BATOV Pavel Ivanovich

Army General, twice Hero Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 65th Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from the Higher Officer Courses "Vystrel" in 1927, and the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1950.

Participant in the First World War since 1916. Awarded for distinction in battles

2 St. George's crosses and 2 medals.

In 1918 he voluntarily joined the Red Army. From 1920 to 1936 he successively commanded a company, battalion, and rifle regiment. In 1936-1937 he fought on the side of the Republican troops in Spain. Upon return, commander of the rifle corps (1937). In 1939-1940 he took part in the Soviet-Finnish war. Since 1940, deputy commander of the Transcaucasian Military District.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War commander of the special rifle corps in Crimea, deputy commander of the 51st Army of the Southern Front (from August 1941), commander of the 3rd Army (January-February 1942), assistant commander of the Bryansk Front (February-October 1942). ). From October 1942 until the end of the war, commander of the 65th Army, participating in hostilities as part of the Don, Stalingrad, Central, Belorussian, 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts. The troops under the command of P.I. Batov distinguished themselves in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, in the battle for the Dnieper, during the liberation of Belarus, in the Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations. The combat successes of the 65th Army were noted about 30 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

For personal courage and courage, for organizing clear interaction between subordinate troops during the crossing of the Dnieper, P. I. Batov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and for crossing the river. Oder and capture of Stettin ( German name Polish city of Szczecin) was awarded the second “Golden Star”.

After the war - commander of the mechanized and combined arms armies, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, commander of the Carpathian and Baltic military districts, commander of the Southern Group of Forces.

In 1962-1965, Chief of Staff of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states. Since 1965, the military inspector has been an adviser to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since 1970, Chairman of the Soviet War Veterans Committee.

Awarded 6 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Orders of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st degree, “For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR” 3rd degree, “Badge of Honor”, ​​Weapon of Honor, foreign orders, medals.

VATUTIN Nikolay Fedorovich

Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously). In the Battle of Kursk he took part as commander of the Voronezh Front.

In the Red Army since 1920

He graduated from the Poltava Infantry School in 1922, the Kyiv Higher United Military School in 1924, and the Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze in 1929, operational department of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1934, Military Academy of the General Staff in 1937

Participant in the Civil War. After the war, he commanded a platoon, a company, and worked at the headquarters of the 7th Infantry Division. In 1931-1941 was the chief of staff of the division, head of the 1st department of the headquarters of the Siberian Military District, deputy chief of staff and chief of staff of the Kyiv Special Military District, head of the Operations Directorate and deputy chief of the General Staff.

From June 30, 1941, Chief of Staff of the North-Western Front. In May - July 1942, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In July 1942 he was appointed commander of the Voronezh Front. During the Battle of Stalingrad he commanded the troops of the Southwestern Front. In March 1943, he was again appointed commander of the Voronezh Front (from October 1943 - the 1st Ukrainian Front). On February 29, 1944, while leaving for the troops, he was seriously wounded and died on April 15. Buried in Kyiv.

Awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, Suvorov 1st degree, Kutuzov 1st degree, and the Czechoslovakian Order.

ZHADOV Alexey Semenovich

Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 5th Guards Army.

In the Red Army since 1919

He graduated from cavalry courses in 1920, military-political courses in 1928, and the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1934, Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1950

Participant in the Civil War. In November 1919, as part of a separate detachment of the 46th Infantry Division, he fought against the Denikinites. From October 1920, as a platoon commander of a cavalry regiment of the 11th Cavalry Division of the 1st Cavalry Army, he participated in battles with Wrangel’s troops, as well as with gangs operating in Ukraine and Belarus. In 1922-1924. fought with the Basmachi in Central Asia and was seriously wounded. Since 1925, commander of a training platoon, then commander and political instructor of the squadron, chief of staff of the regiment, chief of the operational unit of the division headquarters, chief of staff of the corps, assistant cavalry inspector in the Red Army. Since 1940, commander of the mountain cavalry division.

During the Great Patriotic War, commander of the 4th Airborne Corps (from June 1941). As chief of staff of the 3rd Army of the Central and then Bryansk Fronts, he took part in the Battle of Moscow, and in the summer of 1942 he commanded the 8th Cavalry Corps on the Bryansk Front.

Since October 1942, commander of the 66th Army of the Don Front, operating north of Stalingrad. Since April 1943, the 66th Army was transformed into the 5th Guards Army.

Under the leadership of A. S. Zhadov, the army as part of the Voronezh Front participated in the defeat of the enemy near Prokhorovka, and then in the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation. Subsequently, the 5th Guards Army participated in the liberation of Ukraine, in the Lvov-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, Berlin, and Prague operations.

Army troops were noted 21 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for successful military operations. For his skillful command and control of troops in the fight against the Nazi invaders and the courage and bravery shown at the same time, A. S. Zhadov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the post-war period - Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces for combat training (1946-1949), head of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze (1950-1954), Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Forces (1954-1955), Deputy and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces (1956-1964). Since September 1964 - First Deputy Chief Inspector of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since October 1969, the military inspector has been an adviser to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 5 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Red Star, “For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR” 3rd degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.

Died 1977

KATUKOV Mikhail Efimovich

Marshal of armored forces, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 1st Tank Army.

In the Red Army since 1919

He graduated from the Mogilev infantry courses in 1922, the Higher Officer Courses “Vystrel” in 1927, the academic advanced training courses for command personnel at the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army in 1935, the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1951.

Participant of the October armed uprising in Petrograd.

IN Civil War fought as a private on the Southern Front.

From 1922 to 1940, he successively commanded a platoon, a company, was the head of a regimental school, commander of a training battalion, chief of staff of a brigade, and commander of a tank brigade. Since November 1940, commander of the 20th Panzer Division.

At the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he took part in defensive operations in the area. Lutsk, Dubno, Korosten.

On November 11, 1941, for brave and skillful military actions, M. E. Katukov’s brigade was the first in the tank forces to receive the rank of guards.

In 1942, M.E. Katukov commanded the 1st Tank Corps, which repelled the onslaught of enemy troops in the Kursk-Voronezh direction, and then the 3rd Mechanized Corps.

In January 1943, he was appointed commander of the 1st Tank Army, which, as part of the Voronezh and later the 1st Ukrainian Front, distinguished itself in the Battle of Kursk and during the liberation of Ukraine.

In June 1944, the army was transformed into a guards army. She participated in the Lvov-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, East Pomeranian and Berlin operations.

In the post-war years, M.E. Katukov commanded the army, armored and mechanized forces of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Since 1955 - Inspector General of the Main Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since 1963 - military inspector-adviser of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 4 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st degree, Kutuzov 2nd degree, Order of the Red Star, “For service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR » 3rd degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.

KONEV Ivan Stepanovich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the Steppe Front.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from advanced training courses for senior command personnel at the Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze in 1926, Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze in 1934

During the First World War he was drafted into the army and sent to the Southwestern Front. Having been demobilized from the army in 1918, he took part in the establishment of Soviet power in Nikolsk ( Vologda Region), where he was elected a member of the Nikolsky district executive committee and appointed district military commissar.

During the Civil War, he was a commissar of an armored train, then a rifle brigade, a division, and the headquarters of the people's revolutionary army of the Far Eastern Republic. Fought on the Eastern Front.

After the Civil War - military commissar of the 17th Primorsky Rifle Corps, 17th Rifle Division. After completing advanced training courses for senior commanders, he was appointed regiment commander. Later he was an assistant division commander in 1931-1932. and 1935-1937, commanded a rifle division, corps and the 2nd Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army.

In 1940-1941 - commanded the troops of the Transbaikal and North Caucasus military districts.

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he was commander of the 19th Army of the Western Front. Then he successively commanded the Western, Kalinin, Northwestern, Steppe and 1st Ukrainian fronts.

In the Battle of Kursk, troops under the command of I. S. Konev successfully acted during the counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction.

After the war, he held the positions of Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Forces, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Chief Inspector of the Soviet Army - Deputy Minister of War of the USSR, Commander of the Carpathian Military District, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR - Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the participating states Warsaw Pact, Inspector General of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Hero of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (1970), Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic (1971).

Awarded 7 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, 2 Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Order of the Red Star, medals and foreign orders.

Awarded the highest military order "Victory" and the Weapon of Honor.

MALINOVSKY Rodion Yakovlevich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the Southwestern Front.

In the Red Army since 1919

Graduated from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze.

Since 1914 he participated as a private in the First World War. Awarded the St. George Cross, 4th degree.

In February 1916 he was sent to France as part of the Russian Expeditionary Force. Upon returning to Russia, he voluntarily joined the Red Army in 1919.

During the Civil War he took part in battles as part of the 27th Infantry Division of the Eastern Front.

In December 1920, he was the commander of a machine-gun platoon, then the head of a machine-gun team, assistant commander, and battalion commander.

Since 1930, he was chief of staff of the cavalry regiment of the 10th Cavalry Division, then served in the headquarters of the North Caucasus and Belarusian military districts, and was chief of staff of the 3rd Cavalry Corps.

In 1937-1938 Volunteered in the Spanish Civil War and was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Red Banner for combat.

Since 1939, teacher at the Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze. Since March 1941, commander of the 48th Rifle Corps.

During the Great Patriotic War, he commanded the 6th, 66th, 2nd Guards, 5th Shock and 51st Armies, the Southern, Southwestern, 3rd Ukrainian, 2nd Ukrainian Fronts. He took part in the Battles of Stalingrad, Kursk, Zaporozhye, Nikopol-Krivoy Rog, Bereznegovato-Snigirev, Odessa, Iasi-Kishinev, Debrecen, Budapest, and Vienna operations.

Since July 1945, commander of the Transbaikal Front, which delivered the main blow in the Manchurian strategic operation. For high military leadership, courage and bravery, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the war, he commanded the troops of the Transbaikal-Amur Military District, was the commander-in-chief of the troops Far East, commander of the Far Eastern Military District.

Since March 1956, the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR has been the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces.

Since October 1957, Minister of Defense of the USSR. He remained in this position until the end of his life.

Awarded 5 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Order of Kutuzov 1st degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.

Awarded the highest military order "Victory".

POPOV Markian Mikhailovich

Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the Bryansk Front.

Born on November 15, 1902 in the village of Ust-Medveditskaya (now the town of Serafimovich, Volgograd region).

In the Red Army since 1920

He graduated from the infantry command courses in 1922, the Higher Officer Courses “Vystrel” in 1925, and the Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze.

He fought in the Civil War on the Western Front as a private.

Since 1922, platoon commander, assistant company commander, assistant chief and head of the regimental school, battalion commander, inspector of military educational institutions of the Moscow Military District. From May 1936, chief of staff of the mechanized brigade, then the 5th mechanized corps. From June 1938, deputy commander, from September, chief of staff, from July 1939, commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army in the Far East, and from January 1941, commander of the Leningrad Military District.

During the Great Patriotic War, commander of the Northern and Leningrad fronts (June - September 1941), the 61st and 40th armies (November 1941 - October 1942). He was deputy commander of the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts. Successfully commanded the 5th Shock Army (October 1942 - April 1943), the Reserve Front and the troops of the Steppe Military District (April - May 1943), Bryansk (June-October 1943), Baltic and 2nd Baltic (October 1943 - April 1944) fronts. From April 1944 until the end of the war, chief of staff of the Leningrad, 2nd Baltic, and then again the Leningrad fronts.

He participated in the planning of operations and successfully led troops in the battles near Leningrad and Moscow, in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, and during the liberation of Karelia and the Baltic states.

In the post-war period, commander of the troops of the Lvov (1945-1946), Tauride (1946-1954) military districts. From January 1955, Deputy Chief and then Head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training, and from August 1956, Chief of the General Staff - First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. Since 1962, the military inspector has been an adviser to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 5 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, 2 Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Order of the Red Star, medals, as well as foreign orders.

ROKOSSOVSKY Konstantin Konstantinovich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, Marshal of Poland, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the Central Front.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from cavalry advanced training courses for command personnel in 1925, and advanced training courses for senior command personnel at the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1929

In the army since 1914. Participant in the First World War. He fought in the 5th Dragoon Kargopol Regiment, as a private and junior non-commissioned officer.

After the October Revolution of 1917, he fought in the ranks of the Red Army. During the Civil War, he commanded a squadron, a separate division and a cavalry regiment. For personal courage and courage he was awarded 2 Orders of the Red Banner.

After the war, he successively commanded the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, a cavalry regiment, and the 5th Separate Cavalry Brigade. For military distinctions at the Chinese Eastern Railway he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

From 1930 he commanded the 7th, then the 15th cavalry divisions, from 1936 - the 5th cavalry, from November 1940 - the 9th mechanized corps.

From July 1941 he commanded the 16th Army of the Western Front. From July 1942 he commanded the Bryansk, from September the Don, from February 1943 the Central, from October 1943 the Belorussian, from February 1944 the 1st Belorussian and from November 1944 until the end of the war the 2nd Belorussian Front.

Troops under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky took part in the Battle of Smolensk (1941), the Battle of Moscow, the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, and the Belorussian, East Prussian, East Pomeranian, and Berlin operations.

After the war, Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Group of Forces (1945-1949). In October 1949, at the request of the government of the Polish People's Republic, with the permission of the Soviet government, he went to the People's Republic of Poland, where he was appointed Minister of National Defense and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Poland. He was awarded the rank of Marshal of Poland.

Upon returning to the USSR in 1956, he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. Since July 1957, the chief inspector has been the Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. Since October 1957, commander of the Transcaucasian Military District. In 1958-1962. Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR and Chief Inspector of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since April 1962, chief inspector of the Group of Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 7 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 6 Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov 1st degree, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals.

Awarded the highest military order "Victory". Awarded the Arms of Honor.

ROMANENKO Prokofy Logvinovich

Colonel General. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 2nd Tank Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from advanced training courses for command personnel in 1925, advanced training courses for senior command personnel in 1930, and the Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze in 1933, Military Academy of the General Staff in 1948

In military service since 1914. Participant in the First World War, ensign. Awarded 4 St. George Crosses.

After the October Revolution of 1917, he was a volost military commissar in the Stavropol province, then during the Civil War he commanded a partisan detachment, fought on the Southern and Western fronts as a squadron and regiment commander and assistant commander of a cavalry brigade.

After the war he commanded a cavalry regiment, and from 1937 a mechanized brigade. Participated in the national liberation struggle of the Spanish people in 1936-1939. For heroism and courage he was awarded the Order of Lenin.

Since 1938, commander of the 7th Mechanized Corps, participant in the Soviet-Finnish War (1939-1940). From May 1940, commander of the 34th Rifle Corps, then the 1st Mechanized Corps.

During the Great Patriotic War, commander of the 17th Army of the Trans-Baikal Front. From May 1942, commander of the 3rd Tank Army, then deputy commander of the Bryansk Front (September-November 1942), from November 1942 to December 1944, commander of the 5th, 2nd Tank Armies, 48th army. The troops of these armies took part in the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, and in the Belarusian operation.

In 1945-1947 Commander of the East Siberian Military District.

Awarded 2 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, 2 Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, medals, foreign order.

ROTMISTROV Pavel Alekseevich

Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces, Hero of the Soviet Union, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army.

In the Red Army since 1919

Graduated from the Military United School named after. All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze, Military Academy of the General Staff.

