The Nazis began their attack on the USSR with powerful artillery shelling of border areas and air raids on the locations of Soviet troops, airfields, barracks, railway junctions, and cities. Army Group Center, led by Field Marshal F. von Bock, was advancing on Minsk, Smolensk and Moscow. She was opposed by the Western Front, commanded by D. G. Pavlov.

Border guards, pilots, and representatives of all branches of the Soviet troops fought heroically with the enemy. The soldiers of the border outposts, commanded by M.K. Ishkov, A.M. Kizhevatov, I.R. Tikhonov, V.M. Usov, died, but did not leave their combat positions. On the first day of the war, pilots P.S. Ryabtsev rammed enemy planes. A. S. Danilov, S. M. Gudimov, D. V. Kokorev. The bomber crews N.F. Gastello and A.S. Maslov carried out ground rams. On the first day of the war, more than 100 German aircraft were shot down in air battles. The whole world knows the heroic defense of the Brest Fortress. For the immortal feat performed by its defenders, in 1965 the Brest Fortress was awarded the honorary title “Hero Fortress”.

In the first three days of the defense of Minsk alone, soldiers of the 100th Soviet division destroyed about 100 enemy tanks. However, on June 28, 1941, Nazi troops managed to capture Minsk. In a giant “cauldron” west of the Belarusian capital, over 300 thousand soldiers and commanders of the 3, 4, 10 and 13 Soviet armies were surrounded, most of whom were captured by the Germans. Only some of the soldiers were able to break out of the encirclement, others remained in the forests and then moved on to partisan warfare.

In a difficult military-strategic situation in July 1941, units of the Western Front carried out a series of counterattacks. On July 6, troops of the 20th Army under the command of Lieutenant General P. A. Kurochkin launched a counterattack in the direction of Senno-Lepel and threw the enemy back 30-40 km. One of the largest tank battles of the initial period of the war took place, in which more than 1,500 vehicles were involved on both sides. On July 13, troops of the 63rd Rifle Corps, led by Lieutenant General L.G. Petrovsky, crossed the Dnieper, liberated Zhlobin, Rogachev and launched an attack on Bobruisk. On July 22, a 12-day raid began behind enemy lines by the combined cavalry group of Colonel General O. I. Gorodovikov. Glusk and Starye Dorogi were liberated, and a sudden blow was struck against Osipovichi. On July 30, Krichev was released. But, not supported by a general offensive, counterattacks by individual military formations had only temporary tactical success.

The battles on the borders of the Berezina and Dnieper were exceptionally intense. Near Borisov, according to the German General H. Guderian, Hitler’s troops felt the power of the T-34 tanks. On July 14, 1941, near Orsha, a powerful surprise attack on the enemy was carried out for the first time by a battery of rocket launchers (Katyusha) under the command of Captain I. A. Flerov. For 23 days, Soviet troops held back the enemy's onslaught near Mogilev. The battle for Gomel lasted for more than a month. Defensive bloody battles on the territory of Belarus continued from June to August 1941. By the beginning of September 1941, the entire territory of Belarus was occupied by Nazi troops.

The conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in no way changed A. Hitler’s attitude towards Russia as a zone of future colonization. The latest version of the war plan against the USSR, codenamed “Barbarossa” (in honor of Frederick Barbarossa, the German king and Roman emperor in the 12th century), was approved on December 18, 1940. The operation began for many reasons, in particular in connection with the military campaigns in Yugoslavia and Greece were repeatedly postponed, the day of the attack was finally set for June 22, 1941. On the eve of June 21, 1941, having received information from the headquarters of the Kiev Military District about a border defector who claimed that the German offensive would begin on the morning of June 22, after After an hour and a half meeting in the Kremlin, I. Stalin signed Directive No. 1 for military councils to the western military districts, formalized as an order of the People's Commissar of Defense. According to this document: “During 22–23.6.41, a sudden attack by the Germans is possible... The attack may begin with provocative actions. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications. At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kyiv and Odessa military districts should be in full combat readiness to meet a possible surprise attack from the Germans or their allies.” On Sunday, June 22, 1941 at 3:30 a.m., Germany and its allies began military operations along the entire border of the Soviet Union from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea. Directive No. 2, signed at 7:15 p.m., read: “Troops will attack enemy forces with all their might and means and destroy them in areas where they have violated the Soviet border. Using reconnaissance and combat aircraft to establish the concentration areas of enemy aircraft and the grouping of their ground forces. Using powerful strikes from bomber and attack aircraft, destroy aircraft at enemy airfields and bomb groups of his ground forces. A little later, Directive No. 3 was signed, which caused bewilderment in most headquarters of the western fronts. According to it, “... the immediate task of the troops on June 23 - 24... is to encircle and destroy the enemy’s Suwalki grouping with concentric concentrated strikes of the troops of the North-Western and Western Fronts and to capture the Suwalki area by the end of June 24; with powerful concentric strikes of mechanized corps, all aviation of the Southwestern Front and other troops of 5 and 6A, encircle and destroy the enemy group advancing in the direction of Vladimir-Volynsky, Brody. By the end of 24. 6 to take possession of the Lublin region... At the front from the Baltic Sea to the state border with Hungary, I authorize the crossing of the state border and actions without regard to the border.” For the offensive in the area of ​​the Brest Fortress, the Wehrmacht command deployed the 45th Infantry Division (Major General F. Schlieper) and part of the forces of the 31st Infantry Division (Major General K. Kalmukoff) of the 12th Army Corps (Infantry General V. Schroth) 4th Field Army (Field Marshal G. von Kluge) Army Group Center. The 34th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General of Artillery H. Behlendorff) of the 12th Army Corps of the 4th Field Army and the rest of the 31st Infantry Division operated on the flanks. To assist the advancing infantry units, units of the 2nd Panzer Group (Colonel General H. Guderian), aviation of the 2nd Air Fleet (Field Marshal A. Kesselring), artillery, including 600-mm mortars (an artillery gun with a short barrel, intended mainly for the destruction of particularly strong defensive structures - Author) "Thor", nine 210-mm mortars, a regiment of heavy chemical mortars for special purposes, two divisions of special-power mortars, reinforcement units. The German command planned to capture Brest and the Brest Fortress in the very first hours of the war. The fighting in the fortress took on a fierce, protracted character, which the enemy did not expect. Thus, on the territory of the border Terespol fortification, the defense was held by soldiers of the driver course of the Belarusian border district under the command of the head of the course, senior lieutenant F. Melnikov and the course teacher, lieutenant Zhdanov, the transport company of the 17th border detachment, led by the commander, senior lieutenant A. Cherny, together with soldiers of the cavalry courses , a sapper platoon, reinforced squads of the 9th border outpost, a veterinary hospital, and training sessions for athletes. At the beginning of hostilities, the Volyn fortification housed the hospitals of the 4th Army and the 28th Rifle Corps, the 95th medical battalion of the 6th Rifle Division, and there was a small part of the regimental school for junior commanders of the 84th Rifle Regiment, detachments of the 9th th border posts. On the earthen ramparts at the South Gate, the defense was held by the duty platoon of the regimental school.

