During his speech, the Russian leader wondered whether the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was the only document signed by one of the European countries with Nazi Germany.
“It turns out that this is not at all true. I will simply list them with your permission. So, “Declaration on the Non-Use of Force between Germany and Poland”<…>Signed in 1934. In essence, this is a non-aggression pact,” Putin began.
He went on to name the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935. “Great Britain provided Hitler with the opportunity to have his own navy, which was essentially prohibited to him or reduced to a minimum as a result of the First World War. Then the Anglo-German declaration of Chamberlain and Hitler, signed on September 30, 1938, agreed upon by them on Chamberlain’s initiative,” - the president pointed out.
Putin noted that this is not all. "Franco-German Declaration. The Declaration was signed on December 6, 1938 in Paris by the Foreign Ministers of France and Germany Bonet and Ribbentrop. Finally, the Treaty between the Republic of Lithuania and the German Reich. The Treaty was signed on March 22, 1939 in Berlin<…>that the Klaipeda region is once again reunited with the German Reich. And the non-aggression pact between the German Reich and Latvia of June 7, 1939,” the Russian president listed.
“Thus, the agreement between the USSR and Germany was the last in a series of those that were signed by other European countries, as if interested in maintaining peace in Europe. Moreover, I would like to note that the USSR agreed to sign this document only after it had exhausted all possibilities, all proposals of the USSR to create a unified security system were rejected<…>in Europe," he said.
Next, the president presented excerpts from some archival documents. Thus, he cited the words of the French Prime Minister: “Not only can one not count on Polish support, but there is also no confidence that Poland will not attack from the rear.”
Putin further points out that French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier raised a number of questions with the Polish ambassador. "He asked him if the Poles would let the Soviet troops through. (Józef) Lukasiewicz answered in the negative. Daladier asked if they would let the Soviet airplanes through. Lukasiewicz said that the Poles would open fire on them. When Lukasiewicz answered in the negative and when asked if Poland would come to the rescue , If<…>Germany will declare war on France, the Polish representative replied that no. Daladier replied that he saw no point in a Franco-Polish alliance,” Putin said.
The President of Russia noted that this suggests “that the USSR was ready to provide assistance to Czechoslovakia, which Germany was going to rob.” “But in the agreement between the USSR and Czechoslovakia it was written that the USSR would do this only if France also fulfilled its obligations to Czechoslovakia. France linked its assistance to Czechoslovakia with support from Poland. Poland refused,” he said.
Putin also presented data on what the Polish authorities did when Germany began to lay claim to part of Czechoslovak territory. "They made a demand at the same time, just like Germany, for their share of the spoils<…>They demanded that a certain part of Czechoslovakia be given to them too,” Putin said.
He indicated that the Poles were ready to use force. "There is also a specific document from the archive. From the report<…>on the preparation of an offensive operation on the Teshin region and the training of troops. The Polish authorities trained and sent militants to Czechoslovak territory to commit sabotage and terrorist attacks, and were actively preparing for the division and occupation of Czechoslovakia,” the Russian president said.
He further cited excerpts from the recording of the conversation between the German Ambassador to Poland and the Polish Foreign Minister. “In this document, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland expressed the hope that, further quote, “in the areas claimed by Poland, there will be no contradictions with German interests.” That is, the division of Czechoslovak territory is taking place,” Putin said.
“France and Great Britain did not support Czechoslovakia, which forced it to accept this violence,” the president added.
Putin also read out quotes from the report of the French Ambassador to Germany to French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet dated September 22. The document states that “the proposed annexation of territories would turn into the dismemberment” of Czechoslovakia, and notes that “this is exactly what the Reich needs.”
“France and England, who tried to make concessions and, by satisfying German demands in every possible way, wanted to save the existence of the Czech state, find themselves faced with a united front of three states seeking the division of Czechoslovakia. The leaders of the Reich, who make no secret of the fact that their goal is to erase Czechoslovakia from the map of Europe, they immediately took advantage of the Polish and Hungarian demarche,” Putin said.
He also drew attention to how the agreement between Hitler, Great Britain and France in 1938 was assessed by major world politicians at that time. “We can say that, with rare exceptions, they reacted very positively and optimistically. And only Winston Churchill honestly assessed the situation and called things by their proper names,” he noted.