During the Civil War he commanded a platoon, company, battery, and was deputy battalion commander.

From 1931 to 1937 he worked at division and army headquarters and commanded a rifle regiment.

Since 1938, teacher at the Department of Tactics at the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army.

During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. commander of a tank battalion and chief of staff of the 35th Tank Brigade.

From December 1940, deputy commander of the 5th Tank Division, and from May 1941, chief of staff of the mechanized corps.

During the Great Patriotic War he fought on the Western, Northwestern, Kalinin, Stalingrad, Voronezh, Steppe, Southwestern, 2nd Ukrainian and 3rd Belorussian fronts.

Participated in the battle of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, as well as the Belgorod-Kharkov, Uman-Botoshan, Korsun-Shevchenkovsk, and Belarusian operations.

After the war, commander of armored and mechanized forces of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, then the Far East. Deputy Chief, then Head of the Department of the Military Academy of the General Staff, Head of the Military Academy of Armored Forces, Assistant Minister of Defense of the USSR, Chief Inspector of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 5 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov 1st degree, Suvorov 2nd degree, Red Star, “For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR” 3rd degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.

RYBALKO Pavel Semenovich

Marshal of armored forces, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army.

Born on November 4, 1894 in the village of Maly Istorop (Lebedinsky district, Sumy region, Republic of Ukraine).

In the Red Army since 1919

He graduated from advanced training courses for senior command personnel in 1926 and 1930, Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze in 1934

Member of the First World War, private.

During the Civil War, regimental and brigade commissar, squadron commander, cavalry regiment and brigade commander.

After graduating from the academy, he was sent as an assistant commander of a mountain cavalry division, then as a military attache to Poland and China.

During the Great Patriotic War, deputy commander of the 5th Tank Army, later commanded the 5th, 3rd, 3rd Guards Tank Armies in the Bryansk, Southwestern, Central, Voronezh, 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts.

Participated in the Battle of Kursk, in the Ostrogozh-Rossoshansk, Kharkov, Kiev, Zhitomir-Berdichev, Proskurov-Chernivtsi, Lvov-Sandomierz, Lower Silesian, Upper Silesian, Berlin and Prague operations.

For successful military operations of the troops commanded by P. S. Rybalko

22 times noted in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

After the war, first deputy commander and then commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the Soviet Army.

Awarded 2 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Order of Kutuzov 1st degree, Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.

SOKOLOVSKY Vasily Danilovich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the Western Front.

Born on July 21, 1897 in the village of Kozliki, Bialystok district (Grodno region, Republic of Belarus).

In the Red Army since 1918

Graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army in 1921, Higher Academic Courses in 1928.

During the Civil War he fought on the Eastern, Southern and Caucasian fronts. He held the positions of company commander, regiment adjutant, assistant regiment commander, regiment commander, senior assistant chief of staff of the 39th Infantry Division, brigade commander, chief of staff of the 32nd Infantry Division.

In 1921, assistant to the head of the operational department of the Turkestan Front, then chief of staff of the division, division commander. Commanded the Group of Forces of the Fergana and Samarkand regions.

In 1922 - 1930 chief of staff of a rifle division, rifle corps.

In 1930 - 1935 commander of a rifle division, then chief of staff of the Volga Military District.

Since May 1935, chief of staff of the Ural, since April 1938, of the Moscow military districts. Since February 1941, Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

During the Great Patriotic War, he held the positions of chief of staff of the Western Front, chief of staff of the western direction, commander of the troops of the Western Front, chief of staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front, deputy commander of the 1st Belorussian Front.

For his skillful leadership of the military operations of troops in the Berlin operation, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the war, he served as deputy commander-in-chief, then commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, first deputy minister of defense of the USSR, chief of the General Staff - first deputy minister of war.

Awarded 8 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, 3 Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals, Weapons of Honor.

CHERNYAKHOVSKY Ivan Danilovich

Army General, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 60th Army.

In the Red Army since 1924

He graduated from the Kyiv Artillery School in 1928, and the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army in 1936.

From 1928 to 1931, he served as platoon commander, head of the regiment's topographic detachment, assistant battery commander for political affairs, and commander of a reconnaissance training battery.

Upon graduation from the academy, he was appointed chief of staff of a battalion, then commander of a tank battalion, tank regiment, deputy division commander, and commander of a tank division.

During the Great Patriotic War, he commanded a tank corps and the 60th Army on the Voronezh, Central and 1st Ukrainian fronts.

The troops under the command of I. D. Chernyakhovsky distinguished themselves in the Voronezh-Kastornensky operation, the Battle of Kursk, and during the crossing of the river. Desna and Dnieper. Later they participated in the Kyiv, Zhitomir-Berdichev, Rivne-Lutsk, Proskurov-Chernivtsi, Vilnius, Kaunas, Memel, and East Prussian operations.

For successful military operations during the Great Patriotic War, the troops commanded by I. D. Chernyakhovsky were noted 34 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

Near the city of Melzak he was mortally wounded and died on February 18, 1945. He was buried in Vilnius.

Awarded the Order of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Order of Kutuzov 1st degree, Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st degree and medals.

CHIBISOV Nikandr Evlampievich

Colonel General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 38th Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

Graduated from the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1935

During the First World War he fought on the Western and Southwestern fronts. Commanded a company.

During the Civil War, he took part in battles on the Karelian Isthmus, near Narva, Pskov, and in Belarus.

He was a platoon, company, battalion, regiment commander, assistant chief of staff and chief of staff of a rifle brigade. From 1922 to 1937 in staff and command positions. Since 1937, commander of a rifle division, since 1938 - a rifle corps, in 1938-1940. Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District.

During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. Chief of Staff of the 7th Army.

Since July 1940, deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District, and since January 1941, deputy commander of the Odessa Military District.

Troops under the command of N. E. Chibisov took part in the Voronezh-Kastornensky, Kharkov, Belgorod-Kharkov, Kyiv, Leningrad-Novgorod operations.

For skillful leadership of army troops during the crossing of the Dnieper, courage and heroism, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Since June 1944, he served as head of the Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze, from March 1949 - Deputy Chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee, and from October 1949 - Assistant Commander of the Belarusian Military District.

Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, Order of Suvorov 1st degree and medals.

SHLEMIN Ivan Timofeevich

Lieutenant General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 6th Guards Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from the first Petrograd infantry courses in 1920, the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze in 1925, operational department of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze in 1932

Member of the First World War. During the Civil War, he participated as a platoon commander in battles in Estonia and near Petrograd. From 1925 he was the chief of staff of a rifle regiment, then the chief of an operational unit and the chief of staff of a division, and from 1932 he worked at the headquarters of the Red Army (from 1935 the General Staff).

Since 1936, commander of a rifle regiment, since 1937, head of the Military Academy of the General Staff, since 1940, chief of staff of the 11th Army, in this position he entered the Great Patriotic War.

From May 1942, chief of staff of the North-Western Front, then of the 1st Guards Army. Since January 1943, he successively commanded the 5th Tank, 12th, 6th, 46th Armies on the Southwestern, 3rd and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts.

Troops under the command of I. T. Shlemin took part in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, Donbass, Nikopol-Krivoy Rog, Bereznegovato-Snigirev, Odessa, Iasi-Kishinev, Debrecen and Budapest operations. For successful actions they were noted 15 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

For skillful command and control of troops and the heroism and courage demonstrated, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the Great Patriotic War, he was the chief of staff of the Southern Group of Forces, and from April 1948, the deputy chief of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces - the head of the operational department, and from June 1949, the chief of staff of the Central Group of Forces. In 1954-1962. senior lecturer and deputy head of the department at the Military Academy of the General Staff. Since 1962 in reserve.

Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1st degree, medals.

SHUMILOV Mikhail Stepanovich

Colonel General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the 7th Guards Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from the command and political courses in 1924, the Higher Officer Courses “Vystrel” in 1929, the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1948, and before the Great October Revolution, Chuguev military school in 1916

Member of the First World War, ensign. During the Civil War he fought on the Eastern and Southern fronts, commanding a platoon, company, and regiment. After the war, the commander of the regiment, then the division and corps, took part in the campaign in Western Belarus in 1939, the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940.

During the Great Patriotic War, commander of a rifle corps, deputy commander of the 55th and 21st armies on the Leningrad and Southwestern fronts (1941-1942). From August 1942 until the end of the war, commander of the 64th Army (transformed in March 1943 into the 7th Guards), operating as part of the Stalingrad, Don, Voronezh, Steppe, and 2nd Ukrainian fronts.

Troops under the command of M.S. Shumilov took part in the defense of Leningrad, in battles in the Kharkov region, heroically fought at Stalingrad and together with the 62nd Army in the city itself, defended it from the enemy, participated in the battles of Kursk and the Dnieper, in Kirovograd , Uman-Botoshan, Iasi-Chisinau, Budapest, Bratislava-Brnov operations.

For excellent military operations, the army troops were noted 16 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

After the war, he commanded the troops of the White Sea (1948-1949) and Voronezh (1949-1955) military districts.

In 1956-1958 retired. Since 1958, military consultant to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, Red Star, “For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR” 3rd degree, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals .

Battle of Kursk(July 5, 1943 - August 23, 1943, also known as the Battle of Kursk) is one of the key battles of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War in terms of its scale, forces and means involved, tension, results and military-political consequences. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into 3 parts: Kursk defensive operation (July 5-12); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive. The German side called the offensive part of the battle “Operation Citadel.”

After the end of the battle, the strategic initiative in the war passed to the side of the Red Army, which until the end of the war carried out mainly offensive operations, while the Wehrmacht was on the defensive.

Story

After the defeat at Stalingrad, the German command decided to take revenge, having in mind the implementation of a major offensive on the Soviet-German front, the location of which was the so-called Kursk ledge (or arc), formed by Soviet troops in the winter and spring of 1943. The Battle of Kursk, like the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, was distinguished by its great scope and focus. More than 4 million people, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, 13.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and up to 12 thousand combat aircraft took part in it on both sides.

In the Kursk area, the Germans concentrated up to 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions, which were part of the 9th and 2nd armies of the Center group of General Field Marshal von Kluge, the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force group Army "South" of Field Marshal E. Manstein. Operation Citadel, developed by the Germans, envisaged the encirclement of Soviet troops with converging attacks on Kursk and a further offensive into the depths of the defense.

The situation in the Kursk direction by the beginning of July 1943

By the beginning of July, the Soviet command completed preparations for the Battle of Kursk. The troops operating in the Kursk salient area were reinforced. From April to July, the Central and Voronezh Fronts received 10 rifle divisions, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades, 13 separate anti-tank artillery regiments, 14 artillery regiments, 8 guards mortar regiments, 7 separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments and other units . From March to July, 5,635 guns and 3,522 mortars, as well as 1,294 aircraft, were placed at the disposal of these fronts. The Steppe Military District, units and formations of the Bryansk and left wing of the Western Front received significant reinforcements. The troops concentrated in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions were prepared to repel powerful attacks from selected Wehrmacht divisions and launch a decisive counteroffensive.

The defense of the northern flank was carried out by the troops of the Central Front under General Rokossovsky, and the southern flank by the Voronezh Front of General Vatutin. The depth of defense was 150 kilometers and was built in several echelons. Soviet troops had some advantage in manpower and equipment; In addition, warned of the German offensive, the Soviet command carried out counter-artillery preparation on July 5, inflicting significant losses on the enemy.

Having revealed the offensive plan of the fascist German command, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided to exhaust and bleed the enemy’s strike forces through deliberate defense, and then complete their complete defeat with a decisive counteroffensive. The defense of the Kursk ledge was entrusted to the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts. Both fronts numbered more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3,300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,650 aircraft. Troops of the Central Front (48, 13, 70, 65, 60th Combined Arms Army, 2nd Tank Army, 16th Air Army, 9th and 19th Separate Tank Corps) under the command of General K.K. Rokossovsky was supposed to repel the enemy's attack from Orel. In front of the Voronezh Front (38th, 40th, 6th and 7th Guards, 69th Armies, 1st Tank Army, 2nd Air Army, 35th Guards Rifle Corps, 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps) , commanded by General N.F. Vatutin was tasked with repelling the enemy’s attack from Belgorod. In the rear of the Kursk ledge, the Steppe Military District was deployed (from July 9 - Steppe Front: 4th and 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, 53rd Armies, 5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Air Army, 1 Rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized, 3 cavalry corps), which was the strategic reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters.

On August 3, after powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, front troops, supported by a barrage of fire, went on the offensive and successfully broke through the first enemy position. With the introduction of second echelons of regiments into battle, the second position was broken through. To increase the efforts of the 5th Guards Army, advanced tank brigades of the corps of the first echelon of tank armies were brought into battle. They, together with rifle divisions, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defense line. Following the advanced brigades, the main forces of the tank armies were brought into battle. By the end of the day, they had overcome the second line of enemy defense and advanced 12–26 km in depth, thereby separating the Tomarov and Belgorod centers of enemy resistance. Simultaneously with the tank armies, the following were introduced into the battle: in the zone of the 6th Guards Army - the 5th Guards Tank Corps, and in the zone of the 53rd Army - the 1st Mechanized Corps. They, together with rifle formations, broke the enemy’s resistance, completed the breakthrough of the main defensive line, and by the end of the day approached the second defensive line. Having broken through the tactical defense zone and destroyed the nearest operational reserves, the main strike group of the Voronezh Front began pursuing the enemy in the morning of the second day of the operation.

One of the largest tank battles in world history took place in the Prokhorovka area. About 1,200 tanks and self-propelled artillery units took part in this battle on both sides. On July 12, the Germans were forced to go on the defensive, and on July 16 they began to retreat. Pursuing the enemy, Soviet troops drove the Germans back to their starting line. At the same time, at the height of the battle, on July 12, Soviet troops on the Western and Bryansk fronts launched an offensive in the Oryol bridgehead area and liberated the cities of Orel and Belgorod. Partisan units provided active assistance to the regular troops. They disrupted enemy communications and the work of rear agencies. In the Oryol region alone, from July 21 to August 9, more than 100 thousand rails were blown up. The German command was forced to keep a significant number of divisions only on security duty.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts defeated 15 enemy divisions, advanced 140 km in the southern and southwestern direction, and came close to the Donbass enemy group. Soviet troops liberated Kharkov. During the occupation and battles, the Nazis destroyed about 300 thousand civilians and prisoners of war in the city and region (according to incomplete data), about 160 thousand people were driven to Germany, they destroyed 1,600 thousand m2 of housing, over 500 industrial enterprises, all cultural and educational, medical and communal institutions. Thus, Soviet troops completed the defeat of the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group and took an advantageous position to launch a general offensive with the aim of liberating Left Bank Ukraine and Donbass. Our relatives also took part in the Battle of Kursk.

The strategic talent of Soviet commanders was revealed in the Battle of Kursk. The operational art and tactics of military leaders showed superiority over the German classical school: second echelons in the offensive, powerful mobile groups, and strong reserves began to emerge. During the 50-day battles, Soviet troops defeated 30 German divisions, including 7 tank divisions. The total losses of the enemy amounted to more than 500 thousand people, up to 1.5 thousand tanks, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3.5 thousand aircraft.