As a result of bloody battles and losses, the defense of the fortress broke up into a number of isolated centers of resistance. Until July 12, a small group led by P. Gavrilov continued to fight in the Eastern Fort. Later, having escaped from the fort, seriously wounded, P. Gavrilov and deputy political instructor G. Derevianko were captured on July 23, 1941. Subsequently, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated March 24, 1945, for the exemplary performance of combat missions of the command and the heroism and courage displayed at the same time, Sergeant Pyotr Ivanovich Gavrilov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

7. Nazi occupation regime, Policy of genocide.

By tearing apart the entire territory of Belarus and thereby introducing new borders, the Nazis believed that this would facilitate the process of transforming it into a German colony. All civil administrative bodies and departments in the Reichskommissariats were subordinated to the corresponding Reichskommissar, reporting only to the Fuhrer and Minister A. Rosenberg, with the exception of the postal and railway departments, which independently communicated with their imperial ministries. Under the Reichskommissars there were departments: administrative, cultural and political, press, agriculture and food, for the use of labor. In addition, the Main Economic Chamber operated under the Reichskommissariat Ostland, which also had departments: crafts, industry, trade, banks and insurance companies, and transport.

The bodies of civil administration in the occupied territories were commissariats (divided into main commissariats - in Minsk and Baranovichi), district, district, city, local commissariats) and district chiefs (officials of the occupation administration who oversaw local government bodies). the main tasks of city government were as follows: “The city government is in charge of all civil affairs of the city, its property, buildings, lands, living and dead inventory, keeps records of the population, maintaining order and legality in the city, and manages the entire civilian population, caring for its welfare and security." The lowest level of local auxiliary administration were village elders, who were to be appointed by the volost burgomasters from among the indigenous residents of the village, and then approved by the head of the district. Numerous special forces in the form of military counterintelligence were created and operated on the territory of Belarus - Abwehr. The Nazi occupation regime, represented by the German administration and collaborationist military formations, was aimed at the mass destruction of the local population.

In general terms, the fate of the peoples of the USSR, including the Belarusians, was determined in the general plan "Ost", prepared by the Imperial State Security Administration on the orders of Reichsführer G. Himmler in 1940. The first version of the plan, the existence of which was known to a strictly limited circle of individuals , belonged mainly to the territory of Poland. After Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, the fundamental provisions and principles of the Nazi colonialist policy in the occupied territory of the USSR were developed. It should be noted that the full text of the Ost plan has never been found. However, historians have at their disposal a fairly detailed retelling of the theses of this plan. This refers to the comments and proposals of the Reichsführer SS G. Himmler, which came to us in the presentation of E. Wetzel, one of the employees of the Imperial Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories under the leadership of A. Rosenberg.

According to the Ost master plan, it was envisaged to “evict 75% of the Belarusian population from the territory they occupied. This means that 25% of Belarusians, according to the plan of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security, are subject to Germanization... They should also be resettled in Western Siberia.” Which meant their actual destruction.

At the very beginning of the occupation of Belarus, the extermination of the local population was carried out in accordance with the “Order on Commissars” dated June 6, 1941 and the order of Field Marshal W. Reichenau dated October 10, 1941, according to which “the fight against Bolshevism requires taking merciless and energetic actions...” , “the ruthless destruction of racially alien treachery and cruelty, and thereby ensuring the life of the German Wehrmacht in Russia.”

In order to make the extermination of the population more organized and efficient, the Nazis created a system of concentration camps and prisons.

According to the official definition, they can be divided into death camps for prisoners of war (dulags, stalags, oflags), for civilians (SD work camps, women's camps, SS transit camps, penal camps). Of particular note are the concentration camps for the Jewish population - ghettos.

After being captured, military personnel were distributed from divisional collection points to army collection points, from where, after the initial registration, they were sent to transit or transit camps (dulags). The Supreme Command (OKW) determined the number of prisoners who were to be transferred to stationary camps - camps for privates and sergeants (stalags) And officer camps (oflags). Oflags and stalags, which were located in one place for a long time, had barracks for housing prisoners of war. In the Stalags, a large number of work teams were formed from among the prisoners, which were used both in areas of military and civilian subordination. Although, according to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1929, officers should not have been involved in physical labor. However, according to the German side, the corresponding article of this agreement was not valid in relation to the captured junior officers of the Red Army.

If necessary, along with the main camps, separately located satellite camps. The conditions in the concentration camps were specially created for the purpose of natural extinction of both prisoners of war and civilians. In addition to prisoner of war camps, for civilians. On the territory of Belarus, one of the largest death camps, both in terms of territory and in terms of the number of killed, was Trostenets concentration death camp. The largest group of camps for civilians that existed on the territory of occupied Belarus are labor concentration camps, the purpose of which was to use the civilian population as free labor for the needs of Germany and its army. concentration camps like ghetto- place of detention of the Jewish population. On the territory of Belarus, as well as in the Vitebsk region in general, ghettos were created of “open” and “closed” types. “Open” ghettos arose in places with a significant Jewish population, where it was inappropriate to evict them and then protect them. In addition, they also arose in small settlements where the German authorities could not organize security for the “closed” ghetto. In the “open” types, Jews were ordered not to leave their place of residence without permission from the occupation authorities. In these ghettos, as in the “closed” ones, Jews performed forced labor and were required to pay indemnity. It should be noted that the “open” ghetto was temporary in nature - until complete destruction or relocation to a “closed” ghetto, the creation of which was aimed at relocating all Jews to a certain place: a block, street or house (room). The external sign of this type was a fence, which was installed by the Jews themselves and at their expense. Entry and exit from the ghetto could only be done through one or several checkpoints, which were guarded from the outside and inside.

Ghettos began to be created in July - August 1941, mainly in large cities: Vitebsk (July 1941), Polotsk (August 1941), Orsha (September 1941), and then in other settlements (Shumilino, Gorodok , Tolochin, Chashniki, etc.). It should be noted that the largest on the territory of Belarus was the Minsk ghetto.