Putin also quoted from the speech of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov at the League of Nations in September 1938. “Avoiding war today and getting a sure and comprehensive war tomorrow, and even at the cost of the appetites of insatiable aggressors and the destruction of sovereign states, does not mean acting in the spirit of the League of Nations pact. That is, the Soviet Union condemned this event,” the Russian President emphasized.
The Ministry of Defense has declassified unique documents telling about the events of the eve and initial period of World War II, which, in particular, talk about the threat from Poland. The materials were published in the new multimedia section “A fragile world on the threshold of war.”
As the military department noted, the declassified documents give an idea of “why certain decisions were made in such a difficult military-political situation.” The new section is also designed to combat attempts to falsify history and revise the results of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War.
Among the declassified documents are: memo Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Boris Shaposhnikov to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Kliment Voroshilov. It contains military threat assessment, which can be represented by various states either independently or as part of military alliances and blocs.
The degree of importance and secrecy of the document is emphasized by the fact that Shaposhnikov did not resort to the help of a secretary-typist, but wrote the 31-page report on his own. According to Soviet military experts, the most likely threat to the USSR during this period was posed not only by the military alliance of Germany and Italy, but also by Poland, which was “in the orbit” of the fascist bloc.
As Shaposhnikov noted, “The Soviet Union needs to be prepared to fight on two fronts: in the west against Germany-Poland and partly against Italy with the possible addition of limitrophes to them, and in the east against Japan.”
It follows from the document that Germany and Poland on the eve of the war could together expose more than 160 infantry divisions, more than 7 thousand tanks and 4.5 thousand aircraft. For comparison, People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov, during negotiations with the British and French military delegations in May 1939, said that Moscow was capable of fielding 136 divisions and 5 thousand aircraft.
The materials also describe the combat operations of the 2nd German Army Corps during the offensive against Poland in 1939, compiled in 1949 by a prisoner of war, Lieutenant General of the former German army, Hermann Böhme, who held the position of chief of the unit’s operations department during the period of the described hostilities. In them, he describes in detail how secretly, under the guise of exercises, German troops prepared for the attack, and also reveals the sequence of actions of the corps troops during the offensive. The testimony of a German general testifies to the fierce resistance of the Poles and describes the tense course of the battles for Warsaw and the Modlin fortress.
World War II lasted six years from September 1, 1939 to September 2, 1945. Her last fights were fought at Far East. On September 2, 1945, an act of unconditional surrender of Japan, an ally of Germany, was signed on board the American battleship Missouri.
61 states with a population of 1.7 billion people were drawn into the war, military operations were carried out on the territory of 40 states, as well as in sea and ocean theaters. The Second World War was the most destructive and bloody of wars. More than 55 million people died in it. The Soviet Union suffered the greatest casualties, losing 27 million people.
On the anniversary of the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Ministry of Defense published on its website more than 100 pages of declassified memoirs of Soviet military leaders. Documents from the declassified funds of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense include answers from district, army, corps and division commanders to five key questions prepared by the Military Historical Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army.
In 1952, a group was created in the Military Historical Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army under the leadership of Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky, which began developing a description of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.
The assignments were sent to the commanders of districts, armies, corps and division commanders who were in charge in the first days of the war.
The materials received by the Military Historical Directorate, authored by famous Soviet military leaders, were carefully studied and analyzed and formed the basis for fundamental scientific works describing the course of the Great Patriotic War from the point of view of military specialists.
DEREVYANKO KUZMA NIKOLAEVICH
lieutenant general
In 1941 - deputy head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District (North-Western Front)
“The grouping of fascist German troops on the eve of the war in the Memel region, in East Prussia and in the Suwalki region in the last days before the war was known to the district headquarters quite fully and in a significant part of it and in detail.
The uncovered grouping of fascist German troops on the eve of hostilities was regarded by the intelligence department [of the district headquarters] as an offensive group with a significant saturation of tanks and motorized units.”
BAGRAMYAN IVAN HRISTOFOROVICH
Marshal of the Soviet Union
In 1941 - head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Kyiv Special Military District (Southwestern Front)
“The troops directly covering the state border had detailed plans and documentation up to and including the regiment. Field positions were prepared for them along the entire border. These troops represented the first operational echelon.”
“The covering troops, the first operational echelon, were stationed directly at the borders and began deployment under the cover of fortified areas with the outbreak of hostilities.”