Near Kursk, the Wehrmacht military machine suffered such a blow, after which the outcome of the war was actually predetermined. This was a radical change in the course of the war, forcing many politicians on all warring sides to reconsider their positions. The successes of the Soviet troops in the summer of 1943 had a profound influence on the work of the Tehran Conference, in which the leaders of the countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition took part, and on its decision to open a second front in Europe in May 1944.

The victory of the Red Army was highly appreciated by our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. In particular, US President F. Roosevelt wrote in his message to J.V. Stalin: “During a month of gigantic battles, your armed forces, with their skill, their courage, their dedication and their tenacity, not only stopped the long-planned German offensive, but also began a successful a counter-offensive with far-reaching consequences... The Soviet Union can rightly be proud of its heroic victories.”

The victory at the Kursk Bulge was of invaluable importance for further strengthening the moral and political unity of the Soviet people and raising the morale of the Red Army. The struggle of Soviet people located in the territories of our country temporarily occupied by the enemy received a powerful impetus. The partisan movement gained even greater scope.

The decisive factor in achieving the victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk was the fact that the Soviet command managed to correctly determine the direction of the main attack of the enemy’s summer (1943) offensive. And not only to determine, but also to be able to reveal in detail the plan of Hitler’s command, to obtain data about the plan for Operation Citadel and the composition of the group of enemy troops, and even the time of the start of the operation. The decisive role in this belonged to Soviet intelligence.

In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet military art received further development, and all 3 of its components: strategy, operational art and tactics. Thus, in particular, experience was gained in creating large groupings of troops in defense capable of withstanding massive attacks by enemy tanks and aircraft, creating powerful positional defense in depth, the art of decisively massing forces and means in the most important directions, as well as the art of maneuvering as during a defensive battle as well as an offensive one.

The Soviet command skillfully chose the moment to launch a counteroffensive, when the enemy’s strike forces were already thoroughly exhausted during the defensive battle. With the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, the correct choice of attack directions and the most appropriate methods of defeating the enemy, as well as the organization of interaction between fronts and armies in solving operational-strategic tasks, were of great importance.

The presence of strong strategic reserves, their advance preparation and timely entry into battle played a decisive role in achieving success.

One of the most important factors that ensured the Red Army's victory on the Kursk Bulge was the courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers, their dedication in the fight against a strong and experienced enemy, their unshakable resilience in defense and unstoppable pressure in the offensive, readiness for any test to defeat the enemy. The source of these high moral and fighting qualities was not at all the fear of repression, as some publicists and “historians” are now trying to present, but a feeling of patriotism, hatred of the enemy and love of the Fatherland. They were the sources of the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers, their loyalty to military duty when carrying out combat missions of the command, countless feats in battle and selfless dedication in defending their Fatherland - in a word, everything without which victory in the war is impossible. The Motherland highly appreciated the exploits of Soviet soldiers in the Battle of the Arc of Fire. More than 100 thousand participants in the battle were awarded orders and medals, and over 180 of the bravest warriors were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The turning point in the work of the rear and the entire economy of the country, achieved by the unprecedented labor feat of the Soviet people, made it possible by mid-1943 to supply the Red Army in ever-increasing volumes with all the necessary material resources, and above all with weapons and military equipment, including new models, not only not inferior in terms of tactical and technical characteristics, they were the best examples of German weapons and equipment, but often surpassed them. Among them, it is necessary first of all to highlight the appearance of 85-, 122- and 152-mm self-propelled guns, new anti-tank guns using sub-caliber and cumulative projectiles, which played a big role in the fight against enemy tanks, including heavy ones, new types of aircraft, etc. d. All this was one of the most important conditions for the growth of the combat power of the Red Army and its increasingly steadily increasing superiority over the Wehrmacht. It was the Battle of Kursk that was the decisive event that marked the completion of a radical turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet Union. In a figurative expression, the backbone of Nazi Germany was broken in this battle. The Wehrmacht was never destined to recover from the defeats it suffered on the battlefields of Kursk, Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. The Battle of Kursk became one of the most important stages on the path of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces to victory over Nazi Germany. In terms of its military-political significance, it was the largest event of both the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. The Battle of Kursk is one of the most glorious dates in military history of our Fatherland, the memory of which will live for centuries.

We continue the topic of the Kursk Bulge, but first I wanted to say a few words. Now I have moved on to the material about the losses of equipment in our and German units. Ours were significantly higher, especially in the Battle of Prokhorov. The reasons for the losses suffered by the 5th Guards Tank Army of Rotmistrov, was dealt with by a special commission created by Stalin's decision, chaired by Malenkov. In the commission's report in August 1943, the military actions of Soviet troops on July 12 near Prokhorovka were called an example of an unsuccessful operation. And this is a fact that is not at all victorious. In this regard, I would like to provide you with several documents that will help you understand the reason for what happened. I especially want you to pay attention to Rotmistrov’s report to Zhukov dated August 20, 1943. Although it sins in places against the truth, it still deserves attention.

This is only a small part of what explains our losses in that battle...

"Why was the Battle of Prokhorovsk won by the Germans, despite the numerical superiority of Soviet forces? The answer is provided by combat documents, links to the full texts of which are given at the end of the article.

29th Tank Corps :

“The attack began without artillery bombardment of the occupied line by pr-kom and without air cover.

This made it possible for the pr-ku to open concentrated fire on the battle formations of the corps and bomb tanks and motorized infantry with impunity, which led to large losses and a decrease in the tempo of the attack, and this in turn made it possible for the pr-ku to conduct more effective artillery and tank fire from the spot . The terrain for the offensive was not favorable due to its ruggedness; the presence of hollows impassable for tanks to the northwest and southeast of the PROKHOROVKA-BELENIKHINO road forced the tanks to press against the road and open their flanks, without being able to cover them.

Individual units that took the lead, even approaching the storage facility. KOMSOMOLETS, having suffered heavy losses from artillery fire and tank fire from ambushes, retreated to the line occupied by the fire forces.

There was no air cover for the advancing tanks until 13.00. From 13.00 cover was provided by groups of fighters from 2 to 10 vehicles.

With the tanks coming out to the front line of the defense from the forest in the north. STORZHEVOYE and eastern. env. STORDOZHEVOYE pr. opened hurricane fire from ambushes of Tiger tanks, self-propelled guns and anti-tank guns. The infantry was cut off from the tanks and forced to lie down.

Having broken through into the depths of the defense, the tanks suffered heavy losses.

Units of the brigade, supported by a large number of aircraft and tanks, launched a counterattack and units of the brigade were forced to withdraw.

During the attack on the front line of the tank, self-propelled guns, operating in the first echelon of tank battle formations and even breaking out ahead of the tanks, suffered losses from the tank's anti-tank fire (eleven self-propelled guns were put out of action)."

18th Tank Corps :

“Enemy artillery fired intensely at the corps’ battle formations.
The corps, without adequate support from fighter aircraft and suffering heavy losses from artillery fire and intense air bombardment (by 12.00, enemy aircraft had carried out up to 1,500 sorties), slowly moved forward.

The terrain in the corps' zone of action is crossed by three deep ravines running from the left bank of the river. PSEL to railway station BELENIKHINO - PROKHOROVKA, why the 181st, 170th tank brigades advancing in the first echelon were forced to operate on the left flank of the corps line near a strong enemy stronghold. OCTOBER. The 170th Tank Brigade, operating on the left flank, had lost up to 60% of its combat equipment by 12.00.

By the end of the day, the enemy launched a frontal attack of tanks from the area of ​​KOZLOVKA, GREZNOE with a simultaneous attempt to bypass the battle formations of the corps units from the direction of KOZLOVKA, POLEZHAEV, using their Tiger tanks and self-propelled guns, intensively bombarding the battle formations from the air.

Carrying out the assigned task, the 18th Tank Tank met a well-organized, strong enemy anti-tank defense with pre-buried tanks and assault guns at the line of heights 217.9, 241.6.

In order to avoid unnecessary losses in personnel and equipment, by my order No. 68, parts of the corps went on the defensive at the achieved lines.""

"The car is on fire"

Battlefield on the Kursk Bulge. In the foreground on the right is a damaged Soviet T-34

T-34 shot down in the Belgorod area and a tanker killed

T-34 and T-70, shot down during the battle on the Kursk Bulge. 07.1943

Destroyed T-34s during the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm

Burnt T-34 “For Soviet Ukraine” in the Belgorod area. Kursk Bulge. 1943

MZ "Li", 193rd separate tank regiment. Central Front, Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

MZ "Li" - "Alexander Nevsky", 193rd separate tank regiment. Kursk Bulge

Destroyed Soviet light tank T-60

Destroyed T-70 and BA-64 from the 29th Tank Corps

OWL SECRET
Instance No. 1
TO THE FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR UNION - MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
Comrade Zhukov

In tank battles and battles from July 12 to August 20, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army encountered exclusively new types of enemy tanks. Most of all on the battlefield there were T-V (Panther) tanks, a significant number of T-VI (Tiger) tanks, as well as modernized T-III and T-IV tanks.

Having commanded tank units from the first days of the Patriotic War, I am forced to report to you that our tanks today have lost their superiority over enemy tanks in armor and weapons.

The armament, armor and fire targeting of German tanks became much higher, and only the exceptional courage of our tankers and the greater saturation of tank units with artillery did not give the enemy the opportunity to fully exploit the advantages of their tanks. The presence of powerful weapons, strong armor and good sighting devices on German tanks puts our tanks at a clear disadvantage. The efficiency of using our tanks is greatly reduced and their breakdown increases.

The battles I conducted in the summer of 1943 convince me that even now we can successfully conduct a maneuverable tank battle on our own, taking advantage of the excellent maneuverability of our T-34 tank.

When the Germans go over to the defensive with their tank units, at least temporarily, they thereby deprive us of our maneuvering advantages and, on the contrary, begin to fully use the effective range of their tank guns, while at the same time being almost completely out of reach from our aimed tank fire .

Thus, in a collision with German tank units that had gone over to the defensive, we, as general rule, we suffer huge losses in tanks and have no success.

The Germans, having opposed our T-34 and KV tanks with their T-V (Panther) and T-VI (Tiger) tanks, no longer experience the former fear of tanks on the battlefields.

T-70 tanks simply cannot be allowed into tank battles, since they are more than easily destroyed by fire from German tanks.

We have to admit with bitterness that our tank technology, with the exception of the introduction into service of the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns, did not produce anything new during the war years, and the shortcomings that occurred on the tanks of the first production, such as: the imperfection of the transmission group (main clutch, gearbox and side clutches), extremely slow and uneven rotation of the turret, extremely poor visibility and cramped crew accommodation have not been completely eliminated to this day.

If our aviation during the years of the Patriotic War, according to its tactical and technical data, has been steadily moving forward, producing more and more advanced aircraft, then unfortunately the same cannot be said about our tanks.

Now the T-34 and KV tanks have lost the first place that they rightfully had among the tanks of the warring countries in the first days of the war.

Back in December 1941, I captured a secret instruction from the German command, which was written on the basis of field tests of our KV and T-34 tanks conducted by the Germans.

As a result of these tests, the instructions read approximately the following: German tanks cannot engage in tank combat with Russian KV and T-34 tanks and must avoid tank combat. When meeting with Russian tanks, it was recommended to take cover with artillery and transfer the actions of tank units to another section of the front.

And, indeed, if we recall our tank battles in 1941 and 1942, then it can be argued that the Germans usually did not engage us in battle without the help of other branches of the military, and if they did, it was with a multiple superiority in the number of their tanks, which it was not difficult for them to achieve in 1941 and 1942.

On the basis of our T-34 tank - the best tank in the world at the beginning of the war, the Germans in 1943 managed to produce an even more improved T-V "Panther" tank, which is essentially a copy of our T-34 tank, in its own way qualities is significantly higher than the T-34 tank and especially in terms of the quality of weapons.

To characterize and compare our and German tanks, I provide the following table:

Tank brand and control system	Nose armor in mm.	Turret front and stern	Board	Stern	Roof, bottom	Gun caliber in mm.	Col. shells.	Speed ​​max.
T-34	45	95-75	45	40	20-15	76	100	55,0
T-V	90-75	90-45	40	40	15	75x)
KV-1S	75-69	82	60	60	30-30	76	102	43,0
T-V1	100	82-100	82	82	28-28	88	86	44,0
SU-152	70	70-60	60	60	30-30	152	20	43,0
Ferdinand	200		160	85		88		20,0

x) The barrel of a 75 mm gun is 1.5 times longer than the barrel of our 76 mm gun and the projectile has a significantly higher initial velocity.

I, as an ardent patriot of the tank forces, ask you, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, to break the conservatism and arrogance of our tank designers and production workers and raise with all urgency the question of the mass production of new tanks by the winter of 1943, superior in their combat qualities and design design of currently existing types of German tanks.

In addition, I ask you to dramatically improve the equipment of tank units with evacuation means.

The enemy, as a rule, evacuates all his damaged tanks, and our tankers are often deprived of this opportunity, as a result of which we lose a lot in terms of tank recovery time. At the same time, in those cases when the tank battlefield remains with the enemy for some period, our repairmen find shapeless piles of metal instead of their damaged tanks, since this year the enemy, leaving the battlefield, blows up all our damaged tanks.

TROOPER COMMANDER
5TH GUARDS TANK ARMY
GUARDS LIEUTENANT GENERAL
TANK FORCES -
(ROMISTROV) Signature.

Active Army.
=========================
RCHDNI, f. 71, op. 25, building 9027с, l. 1-5

Something I would definitely like to add:

"One of the reasons for the staggering losses of the 5th Guards TA is also the fact that approximately a third of its tanks were light T-70. Frontal hull armor - 45 mm, turret armor - 35 mm. Armament - 45 mm 20K cannon, model 1938, armor penetration 45 mm at a distance of 100 m (one hundred meters!). Crew - two people. These tanks had nothing to catch at all on the field near Prokhorovka (although, of course, they could damage a German tank of the Pz-4 class and older, driving up point-blank and working in “woodpecker” mode... if you persuade the German tankers to look in the other direction; well, or an armored personnel carrier, if you’re lucky enough to find one, drive it into the field with a pitchfork). There is nothing to catch in the framework of an oncoming tank battle, of course - if they were lucky enough to break through the defenses, then they could quite successfully support their infantry, which is, in fact, what they were created for.

One should also not discount the general lack of training of the personnel of the 5th TA, which received reinforcements literally on the eve of the Kursk operation. Moreover, both ordinary tank crews and junior/middle-level commanders are untrained. Even in this suicidal attack it was possible to achieve best results, observing proper formation - which, alas, was not observed - everyone rushed into the attack in a heap. Including self-propelled guns, which have no place at all in attacking formations.

Well, and most importantly - monstrous ineffective work of repair and evacuation teams. This was generally very bad until 1944, but in this case the 5th TA simply failed on a massive scale. I don’t know how many were on the BREM staff by that time (and whether they were even in its combat formations in those days - they might have forgotten in the rear), but they couldn’t cope with the job. Khrushchev (then a member of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front), in a report on July 24, 1943 to Stalin about the tank battle near Prokhorovka, writes: “When the enemy retreats, specially created teams evacuate their damaged tanks and other materiel, and everything that cannot be taken out, including ours tanks and our material part, burns and blows up. As a result of this, the damaged material part captured by us in most cases cannot be repaired, but can be used as scrap metal, which we will try to evacuate from the battlefield in the near future" (RGASPI, f. 83, op.1, d.27, l.2)

………………….

