow.

The main group was tasked with destroying the main forces of the Co-

the Soviet Army in the western direction, to capture Moscow and the northern part of the Soviet Union; in the future - turn the front to the south in order to occupy Ukraine in cooperation with the southern group. As a result, it was planned to reach the Rostov, Gorky, Arkhangelsk border.

To deliver the main blow, it was planned to create an army group "Se-

ver" from three armies (a total of 68 divisions, of which 15 tank and two motorized). The northern flank of the strike group was to

to hide behind one of the armies, which at the first stage had to cross

on the offensive, cross the Western Dvina in its lower reaches and advance in the direction of Pskov, Leningrad.

An auxiliary strike was supposed to be delivered south of the Pripyat marshes by Army Group "South" consisting of two armies (a total of 35 divisions, including 5 tank and 6 motorized) with the aim of capturing Kiev and crossing the Dnieper in its middle course. 44 divisions were allocated to the reserve of the main command of the ground forces, which were to advance beyond

Army Group North.

The German Air Force was tasked with destroying Soviet aviation, gaining air supremacy, disrupting railway and

road transportation, prevent the concentration of Soviet ground forces in forested areas, support German mobile formations with dive bomber attacks, prepare and carry out airborne operations and provide air cover for concentrations of German troops and transport.

The Navy had to neutralize the Soviet fleet at

Baltic Sea, protect transport with iron ore coming from Sweden, and ensure maritime transport in the Baltic to supply existing German formations.

The most favorable time of year for waging war against the USSR

The period from mid-May to mid-October was considered.

The main idea of ​​the war plan against the USSR in this version boiled down to

conducting operations in two strategic directions, crashing into

territory with wedges, which ceased later, after forcing

Dnieper, in giant pincers to cover Soviet troops in the central

regions of the country.

Serious miscalculations were revealed in the plan. As the fascist German command concluded, the plan in this version underestimated the strength of resistance of the Soviet Army in the border zone and, moreover, was difficult to implement due to the complexity of the planned maneuver and its support. Therefore, Hitler’s leadership considered it necessary to improve the first version of the war plan against the USSR. Its development was continued at the General Staff of the Ground Forces under the leadership of Lieutenant General F. Paulus, and

in parallel - at the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Supreme High Command, whose chief was Lieutenant General A. Jodl.

B. Lossberg presented General Jodl with a new version of the war plan against

THE USSR. Lossberg borrowed many ideas from the first option: the same forms of strategic maneuver were proposed - delivering powerful cutting blows followed by dismemberment, encirclement and destruction in

giant cauldrons of the Soviet Army troops, reaching the lower reaches

Don and Volga (from Stalingrad to Gorky), then Northern Dvina (to

Arkhangelsk).

The new version of the war plan against the USSR had its own peculiarities. He allowed for the possibility of an organized withdrawal of Soviet troops from the western defensive lines into the interior of the country and launching counterattacks on the extended

during the offensive to German groups. It was believed that the most favorable situation for the successful completion of the campaign against the USSR would arise if the Soviet troops, with their main forces, offered stubborn resistance in the border zone. It was assumed that when

In such a development of events, the German formations, due to their superiority in forces, means and maneuverability, will easily defeat the troops

of the Soviet Army in the border areas, after which the Soviet command will not be able to organize a systematic retreat of its armed forces.

According to Lossberg's project, it was planned to conduct military operations in three strategic directions: Kiev (Ukrainian), Moscow and Leningrad. At each of them it was planned to deploy: from the ground forces - an army group and from the air force - an air fleet. It was assumed that the main blow would be delivered by the southern army group (as it was called in the project) from the area of ​​Warsaw and South-East Prussia in the general direction of Minsk and Moscow. It was assigned the bulk of tank and motorized formations. “Southern Army Group,” the draft said, “

going on the offensive, he will direct the main blow into the gap between the Dnieper

and the Dvina against Russian forces in the Minsk region, and then would launch an attack on Moscow." The Northern Army Group was to advance from East Prussia through the lower reaches of the Western Dvina in the general direction of

Leningrad. It was assumed that during the offensive, the southern army group would be able, depending on the situation, for some time to turn part of its forces from the line east of the Western Dvina to the north in order to prevent the retreat of the Soviet Army to the east.