“Their advance entry to prepared positions was prohibited by the General Staff so as not to give a reason for provoking war on the part of Nazi Germany.”
On August 20, the exhibition “1939. The Beginning of World War II” opens in the exhibition hall of the federal archives. These are more than 300 documents, almost half of them are originals. Many are rarities, for example, the Non-Aggression Treaty between the USSR and Germany of August 23, 1939 and the secret protocol to it. Or Hitler’s telegram to Stalin with a proposal to accept Ribbentrop on a visit to Moscow and the response letter from the General Secretary of the CPSU (b). For the first time, the exhibition presents copies of foreign captured documents, which are still classified in the source countries. At the same time, it will be possible to get acquainted with electronic images of more than 700 documents on the Internet.
Such an exhibition is far from an ordinary event in the history of research into the origins of the tragedy that broke out 80 years ago. Scientific and public debate is too fierce about those who pushed the world to the abyss, which, according to various estimates, from 50 to 70 million people could not cross. The surest way to find answers to difficult questions of the past is to read the archives carefully and without prejudice, says the head of Rosarkhiv, Andrei Artizov.
Political and diplomatic documents are open. As for the archives of the special services, there are special specifics
Andrey Nikolaevich, to what extent is the topic of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which the USSR and Germany concluded on August 23, 1939, open? Ten years ago, experts claimed that the archives of the President of the Russian Federation contained a huge number of documents classified as “Secret”. What changed?
Andrey Artizov: I speak responsibly: political and diplomatic documents are open. As for the archives of the special services, there are special specifics. Most of it, which does not harm the sources of information, is open. There are certain restrictions, they are natural for the work of any intelligence and counterintelligence agencies.
But we have never shown these materials in such a volume as at this exhibition.
Why will the trophy collection be presented only in copies?
Andrey Artizov: Yes, we have a unique French collection. But in accordance with the 1992 agreement between the Russian Federation and the French Republic, we returned these captured documents to France. They are not very advertised there. Many are still marked Secret. But these are French secrets. Not ours. When we returned them, we copied them.
The pact is a historical fact, which is again used as a political argument in the information war with Russia. Are the accusations of its then leadership of a special, cunning and aggressiveness, not typical of other political players of that time, grounded?
Andrey Artizov: We do hear allegations of Stalin's double game. On the one hand, negotiations with the British and French, on the other, contacts with the Germans. The events of 1939 are often presented in such a way that the Kremlin stuck a knife in the back of potential allies by accepting the Nazis' offer of cooperation. But let's take a closer look at everything. The “knife” was prepared for Moscow by Western partners for a long time. The arrival of the military missions of France and England and long conversations with them became a kind of litmus test for the Soviet leadership. One can argue about how sincerely the British and French were committed to reaching an agreement with the USSR to counter German aggression, but most importantly, and this was fundamental for Moscow, the Western allies did not show readiness to provide military assistance to the USSR in the event of a war with Germany. And Hitler made Stalin an offer that he could not refuse. Stalin, of course, consulted with Molotov, Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Kaganovich, and his closest circle. If we open the leader’s visit log, it clearly records when and who came to his office. During the days of negotiations with the allies, all the people I listed spent hours with him there.
Meeting of the military missions of Great Britain and France at the Leningradsky station in Moscow. August 11, 1939
We returned the captured documents to France. They are not very advertised there. Many are still marked “Secret”. But these are French secrets. Not ours. When we returned them, we copied them
The system of collective security at the end of the thirties practically disappeared, the League of Nations was rapidly losing its position, the political atmosphere thickened, and each country was forced to take care primarily of its own interests. What benefits did the top Soviet leadership see from the Pact for their country?
Andrey Artizov: From their point of view, the agreement had objective advantages. The USSR remained out of the war for an indefinitely long time. The West was involved in a war in Poland, and then, perhaps, had to fight for a long time with Germany. How many? No one could have predicted what would happen in May 1940 and how quickly France would fall apart.
Separate negotiations with Germany became impossible for the West. This is also true. So, after the signing of the Soviet-German Pact of August 23, intensive contacts began between the British leadership and the Germans: Chamberlain’s personal representatives traveled to Berlin with letters... In order not to be unfounded, let me remind you that they were published in official British publications.
The USSR expanded its sphere of influence and had guaranteed support in this matter from Germany. Hitler agreed to large-scale trade and economic cooperation: the Soviet Union gained access to German military technologies, our military specialists visited German factories.