And a little more to add. Regarding the general situation with command and control of troops.

The point is also that German reconnaissance aircraft discovered in advance the approach to Prokhorovka of the 5th Guards TA and 5th Guards A formations, and it was possible to establish that on July 12, near Prokhorovka, Soviet troops would go on the offensive, so the Germans especially strengthened the anti-tank missile defense on the left flank of the division." Adolf Hitler" 2nd SS Panzer Corps. They, in turn, were going to, after repelling the advance of the Soviet troops, go on a counteroffensive and encircle the Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area, so the Germans concentrated their tank units on the flanks of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, and not in the center. This led to the fact that on July 12, the 18th and 29th Tank Tank had to attack the most powerful German anti-tank tanks head-on, which is why they suffered such heavy losses. In addition, German tank crews repelled the attacks of Soviet tanks with fire from the spot.

In my opinion, the best that Rotmistrov could have done in such a situation was to try to insist on canceling the counterattack on July 12 near Prokhorovka, but no traces were found that he even tried to do this. Here the difference in approaches is especially clearly evident when comparing the actions of the two commanders of tank armies - Rotmistrov and Katukov (for those who are bad with geography, let me clarify - Katukov’s 1st Tank Army occupied positions west of Prokhorovka at the Belaya-Oboyan line).

The first disagreements between Katukov and Vatutin arose on July 6. The front commander gives the order to launch a counterattack with the 1st Tank Army together with the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps in the direction of Tomarovka. Katukov sharply replies that, given the qualitative superiority of German tanks, this is disastrous for the army and will cause unjustified losses. The best way to conduct combat is maneuverable defense using tank ambushes, which allows you to shoot enemy tanks from short distances. Vatutin does not cancel the decision. Further events occur as follows (I quote from the memoirs of M.E. Katukov):

“Reluctantly, I gave the order to launch a counterattack. ... Already the first reports from the battlefield near Yakovlevo showed that we were doing not at all what was needed. As one would expect, the brigades suffered serious losses. With pain in my heart, I saw NP, how thirty-fours burn and smoke.

It was necessary, at any cost, to achieve the cancellation of the counterattack. I hurried to the command post, hoping to urgently contact General Vatutin and once again report to him my thoughts. But he had barely crossed the threshold of the hut when the communications chief reported in a particularly significant tone:

From Headquarters... Comrade Stalin. Not without some excitement I picked up the phone.

Hello, Katukov! - a well-known voice rang out. - Report the situation!

I told the Commander-in-Chief what I saw on the battlefield with my own eyes.

“In my opinion,” I said, “we were too hasty with the counterattack.” The enemy has large unspent reserves, including tank reserves.

What are you offering?

For now, it is advisable to use tanks to fire from a spot, burying them in the ground or placing them in ambushes. Then we could bring enemy vehicles to a distance of three to four hundred meters and destroy them with targeted fire.

Stalin was silent for some time.

“Okay,” he said, “you won’t launch a counterattack.” Vatutin will call you about this."

As a result, the counterattack was canceled, the tanks of all units ended up in the trenches, and July 6 became the darkest day for the 4th German Tank Army. During the day of fighting, 244 German tanks were destroyed (48 tanks lost 134 tanks and 2 SS tanks - 110). Our losses amounted to 56 tanks (mostly in their formations, so there were no problems with their evacuation - I again emphasize the difference between a knocked out tank and a destroyed one). Thus, Katukov’s tactics fully justified themselves.

However, the command of the Voronezh Front did not draw any conclusions and on July 8 issued a new order to carry out a counterattack; only 1 TA (due to the stubbornness of its commander) was tasked not to attack, but to hold positions. The counterattack is carried out by 2 Tank Corps, 2 Guards Tank Corps, 5 Tank Corps and separate tank brigades and regiments. The result of the battle: the loss of three Soviet corps - 215 tanks irretrievably, the loss of German troops - 125 tanks, of which 17 were irretrievable. Now, on the contrary, the day of July 8 becomes the darkest day for the Soviet tank forces, in terms of its losses it is comparable to the losses in the Battle of Prokhorov.

Of course, there is no particular hope that Rotmistrov would be able to push through his decision, but it was at least worth a try!

It should be noted that limiting the battles near Prokhorovka only on July 12 and only to the attack of the 5th Guards TA is unlawful. After July 12, the main efforts of the 2nd SS Tank Tank and 3rd Tank Tank were aimed at encircling the divisions of the 69th Army, southwest of Prokhorovka, and although the command of the Voronezh Front managed to withdraw the personnel of the 69th Army from the resulting pocket in time, however, most of the weapons and they had to give up technology. That is, the German command managed to achieve very significant tactical success, weakening the 5 Guards A and 5 Guards TA and for some time depriving the 69 A of combat effectiveness. After July 12, on the German side there were actually attempts to encircle and inflict maximum damage on the Soviet troops (in order to calmly begin withdraw your forces to the previous front line). After which the Germans, under the cover of strong rearguards, quite calmly withdrew their troops to the lines they occupied until July 5, evacuating the damaged equipment and subsequently restoring it.

At the same time, the decision of the command of the Voronezh Front from July 16 to switch to a stubborn defense on the occupied lines becomes completely incomprehensible, when the Germans are not only not going to attack, but, on the contrary, are gradually withdrawing their forces (in particular, the “Totenkopf” division actually began withdrawing on July 13 ). And when it was established that the Germans were not advancing, but were retreating, it was already too late. That is, it was already too late to quickly catch the Germans’ tail and peck them in the back of the head.

It seems that the command of the Voronezh Front had little idea of ​​what was happening at the front in the period from July 5 to 18, which manifested itself in a too slow reaction to the rapidly changing situation at the front. The texts of orders for advancement, attack or redeployment are replete with inaccuracies and uncertainties; they lack information about the opposing enemy, its composition and intentions, and there is no at least approximate information about the outline of the front line. A significant part of the orders in the Soviet troops during the Battle of Kursk was given “over the heads” of subordinate commanders, and the latter were not informed about this, wondering why and why the units subordinate to them were carrying out some incomprehensible actions.

So it is not surprising that the chaos in the units was sometimes indescribable:

So on July 8, the Soviet 99th Tank Brigade of the 2nd Tank Corps attacked the Soviet 285th Infantry Regiment of the 183rd Infantry Division. Despite the attempts of the commanders of the units of the 285th regiment to stop the tankers, they continued to crush the soldiers and fire guns at the 1st battalion of the said regiment (result: 25 people were killed and 37 wounded).

On July 12, the Soviet 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment of the 5th Guards TA (sent as part of the combined detachment of Major General K.G. Trufanov to help the 69th Army) without accurate information about the location of its own and the Germans and without sending forward reconnaissance (into battle without reconnaissance - this is close and understandable to us), the tankers of the regiment immediately opened fire on the battle formations of the Soviet 92nd Infantry Division and the tanks of the Soviet 96th Tank Brigade of the 69th Army, defending against the Germans in the area of ​​​​the village of Aleksandrovka (24 km southeast of Prokhorovka station). Having fought through their own, the regiment came across advancing German tanks, after which it turned around and, crushing and dragging along separate groups of its own infantry, began to retreat. The anti-tank artillery, which was following the same regiment (53 Guards Tank Regiment) to the front line and had just arrived at the scene of events, mistaking the tanks of the 96 Tank Brigade for German tanks pursuing the 53 Guards Separate Tank Regiment, turned around and did not open fire on its infantry and tanks only thanks to serendipity.

Well, and so on... In the order of the commander of the 69th Army, all this was described as “these outrages.” Well, that's putting it mildly.

So we can summarize that the Germans won the Battle of Prokhorovka, but this victory was a special case against a generally negative background for Germany. The German positions at Prokhorovka were good if a further offensive was planned (which Manstein insisted on), but not for defense. But it was impossible to advance further for reasons not directly related to what was happening near Prokhorovka. Far from Prokhorovka, on July 11, 1943, reconnaissance in force began from the Soviet Western and Bryansk fronts (mistaken by the German command of the OKH ground forces for an offensive), and on July 12, these fronts actually went on the offensive. On July 13, the German command became aware of the impending offensive of the Soviet Southern Front in the Donbass, that is, practically on the southern flank of Army Group South (this offensive followed on July 17). In addition, the situation in Sicily became more complicated for the Germans, where the Americans and British landed on July 10. Tanks were also needed there.

On July 13, a meeting was held with the Fuhrer, to which Field Marshal General Erich von Manstein was also summoned. Adolf Hitler ordered the end of Operation Citadel due to the intensification of Soviet troops in various areas Eastern Front and sending part of the forces from it to form new German formations in Italy and the Balkans. The order was accepted for execution despite the objections of Manstein, who believed that Soviet troops on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge were on the verge of defeat. Manstein was not directly ordered to withdraw his troops, but was forbidden to use his only reserve, the 24th Tank Corps. Without the deployment of this corps, a further offensive would lose perspective, and therefore there was no point in holding the captured positions. (soon 24 Tank Corps was already repelling the advance of the Soviet Southwestern Front in the middle reaches of the Seversky Donets River). The 2nd SS Tank Tank was intended for transfer to Italy, but it was temporarily returned for joint operations with the 3rd Tank Tank with the aim of eliminating the breakthrough of the troops of the Soviet Southern Front on the Mius River, 60 km north of the city of Taganrog, in the defense zone of the German 6th Army.

The merit of the Soviet troops is that they slowed down the pace of the German offensive on Kursk, which, combined with the general military-political situation and a combination of circumstances that were not in favor of Germany everywhere in July 1943, made Operation Citadel unfeasible, but to speak purely military victory of the Soviet Army in the Battle of Kursk is wishful thinking. "

Battle of Kursk, 1943

Since March 1943, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) had been working on a strategic offensive plan, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, based on information that the Wehrmacht command was planning to launch an offensive near Kursk, it was decided to bleed German troops powerful defense, and then go on a counteroffensive. Possessing strategic initiative, the Soviet side deliberately began military operations not with an offensive, but with a defense. The development of events showed that this plan was correct.

Since the spring of 1943, Nazi Germany has launched intense preparations for the offensive. The Nazis established mass production of new medium and heavy tanks and increased the production of guns, mortars and combat aircraft compared to 1942. Due to total mobilization, they almost completely made up for the losses suffered in personnel.

The fascist German command decided to conduct a major offensive operation in the summer of 1943 and once again seize the strategic initiative. The idea of ​​the operation was to encircle and destroy Soviet troops in the Kursk salient with powerful counter strikes from the areas of Orel and Belgorod to Kursk. In the future, the enemy intended to defeat Soviet troops in the Donbass. To carry out the operation near Kursk, called “Citadel,” the enemy concentrated enormous forces and appointed the most experienced military leaders: 50 divisions, among others. 16 tanks, Army Group Center (commander Field Marshal G. Kluge) and Army Group South (commander Field Marshal E. Manstein). In total, the enemy strike forces included over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2,000 aircraft. Important place The enemy's plan called for the use of new military equipment - Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as new aircraft (Focke-Wulf-190A fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft).

The Soviet command countered the offensive of fascist German troops against the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge, which began on July 5, 1943, with a strong active defense. The enemy, attacking Kursk from the north, was stopped four days later. He managed to wedge 10-12 km into the defense of the Soviet troops. The group advancing on Kursk from the south advanced 35 km, but did not reach its goal.

On July 12, Soviet troops, having exhausted the enemy, launched a counteroffensive. On this day, in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place (up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns on both sides). Developing the offensive, Soviet ground forces, supported by air strikes from the 2nd and 17th Air Armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23 pushed the enemy back 140-150 km to the west, liberating Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov.

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The balance of forces at the front changed sharply in favor of the Red Army, which provided it with favorable conditions for the deployment of a general strategic offensive.

Having revealed the offensive plan of the fascist German command, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided to exhaust and bleed the enemy’s strike forces through deliberate defense, and then complete their complete defeat with a decisive counteroffensive. The defense of the Kursk ledge was entrusted to the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts. Both fronts numbered more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3,300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (48, 13, 70, 65, 60th combined arms armies, 2nd tank army, 16th air army, 9th and 19th separate tank corps) under the command of General K. K. Rokossovsky should were to repel the enemy's attack from Orel. In front of the Voronezh Front (38th, 40th, 6th and 7th Guards, 69th Armies, 1st Tank Army, 2nd Air Army, 35th Guards Rifle Corps, 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps) , commanded by General N.F. Vatutin, was tasked with repelling the enemy’s attack from Belgorod. In the rear of the Kursk ledge, the Steppe Military District was deployed (from July 9 - Steppe Front: 4th and 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, 53rd Armies, 5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Air Army, 1 Rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized, 3 cavalry corps), which was the strategic reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters.

Enemy troops: in the Oryol-Kursk direction - the 9th and 2nd armies of Army Group "Center" (50 divisions, including 16 motorized tank divisions; commander - Field Marshal G. Kluge), in the Belgorod-Kursk direction - 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf of Army Group South (commander - Field Marshal General E. Manstein).

The commander of the central front considered Ponyri and Kursk the most likely direction of action for the enemy's main forces, and Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets as auxiliary forces. Therefore, he decided to concentrate the main forces of the front on the right wing. The decisive massing of forces and assets in the direction of the expected enemy attack made it possible to create high densities in the 13th Army zone (32 km) - 94 guns and mortars, of which more than 30 anti-tank artillery guns, and about 9 tanks per 1 km of front.

The commander of the Voronezh Front determined that the enemy’s attack could be in the directions of Belgorod and Oboyan; Belgorod, Korocha; Volchansk, Novy Oskol. Therefore, it was decided to concentrate the main forces in the center and on the left wing of the front. Unlike the Central Front, the armies of the first echelon received wide areas of defense. However, even here, in the zone of the 6th and 7th Guards armies, the density of anti-tank artillery was 15.6 guns per 1 km of front, and taking into account the assets located in the second echelon of the front, up to 30 guns per 1 km of front.

Based on our intelligence data and the testimony of prisoners, it was established that the enemy offensive would begin on July 5. Early in the morning of this day, artillery counter-preparation, planned in the fronts and armies, was carried out on the Voronezh and central fronts. As a result, it was possible to delay the enemy’s advance for 1.5 - 2 hours and somewhat weaken his initial blow.

On the morning of July 5, the Oryol enemy group, under the cover of artillery fire and with the support of aviation, went on the offensive, delivering the main blow to Olkhovatka, and auxiliary blows to Maloarkhangelsk and Fatezh. Our troops met the enemy with exceptional resilience. The Nazi troops suffered heavy losses. Only after the fifth attack did they manage to break into the front line of defense of the 29th Rifle Corps in the Olkhovat direction.

In the afternoon, the commander of the 13th Army, General N.P. Pukhov, moved several tank and self-propelled artillery units and mobile barrage units to the main line, and the front commander moved howitzer and mortar brigades to the Olkhovatka area. Decisive counterattacks by tanks in cooperation with rifle units and artillery stopped the enemy’s advance. On this day, fierce battles also broke out in the air. The 16th Air Army supported the fighting of the defending troops of the central front. By the end of the day, at the cost of huge losses, the enemy managed to advance 6-8 km in the Olkhovat direction. In other directions his attacks were unsuccessful.