To conduct operations south of the Pripyat Marshes, Lossberg proposed concentrating a third army group, the combat strength of which would be equal to

a third of the German troops intended for action south of Polesie. This

The group was given the task of defeating the troops of the Soviet Army in the South and capturing Ukraine during a double exciting strike (from the Dublin area and from the border north of the mouth of the Danube).

Germany's allies - Finland and

Romania. Finnish troops, together with German troops transferred from Norway, were supposed to organize a separate operational group and advance with part of their forces towards Murmansk, and with the main forces - north of Lake Ladoga

To Leningrad. The Romanian army had to cover those operating with

German troops on the territory of Romania.

The German Air Force, according to the Lossberg project, ensured the suppression and destruction of Soviet aviation at airfields, air support for the advance of German troops in selected strategic directions. The project took into account that the nature of the coastal strip of the Baltic Sea precluded the use of large German surface forces against the Soviets Russian Baltic Fleet. Therefore, the German Navy was given limited tasks: to ensure the protection of its own coastal strip and

close the exits to Soviet warships in the Baltic Sea. At the same time, it was emphasized that the threat to German communications in the Baltic Sea from the Soviet surface and submarine fleet “will be eliminated only if Russian naval bases, including Le-

Ningrad will be captured during ground operations. Then it will be possible to use the sea route to supply the northern wing. Previously, it was impossible to count on reliable communication by sea between the ports of the Baltic and Finland."

The version of the war plan proposed by Lossberg was refined more than once. New developments also arose, until in mid-November 1940 the OKH

presented a detailed war plan, which initially received the code name “Otto.” On November 19, Halder reported it to the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Brauchitsch. He did not make any significant changes to it. The plan provided for the creation of three army groups - "Se-

ver", "Center" and "South", which were supposed to attack Leningrad, Moscow

and Kyiv. The main attention was paid to the Moscow direction, where the main forces were concentrated.

At the same time, it is important to prevent the systematic withdrawal of Soviet troops and achieve the complete destruction of the military potential of the USSR. Hitler

demanded that the war be waged in such a way as to destroy the maximum number of Soviet Army forces in the border areas. He gave instructions

provide for the encirclement of Soviet troops in the Baltic states. Army group

"South", according to Hitler, should have launched the offensive somewhat later than Army Groups "Center" and "North". It was planned to complete the campaign before the onset of winter cold. “I will not repeat Napoleon’s mistakes. When I go to Moscow,” said the self-confident Fuhrer, “I will perform enough

early to reach it before winter."

OKH held a discussion, which, according to Halder, contributed to the development of a common point of view on the main issues of waging war against

THE USSR. The discussion participants came to the conclusion that in order to defeat the Soviet

The union will require no more than 8-10 weeks.

PLAN "BARBAROSSA"

On the evening of December 18, 1940, Hitler signed a directive to launch military operations against the USSR, which received a serial number

21 and the code name version "Barbarossa" (Fall "Bar-

barossa"). It was made in only nine copies, three of which were presented to the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces (ground forces, air force and navy), and six were locked in OKW safes.

Directive N21 set out only the general plan and initial instructions for waging war against the USSR and did not represent a complete war plan. The war plan against the USSR is a whole complex of political, economic and strategic measures of the Hitlerite leadership. In addition to Directive N21, the plan included directives and orders of the Supreme High Command and the main commands of the armed forces on strategic concentration and deployment, logistics, preparation of the theater of military operations, camouflage, disinformation and other documents.

Among these documents, the directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of ground forces of January 31, 1941 was especially important.

d. She specified and clarified the tasks and methods of action of the armed forces set out in Directive N21.

The Barbarossa plan envisaged the defeat of the Soviet Union in one short-term campaign even before the war against England was over. Le-

Ningrad, Moscow, Central industrial region and Donetsk basin. A special place in the plan was given to Moscow. It was assumed that its capture would be decisive for the victorious outcome of the entire war. "Co-

The ultimate goal of the operation, stated in Directive N21, is to create a protective barrier against Asian Russia along the common Volga-Arkhangelsk line. Thus, if necessary, the last industrial region remaining with the Russians in the Urals can be paralyzed with

with the help of aviation."

To defeat the Soviet Union, it was planned to use all of Germany's ground forces, excluding only the formations and units necessary to conduct occupation service in the enslaved countries. German Air Force

The task was “to free up such forces to support the ground forces during the eastern campaign so that we could count on the rapid completion of ground operations and at the same time limit to a minimum the destruction of the eastern regions of Germany by enemy aircraft.” For combat operations at sea against three Soviet fleets - Se-

Verny, Baltic and Black Sea - it was planned to allocate a significant part of the warships of the German Navy and the naval forces of Finland and Romania.