The occupation authorities sought to obtain from the ghetto everything necessary for the Wehrmacht, the Gestapo and their enrichment through the organization of administrative forms of control within the concentration camp itself. Thus, during the Nazi occupation, a network of concentration camps for prisoners of war and civilians was created on the territory of Belarus. In total, according to archival data, there were about 260 different types of places for concentration and mass extermination of prisoners of war and about 350 for the civilian population.

Punitive operations. In the occupied territory of Belarus, the mass extermination of the local population was carried out not only through the system of concentration camps, but also through punitive operations. More than 140 punitive actions were carried out on the territory of Belarus to suppress resistance, enslave residents of the occupied territory, and plunder property, during which about 5.5 thousand settlements were destroyed, including 630 along with their residents. The burned village of Khatyn became a tragic symbol of these atrocities.

Collaborationism

To strengthen and maintain the occupation regime, the Nazi invaders sought to attract “local personnel.”

The concept of “collaborator” (in French, collaboration) means a traitor, a traitor to the Motherland, a person who collaborated with the German invaders in the countries they occupied during the Second World War. According to M. Semiryagi, “no army acting as occupiers of any country can do without cooperation with the authorities and population of that country. Without such cooperation, the occupation system cannot be functional.” The complex of relationships between them is the essence of collaborationism.

Based on the nature of the activities, three main groups of collaboration can be distinguished on the territory of Belarus during the Great Patriotic War: political, military and economic (economic).

Political collaboration included national radical forces, political parties and organizations, individuals who took the path of political cooperation with the Nazi authorities with the aim of creating, with the help of Germany, Belarusian statehood under Nazi protectorate. At the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War, about 50 Belarusian representatives arrived on the territory of Belarus along with the Wehrmacht, who hoped to occupy various administrative positions. Among them are R. Ostrovsky, I. Ermachenko, V. Ivanovsky and others.

Military collaboration is the most widespread in terms of the number of participants. Can be divided into several groups: 1) local police apparatus, local order service, auxiliary security police formations, railway battalions, so-called “eastern” battalions and Cossack formations, auxiliary construction and other units, Abwehr agents, SD; 2) local self-defense - Belarusian self-defense, Belarusian regional defense (BKO), part of the Polish and Ukrainian OUN - UPA, which collaborated with the Germans, defense villages, Cossack units of Ataman Pavlov and Kaminsky’s detachments.

Economic (economic) collaboration included managers and employees of economic bodies, enterprises and organizations that functioned during the Great Patriotic War, directly or indirectly working for the occupation authorities.

However, everyday collaboration, for example, billeting enemy soldiers or providing them with any services (darning linen, washing, etc.) can hardly be called treason in the criminal sense of the word. It is difficult to blame anything on the people who, at gunpoint of enemy guns, were engaged in clearing, repairing and protecting railways and highways.

To strengthen the “new order,” from September 22, 1941, with the direct assistance of V. Kube, the Belarusian Self-Help began to operate in all districts of Belarus, headed at different times by I. Ermachenko. According to the Charter, this organization was declared as a charitable organization, which “has the goal of eliminating misfortune in Belarus... and creating the opportunity for better cultural development for the Belarusian people.” Belarusian Self-Defense Corps (BSA)- a paramilitary formation to which collaborators paid special attention. To create the appearance that the corps is under Belarusian leadership, the Germans allowed the appointment of Belarusians to all senior command positions: chief (chief commandant) - head of the Central Council of the BNS I. Ermachenko; Chief of Staff of the BSA - Lieutenant Colonel I. Gutko; the chief assistant (“Minister of War”) and head of the military department is Captain F. Kushel. In order to attract young people to his side, as well as organize control over them, V. Kube contributed to the creation of the Union of Belarusian Youth (UBM) on June 22, 1943, similar to the “Hitler Youth”. The goals, objectives, functions and boundaries of the activities of this organization are defined in the charter and program approved by it. Any Belarusian between the ages of 10 and 20, who provided written evidence of Aryan origin and desire to serve Nazism, could join the SBM. Its activities were based on the strict principle of Fuhrerism. In order to emphasize the paramilitary nature of the organization, uniforms, ranks, insignia, as well as official symbols - an emblem and a flag - were introduced.

Guerrilla warfare.

The most important component of the struggle of the Soviet people against the occupiers, an essential factor in achieving victory was the partisan and underground movement. The first partisan detachments included many employees of state security agencies. Already on June 26, 1941, on the territory of the Minsk, Mogilev and Vitebsk regions, they created 14 partisan detachments, which included 1,162 people. Among the first partisan detachments of Belarus, which began their operations at the end of June 1941, were the Pinsk partisan detachment ( commander - V. Korzh) and the partisan detachment "Red October" (commander - T. Bumazhkov). Following them, the Batka Minaya detachments were created (commander - M. Shmyrev). In a short time, the partisan movement in Belarus became a serious force opposing the Nazi troops. The main tasks of the partisan struggle were formulated in the joint directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the Party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions dated June 29, 1941, which stated: “... in areas occupied by the enemy, create partisan detachments and sabotage groups to fight parts of the enemy army, to incite partisan war everywhere, to blow up bridges, roads, damage telephone and telegraph communications, set fire to warehouses, and so on...” For July - September 1941 in the eastern, not yet occupied part of Belarus on short-term courses and in partisan training centers 430 detachments were formed, with more than 8,000 people. partisan formations were separate groups, detachments, battalions and regiments of various sizes. In the winter of 1941, many of them, due to a number of reasons, namely lack of combat experience, support from the “Mainland” and difficult living conditions, lost their combat effectiveness and stopped fighting. Large formations (regiments and battalions), numbering up to several hundred people, broke up into separate detachments and groups. The detachment form of organization of partisan forces was established in all occupied areas, which became the most typical and basic organizational unit of partisan formations. The number of detachments usually amounted to several dozen people. With the rise of the partisan movement, the number of units and their numbers began to grow. Thus, in 1942, many detachments consisted of 150–200 or more partisans. According to GKO Decree No. 1837 of May 30, 1942, at the headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army, Central headquarters of the partisan movement(TsShPD) headed by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)B P. Ponomarenko. The central and front-line headquarters of the partisan movement were tasked with disorganizing the enemy’s rear by deploying mass resistance to the invaders in cities and towns, destroying its communications and communication lines, destroying warehouses and bases with ammunition, weapons and fuel, attacks on military headquarters, police stations and commandant’s offices , administrative and economic institutions, strengthening intelligence activities, etc. The structure of the headquarters was determined in accordance with the assigned tasks. As part of the Central Headquarters, 6 departments were formed: operational, intelligence, communications, personnel, logistics and general. Subsequently, they were replenished with political, encryption, secret and financial departments. Subsequently, by decree of the State Defense Committee of September 9, 1942, it was formed Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement(BSPD) headed by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks) P. Kalinin. Partisan connection- one of the organizational forms of unification of partisan brigades, regiments, and detachments that operated in the territory occupied by the Nazi invaders. Partisan brigade was the main organizational form of partisan formations and usually consisted of 3 – 7 or more detachments (battalions), depending on their size. Many of them included cavalry units and heavy weapons units - artillery, mortar and machine gun platoons, companies, batteries (divisions). The number of partisan brigades was not constant and ranged on average from several hundred to 3–4 thousand or more people. The brigade's management usually consisted of a commander, a commissar, a chief of staff, deputy commanders for reconnaissance and sabotage, an assistant commander for support, a head of medical service, and a deputy commissar for Komsomol. Most brigades had headquarters companies or platoons of communications, security, a radio station, an underground printing house, many had their own hospitals, workshops for repairing weapons and property, combat support platoons, landing sites for aircraft.. The “Oath” was of great importance for raising morale and patriotism Belarusian partisan". In general, in the partisan movement in Belarus During the Great Patriotic War, according to official data, 373,492 people took part. The actions of the partisans included mainly three types of activities: combat, sabotage and reconnaissance, and were carried out in four main forms: operations of individual detachments in one administrative region; actions of a group of detachments and formations in the territory turned into partisan zones and regions; guerrilla operations in cooperation with units of the regular army and raids of partisan formations across enemy-occupied territory.