And finally, the situation in the Far East has stabilized. Japan could not decide to take any action against the USSR in the presence of a non-aggression treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union. The last circumstance was of key importance. There had been fighting in the Khalkhin Gol area for several months. And on August 20, two days before Ribbentrop’s arrival in Moscow, the Soviet-Mongolian offensive against the Japanese began. The calculation that the agreement with Germany would affect the Land of the Rising Sun and that it would not decide on further escalation turned out to be correct.
After the news of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, a real political crisis erupted in Tokyo. At the exhibition we will show two encrypted telegrams from Sorge about this. The Japanese found the behavior of Germany's closest ally offensive, violating the secret provision of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which states the need to consult each other when conducting such negotiations. The Japanese government sent an official protest to Berlin. At Ribbentrop's request, State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry Weizsäcker refused to accept him. And on August 28, the Japanese cabinet resigned.
How serious were ideological considerations in Stalin's motives for signing the agreement with Hitler?
Andrey Artizov: Late in the evening of September 7, Stalin, in the presence of Molotov and Zhdanov, received the leader of the Comintern, Dimitrov, and the secretary of this organization, Manuilsky. In his diary, Dimitrov recorded the following explanation from the leader regarding the agreement on the German attack on Poland. “The war is going on between two groups of capitalist countries (poor and rich, in relation to colonies, raw materials, etc.) for the redistribution of the world, for domination over the world. We are not averse to them having a good fight and weakening each other. It’s not bad if with our hands Germany would have undermined the position of the richest capitalist countries, especially England." In other words, the mutual weakening of capitalist countries is beneficial to the world proletariat. It was important for Stalin to explain the situation to his confused comrades in the communist movement, and in terms of the Marxist-Leninist worldview.
What did Hitler explain to his comrades?
Andrey Artizov: He had similar problems. A few days before Stalin’s explanation, the Fuhrer gathered Gauleiters and Reichstag deputies, members of the Nazi Party. The meeting took place on August 28, 1939 in Berlin. He said the treaty with the Soviet Union "was misunderstood by many party members." He emphasized that his attitude towards the USSR had not changed. "It's a pact with Satan to get rid of the devil." And one more thing: “All means are good against the Soviets, including such a pact.” As we can see, the leaders’ explanations did not differ much in the depth of mutual hostility and mistrust. The material and territorial benefits that the treaty brought to the parties did not overcome irreconcilable ideological differences. A future clash between Nazis and Communists was inevitable. And there was a year and a half left before Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union.
How did France and England react to the entry of the Red Army into Poland?
Andrey Artizov: Documents on this topic are also in the exhibition. No one pulled their hair out over this. They understood that the western borders of the Soviet Union had been pushed back, the Soviet Union, and this was a possible ally in a future war with Germany, had become stronger. Here is a coded telegram from Yakov Surits, the USSR plenipotentiary representative in France, who in 1939 was a member of the Soviet delegation to the League of Nations, to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR dated September 23. It talks about the reaction of social and political circles in France to the establishment of a demarcation line between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army on Polish territory along the Curzon line. “Everyone here agrees that the demarcation line between the Soviet and German armies in Poland is extremely beneficial for the USSR. A major victory for Moscow! And not only because a very significant part of Poland was brought under the control of Soviet weapons, but also because a barrier was created against earlier the outlined and most probable paths of Hitler’s offensive against the USSR.”
Secret additional protocol on the delimitation of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR to the Soviet-German Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact. August 23, 1939. The main archival secret of the 20th century.Photo: AVP of the Russian Federation/"1939 The Year of the Beginning of the Second World War"
Stalin concluded a treaty of friendship with Hitler, and French, English, and American politicians, if you listen to Western propagandists, did not stain themselves with contacts with the monster...
Andrey Artizov: There were contacts, and some more. Chamberlain and Daladier drank coffee with him. Roosevelt carried on the correspondence. We received his last official letter (can be seen at the exhibition) from the Political Archive of the German Foreign Ministry. The US President appeals to Hitler: you are inciting war, stop... He responded in the Reichstag with a devastating speech, where in a very ironic manner he stated that he would not allow Germany to be humiliated... Moreover, Roosevelt said in a letter that many nations they are afraid of Germany. So Nazi diplomats immediately formally asked those countries about which the president spoke whether they authorized Roosevelt to be concerned. They were told: no...