According to the Barbarossa plan, 152 divisions were allocated to attack the USSR

(including 19 tank and 14 motorized) and two brigades. Allies

Germany fielded 29 infantry divisions and 16 brigades. Thus, if we take two brigades as one division, a total of 190 divisions were allocated. In addition, two-thirds of the available

in Germany the Air Force and significant naval forces.

Ground forces intended to attack the Soviet Union

yuz, were reduced to three army groups:

"South" - 11th, 17th and 6th field armies and 1st tank group; "Center"

4th and 9th field armies, 2nd and 3rd tank groups; "North" - 16th

and the 18th and 4th tank groups.

The 2nd separate field army remained in the reserve of the OKH, the army "Nor-

Vegia" received the task of acting independently in the Murmansk and Kandalash directions.

Plan "Barbarossa" contained a somewhat sophisticated assessment of the Armed Forces

USSR forces. According to German data, by the beginning of the German invasion

(as of June 20, 1941) in the Soviet Armed Forces there were 170 rifle, 33.5 cavalry divisions and 46 mechanized and tank

brigades Of these, as stated by the fascist command, 118 rifle,

20 cavalry divisions and 40 brigades were stationed in the western

border districts, 27 rifle divisions, 5.5 cavalry divisions and 1

brigade in the rest of the European part of the USSR, and 33 divisions and 5 brigades in the Far East. It was assumed that Soviet aviation had

8 thousand combat aircraft (including about 1,100 modern ones), of which 6 thousand were in the European part of the USSR.

Based on Soviet sources, the German command was seriously mistaken in determining the number and deployment of Soviet troops. So in

the book “50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR” says: “In fact, in the Western European districts alone there were 170 divisions and 2 brigades

Soviet Army. A particularly big miscalculation was made by the Nazis during

determining the number of Soviet troops stationed in the internal districts."

Hitler's command assumed that Soviet troops deployed in the west would use for defense field fortifications on the new and old state borders, as well as numerous water

barriers, will enter into battle in large formations west of the Dnieper and

Western Dvina. At the same time, the Soviet command will strive to maintain air and naval bases in the Baltic states, and the southern wing

the front will rely on the coast of the Black Sea. “In the event of unfavorable development of operations south and north of the Pripyat swamps,” it was noted in the plan

"Barbarossa" - the Russians will try to stop the German offensive on the line of the Dnieper and Western Dvina rivers.

When attempting to eliminate German breakthroughs, as well as possible attempts to withdraw threatened troops beyond the Dnieper and Western Dvina lines, one should take into account the possibility of offensive actions by large Russian formations using tanks."

According to Pan "Barbarossa" large tank and motorized forces,

using aviation support, they were supposed to deliver a swift strike to great depths north and south of the Pripyat marshes, break through the defenses of the main forces of the Soviet Army, presumably concentrated in the western part of the USSR, and destroy disunited groups of Soviet troops.

An attack by two groups was planned north of the Pripyat marshes

armies: "Center" (commander Field Marshal F. Bock) and "North" (

Commander Field Marshal V. Leeb).

Army Group "Center" delivered the main blow and was supposed to, concentrating the main efforts on the flanks where the 2nd and 3rd tank groups were deployed, carry out a deep breakthrough with these formations to the north

and south of Minsk, reach the Smolensk area, planned for connecting tank groups. It was assumed that with the entry of tank formations into the area

In Smolensk, the preconditions will be created for the destruction by field armies of the Soviet troops remaining between Bialystok and Minsk. Subsequently,

Once the main forces reached the line of Yaroslavl, Smolensk, Vitebsk, Army Group Center had to act depending on the situation developing on its left wing. If the neighbor on the left fails to quickly defeat the troops defending in front of him, the army group was supposed to turn its tank formations to the north, and conduct an offensive in the eastern direction towards Moscow with field armies. If the army group

"North" will be able to carry out the defeat of the Soviet Army in its offensive zone, Army Group "Center" should immediately strike at

Army Group "North" received the task, advancing from eastern Prussia, to deliver the main blow in the direction of Leningrad, destroy the troops of the Soviet Army defending in the Baltics and, capturing the ports on

the Baltic Sea, including Leningrad and Kronstadt, to deprive the Soviet Baltic Fleet of its bases. If this army group is unable to

the defeat of the group of Soviet troops in the Baltic states, the mobile troops of Army Group Center, the Finnish army and

units transferred from Norway. The group thus strengthened

Army "North" had to achieve the destruction of the Soviet troops opposing it. According to the German command, the operation was intensified

Army Group North provided Army Group Center with freedom of maneuver

to capture Moscow and solve operational-strategic tasks in cooperation with Army Group South.