The most effective method of partisan warfare was sabotage, especially widely carried out on enemy communications. And if at the beginning of the war they were episodic in nature, then later, with the creation of partisan headquarters, they began to be united by a common plan and grew into the form of large operations, coordinated in time and place with the operations of the active army.

Putting sabotage on enemy communications in first place among other types of guerrilla actions, the TsShPD explained this for a number of reasons: the small number of participants and the necessary means compared to other types of operations; small losses of partisans compared to the enemy; the diversion of significant enemy forces to guard their communications, which reduced the enemy’s ability to conduct active operations against the partisans. Wider choice of locations for operations compared to other types of actions, for example, the defeat of garrisons.

To work on enemy communications, the partisans had a variety of mine-explosive and incendiary equipment. Using mines and land mines weighing from 200 g to 10 kg, small groups of partisan saboteurs derailed military trains. In this case, not only the force of the explosion was taken into account, but also the kinetic energy of the train, which increased the destruction of the rolling stock. Tank or infantry battalions, which had a certain strength in battle, were completely helpless against a mine laid by a small group of guerrilla miners or a lone saboteur. "Rail War". In July 1943, the TsShPD developed a plan for an operation called the “Rail War,” the goal of which was to deliver simultaneous widespread attacks on enemy railways, causing their complete disorganization and disrupting enemy operations at the fronts. July 14, 1943 The TSSHPD was sent to the headquarters of republican and regional formations special order “On guerrilla “rail war” on enemy communications” Guerrilla raids. In accordance with the TsShPD plan to implement the GKO order of September 5, 1942, partisan raids began on enemy rear lines, which became one of the most effective forms of activity. Their main tasks were the development of the partisan movement in new regions; attacks on the most important targets in the enemy rear, mainly on his communications; direct assistance to the Red Army; intelligence and introduction of agents; defeat of small enemy garrisons: destruction of traitors and, of course, a safe exit from enemy attacks.

Underground struggle.

Underground organizations and groups on the territory of Belarus began to operate in all fairly large populated areas almost from the first days of its occupation. They were created in different ways: but in most cases independently. Komsomol organizations.

Like the partisan formations, the underground was also engaged in sabotage, combat and political activities. In addition, already in the first months of the occupation, the underground sabotaged various activities of the invaders. The methods of their activities were very different: concealing their professions, damaging equipment and tools, not going to work on time, hiding the harvest, agricultural equipment, etc. Acts of sabotage inflicted significant losses on the enemy, which weakened his strength and eased the position of the Red Army. One of the most numerous and effective was the underground in the Vitebsk region. It consisted of over 200 organizations and groups. Among the underground members of the region are Heroes of the Soviet Union K. Zaslonov (leader of the Orsha underground), V. Horuzhaya (leader of the Vitebsk city underground group), Z. Portnova and F. Zenkova (participants of the underground Komsomol group at Obol station, Shumilinsky district), T. Marinenko (Participant of the Polotsk underground), P. Masherov and V. Khomchenovsky (leader and participant of the Rossony underground organization). In addition to these largest underground organizations, the fight against the enemy on the territory of the Vitebsk region was carried out by patriots of Bogushevsky, Braslav, Verkhnedvinsky, Dokshitsky, Dubrovensky, Lioznensky, Postavsky, Sennensky, Surazhsky, Chashniksky, Sharkovshchinsky districts.

anti-Nazi organizations, which were created mainly on the initiative of former members of the Communist Party of Western Belarus (KPZB) and members of the CP(b)B. In May 1942, on the basis of anti-fascist groups in five districts, the “District Belarusian Anti-fascist Committee of the Baranovichi Region” was created. In addition, the Polish nationalist underground (especially the Home Army) also operated on the territory of western Belarus, led by the Polish government, which was in exile in London. In addition to these largest underground organizations, the fight against the enemy on the territory of the Vitebsk region was carried out by patriots of Bogushevsky, Braslav, Verkhnedvinsky, Dokshitsky, Dubrovensky, Lioznensky, Postavsky, Sennensky, Surazhsky, Chashniksky, Sharkovshchinsky districts.

In the western regions of Belarus, forces with different political orientations acted against the occupiers, which was the result of the recent existence of two different state systems there. In this region arose anti-Nazi organizations, which were created mainly on the initiative of former members of the Communist Party of Western Belarus (KPZB) and members of the CP(b)B. In May 1942, on the basis of anti-fascist groups in five districts, the “District Belarusian Anti-fascist Committee of the Baranovichi Region” was created. In addition, the Polish nationalist underground (especially the Home Army) also operated on the territory of western Belarus, led by the Polish government, which was in exile in London

Thus, in total, during the years of occupation, about 70 thousand citizens of Belarus fought in the ranks of the underground; 10 underground regional party committees and the same number of regional Komsomol committees operated in the occupied territory, as well as 193 inter-district, district and city committees of the CP(b)B and 214 LKSMB.