Having determined the direction of the enemy's main efforts, the front commander decided on the morning of July 6 to launch a counterattack from the Olkhovatka area to Gnilusha in order to restore the position of the 13th Army. The 17th Guards Rifle Corps of the 13th Army, the 2nd Tank Army of General A.G. Rodin and the 19th Tank Corps were involved in the counterattack. As a result of the counterattack, the enemy was stopped in front of the second line of defense and, having suffered heavy losses, was unable to continue the offensive in all three directions in the following days. After delivering a counterattack, the 2nd Tank Army and the 19th Tank Corps went on the defensive behind the second line, which strengthened the position of the troops of the Central Front.

On the same day, the enemy launched an offensive in the direction of Oboyan and Korocha; The main blows were taken by the 6th and 7th Guards, 69th Army and 1st Tank Army.

Having failed to achieve success in the Olkhovat direction, the enemy launched an attack on Ponyri on the morning of July 7, where the 307th Rifle Division was defending. During the day she repelled eight attacks. When enemy units broke into the northwestern outskirts of the Ponyri station, the division commander, General M.A. Enshin, concentrated artillery and mortar fire on them, then launched a counterattack with the forces of the second echelon and the attached tank brigade and restored the situation. On July 8 and 9, the enemy continued attacks on Olkhovatka and Ponyri, and on July 10, against the troops of the right flank of the 70th Army, but all his attempts to break through the second line of defense were thwarted.

Having exhausted their reserves, the enemy was forced to abandon the offensive and on July 11 went on the defensive.

German soldiers in front of a Tiger tank, during the Battle of Kursk in June-July 1943

The enemy also launched a general offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front on the morning of July 5, delivering the main attack with the forces of the 4th Tank Army on Oboyan, and with the auxiliary operational group Kempf on Korocha. The fighting became especially fierce in the Oboyan direction. In the first half of the day, the commander of the 6th Guards Army, General I.M. Chistyakov, moved to the first line of defense part of the anti-tank artillery brigade, two tank and one self-propelled artillery regiments and a tank brigade. By the end of the day, the troops of this army inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and stopped his attacks. The main line of our defense was broken through only in certain areas. In the Korochan direction, the enemy managed to cross the Northern Donets south of Belgorod and seize a small bridgehead.

In the current situation, the front commander decided to cover the Oboyan direction. To this end, on the night of July 6, he moved the 1st Tank Army of General M.E. Katukov, as well as the 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, operationally subordinate to the 6th Guards Army, to the second line of defense. In addition, the army was reinforced with front-line artillery.

On the morning of July 6, the enemy resumed the offensive in all directions. In the Oboyan direction, he repeatedly launched attacks from 150 to 400 tanks, but each time he met powerful fire from infantry, artillery and tanks. Only towards the end of the day did he manage to break into the second line of our defense.

On that day, in the Korochan direction, the enemy managed to complete the breakthrough of the main defense line, but its further advance was stopped.

Heavy German tanks "Tiger" (Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger I") at the attack line, south of Orel. Battle of Kursk, mid-July 1943

On July 7 and 8, the Nazis, bringing fresh reserves into the battle, again tried to break through to Oboyan, expand the breakthrough towards the flanks and deepen it in the direction of Prokhorovka. Up to 300 enemy tanks were rushing to the northeast. However, all enemy attempts were paralyzed by the active actions of the 10th and 2nd Tank Corps, advanced from the reserves of the Headquarters to the Prokhorovka area, as well as by the active actions of the 2nd and 17th Air Armies. In the Korochan direction, enemy attacks were also repulsed. The counterattack carried out on July 8 by formations of the 40th Army on the left flank of the enemy’s 4th Tank Army, and by units of the 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps on its left flank, significantly eased the position of our troops in the Oboyan direction.

From July 9 to July 11, the enemy brought additional reserves into the battle and at any cost sought to break through along the Belgorod highway to Kursk. The front command promptly deployed part of its artillery to help the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies. In addition, to cover the Oboyan direction, the 10th Tank Corps was regrouped from the Prokhorovka area and the main aviation forces were targeted, and the 5th Guards Tank Corps was regrouped to strengthen the right flank of the 1st Tank Army. Through the joint efforts of ground forces and aviation, almost all enemy attacks were repulsed. Only on July 9, in the Kochetovka area, enemy tanks managed to break through to the third line of our defense. But two divisions of the 5th Guards Army of the Steppe Front and advanced tank brigades of the 5th Guards Tank Army were advanced against them, which stopped the advance of enemy tanks.

SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf", Kursk, 1943.

There was clearly a crisis brewing in the enemy's offensive. Therefore, the chairman of the Supreme Command headquarters, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky and the commander of the Voronezh Front, General N. F. Vatutin, decided on the morning of July 12 to launch a counterattack from the Prokhorovka area with the forces of the 5th Guards Army of General A. S. Zhdanov and the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. A. Rotmistrov, as well as the forces of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies in the general direction of Yakovlevo with the goal of the final defeat of the wedged enemy group. From the air, the counterattack was to be provided by the main forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies.

On the morning of July 12, the troops of the Voronezh Front launched a counterattack. The main events took place in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station (on the Belgorod - Kursk line, 56 km north of Belgorod), where the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place between the advancing enemy tank group (4th Tank Army, Task Force Kempf ") and the Soviet troops that launched a counterattack (5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Guards Army). On both sides, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in the battle. Air support for the enemy strike force was provided by aviation from Army Group South. Air strikes against the enemy were carried out by the 2nd Air Army, units of the 17th Air Army, and long-range aviation (about 1,300 sorties were carried out). During the day of battle, the enemy lost up to 400 tanks and assault guns, over 10 thousand people. Having failed to achieve the intended goal - to capture Kursk from the southeast, the enemy (advanced on the southern front of the Kursk ledge to a maximum of 35 km) went on the defensive.

On July 12, a turning point occurred in the Battle of Kursk. By order of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Hitler's command was forced to abandon offensive plans and on July 16 began to withdraw its troops to their original position. The troops of the Voronezh, and from July 18, the Steppe fronts began to pursue the enemy and by the end of July 23 they had mostly reached the line they occupied at the beginning of the defensive battle.

Source: I.S. Konev "Notes of the Front Commander, 1943-1945", Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1989.

The Oryol salient was defended by troops of the 2nd Tank and 9th Field Armies, which were part of the Center group. They consisted of 27 infantry, 10 tank and motorized divisions. Here the enemy created a strong defense, the tactical zone of which consisted of two stripes with a total depth of 12 - 15 km. They had a developed system of trenches, communication passages and a large number of armored firing points. A number of intermediate defensive lines were prepared in the operational depth. The total depth of its defense on the Oryol bridgehead reached 150 km.

The Oryol group of the enemy was ordered by the Supreme Command Headquarters to defeat the troops of the left wing of the Western Front and the main forces of the Bryansk and Central Fronts. The idea of ​​the operation was to cut the enemy group into separate parts and destroy it with counter strikes from the north, east and south in the general direction of Oryol.

The Western Front (commanded by General V.D. Sokolovsky) received the task of delivering the main blow with the troops of the 11th Guards Army from the area southwest of Kozelsk to Khotynets, preventing the withdrawal of Nazi troops from Orel to the west and, in cooperation with other fronts, destroying them; with part of the forces, together with the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front, encircle and destroy the Bolkhov enemy group; carry out an auxiliary strike by troops of the 50th Army on Zhizdra.

The Bryansk Front (commanded by General M. M. Popov) was supposed to deliver the main blow with the troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies from the Novosil area to Orel, and the auxiliary blow with the forces of the 61st Army to Bolkhov.

The Central Front had the task of eliminating the wedged enemy group north of Olkhovatka, subsequently developing an attack on Kromy and, in cooperation with the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts, completing the defeat of the enemy in the Oryol salient.

Preparations for the operation at the fronts were carried out taking into account the fact that they had to break through the enemy’s prepared and deeply echeloned defenses for the first time and develop tactical success at a high pace. For this purpose, a decisive massing of forces and means was carried out, the combat formations of troops were echeloned deeper, success development echelons were created in the armies, consisting of one or two tank corps, the offensive was to be carried out day and night.

For example, with the total width of the 11th Guards Army's offensive zone being 36 km, a decisive massing of forces and assets was achieved in the 14-kilometer breakthrough area, which ensured an increase in operational-tactical densities. The average artillery density in the army breakthrough area reached 185, and in the 8th Guards Rifle Corps - 232 guns and mortars per 1 km of front. If the offensive zones of the divisions in the counteroffensive near Stalingrad fluctuated within 5 km, then in the 8th Guards Rifle Regiment they were narrowed to 2 km. What was new compared to the counteroffensive at Stalingrad was that the battle formation of rifle corps, divisions, regiments and battalions was formed, as a rule, in two and sometimes in three echelons. This ensured an increase in the force of the strike from the depths and the timely development of the emerging success.

Characteristic of the use of artillery was the creation in armies of destruction and long-range artillery groups, groups of guards mortars and anti-aircraft artillery groups. The artillery training schedule in some armies began to include a period of shooting and destruction.

There have been changes in the use of tanks. For the first time, self-propelled artillery regiments were included in the tank groups for direct infantry support (NIS), which were supposed to advance behind the tanks and support their actions with the fire of their guns. Moreover, in some armies, NPP tanks were assigned not only to the rifle divisions of the first, but also to the second echelon of the corps. Tank corps constituted mobile army groups, and tank armies were intended to be used for the first time as mobile groups of fronts.

The combat operations of our troops were to be supported by more than 3 thousand aircraft of the 1st, 15th and 16th Air Armies (commanded by Generals M.M. Gromov, N.F. Naumenko, S.I. Rudenko) of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts, and also long-range aviation.

Aviation was assigned the following tasks: to cover the troops of strike groups of the fronts during the preparation and conduct of operations; suppress resistance centers at the front line and in the immediate depths and disrupt the enemy command and control system for the period of aviation training; from the beginning of the attack, continuously accompany the infantry and tanks; ensure the introduction of tank formations into battle and their operations in operational depth; fight against suitable enemy reserves.

The counter-offensive was preceded by a lot of preparatory work. On all fronts, the initial areas for the offensive were well equipped, troops were regrouped, and large reserves of material and technical resources were created. A day before the offensive, reconnaissance in force was carried out on the fronts by the forward battalions, which made it possible to clarify the true outline of the front line of the enemy’s defense, and in some areas to capture the front trench.

On the morning of July 12, after powerful air and artillery preparation, which lasted about three hours, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive. The greatest success was achieved in the direction of the main attack of the Western Front. By mid-day, the troops of the 11th Guards Army (commanded by General I. Kh. Bagramyan), thanks to the timely entry into battle of the second echelons of rifle regiments and separate tank brigades, broke through the main enemy defense line and crossed the Fomina River. In order to quickly complete the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical zone, on the afternoon of July 12, the 5th Tank Corps was introduced into the battle in the direction of Bolkhov. On the morning of the second day of the operation, the second echelons of rifle corps entered the battle, which, together with tank units, bypassing strong strongholds of the enemy, with the active support of artillery and aviation, completed the breakthrough of the second line of its defense by mid-July 13.

After completing the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone, the 5th Tank Corps and its 1st Tank Corps, introduced into the breakthrough to the right, together with the advanced detachments of rifle formations, proceeded to pursue the enemy. By the morning of July 15, they reached the Vytebet River and crossed it on the move, and by the end of the next day they cut the Bolkhov-Khotynets road. To delay their advance, the enemy pulled up reserves and launched a series of counterattacks.

In this situation, the commander of the 11th Guards Army regrouped the 36th Guards Rifle Corps from the left flank of the army and moved here the 25th Tank Corps, transferred from the front reserve. Having repelled enemy counterattacks, the troops of the 11th Guards Army resumed the offensive and by July 19 advanced up to 60 km, expanding the breakthrough to 120 km and covering the left flank of the Bolkhov enemy group from the southwest.

In order to develop the operation, the Supreme High Command Headquarters strengthened the western front with the 11th Army (commanded by General I. I. Fedyuninsky). After a long march, on July 20, an incomplete army was immediately introduced into battle at the junction between the 50th and 11th Guards armies in the direction of Khvostovichi. In five days, she broke the stubborn resistance of the enemy and advanced 15 km.

In order to completely defeat the enemy and develop the offensive, the commander of the Western Front in the middle of the day on July 26 brought into battle in the zone of the 11th Guards Army the 4th Tank Army transferred to him from the Headquarters reserve (commander General V.M. Badanov).

Having an operational formation in two echelons, the 4th Tank Army, after a short artillery preparation with the support of aviation, launched an offensive on Bolkhov, and then struck at Khotynets and Karachev. In five days she advanced 12 - 20 km. She had to break through intermediate defensive lines previously occupied by enemy troops. Through its actions, the 4th Tank Army contributed to the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front in the liberation of Bolkhov.

On July 30, the troops of the left wing of the Western Front (11th Guards, 4th Tank, 11th Army and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps) in connection with the preparation of the Smolensk offensive operation were transferred to the subordination of the Bryansk Front.

The offensive of the Bryansk Front developed much more slowly than that of the Western Front. The troops of the 61st Army under the command of General P. A. Belov, together with the 20th Tank Corps, broke through the enemy’s defenses and, repelling his counterattacks, liberated Bolkhov on July 29.

The troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies, with the 1st Guards Tank Corps introduced into the battle in the middle of the second day of the offensive, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone by the end of July 13. By July 18, they approached the Oleshnya River, where they encountered fierce enemy resistance at the rear defensive line.

In order to speed up the defeat of the enemy's Oryol group, the Supreme High Command Headquarters transferred the 3rd Guards Tank Army (commanded by General P. S. Rybalko) from its reserve to the Bryansk Front. On the morning of July 19, with the support of formations of the 1st and 15th Air Armies and long-range aviation, it went on the offensive from the Bogdanovo, Podmaslovo line and, repelling strong counterattacks of the enemy, by the end of the day broke through its defenses on the Oleshnya River. On the night of July 20, the tank army, having regrouped, struck in the direction of Otrada, assisting the Bryansk Front in defeating the Mtsensk enemy group. On the morning of July 21, after a regrouping of forces, the army attacked Stanovoy Kolodez and captured it on July 26. The next day it was transferred to the Central Front.

The offensive of the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts forced the enemy to pull back part of the forces of the Oryol group from the Kursk direction and thereby created a favorable situation for the troops of the right wing of the Central Front to launch a counteroffensive. By July 18, they had restored their previous position and continued to advance in the direction of Krom.

By the end of July, troops on three fronts captured the enemy’s Oryol group from the north, east and south. The fascist German command, trying to prevent the threat of encirclement, on July 30 began the withdrawal of all its troops from the Oryol bridgehead. Soviet troops began pursuit. On the morning of August 4, the troops of the left wing of the Bryansk Front broke into Oryol and by the morning of August 5 liberated it. On the same day, Belgorod was liberated by the troops of the Steppe Front.

Having captured Orel, our troops continued the offensive. On August 18 they reached the Zhizdra, Litizh line. As a result of the Oryol operation, 14 enemy divisions were defeated (including 6 tank divisions)

3. Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (August 3 - 23, 1943)

The Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead was defended by the 4th Tank Army and the Kempf task force. They consisted of 18 divisions, including 4 tank divisions. Here the enemy created 7 defensive lines with a total depth of up to 90 km, as well as 1 contour around Belgorod and 2 around Kharkov.