An offensive by Army Group "South" was planned south of the Pripyat marshes.

(Commander Field Marshal G. Rundstedt). It delivered one strong blow from the Lublin area in the general direction of Kyiv and further south along the bend of the Dnieper. As a result of the strike, in which powerful tank formations were to play the main role, it was supposed to cut off the Soviet troops located in Western Ukraine from their communications on the Dnieper, seize the crossings across the Dnieper in the Kiev area and

south of it. This ensured freedom of maneuver to develop an offensive in an eastern direction in cooperation with troops advancing to the north, or to advance to the south of the Soviet Union in order to capture important economic regions.

The troops of the right wing of Army Group South (11th Army) were supposed to create a false impression of the deployment of large forces on the

rhetoric of Romania, pin down the opposing troops of the Soviet Army, and in

further, as the offensive on the Soviet-German front develops, to prevent the organized withdrawal of Soviet formations beyond

The Barbarossa plan planned to use the principles of combat operations that had proven themselves in the Polish and Western European campaigns. Od-

However, it was emphasized that, unlike actions in the West, the offensive

against Soviet troops must be waged simultaneously along the entire front: both in the direction of the main attacks and in secondary sectors. “Only in this way,” said the directive of January 31

1941, - it will be possible to prevent the timely withdrawal of combat-ready enemy forces and destroy them west of the Dnieper-Dvina line."

The Barbarossa plan took into account the possibility of active counteraction by Soviet aviation to the advance of German ground forces. Germanic

From the very beginning of hostilities, the Air Force was tasked with suppressing the Soviet Air Force and supporting the offensive of ground forces in the main attack directions. To solve these problems, at the first stage of the war, it was planned to use almost all German aviation allocated for actions against the Soviet Union. Attacks on rear industrial centers

The USSR was planned to begin only after the troops of the Soviet

The armies will be defeated in Belarus, the Baltic states and Ukraine.

The offensive of Army Group "Center" was planned to be supported by the 2nd Air Fleet, "South" - by the 4th Air Fleet, and "North" - by the 1st Air Fleet.

The Navy of Nazi Germany had to defend its coast and prevent the ships of the Soviet Navy from breaking through from the Baltic Sea. At the same time, it was planned to avoid large naval operations until the ground forces of Le-

Ningrad as the last naval base of the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Subsequently, the naval forces of Nazi Germany were tasked with ensuring freedom of navigation in the Baltic Sea and

supplying troops of the northern wing of the ground forces.

The attack on the USSR was planned to be carried out on May 15, 1941. Thus, according to the Barbarossa plan, the immediate strategic goal of the Nazis in the war against the USSR was the defeat of the troops of the Soviet Army in

The Baltic states, Belarus and the Right Bank Ukraine. The subsequent goal was to capture Leningrad in the north, in

center-Central industrial region and capital of the Soviet Union,

in the south - to capture all of Ukraine and the Donetsk basin as quickly as possible. Co-

The final goal of the eastern campaign was the entry of fascist German troops to the Volga and Northern Dvina.

On February 3, 1941, at a meeting in Berchtesgaden, Hitler was present

Keitel and Jodl heard a detailed report from Brauchitsch and Haider on the plan for war against the USSR. The Fuhrer approved the report and assured the generals that the plan would be successfully implemented: “When the implementation of Plan Barbarossa begins, the world will hold its breath and freeze.”

Armed forces of Romania, Hungary and Finland, allies of the fascist

Germany - should have received specific tasks immediately before the start of the war.

The use of Romanian troops was determined by the Munich plan, developed by the command of the German troops in Romania. In mid-June, this plan was brought to the attention of the Romanian leadership. On June 20, the Romanian dictator Antonescu issued an order on its basis to the armed forces of Romania, which outlined the tasks of the Romanian troops.