On the night of June 22-23, front commander Pavlov tried to organize a counteroffensive, but this led to huge losses of manpower and equipment. On June 23 and 24, the 6th and 11th mechanized corps were killed. The front command made attempts to delay the German advance in the Polotsk-Vitebsk region. And this attempt was unsuccessful. On June 25, northeast of Slonim, the tanks of Guderian and Hoth completed the encirclement of units that were retreating from Bialystok. On June 26, the Germans captured Baranovichi, and on June 27, most of the units of the Western Front fell into a new encirclement in the Novogrudok region. 11 divisions of the 3rd and 10th armies were destroyed.

Soviet soldiers put up desperate resistance in defensive battles and showed perseverance and courage. The border guards stood at their borders to the death, until the last bullet. During the week of fighting, the fighters of the border outpost of Lieutenant A. Kizhevatova, located in the area of ​​the Brest Fortress, destroyed about a battalion of Nazis. The fortress defense headquarters was headed by captain I. Zubachev and regimental commissar E. Fomin. Major became the head of defense P. Gavrilov. The defenders of the fortress held out for about a month, although according to the Nazis' plans, only a few hours were allotted for capturing the fortress. The last days of the defense of the fortress are covered in legends. On its walls were written inscriptions known throughout the world: “I’m dying, but I’m not giving up! Farewell, Motherland." In 1965, the Brest Fortress received the title “Hero Fortress”.

Until the end of June 1941, the garrison of the Brest Fortress fought staunchly. In the first days of the war, the crew of captain N.D. Gastello directed his damaged aircraft towards a concentration of enemy equipment and manpower. Pilots P.S. rammed enemy planes in the first hours of the war. Ryabtsev over Brest, A.S. Danilov in the Grodno region, S.M. Gudimov in the Pruzhany area, D.V. Kokarev.

At the beginning of July 1941, the Soviet command attempted to create a defense line along the Western Dvina and Dnieper. There were three days of fighting in Borisov. Heavy fighting took place for Gomel on August 12-19. By the beginning of September 1941, the entire territory of Belarus was occupied by German troops.

During the defense of Gomel, the pilot made his first aerial ram B. Kovzan- the only pilot in the world who made four air rams and survived.

Defense of Minsk: The 100th Rifle Division under the command of Major General took part in the defense of Minsk I. Russiyanova, whose fighters for the first time during the war used the so-called glass artillery - bottles with a flammable mixture to fight tanks. On June 26, 1941, German mechanized units approached Minsk. The troops of the 13th Army held the lines until June 28. The troops of the 100th Infantry Division of Major General I.M. fought heroically. Rusiyanov in the Ostroshitsky town area. By the evening of June 28, German troops occupied Minsk. Retreating to the east, units of the Red Army fought heavy defensive battles. All the burdens of the country's defense were placed on the shoulders of ordinary soldiers. Only on June 29, a directive was given by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to party and Soviet organizations in the front-line regions, in accordance with which additional mobilization into the Red Army was carried out. In June - August, more than 500 thousand residents of Belarus were mobilized.

Lepel counterattack: In July 1941, during the Lepel counterattack of the Red Army troops, one of the largest tank battles at the beginning of the war took place. About 1,600 tanks from both sides took part in it. The enemy was pushed back 40 km.

Battles near Mogilev: The battles in the Mogilev area were very intense. During the defense of the city, which lasted 23 days, the rifle regiment under the command of Colonel distinguished himself S. Kutepova. In just one day of fighting, his fighters destroyed 39 fascist tanks.

On July 14, 1941, near Orsha, rocket artillery (“Katyushas”) was used for the first time - a battery of mortars under the command of a captain I. Flerova.

Results of defensive battles: The two-month defensive battles of Soviet troops in Belarus did not allow the enemy to implement the plan for a lightning war, and made it possible to concentrate reserves and prepare for defense in the Moscow direction.

During the initial period of the war, the Red Army troops were forced to retreat. The reasons for the retreat were that its personnel were preparing mainly for offensive actions, since in the pre-war years the prevailing opinion was that the future war would be offensive, fleeting and on foreign territory. The rearmament of the troops was not completely carried out, the new equipment had not yet been mastered. The armed forces, including that part of them that was stationed in the BSSR, were weakened by repressions that deprived the Red Army of experienced commanders.

The catastrophe of the Red Army at the beginning of the war was a consequence of the existence of a harsh totalitarian regime in the country. One of the reasons for this disaster was the incompetence and self-confidence of the party and state apparatus in the center and locally. In the first days of the war, the leadership of the BSSR called on the population to remain calm and convinced people that the enemy would not pass through. Resolutions were adopted to combat “alarmists.” At the same time, trains were being prepared to evacuate employees of the Central Committee and government agencies. Three days before the occupation, during a tragic period for the people, the leaders of the republic, without announcing a general evacuation, secretly left the city on the night of June 24-25. The defense of the western military districts turned out to be unprepared. As a result of repression of military personnel in the second half of the 30s. About 40% of the most trained, experienced officers, generals, and marshals were destroyed. Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky subsequently stated that without the repressions of 1937, perhaps the 1941 war would not have happened at all.)

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INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I. Causes of defeat at the initial stage of the war. Defensive battles of the Red Army troops in the border regions of the BSSR

1.1 Defense of the Brest Fortress

CHAPTER II. Novogrudok cauldron, defense of Minsk

CHAPTER III. Attempts to organize a line of defense on the Berezina and Dnieper

3.1 Defense of Mogilev

CHAPTER IV. Evacuation of industrial enterprises and collective farm property

CHAPTER V. Help of the population of the Red Army in defensive battles. Extermination battalions and militia units

CHAPTER VI. Results of two months of fighting in Belarus

CONCLUSION

LIST OF REFERENCES USED

INTRODUCTION

In the life of a people there are always meaningful points of development, unique genes of history, in which the nature of national identity, the historical connection of generations, and the civilizational priorities of society and the state are encoded. Such, of course, a meaningful point in our history is the Great Patriotic War, during which the majestic spirit of the Belarusian people, their freedom-loving essence and historical wisdom were most clearly manifested.

The greatest defeat in the history of wars was the defeat of a multi-million army that had powerful weapons and outnumbered the enemy; the death of hundreds of thousands of people who never had time to understand why they had not to participate in victorious military operations on foreign territory, which official propaganda talked so much about in the late 1930s, but to repel the monstrous blow of the well-oiled Wehrmacht machine; the capture - in a matter of days - of an unprecedented number of Soviet soldiers and commanders; lightning-fast occupation of vast spaces; the almost universal confusion of the citizens of a powerful power that found itself on the brink of collapse - all this was difficult to fit into the minds of contemporaries and descendants and required explanation.

The victory over Nazi Germany and its satellites is one of the outstanding events in world history. This is the enduring national and military pride of the Belarusian people. Everyone rose up to fight the fascist invasion: old and young, men and women, all layers of Belarusian society.