The idea of ​​the Supreme High Command headquarters was to use powerful blows from troops from adjacent wings of the Voronezh and steppe fronts to cut the opposing enemy group into two parts, subsequently deeply envelop it in the Kharkov region and, in cooperation with the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front, destroy it.

The troops of the Voronezh Front delivered the main blow with the forces of two combined arms and two tank armies from the area northeast of Tomarovka to Bogodukhov, Valki, bypassing Kharkov from the west, an auxiliary attack, also by the forces of two combined arms armies, from the Proletarsky area in the direction of Boromlya, in order to cover the main groups from the West.

The steppe front under the command of General I. S. Konev delivered the main blow with troops of the 53rd and part of the forces of the 69th armies from the area north-west of Belgorod to Kharkov from the north, an auxiliary blow was delivered by the forces of the 7th Guards Army from the area south-east of Belgorod to west direction.

By decision of the commander of the Southwestern Front, General R. Ya. Malinovsky, the 57th Army launched a strike from the Martovaya area to Merefa, covering Kharkov from the southeast.

From the air, the offensive of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts was ensured by the 2nd and 5th air armies of generals S.A. Krasovsky and S.K. Goryunov, respectively. In addition, part of the long-range aviation forces was involved.

To achieve success in breaking through the enemy’s defenses, the command of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts decisively massed forces and assets in the directions of their main attacks, which made it possible to create high operational densities. Thus, in the zone of the 5th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front, they reached 1.5 km per rifle division, 230 guns and mortars and 70 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of front.

There were characteristic features in planning the use of artillery and tanks. Artillery destruction groups were created not only in armies, but also in corps operating in the main directions. Separate tank and mechanized corps were to be used as mobile army groups, and tank armies - as a mobile group of the Voronezh Front, which was new in the art of war.

The tank armies were planned to be brought into battle in the offensive zone of the 5th Guards Army. They were supposed to operate in the directions: 1st Tank Army - Bogodolov, 5th Guards Tank Army - Zolochev, and by the end of the third or fourth day of the operation, reach the Valka, Lyubotin area, thereby cutting off the retreat of the Kharkov enemy group to the west.

Artillery and engineering support for the entry of tank armies into battle was assigned to the 5th Guards Army.

For aviation support, each tank army was allocated one assault and fighter aviation division.

In preparing for the operation, it was instructive to disinform the enemy about the true direction of the main attack of our troops. From July 28 to August 6, the 38th Army, operating on the right wing of the Voronezh Front, skillfully imitated the concentration of a large group of troops in the Sumy direction. The fascist German command not only began bombing areas of false troop concentrations, but also kept a significant number of its reserves in this direction.

A special feature was that the operation was prepared in a limited time. Nevertheless, the troops of both fronts were able to prepare for the offensive and provide themselves with the necessary material resources.

Hiding behind destroyed enemy tanks, the soldiers move forward, Belgorod direction, August 2, 1943.

On August 3, after powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, front troops, supported by a barrage of fire, went on the offensive and successfully broke through the first enemy position. With the introduction of second echelons of regiments into battle, the second position was broken through. To increase the efforts of the 5th Guards Army, advanced tank brigades of the corps of the first echelon of tank armies were brought into battle. They, together with rifle divisions, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defense line. Following the advanced brigades, the main forces of the tank armies were brought into battle. By the end of the day, they had overcome the second line of enemy defense and advanced 12 - 26 km in depth, thereby separating the Tomarov and Belgorod centers of enemy resistance.

Simultaneously with the tank armies, the following were introduced into the battle: in the zone of the 6th Guards Army - the 5th Guards Tank Corps, and in the zone of the 53rd Army - the 1st Mechanized Corps. They, together with rifle formations, broke the enemy’s resistance, completed the breakthrough of the main defensive line, and by the end of the day approached the second defensive line. Having broken through the tactical defense zone and destroyed the nearest operational reserves, the main strike group of the Voronezh Front began pursuing the enemy in the morning of the second day of the operation.

On August 4, troops of the 1st Tank Army from the Tomarovka area began to develop an offensive to the south. Its 6th Tank and 3rd Mechanized Corps, with reinforced tank brigades ahead, advanced 70 km by mid-day on August 6th. In the afternoon of the next day, the 6th Tank Corps liberated Bogodukhov.

The 5th Guards Tank Army, bypassing the enemy's centers of resistance from the west, struck at Zolochev and broke into the city on August 6.

By this time, the troops of the 6th Guards Army had captured the enemy’s strong defense center of Tomarovka, surrounded and destroyed his Borisov group. The 4th and 5th Guards Tank Corps played a major role in this. Developing an offensive in the southwestern direction, they bypassed the Borisov group of Germans from the west and east, and on August 7, with a swift strike, they broke into Grayvoron, thereby cutting off the enemy’s escape routes to the west and south. This was facilitated by the actions of the auxiliary group of the Voronezh Front, which went on the offensive on the morning of August 5 in its direction.

The troops of the Steppe Front, having completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone on August 4, captured Belgorod by storm by the end of the next day, after which they began to develop an offensive against Kharkov. By the end of August 7, the breakthrough front of our troops had reached 120 km. Tank armies advanced to a depth of 100 km, and combined arms armies - up to 60 - 65 km.

Kislov Photos

The troops of the 40th and 27th armies, continuing to develop the offensive, reached the Bromlya, Trostyanets, Akhtyrka line by August 11. A company of the 12th Guards Tank Brigade, led by Captain I.A. Tereshchuk, broke into Akhtyrka on August 10, where it was surrounded by the enemy. For two days, Soviet tank crews, without communication with the brigade, were in besieged tanks, repelling the fierce attacks of the Nazis who tried to capture them alive. Over two days of fighting, the company destroyed 6 tanks, 2 self-propelled guns, 5 armored cars and up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers. With two surviving tanks, Captain Tereshchuk fought out of the encirclement and returned to his brigade. For decisive and skillful actions in battle, Captain I. A. Tereshchuk was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

By August 10, the main forces of the 1st Tank Army reached the Merchik River. After capturing the city of Zolochev, the 5th Guards Tank Army was reassigned to the Steppe Front and began regrouping in the Bogodukhov area.

Advancing behind the tank armies, the troops of the 6th Guards Army reached northeast of Krasnokutsk by August 11, and the 5th Guards Army captured Kharkov from the west. By this time, the troops of the Steppe Front had approached the outer defensive perimeter of Kharkov from the north, and the 57th Army, transferred to this front on August 8, from the east and southeast.

The fascist German command, fearing the encirclement of the Kharkov group, by August 11 concentrated three tank divisions east of Bogodukhov (Reich, Death's Head, Viking) and on the morning of August 12 launched a counterattack on the advancing troops of the 1st Tank Army in the general direction on Bogodukhov. An oncoming tank battle unfolded. During its course, the enemy pushed back the formations of the 1st Tank Army by 3-4 km, but was unable to break through to Bogodukhov. On the morning of August 13, the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank, 6th and 5th Guards armies were brought into battle. The main forces of front-line aviation were also sent here. It conducted reconnaissance and carried out operations to disrupt the railway and road transport of the Nazis, assisted combined arms and tank armies in repelling counterattacks of the Nazi troops. By the end of August 17, our troops finally thwarted the enemy’s counterattack from the south on Bogodukhov.

Tankers and machine gunners of the 15th Guards Mechanized Brigade advance on the city of Amvrosievka, August 23, 1943.

However, the fascist German command did not abandon its plan. On the morning of August 18, it launched a counterattack from the Akhtyrka area with three tank and motorized divisions and broke through the front of the 27th Army. Against this enemy grouping, the commander of the Voronezh Front advanced the 4th Guards Army, transferred from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, the 3rd mechanized and 6th tank corps of the 1st Tank Army from the Bogodukhov area, and also used the 4th and 5th separate guards tank corps. These forces, by striking the enemy’s flanks by the end of August 19, stopped his advance from the west to Bogodukhov. Then the troops of the right wing of the Voronezh Front struck at the rear of the Akhtyrka group of Germans and completely defeated it.

At the same time, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began the assault on Kharkov. On the night of August 23, formations of the 69th and 7th Guards armies captured the city.

Soviet soldiers inspect a German heavy tank "Panther" destroyed on the Prokhorovsky bridgehead, Belgorod region. 1943

Photo - A. Morkovkin

The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts defeated 15 enemy divisions, advanced 140 km in the southern and southwestern direction, and came close to the Donbass enemy group. Soviet troops liberated Kharkov. During the occupation and battles, the Nazis destroyed about 300 thousand civilians and prisoners of war in the city and region (according to incomplete data), about 160 thousand people were driven to Germany, they destroyed 1,600 thousand m2 of housing, over 500 industrial enterprises, all cultural and educational , medical and communal institutions.

Thus, Soviet troops completed the defeat of the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group and took an advantageous position to launch a general offensive with the aim of liberating Left Bank Ukraine and Donbass.

4. Main conclusions.

The counteroffensive of the Red Army near Kursk ended in an outstanding victory for us. Irreversible losses were inflicted on the enemy, and all his attempts to hold strategic bridgeheads in the Orel and Kharkov areas were thwarted.

The success of the counteroffensive was ensured primarily by the skillful choice of the moment when our troops went on the offensive. It began in conditions when the main German attack groups suffered huge losses and a crisis was defined in their offensive. Success was also ensured by the skillful organization of strategic interaction between groups of fronts attacking in the western and southwestern, as well as in other directions. This did not allow the fascist German command to regroup troops in areas that were dangerous to them.

The success of the counteroffensive was greatly influenced by the large strategic reserves of the Supreme High Command Headquarters previously created in the Kursk direction, which were used to develop the offensive of the fronts.

For the first time, Soviet troops solved the problem of breaking through the enemy’s previously prepared, deeply echeloned defense and subsequent development of operational success. This was achieved thanks to the creation of powerful strike groups in the fronts and armies, the massing of forces and means in breakthrough areas and the presence of tank formations in the fronts, and large tank (mechanized) formations in the armies.

Before the start of the counteroffensive, reconnaissance in force was carried out more widely than in previous operations, not only by reinforced companies, but also by advanced battalions.

During the counteroffensive, the fronts and armies gained experience in repelling counterattacks from large enemy tank formations. It was carried out with close cooperation between all branches of the military and aviation. In order to stop the enemy and defeat his advancing troops, fronts and armies with part of their forces switched to a tough defense while simultaneously delivering a powerful blow to the flank and rear of the enemy’s counterattack group. As a result of the increase in the number of military equipment and reinforcement means, the tactical densities of our troops in the counteroffensive near Kursk increased by 2 - 3 times in comparison with the counteroffensive near Stalingrad.

What was new in the field of offensive combat tactics was the transition of units and formations from single-echelon to deeply echeloned combat formations. This turned out to be possible due to the narrowing of their sectors and offensive zones.

In the counteroffensive near Kursk, the methods of using military branches and aviation were improved. On a larger scale, tank and mechanized troops were used. The density of NPP tanks compared to the counteroffensive at Stalingrad increased and amounted to 15 - 20 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of front. However, when breaking through a strong, deeply layered enemy defense, such densities turned out to be insufficient. Tank and mechanized corps became the main means of developing the success of combined arms armies, and tank armies of a homogeneous composition became the echelon for developing the success of the front. Their use to complete the breakthrough of a previously prepared positional defense was a necessary measure, often leading to significant tank losses and weakening of tank formations and formations, but in specific conditions the situation justified itself. For the first time, self-propelled artillery regiments were widely used near Kursk. Experience has shown that they were an effective means of supporting the advance of tanks and infantry.

There were also peculiarities in the use of artillery: the density of guns and mortars in the direction of the main attack increased significantly; the gap between the end of artillery preparation and the beginning of support for the attack was eliminated; army artillery groups by number of corps

Battle of Kursk
	Central Russia, Eastern Ukraine
	Victory of the Red Army
Commanders
Georgy Zhukov	Erich von Manstein
Nikolay Vatutin	Gunther Hans von Kluge
Ivan Konev	Walter Model
Konstantin Rokossovsky	Hermann Got
Strengths of the parties
By the beginning of the operation, 1.3 million people + 0.6 million in reserve, 3,444 tanks + 1.5 thousand in reserve, 19,100 guns and mortars + 7.4 thousand in reserve, 2,172 aircraft + 0.5 thousand in reserve reserve	According to Soviet data - approx. 900 thousand people, according to it. according to data - 780 thousand people. 2,758 tanks and self-propelled guns (of which 218 are under repair), approx. 10 thousand guns, approx. 2050 aircraft
Defensive phase: Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all) Irrevocable - 70,330 Sanitary - 107,517 Operation Kutuzov: Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front Irrevocable - 112,529 Sanitary - 317,361 Operation "Rumyantsev": Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front Irrevocable - 71,611 Hospital - 183,955 General in the battle for the Kursk ledge: Irrevocable - 189,652 Hospital - 406,743 In the Battle of Kursk as a whole ~ 254,470 killed, captured, missing missing 608,833 wounded and sick 153 thousand small arms 6064 tanks and self-propelled guns 5245 guns and mortars 1626 combat aircraft	According to German sources, 103,600 were killed and missing on the entire Eastern Front. 433,933 wounded. According to Soviet sources, 500 thousand total losses in the Kursk salient. 1000 tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet data, less than 1696 aircraft

Battle of Kursk(July 5, 1943 – August 23, 1943, also known as Battle of Kursk) in terms of its scale, the forces and means involved, tension, results and military-political consequences, it is one of the key battles of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into 3 parts: Kursk defensive operation (July 5-12); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive. The German side called the offensive part of the battle “Operation Citadel.”

After the end of the battle, the strategic initiative in the war passed to the side of the Red Army, which until the end of the war carried out mainly offensive operations, while the Wehrmacht was on the defensive.

Preparing for battle

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion with a depth of up to 150 and a width of up to 200 km, facing the west (the so-called “Kursk Bulge”) was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front. During April - June 1943, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the parties prepared for the summer campaign.

Plans and strengths of the parties

The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk salient in the summer of 1943. It was planned to launch converging attacks from the areas of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The strike groups were supposed to unite in the Kursk area, encircling the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The operation received the code name “Citadel”. According to the information of the German general Friedrich Fangor (German. Friedrich Fangohr), at a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted at the suggestion of General Hoth: the 2nd SS Panzer Corps turns from the Oboyan direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow for a global battle with the armored reserves of the Soviet troops.

To carry out the operation, the Germans concentrated a group of up to 50 divisions (of which 18 tank and motorized), 2 tank brigades, 3 separate tank battalions and 8 assault gun divisions, with a total number, according to Soviet sources, of about 900 thousand people. The leadership of the troops was carried out by Field Marshal General Günter Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Army Group South). Organizationally, the strike forces were part of the 2nd Tank, 2nd and 9th Armies (commander - Field Marshal Walter Model, Army Group Center, Orel region) and the 4th Tank Army, 24th Tank Corps and operational group "Kempf" (commander - General Hermann Goth, Army Group "South", Belgorod region). Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th Air Fleets.