Before the start of hostilities, the Romanian ground forces had to

cover the concentration and deployment of German troops in Romania, and

with the beginning of the war, pin down a group of Soviet troops located on the border with Romania. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the border of the Prut River, which was believed to follow as a result of the offensive of the German group

Army "South", the Romanian troops had to move on to vigorous pursuit of units of the Soviet Army. If the Soviet troops managed to hold their positions along the Prut River, the Romanian formations would have to carry out a breakthrough of the Soviet defense in the Tsutsora, New Bedrazh sector.

Tasks for the Finnish and German troops deployed in the Northern and

Central Finland, were determined by the OKW directive of April 7

1941 and were announced by the operational directives of the Finnish General Staff, as well as by the directive of the commander of the Army "Norway" dated April 20.

The OKW directive stipulated that the Finnish armed forces, before the advance of Hitler's troops, were to cover the deployment of German formations in Finland, and with the Wehrmacht going on the offensive, to pin down the Soviet groups in the Karelian and Petrozavodsk directions. With the exit of the army group "North" at the border of the Luga River to Finnish troops it was necessary to launch a decisive offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, as well as between Lakes Onega and Ladoga, in order to connect with the German armies on the Svir River and in the Leningrad region.

The German troops deployed on the territory of Finland, according to the directive of the commander of the Army "Norway", were given the task of attacking in two groups (each consisting of a reinforced corps): one

Murmansk, the other is on Kandalaksha. The southern group, having broken through the defenses, was supposed to reach the White Sea in the Kandalakshiya area and then advance along the Murmansk railway to the north in order to, in cooperation with the northern group, destroy the Soviet troops located on the Kola Peninsula and capture Murmansk and Polyarnoye. Aviation support for the Finnish and German troops advancing from Finland was entrusted to the 5th Air Fleet of Germany and the Finnish Air Force.

At the end of April, the political and military leadership of Nazi Germany finally set the date of the attack on the USSR: Sunday, June 22, 1941. The postponement from May to June was caused by the need to redeploy forces that participated in the aggression against Yugoslavia and Greece to the borders of the USSR.

Preparing the war against the USSR, Hitler's leadership outlined major measures to restructure its armed forces. They concerned primarily the ground forces. It was planned to increase the number of divisions of the active army to 180 and increase the reserve army. By the beginning of the war

against the USSR, the Wehrmacht, including the reserve army and SS troops, should have had about 250 fully equipped divisions.

Particular attention was paid to strengthening mobile troops. It was planned

deploy 20 tank divisions instead of the existing 10 and increase the level of motorization of the infantry. For this purpose, it was planned to additionally allocate 130 for the production of military trucks, all-terrain vehicles and armored vehicles

thousand tons of steel at the expense of the fleet and aviation.

Big changes were planned in the production of weapons. According to the planned program, the most important task was the production of the latest models of tanks and anti-tank artillery. It was also planned to significantly increase the production of aircraft of those designs that had stood the test during battles in the West.

Great importance was attached to the preparation of the theater of military operations.

Directive of August 9, 1940, which received the code name "Aufbau Ost" ("Construction in the East"), planned the transfer of supply bases from west to east, the construction of new railways in the eastern regions

and highways, training grounds, barracks, etc., expansion and improvement of airfields, communication networks.

In preparations for aggression against the USSR, Hitler’s leadership assigned the most important place to ensuring surprise of the attack and secrecy

carrying out each preparatory activity, whether it related to economic restructuring, strategic planning, preparation of a theater of military operations or deployment of armed forces, etc. All documents related to planning the war in the East were prepared with the utmost secrecy. An extremely narrow circle of people was allowed to develop them. The concentration and operational deployment of troops was planned to be carried out in compliance with all camouflage measures. However, Hitler's leadership understood that it was impossible to completely hide the concentration and deployment of a multi-million army with a huge amount of military equipment near the Soviet borders. Therefore, it resorted to a broadly conceived political and operational-strategic camouflage of the impending aggression, recognizing the number one task of introducing the Soviet government

The Union and the command of the Soviet Army were misled about the plan, scale

and the time of the onset of aggression.

In the development of measures to camouflage the concentration of Wehrmacht troops in the east, they took part as bodies of the operational-strategic

leadership, and the Abwehr (intelligence and counterintelligence). The Abwehr developed a directive, signed on September 6, 1940 by Jodl, which specifically outlined the goals and objectives of disinformation. Directive N21, the “Barbarossa” version, also contained instructions on the secrecy of preparations for aggression.