The feeling of patriotism of our people during the Great Patriotic War reached its highest intensity. The desire to defend the independence of the country, native land, and home was indomitable.

From the first day of the war, the most alarming situation arose in Belarus, where the Wehrmacht delivered the main blow with its most powerful formation - the troops of Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal F. von Bock. It should be noted that the Western Front opposing him (commander of the Army General D. Pavlov, member of the Military Council - Corps Commissar A. Fominykh, chief of staff Major General V. Klimovskikh) had considerable forces.

Having seized air supremacy, the enemy launched methodical attacks on military headquarters, airfields, communications centers and railways, which completely disrupted command and control of troops, the operation of transport, the delivery of ammunition, fuel, and the transfer of forces.

REASONS FOR DEFEAT AT THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE WAR. DEFENSIVE BATTLES OF THE RED ARMY TROOPS IN THE BORDER REGIONS OF THE BSSR

The fascist German command attached exceptionally great importance to the Western direction, which was one of the main ones during the preparation for the war against the USSR, as well as after the attack on our country. The “Barbarossa Plan” provided for the main efforts to be concentrated north of the Pripyat marshes. Therefore, the enemy attached paramount importance to the attack on this shortest direction, leading through Minsk and Smolensk to Moscow.

The German command took into account that the outcome of the first battles would largely determine the subsequent development of military events. Therefore, it sought, at any cost, to achieve the defeat of Soviet troops in Belarus, primarily in the Bialystok ledge.

The enemy was aware that the retention by the troops of the Western Special Military District of the Bialystok bulge, which jutted deep to the west, could slow down the actions of its troops intended both for the offensive in the Baltic states and in Ukraine. The group of Soviet troops located in the Bialystok ledge could strike both the flanks and the rear of the advancing German troops in the Baltic and Ukrainian directions and disrupt the implementation of the enemy’s plans at the very beginning of the war. It was important for the German command not to give our troops such an opportunity. In addition, and this was the main reason, it believed that by delivering two strikes in converging directions from the Suwalki salient and from the Brest area, it was possible to encircle and then destroy the main forces of the Western Special Military District. Planning a quick defeat of the Soviet troops in Belarus, the Nazis hoped that by solving this problem, they would open the way for the unhindered advance of their armies to Smolensk and, thereby, achieve the most important strategic success in the Moscow direction.

The encirclement and liquidation of Soviet troops in the Bialystok ledge and in the Minsk direction, as well as the development of the offensive on Smolensk and its subsequent advance to Moscow, was entrusted to Army Group Center (commander Field Marshal F. von Bock). In addition to two field armies (4th and 9th), it included two tank groups (2nd and 3rd) (five motorized corps), i.e. as many mobile formations as there were in Army Groups “North” and “South” combined.

On June 21, Army Group Center was deployed in a sector of 550 km from Goldap to Wlodawa and included 50 divisions and two brigades. A total of 51 crew divisions, incl. 31 infantry, 9 tank, 6 motorized, 1 cavalry, 3 security and two motorized brigades (1 motorized and motorized SS regiment "Gross Germany"). Army Group Center had 6 infantry divisions in reserve. The armies of this group were reinforced by significant resources from the reserve of the main command of the ground forces. They were assigned a large number of artillery battalions, sapper and construction battalions, pontoon-bridge parks and various special forces units. For aviation support of the actions of Army Group Center, the 2nd Air Fleet (Field Marshal A. Kesselring) was allocated, which had 1677 aircraft in its air formations.

The idea of ​​the operation of Army Group Center was to attack with two large strike groups on the flanks, split the Soviet troops in Belarus, encircle and destroy them between Bialystok and Minsk, and then further advance to the Smolensk region to create the preconditions for the interaction of mobile troops with the group armies "North" with the aim of destroying Soviet troops in the Baltic states and in the Leningrad region.

The analysis shows that in terms of personnel, the enemy outnumbered the Soviet troops on average by 2.5 times; in terms of tanks, aircraft, guns and mortars, the superiority was on the Soviet side. However, in the direction of the main attack in the 4th Army zone, the German superiority was

The defense was based on the persistent retention of fortified areas and field fortifications along the state border. The direction of concentration of the main efforts in defense was determined in the following directions: Suwalki, Lida; Suwalki, Bialystok; from the front: Ostrolenka, Malkina-Gurna to Bialystok; Siedlce, Volkovysk; Brest, Baranovichi. According to the plan, the defense was supposed to be active. In the event of an enemy penetration, all defending troops and reserves had to be prepared, on the instructions of the High Command, to launch swift counterattacks in order to defeat enemy groups, transfer hostilities to its territory and capture advantageous positions. Based on this task, a group of forces and means was created and prepared, and the territory of the district was equipped. Options for action by the district troops were developed in detail, taking into account the expected directions of the enemy’s attack. A strong offensive group of troops was created in the Bialystok bulge, which included the main forces of the first echelon of the ZapOVO (19 divisions out of 26, including all tank divisions), ready to deliver a crushing retaliatory blow in the event of an enemy attack in accordance with the plan for covering the state border. Most of them were part of the 10th Army, concentrated in the central part of the ZapOVO in the Bialystok salient.

In total, ZapOVO as part of the ground forces had 44 divisions (including 12 tank, 6 motorized, 3 airborne, 3 artillery brigades, 8 URs, 8 aviation divisions, 2 air defense brigades and other units). ZAPOVO can be described as one of the strongest military districts in the Red Army. In terms of its composition, it was second only to the Kyiv Special Military District. In ZapOVO, together with the Pinsk military flotilla, there were: over 673 thousand personnel, over 14 thousand guns and mortars, about 2900 tanks (of which 2189 were serviceable, including 383 new), 1909 aircraft (of which 1549 were serviceable). This constituted a quarter of the troops concentrated in the western districts. The Pinsk military flotilla included 31 boats, 7 monitors, 4 gunboats, an air squadron (10 aircraft), an anti-aircraft artillery division and a company of marines. In addition, on the territory of Belarus there were 11 border detachments, which numbered 19,519 people. 3 Belarusian Border District and a regiment of operational troops of the NKVD. At the same time, the old state border was guarded, where there was a border barrier zone - 5 border detachments served in it.

Alerted on the morning of June 22, the district's troops found themselves under attack from enemy ground and air forces. The forward formations of the 3rd, 10th and 4th armies, not having time to occupy the defensive lines provided for by the plan, were forced to engage in oncoming battles and battles on the move when advancing to cover areas, separately, in parts, without proper operational formation, under continuous strikes by enemy aircraft, and conduct defensive battles in unprepared positions. As a result, troop control was largely paralyzed.