Based on archival materials that are available to historians today, is it possible to objectively evaluate the “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”?
Andrey Artizov: This is a natural result of the “policy of appeasement” of the German aggressor, which was carried out by the Western allies (primarily Great Britain and France). The consent of the Soviet leadership to the treaty with Hitler was made in the atmosphere of general mistrust that then developed in Europe.
The documents that can be seen at the exhibition also show what a negative impact the position of the then Polish government had on the course and result of the Moscow negotiations between the military missions of the Allies and the USSR. Why are these materials important? Because this is not a “Russian official” speaking, but French archives. Read and draw conclusions.
***
Document
On July 13, 1939, the French military attaché to the USSR, Palace, addressed Daladier with a note about the strategic situation in eastern Europe and its likely impact on the position of the USSR government on the issue of concluding an Anglo-French-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance:
“Poland is completely isolated from its allies, France and England, as was the case with Czechoslovakia. By its own will, it has, to date, deprived itself of effective Soviet military assistance, refusing any passage of troops through its territory... It seems to me more and more obvious that these considerations did not escape both the Soviet military and Mr. Stalin, whose foreign policy was every day more and more clearly aimed at protecting Russian state interests, having witnessed in 1938 that his mutual assistance agreements with France and Czechoslovakia remained a mere piece of paper because they were not backed by military treaties and because we seemed to constantly evade even simple tripartite staff meetings, the USSR is certainly not going to make the same mistakes today.
The USSR, as it has expressed this many times, including before the opening of the current negotiations, will agree to expose itself to Germany’s attack only if the military problem is resolved satisfactorily, if it considers [joint] actions sufficiently prepared and coordinated to believe in success and consider yourself protected.
The meaning of the long negotiations between the Allies and the Poles boiled down to the following: you and I are civilized people, but the Russians cannot be trusted
The wariness and mistrust that arose during the negotiations will disappear only if clear agreements are developed that establish the responsibilities of everyone in the event of aggression.
“I don’t think that the USSR, having studied the military problem, will henceforth agree to sign and implement a political agreement unless it is convinced that the agreement can be concluded on the basis of military agreements, reliably strengthening, despite all the complexity mentioned, the strength of the eastern front.”
General Palace called on his government to take concrete military and political action to establish “an alliance with Russia in order to create a grouping of forces truly capable of stopping aggression, and perhaps avoiding war.” Obviously, not really believing that his opinion would be listened to, he concluded the note with the following gloomy forecast: “Finally, let me add that I think it is quite possible that if we fail to quickly agree, we will see that the USSR will first isolate itself , taking a neutral wait-and-see position, and then achieve an agreement with Germany based on the division of Poland and the Baltic countries."
Document 2
Recording of a conversation between the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Kliment Voroshilov and the head of the French military mission Joseph Doumenk, which took place on August 22, 1939, the day before the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty. The Soviet Marshal reports that he will not participate in the further work of the Anglo-French-Soviet conference and points out to his interlocutor that the negotiations of the military missions have actually reduced to “marking time” due to the reluctance of the Western powers to conclude a full-fledged agreement with guarantees with the Soviet Union .
"Comrade VOROSHILOV: ...The question of military cooperation with the French has been with us for a number of years, but has never received its resolution. Last year, when Czechoslovakia was perishing, we were waiting for a signal from France, our troops were ready, but so and didn't wait.
gene. DUMENK: Our troops were also ready.
Comrade VOROSHILOV: What’s the matter then? Not only were our troops ready, but also the Government, the whole country, the whole people - everyone wanted to help Czechoslovakia and fulfill their treaty obligations.
American magazine Newsweek. May 15, 1939Photo: Sergey Kuksin.
gene. DUMENK: If Marshal had been in France at that time, he would have seen that everything was ready to fight.
After these events in Europe, if a peace front needs to be created, then it needs to be created now. I repeat that I am at your disposal and ready to work when you want, how you want and with very specific methods.
Comrade VOROSHILOV: If the British and French missions had arrived with all the specific and clear proposals, I am convinced that in just 5-6 days all the work could be completed and a military convention could be signed."