But perhaps the treacherous tactics of the Nazis are most fully revealed by the directive on disinformation of the enemy, issued by the OKW on February 15, 1941.

“The purpose of disinformation is,” the directive stated, “to hide the preparations for Operation Barossa.” This main goal should form the basis of all measures to disinform the enemy.” Camouflage measures were planned to be carried out in two stages. The first stage, approximately until mid-April 1941, included the camouflage of general military preparations not related to the massive regrouping of troops. The second - from April to June 1941 - camouflage of concentration and

operational deployment of troops at the borders of the USSR.

At the first stage, it was intended to create a false impression regarding the true intentions of the German command, using various types of preparations for the invasion of England, as well as for the operation

"Marita" (against Greece) and "Sonnenblum" (in North Africa). The initial deployment of troops to attack the USSR was planned

carry out under the guise of normal army movements. At the same time, the goal was to create the impression that the center of concentration of armed forces was in the south of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria and that the concentration of troops in the north was relatively small.

At the second stage, when, as noted in the directive, hide the preparation

it will no longer be possible to attack the Soviet Union, concentration and

the deployment of forces for the eastern campaign was planned to be presented in

in the form of false measures carried out allegedly with the aim of diverting attention from the planned invasion of England. This distracting maneuver was passed off by Hitler’s command as “the greatest in the history of wars.”

At the same time, work was carried out aimed at preserving the impression among the personnel of the German armed forces that preparations for

The landing in England continues, but in a different form - the troops allocated for this purpose are withdrawn to the rear until a certain moment. "It is necessary," the directive said, "to keep as long as possible even those troops that are intended to act directly on east".

Great importance was attached, in particular, to the dissemination of disinformation about non-existent airborne corps, supposedly intended for the invasion of England. About the upcoming landing on

The British Isles had to bear witness to such facts as

seconding English translators to military units, issuing new English topographic maps, reference books, etc.

Rumors were spreading among officers of Army Group South that German troops would allegedly be transferred to Iran to wage a war to capture the British colonies.

The OKW directive on disinformation indicated that the more forces were concentrated in the east, the more effort must be made to keep public opinion astray about German plans.

In the instructions of the OKW chief of staff dated March 9, it was recommended to present the deployment of the Wehrmacht in the east as defensive measures to ensure the rear of Germany during the landing in England and

operations in the Balkans.

Hitler's leadership was so confident in the successful implementation of the Barbarossa plan that around the spring of 1941 they began

detailed development of further plans for conquest of world domination. In the official diary of the Supreme High Command of the Nazi Armed Forces on February 17, 1941, the requirement was stated

Hitler that “after the end of the Eastern campaign it is necessary

provide for the capture of Afghanistan and the organization of an offensive against India

diyu." Based on these instructions, the OKW headquarters began planning Wehrmacht operations for the future. These operations were planned to be carried out in late autumn

1941 and the winter of 1941/42. Their plan was outlined in the draft directive

N32 "Preparation for the period after the implementation of Plan Barbarossa", sent to the ground forces, air force and navy on June 11, 1941.

The project stipulated that after the defeat of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Wehrmacht would seize British colonial possessions and some independent countries in the Mediterranean, Africa, the Middle and

Middle East, invasion of the British Isles, deployment of military operations against America. Hitler's strategists already calculated from

In the fall of 1941, begin the conquest of Iran, Iraq, Egypt, the Suez Canal area, and then India, where it was planned to unite with Japanese troops. The Nazi leadership hoped to annex Spain and Portugal to Germany and quickly take over the siege of the islands. The development of Directive N32 and other documents indicates that after the defeat

The USSR and the solution to the "English problem" the Nazis intended in alliance with

Japan "to eliminate the influence of the Anglo-Saxons in North America." Capture Ka-

Nada and the United States of America were supposed to be carried out by landing large amphibious assault forces from bases in Greenland, Iceland,

Azores Islands and Brazil - on the eastern coast of the North

America and from the Aleutian and Hawaiian Islands - to the west. In April-June

In 1941, these issues were repeatedly discussed at the highest headquarters of the German armed forces.

Thus, the Nazi leadership even before the aggression

against the USSR outlined far-reaching plans for conquest of world domination. The key positions for their implementation, as it seemed to the Hitlerite command, were provided by the campaign against the USSR.