Enemy strike groups, as was provided for by the plan of Hitler’s command, launched an offensive on the flanks of the Bialystok bulge from areas west of Grodno and south of Brest. The right flank of the 3rd Army of General V.I. Kuznetsov was open. In a strip 40 km wide, one 56th Infantry Division of Major General S.P. Sakhnov was forced to enter into battle against 3 infantry divisions of the 8th Army Corps of the Germans.

Unable to withstand the onslaught of superior enemy forces, the troops of the 4th Army (42nd and 6th Rifle Divisions) were forced to retreat. By the end of June 22, the Pinsk military flotilla as an advance detachment reached the Kobrin area, but could not establish contact either with the headquarters of the 4th Army or with the formations of the 28th Rifle Corps. On the first day of the war, the enemy managed to advance 60 km in the Brest-Baranovichi direction and occupy Kobrin.

From the first days of the war until the 20th of July, for almost a month, being completely surrounded, the defenders of the Brest Fortress, where the enemy had a 10-fold superiority in forces, repelled the fierce attacks of the enemy.

On the very first day of the war, June 22, 26 Soviet airfields, where the most combat-ready aviation regiments were based, were subjected to massive air raids. Having inflicted great damage on our aviation, the enemy seized air supremacy. During the first day of fighting, the Western Front Air Force lost 738 aircraft, of which 528 aircraft were on the ground, which amounted to about 40% of the Western Front's aircraft fleet or 63.7% of all aviation losses on the Soviet-German front on June 22. Having learned about this, the commander of the Air Force of the Western Front, Hero of the Soviet Union, holder of 2 Orders of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner, Major General Ivan Ivanovich Kopec, shot himself.

During June 22, the enemy landed several tactical airborne assault forces in the rear of the Western Front, which caused great damage to rear services and disrupted communications.

By the end of the first day, the enemy strike groups had advanced 35 km, and in some directions up to 70 km. There was a threat of deep envelopment of both wings of the Western Front by enemy tank formations. The troops of the 10th Army operating in the center of the front were under threat of encirclement.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that the front command lost control of the troops. Communication with armies and divisions was systematically disrupted. The fighting, based on fortified areas, was focal in nature. Trying to turn the tide of events, the Soviet command on the evening of June 22 set a task for the front troops: to launch a counterattack with combined arms armies and mechanized corps, with the support of front-line and long-range bomber aviation, and by the end of June 24 to encircle and defeat the invading enemy in the Suwalki area. Moreover, the main attention was focused on the destruction of the infantry formations that had broken through in the Grodno area, followed by an attack on the flank of the Suvalka group of Germans.

On June 23 and 24, bloody battles took place in the Grodno region, in which both sides suffered heavy losses. After the capture of Grodno by the Germans on June 24, the front commander clarified the task of Boldin’s group (6, 11 mk, 36 cd) and the 3rd Army. They were ordered to capture the city and advance 70 km. However, this task did not take into account the real situation. Although Boldin’s group managed to pin down significant enemy forces in the Grodno region for two days and inflict significant damage on them, they failed to capture the city. The counterattack somewhat eased the position of the 3rd Army. The enemy's offensive was delayed. In some areas, German troops were thrown back. However, it was not possible to develop the success. The command of Army Group Center transferred two additional army corps from the reserve and turned back some units of the 3rd Panzer Group of G. Hoth. Enemy aircraft, having seized the initiative in the air, continuously bombed the battle formations of the Soviet troops. Mechanized corps were forced to blow up or burn dozens of damaged tanks on the battlefield, without being able to evacuate them, so that they would not fall to the enemy. To avoid encirclement, the 3rd Army retreated beyond the Neman.

The hastily organized counterattack of the 14th Mechanized Corps of the 4th Army on the left wing of the Western Front did not bring noticeable success. The position of the 4th Army, especially in the center, was becoming critical. The gap with the troops of the North-Western Front on the right wing, where the tank group of G. Hoth rushed, and the difficult situation on the left wing, where the 4th Army was retreating, created a threat of deep coverage of the entire Bialystok group from both the north and the south. The commander of the Western Front, General D.G. Pavlov, decided to strengthen the 4th Army with the 47th Rifle Corps, while at the same time the 17th Mechanized Corps was transferred from the front reserve to the river. Sharu to create a defense there. However, it was not possible to create a strong defense along the river. Enemy tank divisions crossed the river. Sharu and on June 25 approached Baranovichi.

The position of the troops on the Western Front became increasingly critical. Of particular concern was the northern wing, where an uncovered gap of 130 km formed. The front troops were unable to delay the enemy in the border zone and eliminate his deep breakthroughs. Enemy strike groups bypassed the flanks of the 3rd and 10th armies, creating a real threat of encirclement. Under the onslaught of the enemy, the troops were forced to retreat, fighting rearguard battles.

By the end of the fourth day of the war, tank formations of Army Group Center had advanced deep into Soviet territory up to 200-250 km. As a result, more than 60 front-line warehouses and bases with property and weapons, located in a zone from 30 to 100 km from the state border, were either blown up and burned, or abandoned. The front lost from 50 to 90% of the reserves of fuel, ammunition, clothing and armored vehicles created in peacetime. This led to the fact that already in the first days of the war there was not enough combat equipment and food both to supply the troops at the front and for the newly formed units and formations.

On June 30, for loss of command and control of the troops, General D.G. Pavlov was removed from his post, and Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko was appointed in his place. On July 2, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko was appointed commander of the Western Front.

One of the first strategic defensive operations of the Red Army, which later received the name Belarusian, was completed. In 18 days, the troops of the Western Front suffered a crushing defeat. Of the 44 divisions that were originally part of the front, 24 were destroyed (rifle - 10, tank - 8, mechanized - 4, cavalry - 2), the remaining 20 divisions lost from 30% to 90% of their forces and assets. The front lost (captured by the enemy, blown up during the retreat by friendly troops, destroyed by enemy aircraft and for other reasons) 32 fuel depots out of 45 and all ammunition depots. The total losses of Soviet troops were: 417,729, and with the Pinsk military flotilla - 417,780 people. Of these: non-refundable - 341,073 people, sanitary - 76,717 people.

The front lost 9,427 guns and mortars, over 4,799 tanks and 1,797 aircraft. Despite this, the pilots of the Western Front destroyed 143 enemy aircraft on the first day of the war, and 708 during the entire defensive operation, which amounted to about 40% of the initial composition of the enemy’s 2nd Air Fleet. Leaving almost all of Belarus, the troops retreated to a depth of 450 to 600 km, creating the threat of a breakthrough on the move to Smolensk.