***
I don’t know if the echoes of historical battles are reaching you on social networks, but now there is a real “holivar” on the topic of “preventive war” on the part of the Soviet Union. Again we remembered Suvorov-Rezun with his book “Icebreaker”. By the way, she turns 30 this year. Has the position of Russian science in relation to the version of the development of history presented there changed somehow?
Andrey Artizov: Firstly, there are different points of view in Russian science: this is not Soviet history, where everything was built under one ideology. Secondly, no fundamental research on the topic of the Soviet Union’s preparation for war has appeared recently. Except for the multi-volume “History of the Great Patriotic War,” which is being done through the Russian Ministry of Defense. But this is a collective effort.
As for Rezun himself and his book, a brilliant study assessing his pseudo-professionalism was done by the Israeli scientist Gabriel Gorodetsky. There is nothing more fundamental. And I adhere to his point of view, because it is closest to the truth.
So was Stalin planning to attack Germany or not? Were preparations made for a preventive war?
Andrey Artizov: I'll tell you this: any army in any historical period, if, of course, it deserves the name "army" and there are smart people on its general staff, it must calculate various turns of events and prepare various options for action. Both defensive and offensive. But there is a long distance from preparation to announcement. Because wars are declared not by the military, but by the political leadership.
We have one document from 1939 (it can be seen at the exhibition). They prepared for the arrival of the British and French military missions in Moscow very seriously: the entire composition of the Soviet delegation was the highest, starting with the member of the Politburo, People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Shaposhnikov... The USSR had serious intentions to cooperate with England and France in the war with Hitler, and few doubted that it would happen. So, before the arrival of the allied missions in Moscow, Shaposhnikov prepared a document for Stalin, which was called “Note from the Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov, considerations for negotiations with England and France, the final version reported to Stalin.” It says that the Soviet Union is ready to field 100 divisions. How to evaluate this? As treacherous preparations for war or as real proposals to the allies?
And then future allies arrive: from the French some general, a member of the military council, and from the British an even less significant figure for making serious decisions, a naval adjutant, an admiral...
Or another example of "preparation". 1938, Hitler occupied the Sudetenland. And we have a mutual assistance agreement with Czechoslovakia and France. The USSR announced mobilization, troops were brought up. Even our planes flew to Czechoslovakia. Is this preparation for war? Certainly. Another thing is that France refused to fulfill its obligations, and Czechoslovakia ultimately did not take unilateral military action. Although she had a decent army, very well armed. And Poland categorically prohibited the passage of our troops through its territory to help Czechoslovakia, stated that it would shoot down our planes... Moreover, with the tacit consent of Nazi Germany, Poland received the Cieszyn region. To then find herself surrounded by Germany. So how to evaluate this?
German troops enter Prague Castle. March 1939. Photo: Gettyimages
Andrey Artizov:
Where are the secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact now stored? Why was there so much fog around them?
Andrey Artizov: The German originals were not preserved; during the bombing of Berlin, the MFA archives were lost. But even in the middle of the war, Ribbentrop ordered that copies be made of the most important documents. And he entrusted this to one of his employees. He did it and hid it. Then, finding himself in the American zone under occupation, this man picked up the cache and handed it over to the Americans. They published documents during the beginning of the Cold War. And then the copies were handed over to the Germans.
The Soviet leadership claimed that we did not have the originals. In fact, for some time they were kept in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After Molotov ceased to be People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, the documents were transferred to the Politburo archive. And they were there virtually until the end of the last century. Nobody had access to them. They learned about them after Soviet power collapsed. They were published in 1992 in the journal “New and Contemporary History” by academician G. Sevostyanov. And they were shown for the first time at an exhibition at the Tretyakov Gallery in 1995.
And from the archives of the former Politburo, the originals were again transferred to the Russian Foreign Ministry.
Key Question
Andrey Artizov: Much becomes clear if you read the report of the French military attaché in Warsaw, Mussa, to the French Minister of War Daladier. On August 24, he writes, in particular, that he has been entrusted with the mission to introduce the Polish General Staff to the course of military negotiations with Moscow and tell them about the Russian proposals. And the Russians put forward one condition: the Poles must let them through their territory to fight the Germans.
Musse reports that on August 17, at 21:00, Captain Beaufre arrived in Warsaw, secretly sent by General Dumenk from Moscow: “He verbally conveyed to me all the useful details about the progress of the negotiations in Moscow. From his message it followed that the negotiations were at a standstill. They were practically interrupted. Their resumption depends on a favorable response from the Polish General Staff and, finally, that time is pressing, and this resumption cannot be delayed further than August 20 or 21."