To carry out the operation, several elite SS tank divisions were deployed to the Kursk area:

• 1st Division Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler"
• 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich"
• 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (Totenkopf)

The troops received a certain amount of new equipment:

• 134 Pz.Kpfw.VI Tiger tanks (another 14 command tanks)
• 190 Pz.Kpfw.V “Panther” (11 more - evacuation (without guns) and command)
• 90 Sd.Kfz assault guns. 184 “Ferdinand” (45 each in sPzJgAbt 653 and sPzJgAbt 654)
• a total of 348 relatively new tanks and self-propelled guns (the Tiger was used several times in 1942 and early 1943).

At the same time, however, a significant number of frankly outdated tanks and self-propelled guns remained in the German units: 384 units (Pz.III, Pz.II, even Pz.I). Also during the Battle of Kursk, German Sd.Kfz.302 teletankettes were used for the first time.

The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, exhaust the enemy troops and defeat them, launching counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. For this purpose, a deeply layered defense was created on both sides of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average mining density in the direction of expected enemy attacks was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines for every kilometer of the front.

The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The coordination of the actions of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as differences in methods of accounting and classification military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is related to the inclusion or exclusion from the calculations of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1,500 tanks). The following table contains some estimates:

Estimates of the forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk according to various sources
Source	Personnel (thousands)		Tanks and (sometimes) self-propelled guns		Guns and (sometimes) mortars		Aircraft
						about 10000	2172 or 2900 (including Po-2 and long-range)
Krivosheev 2001
Glanz, House				2696 or 2928
Müller-Gill.				2540 or 2758
Zett., Frankson			5128 +2688 “reserve rates” total more than 8000

The role of intelligence

From the beginning of 1943, interceptions of secret communications from the High Command of the Nazi Army and secret directives from Hitler increasingly mentioned Operation Citadel. According to the memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, back on March 27, Stalin informed him in general detail about the German plans. On April 12, 1943, the exact text of Directive No. 6, translated from German, “On the plan for Operation Citadel,” of the German High Command, endorsed by all Wehrmacht services, but not yet signed by Hitler, who signed it only three days later, was placed on Stalin’s desk. This data was obtained by a scout working under the name "Werther". The real name of this man still remains unknown, but it is assumed that he was an employee of the Wehrmacht High Command, and the information he received came to Moscow through the Luzi agent Rudolf Rössler operating in Switzerland. There is an alternative assumption that Werther is Adolf Hitler's personal photographer.

However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G.K. Zhukov, relying on data from intelligence agencies of the Kursk fronts, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk Bulge:

Although the exact text of the “Citadel” fell on Stalin’s desk three days before Hitler signed it, the German plan had already become obvious to the highest Soviet military command four days earlier, and the general details of the existence of such a plan had been known to them for at least another year. eight days before.

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation - 3 o'clock in the morning (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow time as 5 o'clock in the morning), at 22:30 and 2:20 Moscow time the forces of two fronts carried out counter-artillery preparation with an amount of ammunition 0.25 ammo. German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor losses in manpower. There was also an unsuccessful air raid by the 2nd and 17th Air Armies (more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) on the enemy’s Kharkov and Belgorod air hubs.

Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 a.m. our time, the Germans also launched a bomb and artillery strike on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern front was delivered in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having failed to achieve success, the Germans moved their attack in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they were unable to break through the Soviet defense. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which, from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of its tanks, the German 9th Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main German attacks were directed towards the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.

July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkasy.

Operation Citadel - the general offensive of the German Army on the Eastern Front in 1943 - was aimed at encircling the troops of the Central (K.K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (N.F. Vatutin) fronts in the area of ​​​​the city of Kursk through counter attacks from the north and south under the base of the Kursk salient, as well as the destruction of Soviet operational and strategic reserves east of the main direction of the main attack (including in the area of ​​Prokhorovka station). Main blow with southern directions were applied by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army (commander - Hermann Hoth, 48 Tank Tank and 2 Tank SS Tank) with the support of the army group "Kempf" (W. Kempf).

At the initial stage of the offensive, the 48th Panzer Corps (com: O. von Knobelsdorff, chief of staff: F. von Mellenthin, 527 tanks, 147 self-propelled guns), which was the most powerful formation of the 4th Panzer Army, consisting of: 3 and 11 tank divisions , mechanized (tank-grenadier) division "Greater Germany", 10th tank brigade and 911th division. assault gun division, with the support of 332 and 167 infantry divisions, had the task of breaking through the first, second and third lines of defense of units of the Voronezh Front from the Gertsovka - Butovo area in the direction of Cherkassk - Yakovlevo - Oboyan. At the same time, it was assumed that in the Yakovlevo area the 48th Tank Tank would link up with units of the 2nd SS Division (thus encircling the 52nd Guards SD and 67th Guards SD), change units of the 2nd SS Division, after which the units of the SS division were supposed to be used against the operational reserves of the Red Army Armies in the area of ​​the station. Prokhorovka, and 48 Tank Corps was supposed to continue operations in the main direction Oboyan - Kursk.

To complete the assigned task, units of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive (Day “X”) needed to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards SD (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and 67th Guards SD (Colonel A.I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoe and make a breakthrough with armored units in direction to the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th Tank Corps determined that the village of Cherkasskoye was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5th. And already on July 6, units of the 48th Tank Army. were supposed to reach the city of Oboyan.

However, as a result of the actions of Soviet units and formations, their courage and fortitude, as well as their advance preparation of defensive lines, the Wehrmacht’s plans in this direction were “significantly adjusted” - 48 Tk did not reach Oboyan.

The factors that determined the unacceptably slow pace of advance of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the area by Soviet units (from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the entire defense to radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of attack aircraft against those accumulated in front of engineering obstacles for enemy tanks, competent location of anti-tank strong points (No. 6 south of Korovin in the 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid reorganization of the battle formations of the 196 Guards battalions .sp (Colonel V.I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassy, ​​timely maneuver by the divisional (245 detachment, 1440 grapnel) and army (493 iptap, as well as 27 optabr colonel N.D. Chevola) anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units of 3 TD and 11 TD with the involvement of forces of 245 detachment troops (Lieutenant Colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 M3 tanks) and 1440 SUP (Lieutenant Colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), and also not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the military outpost in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 baht. 199th Guards Regiment, Captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of ​​workers’ barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of the 11th Tank Division and 332nd Infantry Division by the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day of “X-1”, but the resistance of the combat outpost was never completely suppressed by dawn on July 5th). All of the above factors influenced both the speed of concentration of units in their initial positions before the main attack, and their progress during the offensive itself.

Also, the pace of the corps' advance was affected by the German command's shortcomings in planning the operation and poorly developed interaction between tank and infantry units. In particular, the “Greater Germany” division (W. Heyerlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and the 10 armored brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 Pz.V command tanks) in the current conditions The battle turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering barriers (it was especially difficult to overcome the swampy anti-tank ditch west of Cherkassy), and came under a combined attack from Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments of the 33 detachment (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially among officers), and was unable to deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the line Korovino - Cherkasskoe for a further attack in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that had overcome anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own firepower. So, for example, the combat group of the 3rd battalion of the Fusilier Regiment, which was at the forefront of the attack of the VG division, at the time of the first attack found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division was actually unable to bring them into battle for a long time.

The resulting congestion on the advance routes also resulted in the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th Tank Corps in firing positions, which affected the results of artillery preparation before the start of the attack.

It should be noted that the commander of the 48th Tank Tank became hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of his superiors. Knobelsdorff's lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative impact - all divisions of the corps were brought into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, 1943, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.

The development of the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps on the day of July 5 was greatly facilitated by: active actions of engineer-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the proactive actions of units of the 11th TD (I. Mikl) and 911th department. division of assault guns (overcoming a strip of engineering obstacles and reaching the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy with a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).

An important factor in the success of German tank units was the qualitative leap in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles that occurred by the summer of 1943. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units was revealed when fighting both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet anti-tank tanks were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times less than the effective firing range of the latter; heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in the combined arms 6th Guards A, but also in the 1st Tank Army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).

Only after the bulk of the tanks had overcome the anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassy in the afternoon, repelling a number of counterattacks by Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11th Panzer Division were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00, Divisional Commander A.I. Baksov gave the order to withdraw units of the 196th Guards Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassy, ​​as well as to the center of the village. When units of the 196th Guards Regiment retreated, minefields were laid. At about 21:20, a battle group of grenadiers from the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th Tank Brigade, broke into the village of Yarki (north of Cherkassy). A little later, the 3rd Wehrmacht TD managed to capture the village of Krasny Pochinok (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th Tank Tank of the Wehrmacht was a wedge into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the backdrop of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating to the east parallel to the 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. A.

Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was suppressed around midnight on July 5. However, German units were able to establish complete control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.

Thus, the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD, not possessing large tank formations (they had at their disposal only 39 American M3 tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245th detachment and 1440 saps) were held in the area of ​​​​the villages of Korovino and Cherkasskoye for about a day five enemy divisions (three of them tank). In the battle of July 5, 1943 in the Cherkassy region, the soldiers and commanders of the 196th and 199th Guards especially distinguished themselves. rifle regiments of the 67th Guards. divisions. Competent and truly heroic actions of the soldiers and commanders of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner, pull up army reserves to the place where units of the 48th Tank Corps are wedged at the junction of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this area in the subsequent days of the defensive operation.

As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoe virtually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts, it was a “lunar landscape”).

The heroic defense of the village of Cherkasskoe on July 5, 1943 - one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops - unfortunately, is one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.

July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.

By the end of the first day of the offensive, the 4th TA had penetrated the defenses of the 6th Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the offensive sector of 48 TK (in the area of ​​​​the village of Cherkasskoe) and at 12-13 km in the section of 2 TK SS (in the Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka area). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the entire depth of the first line of defense of the Soviet troops, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards SD (Colonel I.M. Nekrasov), and approached the 5-6 km front directly to the second line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), entering into battle with its advanced units.

However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - did not complete the task of the day on July 5, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the 4th Tank Army that had advanced forward. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to July 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely the Death's Head TD, to cover his right flank against the 375th Infantry Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units performed brilliantly in the battles of July 5 .

On July 6, the tasks of the day for units of the 2nd SS Tank Tank (334 tanks) were determined: for the Death's Head TD (Brigadeführer G. Priss, 114 tanks) - the defeat of the 375th Infantry Division and the expansion of the breakthrough corridor in the direction of the river. Linden Donets, for the Leibstandarte TD (brigadeführer T. Wisch, 99 tanks, 23 self-propelled guns) and “Das Reich” (brigadeführer W. Kruger, 121 tanks, 21 self-propelled guns) - the fastest breakthrough of the second line of defense near the village. Yakovlevo and access to the line of the bend of the Psel river - the village. Grouse.

At about 9:00 on July 6, 1943, after powerful artillery preparation (carried out by artillery regiments of the Leibstandarte, Das Reich divisions and 55 MP six-barreled mortars) with the direct support of the 8th Air Corps (about 150 aircraft in the offensive zone), the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps moved into offensive, delivering the main blow in the area occupied by the 154th and 156th Guards Regiment Regiment. At the same time, the Germans managed to identify control and communications points of the 51st Guards SD regiments and carry out a fire raid on them, which led to the disorganization of communications and control of its troops. In fact, the battalions of the 51st Guards SD repelled enemy attacks without communication with higher command, since the work of liaison officers was not effective due to the high dynamics of the battle.

The initial success of the attack by the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions was ensured due to the numerical advantage in the breakthrough area (two German divisions against two guards rifle regiments), as well as due to good interaction between the division regiments, artillery and aviation - the advanced units of the divisions, the main ramming force of which were the 13th and 8th heavy companies of the "Tigers" (7 and 11 Pz.VI, respectively), with the support of assault gun divisions (23 and 21 StuG) advanced to the Soviet positions even before the end of the artillery and air strike, finding themselves at the moment of its end several hundred meters from the trenches.

By 13:00, the battalions at the junction of the 154th and 156th Guards Regiment Regiments were driven from their positions and began a disorderly retreat in the direction of the villages of Yakovlevo and Luchki; The left-flank 158th Guards Regiment, having folded its right flank, generally continued to hold the line of defense. The withdrawal of units of the 154th and 156th Guards Regiment was carried out mixed with enemy tanks and motorized infantry and was associated with heavy losses (in particular, in the 156th Guards Regiment, out of 1,685 people, about 200 people remained in service on July 7, that is, the regiment was actually destroyed) . General leadership There were practically no retreating battalions; the actions of these units were determined only by the initiative of junior commanders, not all of whom were ready for this. Some units of the 154th and 156th Guards Regiments reached the locations of neighboring divisions. The situation was partly saved by the actions of the artillery of the 51st Guards Rifle Division and the 5th Guards Division from the reserve. Stalingrad Tank Corps - howitzer batteries of the 122nd Guards Ap (Major M. N. Uglovsky) and artillery units of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (Colonel A. M. Shchekal) fought heavy battles in the depths of the defense of the 51st Guards. divisions, slowing down the pace of the advance of the combat groups TD "Leibstandarte" and "Das Reich", in order to enable the retreating infantry to gain a foothold on new lines. At the same time, the artillerymen managed to retain most of their heavy weapons. A short but fierce battle broke out for the village of Luchki, in the area of ​​which the 464th Guards Artillery Division and the 460th Guards Division managed to deploy. mortar battalion 6th Guards MSBR 5th Guards. Stk (at the same time, due to insufficient provision of vehicles, the motorized infantry of this brigade was still on the march 15 km from the battlefield).

At 14:20, the armored group of the Das Reich division as a whole captured the village of Luchki, and the artillery units of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade began to retreat north to the Kalinin farm. After this, right up to the third (rear) defensive line of the Voronezh Front in front of the battle group of the TD "Das Reich" there were virtually no units of the 6th Guards. army capable of holding back its advance: the main forces of the army's anti-tank artillery (namely the 14th, 27th and 28th brigade brigades) were located to the west - on the Oboyanskoye Highway and in the offensive zone of the 48th Tank Corps, which, based on the results of the battles on July 5, was assessed by the army command as the direction of the main strike by the Germans (which was not entirely correct - the strikes of both German tank corps of the 4th TA were considered by the German command as equivalent). To repel the attack of the Das Reich TD artillery of the 6th Guards. And by this point there was simply nothing left.

The offensive of the Leibstandarte TD in the Oboyan direction in the first half of the day on July 6 developed less successfully than that of Das Reich, which was due to the greater saturation of its offensive sector with Soviet artillery (the regiments of Major Kosachev’s 28th regiments were active), timely attacks by the 1st Guards. Tank Brigade (Colonel V.M. Gorelov) and 49th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel A.F. Burda) from the 3rd Mechanized Corps of the 1st TA M.E. Katukov, as well as the presence in its offensive zone of the well-fortified village of Yakovlevo, in street battles in in which the main forces of the division, including its tank regiment, got bogged down for some time.