And he further writes that the next day he met with the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army, General Stakhevich. He listened with great attention, without interrupting and taking numerous notes. The French attaché did not utter a single objection to most of the arguments. Let me quote: “Then he expressed surprise and distrust at the Russian proposals.” In particular, Stakhevich said: “I can’t believe that the Russians really want to fight the Germans. It’s so convenient for them to stay on the second line...”. We discussed for a long time, I again stated my arguments, I also insisted on the danger of failure of the negotiations in Moscow. He did not dispute this, regretting that we were at an impasse. As for agreeing to the Russian proposal, he saw it in the darkest colors... Stakhevich: “If the Russians are on our territory, they will remain there. Even having won, Poland will lose part of its territory.”
Ultimately, he concluded: such a decision was beyond my authority.
The next day, August 19, approximately the same thing happened again. Only the British military attaché took part in the conversation. And again the Poles categorically refused to let Soviet troops pass through their territory. The meaning of these long dialogues is something like this: you and I are civilized people, but the Russians cannot be trusted.
The statement that appeared in the press of the German Information Bureau about the upcoming conclusion of a German-Soviet non-aggression pact and Ribbentrop's trip to Moscow on August 23 produced the effect of a bomb exploding in Warsaw.
Summary: the then Polish leadership did not want any alliance obligations or normal interactions with the Red Army and the Soviet Union. It believed it could handle it on its own. And that the French and British will help.
On August 23, the French ambassador in Warsaw made a hasty demarche against Beck (the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs). The minister seemed to waver, but asked for a delay in answering. A new meeting took place on the afternoon of August 23. The Soviet-German treaty, let me remind you, was signed in Moscow on the same day in the evening. At this second meeting, Beck relented, without failing to again demonstrate the deep hostility that the Poles felt towards the entry of Soviet troops. He agreed to the following formulation, with which General Dumenk went to Voroshilov. Here it is: “We (that is, the Poles, French and British) have reached the certainty that in the event of joint actions against German aggression, cooperation between Poland and the USSR, under technical conditions to be determined, is not excluded (or possible).” But it was already too late.
Declassified documents about the first days of the war: directives of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) of the USSR (including a copy of Directive No. 1 of June 22, 1941), orders and reports of commanders of military units and formations, orders on awards, trophy maps and decrees of the country's leadership.
On June 22, 1941, a directive from the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Semyon Timoshenko was transmitted from Moscow. A few hours earlier, soldiers of the 90th border detachment of the Sokal commandant’s office detained a German soldier of the 221st regiment of the 15th Wehrmacht Infantry Division, Alfred Liskov, who swam across the border Bug River. He was taken to the city of Vladimir-Volynsky, where during interrogation he said that at dawn on June 22, the German army would go on the offensive along the entire length of the Soviet-German border. The information was passed on to higher command.
Directive text:
“I convey to the commanders of the 3rd, 4th, and 10th armies the order of the People's Commissar of Defense for immediate execution:
- During June 22-23, 1941, a surprise attack by the Germans on the fronts of the Leningrad Military District (Leningrad Military District - RBC), PribOVO (Baltic Special Military District, transformed into the North-Western Front. - RBC), ZapOVO (Western Special Military District, transformed into the Western Front. - RBC), KOVO (Kiev Special Military District, transformed into the Southwestern Front - RBC), OdVO (Odessa Military District - RBC). An attack may begin with provocative actions.
- The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.
- I order:
- during the night of June 22, 1941, secretly occupy firing points of fortified areas on the state border;
- before dawn on June 22, 1941, disperse all aviation, including military aviation, to field airfields, carefully camouflage it;
- Bring all units to combat readiness without additional increase in assigned personnel. Prepare all measures to darken cities and objects.
No other activities will be carried out without special orders.”
The directive was signed by the commander of the Western Front troops Dmitry Pavlov, the chief of staff of the Western Front Vladimir Klimovskikh, and a member of the Military Council of the Western Front Alexander Fominykh.
In July, Pavlov, Klimovskikh, the chief of communications of the Western Front, Major General Andrei Grigoriev, and the commander of the 4th Army, Major General Alexander Korobkov, were accused of inaction and the collapse of command and control, which led to a breakthrough of the front, and were sentenced by the Supreme Court of the USSR to death. The sentence was put into effect in July 1941. After Stalin's death they were rehabilitated.
Text of the order:
“To the Military Councils of LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO.
On June 22, 1941, at 4 o'clock in the morning, German aircraft, without any reason, raided our airfields along the western border and bombed them. At the same time, German troops opened artillery fire in different places and crossed our border.
In connection with the unprecedented attack on the Soviet Union by Germany, I order..."<...>
<...>“The troops are to attack enemy forces with all their might and means and destroy them in areas where they have violated the Soviet border.
In the future, until further notice from ground troops, do not cross the border.
Reconnaissance and combat aviation to establish the concentration areas of enemy aircraft and the grouping of their ground forces.”<...>
<...>“Using powerful strikes from bomber and attack aircraft, destroy aircraft at enemy airfields and bomb the main groupings of its ground forces. Air strikes should be carried out to a depth of 100-150 km on German territory.
Bomb Koenigsberg (today Kaliningrad. - RBC) and Memel (a naval base and port on the territory of Lithuania. - RBC).
Do not carry out raids on the territory of Finland and Romania until special instructions are given.”
Signatures: Timoshenko, Malenkov (Georgy Malenkov - member of the Main Military Council of the Red Army. - RBC), Zhukov (Georgy Zhukov - Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. - RBC).
“Comrade Vatutin (Nikolai Vatutin - Zhukov’s first deputy. - RBC). Bomb Romania."
Trophy card "Plan Barbarossa"
In 1940-1941 Germany developed a plan for an attack on the USSR, involving a “blitzkrieg war.” The plan and operation were named after the King of Germany and Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I "Barbarossa".
From a brief combat history of the 158th Fighter Aviation Regiment with a description of the exploits of junior lieutenants Kharitonov and Zdorovtsev
The first soldiers to be awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union during the war were pilots Pyotr Kharitonov and Stepan Zdorovtsev. On June 28, on their I-16 fighters, for the first time during the defense of Leningrad, they used ramming attacks against German aircraft. On July 8 they were awarded titles.
Kharitonov's action schemes
After the war, Pyotr Kharitonov continued to serve in the Air Force. He graduated from the Air Force Academy in 1953 and went into the reserves in 1955. He lived in Donetsk, where he worked at the headquarters of the city's Civil Defense.
Scheme of action of Zdorovtsev
After receiving the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on July 8, 1941, Zdorovtsev flew out on July 9 for reconnaissance. On the way back, near Pskov, he entered into battle with German fighters. His plane was shot down and Zdorovtsev died.
Western Special Military District. Intelligence report No. 2
On June 22, 1941, the 99th Infantry Division was stationed in the Polish city of Przemysl, which was one of the first to be captured by German troops. On June 23, units of the division managed to recapture part of the city and restore the border.
“Intelligence report No. 2 headquarters (division headquarters. - RBC) 99 Boratich forest (village in Lviv region. - RBC) 19:30 June 22, 1941
The enemy crosses the San River (a tributary of the Vistula, flowing through the territory of Ukraine and Poland. - RBC) in the Baric area, occupied Stubenko (a settlement in Poland. - RBC) to an infantry battalion. Up to the infantry battalion is occupied by Gurechko (a village on the territory of Ukraine. - RBC), small equestrian groups at 16:00 appeared in Kruwniki (a settlement in Poland. - RBC). At 13:20 the enemy occupied the Przemysl hospital with unknown numbers.
Congestion of up to an infantry regiment on the opposite bank of the San River in the Vyshatce area. Accumulation of infantry/small groups/1 km south of Gurechko.
At 16:00 the artillery battalion was under fire from the Dusovce area (a village in Poland. - RBC). At 19:30, up to three battalions of large-caliber artillery fired at the town of Medyka (a village in Poland. - RBC) from the districts of Majkovce, Dunkovicky, Vypatce.
Conclusions: on the Grabovets-Przemysl front there is more than one infantry division (infantry division. - RBC), reinforced with artillery/unspecified numbers.
Presumably the main enemy group is on the right flank of the division.
It is necessary to establish: enemy action in front of the right [inaudible] division.
Printed in 5 copies."
Signatures: Chief of Staff of the 99th Infantry Division, Colonel Gorokhov, Head of the Intelligence Department, Captain Didkovsky.