Thus, by 14:00 on July 6, the troops of the 2nd SS Tank Tank had basically completed the first part of the general offensive plan - the left flank of the 6th Guards. A was crushed, and a little later with the capture of. Yakovlevo, on the part of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, conditions were prepared for their replacement by units of the 48th Tank Tank. The advanced units of the 2nd SS Tank Tank were ready to begin fulfilling one of the general goals of Operation Citadel - the destruction of the Red Army reserves in the area of ​​the station. Prokhorovka. However, Hermann Hoth (commander of the 4th TA) was unable to fully implement the offensive plan on July 6, due to the slow advance of the troops of the 48th Tank Corps (O. von Knobelsdorff), which encountered the skillful defense of Katukov’s army, which entered the battle in the afternoon. Although Knobelsdorff's corps managed to encircle some regiments of the 67th and 52nd Guards SD of the 6th Guards in the afternoon. And in the area between the Vorskla and Vorsklitsa rivers (with a total strength of about a rifle division), however, having encountered the tough defense of the 3 Mk brigades (Major General S. M. Krivoshein) on the second line of defense, the corps divisions were unable to capture bridgeheads on the northern bank of the Pena River, discard the Soviet mechanized corps and go to the village. Yakovlevo for the subsequent change of units of 2nd SS Tank. Moreover, on the left flank of the corps, the battle group of the tank regiment 3 TD (F. Westhoven), which had gaped at the entrance to the village of Zavidovka, was shot by tank crews and artillerymen of the 22 Tank Brigade (Colonel N. G. Venenichev), which was part of the 6 Tank Tank Brigade (Major General A D. Getman) 1 TA.

However, the success achieved by the Leibstandarte divisions, and especially Das Reich, forced the command of the Voronezh Front, in conditions of incomplete clarity of the situation, to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough that had formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakova about the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin with his order transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad Tank (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34 and 21 are Mk.IV “Churchill”) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34 and 17 are Mk.IV Churchill) subordinate to the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves of his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards SD with the forces of the 5th Guards. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 tk SS forces of 2 guards. Ttk (directly through the battle formations of the 375th Infantry Division). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I.M. Chistyakov assigned the commander of the 5th Guards. CT to Major General A. G. Kravchenko the task of withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strong points) the main part of the corps (two of three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and a counterattack by these forces on the flank of the Leibstandarte TD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture of the village. Lucky tanks from the Das Reich division, and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the execution of this order. However, under the threat of arrest and execution, they were forced to begin implementing it. The attack by the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.

Sufficient own artillery assets of the 5th Guards. The Stk did not have it, and the order did not leave time for coordinating the actions of the corps with its neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on flat terrain and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of the Das Reich TD, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted a significant fire defeat on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After this, having brought up anti-tank artillery and organized flank maneuvers, units of the Das Reich TD, between 17 and 19 hours, managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of ​​the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenaps (Major Savchenko) and 464 Guards Artillery, which had withdrawn from the village of Luchki. .division and 460 Guards. mortar battalion 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade. By 19:00, units of the Das Reich TD actually managed to encircle most of the 5th Guards. Stk between the village. Luchki and the Kalinin farm, after which, building on the success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of the station. Prokhorovka, tried to capture the Belenikhino crossing. However, thanks to the proactive actions of the commander and battalion commanders, the 20th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) remaining outside the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikino from various corps units that were at hand, managed to stop the offensive of the Das Reich TD, and even forced the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without contact with corps headquarters, on the night of July 7, surrounded units of the 5th Guards. The Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and linked up with units of the 20th Tank Brigade. During July 6, 1943, units of the 5th Guards. Stk 119 tanks were irretrievably lost for combat reasons, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unknown reasons, and 19 were sent for repairs. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (the losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 even exceeded the losses of 29 tanks during the attack on July 12 at the Oktyabrsky storage farm).

After being surrounded by 5th Guards. Stk, continuing the development of success in the northern direction, another detachment of the tank regiment TD "Das Reich", taking advantage of the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of the army defense, occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin) , near the village of Teterevino, and for a short time wedged itself into the defense of the 285th infantry regiment of the 183rd infantry division, but due to the obvious insufficient strength, having lost several tanks, it was forced to retreat. The entry of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.

The offensive of the "Dead Head" TD did not receive significant development during July 6 due to the stubborn resistance of units of the 375th Infantry Division, as well as the counterattack of the 2nd Guards in its sector in the afternoon. Tatsin tank corps (Colonel A. S. Burdeyny, 166 tanks), which took place simultaneously with the counterattack of the 2nd Guards. Stk, and demanded the involvement of all the reserves of this SS division and even some units of the Das Reich TD. However, inflict losses on the Tatsin Corps even approximately comparable to the losses of the 5th Guards. The Germans did not succeed in the counterattack, even though during the counterattack the corps had to cross the Lipovy Donets River twice, and some of its units were surrounded for a short time. Losses of the 2nd Guards. The total number of tanks for July 6 was: 17 tanks burned out and 11 damaged, that is, the corps remained fully combat-ready.

Thus, during July 6, formations of the 4th TA were able to break through the second line of defense of the Voronezh Front on their right flank and inflicted significant losses on the troops of the 6th Guards. A (of the six rifle divisions, by the morning of July 7, only three remained combat-ready, and of the two tank corps transferred to it, one). As a result of the loss of control of units of the 51st Guards SD and 5th Guards. Stk, at the junction of 1 TA and 5 Guards. Stk formed an area not occupied by Soviet troops, which in the following days, at the cost of incredible efforts, Katukov had to plug with brigades of the 1st TA, using his experience of defensive battles near Orel in 1941.

However, all the successes of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, which led to the breakthrough of the second defensive line, again could not be translated into a powerful breakthrough deep into the Soviet defense to destroy the strategic reserves of the Red Army, since the troops of AG Kempf, having achieved some successes on July 6, nevertheless again failed complete the task of the day. AG Kempf was still unable to secure the right flank of the 4th Tank Army, which was threatened by the 2nd Guards. Ttk supported by the still combat-ready 375 sd. German losses in armored vehicles also had a significant impact on the further course of events. So, for example, in the tank regiment of the TD "Great Germany" 48 Tank Tank, after the first two days of the offensive, 53% of the tanks were considered uncombatable (Soviet troops disabled 59 out of 112 vehicles, including 12 "Tigers" out of 14 available), and in the 10th Tank Brigade to on the evening of July 6, only 40 combat Panthers (out of 192) were considered combat-ready. Therefore, on July 7, the 4th TA corps was given less ambitious tasks than on July 6—expanding the breakthrough corridor and securing the army’s flanks.

The commander of the 48th Panzer Corps, O. von Knobelsdorff, summed up the results of the day's battle on the evening of July 6:

Starting from July 6, 1943, not only the German command had to retreat from previously developed plans (which did this on July 5), but also the Soviet command, which clearly underestimated the strength of the German armored strike. Due to the loss of combat effectiveness and failure of the material part of most divisions of the 6th Guards. And, from the evening of July 6, general operational control of the troops holding the second and third lines of Soviet defense in the area of ​​​​the breakthrough of the German 4th Tank Army was actually transferred from the commander of the 6th Guards. A I. M. Chistyakov to the commander of the 1st TA M. E. Katukov. The main framework of the Soviet defense in the following days was created around the brigades and corps of the 1st Tank Army.

Battle of Prokhorovka

On July 12, the largest (or one of the largest) oncoming tank battles in history took place in the Prokhorovka area.

According to data from Soviet sources, on the German side, about 700 tanks and assault guns took part in the battle, according to V. Zamulin - the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 294 tanks (including 15 Tigers) and self-propelled guns.

On the Soviet side, the 5th Tank Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks, took part in the battle. After a massive airstrike, the battle on both sides entered its active phase and continued until the end of the day.

Here is one of the episodes that clearly shows what happened on July 12: the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm and the heights. 252.2 resembled the sea surf - four tank brigades of the Red Army, three batteries of the SAP, two rifle regiments and one battalion of a motorized rifle brigade rolled in waves onto the defense of the SS grenadier regiment, but, having met fierce resistance, retreated. This went on for almost five hours until the guards drove the grenadiers out of the area, suffering colossal losses.

From the memoirs of a battle participant, Untersturmführer Gurs, commander of a motorized rifle platoon of the 2nd Grp:

During the battle, many tank commanders (platoon and company) were out of action. High level of commander losses in the 32nd Tank Brigade: 41 tank commanders (36% of the total), tank platoon commander (61%), company commander (100%) and battalion commander (50%). The command level and the motorized rifle regiment of the brigade suffered very high losses; many company and platoon commanders were killed and seriously injured. Its commander, Captain I. I. Rudenko, was out of action (evacuated from the battlefield to the hospital).

A participant in the battle, deputy chief of staff of the 31st Tank Brigade, and later Hero of the Soviet Union, Grigory Penezhko, recalled the human condition in those terrible conditions:

... Heavy images remained in my memory... There was such a roar that the eardrums were pressed, blood flowed from the ears. The continuous roar of engines, the clanging of metal, the roar, the explosions of shells, the wild rattle of torn iron... From point-blank shots, turrets collapsed, guns twisted, armor burst, tanks exploded. Shots into the gas tanks instantly set the tanks on fire. The hatches opened and the tank crews tried to get out. I saw a young lieutenant, half burned, hanging from his armor. Wounded, he could not get out of the hatch. And so he died. There was no one around to help him. We lost the sense of time; we felt neither thirst, nor heat, nor even blows in the cramped cabin of the tank. One thought, one desire - while you’re alive, beat the enemy. Our tankers, who got out of their wrecked vehicles, searched the field for enemy crews, who were also left without equipment, and beat them with pistols and grappled hand-to-hand. I remember the captain who, in some kind of frenzy, climbed onto the armor of a knocked out German “tiger” and hit the hatch with a machine gun in order to “smoke out” the Nazis from there. I remember how bravely the tank company commander Chertorizhsky acted. He knocked out an enemy Tiger, but was also hit. Jumping out of the car, the tankers put out the fire. And we went into battle again

By the end of July 12, the battle ended with unclear results, only to resume on the afternoon of July 13 and 14. After the battle, German troops were unable to advance any significantly, despite the fact that the losses of the Soviet tank army, caused by tactical errors of its command, were much greater. Having advanced 35 kilometers between July 5 and 12, Manstein’s troops were forced, after trampling on the achieved lines for three days in vain attempts to break into the Soviet defenses, to begin withdrawing troops from the captured “bridgehead.” During the battle, a turning point occurred. Soviet troops, which went on the offensive on July 23, pushed back the German armies in the south of the Kursk Bulge to their original positions.

Losses

According to Soviet data, about 400 German tanks, 300 vehicles, and over 3,500 soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield of the Battle of Prokhorovka. However, these numbers have been called into question. For example, according to G. A. Oleinikov’s calculations, more than 300 German tanks could not have taken part in the battle. According to research by A. Tomzov, citing data from the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles of July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irretrievably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV and 2 Pz.III tanks were sent for long-term repairs , in the short term - 15 Pz.IV and 1 Pz.III tanks. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS Tank Tank on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf division.

At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks.

According to the memoirs of Wehrmacht Major General F.W. von Mellenthin, in the attack on Prokhorovka and, accordingly, in the morning battle with the Soviet TA, only the Reich and Leibstandarte divisions, reinforced by a battalion of self-propelled guns, took part - in total up to 240 vehicles, including including four "tigers". It was not expected to meet a serious enemy; according to the German command, Rotmistrov’s TA was drawn into battle against the “Death’s Head” division (in reality, one corps) and the oncoming attack of more than 800 (according to their estimates) tanks came as a complete surprise.

However, there is reason to believe that the Soviet command “overslept” the enemy and the TA attack with attached corps was not at all an attempt to stop the Germans, but was intended to go behind the rear of the SS tank corps, for which its “Totenkopf” division was mistaken.

The Germans were the first to notice the enemy and managed to change formation for battle; the Soviet tank crews had to do this under fire.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The central front, involved in the battle in the north of the arc, suffered losses of 33,897 people from July 5-11, 1943, of which 15,336 were irrevocable, its enemy, Model’s 9th Army, lost 20,720 people during the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which took part in the battle on the southern front of the arc, lost from July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrecoverable. Including the Voronezh Front alone - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed that the losses of their front were 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irrevocable. If, contrary to Soviet documents from the war period, we consider the official numbers of the German command to be correct, then taking into account the German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides here is 4.95: 1.

According to Soviet data, in the Kursk defensive operation alone from July 5 to July 23, 1943, the Germans lost 70,000 killed, 3,095 tanks and self-propelled guns, 844 field guns, 1,392 aircraft and over 5,000 vehicles.

During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front consumed 1,079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh Front used 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front was due to the smaller massing of forces and assets in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.

According to Ivan Bagramyan, the Sicilian operation did not in any way affect the Battle of Kursk, since the Germans were transferring forces from west to east, therefore “the defeat of the enemy in the Battle of Kursk facilitated the actions of the Anglo-American troops in Italy.”

Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov)

On July 12, the Western (commanded by Colonel-General Vasily Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by Colonel-General Markian Popov) fronts launched an offensive against the 2nd Tank and 9th armies of the Germans in the area of ​​​​the city of Orel. By the end of the day on July 13, Soviet troops broke through the enemy’s defenses. On July 26, the Germans left the Oryol bridgehead and began to retreat to the Hagen defensive line (east of Bryansk). On August 5 at 05-45, Soviet troops completely liberated Oryol. According to Soviet data, 90,000 Nazis were killed in the Oryol operation.

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev)

On the southern front, the counter-offensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5 at approximately 18-00 Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway on August 11, and captured Kharkov on August 23. The German counterattacks were unsuccessful.

On August 5, the first fireworks display of the entire war was given in Moscow - in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

The victory at Kursk marked the transfer of strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for the attack on the Dnieper.

After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as the Watch on the Rhine (1944) or the Balaton operation (1945), were also unsuccessful.

Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, subsequently wrote:

According to Guderian,

Discrepancies in loss estimates

The casualties of both sides in the battle remain unclear. Thus, Soviet historians, including Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. M. Samsonov, talk about more than 500 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners, 1,500 tanks and over 3,700 aircraft.

However, German archival data indicate that the Wehrmacht lost 537,533 people on the entire Eastern Front in July-August 1943. These figures include those killed, wounded, sick, and missing (the number of German prisoners in this operation was insignificant). In particular, based on 10 days of reports of their own losses, the Germans lost:

Total total losses of enemy troops taking part in the attack on the Kursk salient for the entire period 01-31.7.43: 83545 . Therefore, the Soviet figures for German losses of 500 thousand look somewhat exaggerated.

According to the German historian Rüdiger Overmans, in July and August 1943 the Germans lost 130 thousand 429 people killed. However, according to Soviet data, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, 420 thousand Nazis were exterminated (which is 3.2 times more than Overmans), and 38,600 were taken prisoner.

In addition, according to German documents, on the entire Eastern Front the Luftwaffe lost 1,696 aircraft in July-August 1943.

On the other hand, even Soviet commanders during the war did not consider Soviet military reports about German losses to be accurate. Thus, the chief of staff of the Central Front, Lieutenant General M.S. Malinin wrote to lower headquarters:

In works of art

• Liberation (film epic)

• "Battle for Kursk" (eng. BattleofKursk, German Die Deutsche Wochenshau) - video chronicle (1943)
• “Tanks! Battle of Kursk" Tanks!The Battle of Kursk) - documentary film produced by Cromwell Productions, 1999
• "War of the Generals. Kursk" (English) GeneralsatWar) - documentary film by Keith Barker, 2009
• “Kursk Bulge” is a documentary film directed by V. Artemenko.
• Composition Panzerkampf by Sabaton