German losses amounted to about 40 thousand soldiers and officers. Considering that the fascist German troops lost over 100 thousand people in the initial period of the war, the Western Front accounted for 40% of the losses inflicted on the enemy. General F. Halder, on July 4, on the 13th day of the war, noted with concern that 50% of the regular number of combat vehicles remained in service in the 3rd Tank Group. General G. Guderian reported that by July 12, the 2nd Panzer Group had lost 6 thousand people, incl. 400 officers - most of them are commanders and chiefs.

The defensive operation in Belarus provided the first experience in preparing and conducting similar operations of the Great Patriotic War in conditions of limited time, a sharply changing situation, the use of large masses of tanks, aircraft, and a large number of airborne assault forces. Resistance on intermediate lines, counterattacks of mechanized corps and combined arms formations caused significant damage to Army Group Center and slowed down the pace of its offensive, which made it possible for the Soviet command to deploy troops of the 2nd strategic echelon, which then delayed the advance of German troops in Smolensk for 2 months battle of 1941

1.1 DEFENSE OF THE BREST FORTRESS

On the eve of the war

By June 22, 1941, 8 rifle battalions and 1 reconnaissance battalion, 1 artillery regiment and 2 artillery divisions (anti-tank and air defense), some special forces of rifle regiments and units of corps units, assemblies of the assigned personnel of the 6th Oryol and 42nd rifle divisions were stationed in the fortress 28th Rifle Corps of the 4th Army, units of the 17th Red Banner Brest Border Detachment, 33rd Separate Engineer Regiment, part of the 132nd Battalion of NKVD Convoy Troops, unit headquarters (division headquarters and 28th Rifle Corps were located in Brest) , only 7-8 thousand people, not counting family members (300 military families).

The assault on the fortress was entrusted to the 45th Infantry Division of Major General Fritz Schlieper (about 17 thousand people) with reinforcement units and in cooperation with units of neighboring formations (31st Infantry and 34th Infantry Divisions of the 12th Army Corps of the 4th German army). According to the plan, the fortress should have been captured by 12 o'clock on the first day of the war.

Storming the fortress

On June 22 at 3:15 (European time, 4.15 Moscow time) hurricane artillery fire was opened on the fortress, taking the garrison by surprise. As a result, warehouses and water supply were destroyed, communications were interrupted, and major losses were inflicted on the garrison. At 3:45 the assault began. The surprise of the attack led to the fact that the garrison was unable to provide a single coordinated resistance and was divided into several separate centers. The Germans encountered strong resistance at the Terespol fortification, where it came to bayonet attacks, and especially at Kobrin, which ultimately held out the longest; the weaker one was on Volynsky, where the main hospital was located. About half of the garrison with part of the equipment managed to leave the fortress and connect with their units; by 9 o'clock in the morning the fortress with the 3.5-4 thousand people remaining in it was surrounded. The Germans aimed primarily at the Citadel and quite quickly managed to break into it across the bridge from the Terespol fortification, occupying the club building (former church) dominating the fortress. However, the garrison launched a counterattack, repulsed German attempts to capture the Kholm and Brest Gates (connecting the Citadel with the Volyn and Kobrin fortifications, respectively) and on the second day returned the church, destroying the Germans entrenched in it. The Germans in the Citadel were able to gain a foothold only in certain areas

By the evening of June 24, the Germans captured the Volyn and Terespol fortifications; the remnants of the latter's garrison, seeing the impossibility of holding out, crossed to the Citadel at night. Thus, the defense was concentrated in the Kobrin fortification and the Citadel. The defenders of the latter tried to coordinate their actions on June 24: at a meeting of group commanders, a consolidated combat group and headquarters were created, headed by Captain Zubachev and his deputy, regimental commissar Fomin, as announced in “Order No. 1.” An attempt to break out of the fortress through the Kobrin fortification, organized on June 26, ended in failure: the breakthrough group was almost completely destroyed, its remnants (13 people) who escaped from the fortress were immediately captured.

At the Kobrin fortification, by this time all the defenders (about 400 people, under the command of Major P. Gavrilov) were concentrated in the Eastern Fort. Every day the defenders of the fortress had to repel 7-8 attacks, and flamethrowers were used; On June 29-30, a continuous two-day assault on the fortress was launched, as a result of which the Germans managed to capture the headquarters of the Citadel and capture Zubachev and Fomin (Fomin, as a commissar and a Jew, was handed over to one of the prisoners and immediately shot; Zubachev subsequently died in the camp). On the same day, the Germans captured the East Fort.

The organized defense of the fortress ended here; only isolated pockets of resistance remained (any large of them were suppressed over the next week) and single fighters who gathered in groups and scattered again and died, or tried to break out of the fortress and go to the partisans in Belovezhskaya Pushcha (some even succeeded) . So, Gavrilov managed to gather a group of 12 people around him, but they were soon defeated. He himself was among the last to be captured wounded - on July 23. One of the inscriptions in the fortress reads: “I am dying, but I am not giving up. Goodbye, Motherland. 20.VII.41" According to witnesses, shooting was heard from the fortress until the beginning of August.

Memory of the defenders of the fortress

For the first time, the defense of the Brest Fortress became known from a German headquarters report, captured in the papers of the defeated unit in February 1942 near Orel. At the end of the 1940s. the first articles about the defense of the Brest Fortress appeared in newspapers, based solely on rumors; in 1951, the artist P. Krivonogov painted the famous painting “Defenders of the Brest Fortress.” The real details of the defense of the Brest Fortress were not reported by official propaganda, partly because the surviving defenders of the fortress (P. Gavrilov, A. Fil, P. Klypa, etc.) were at that time in the Gulag camps. The credit for restoring the memory of the heroes of the fortress largely belongs to the writer and historian S. S. Smirnov, as well as K. M. Simonov, who supported his initiative. The feat of the heroes of the Brest Fortress was popularized by Smirnov in the book “Brest Fortress” (1957, expanded edition 1964, Lenin Prize 1965). After this, the theme of the defense of the Brest Fortress became an important symbol of official patriotic propaganda, which attached great importance to the feat of the defenders: for example, the TSB says: “For almost a month, the heroes of the Brest Fortress pinned down an entire German division.”

On May 8, 1965, the Brest Fortress was awarded the title of Hero Fortress, with the presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal. Since 1971 it has been a memorial complex. On the territory of the fortress, a number of monuments were built in memory of the heroes, and there is a museum of the defense of the Brest Fortress.

NOVOGRUDKIY CAULDRON, DEFENSE OF MINSK

From the first day of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Tens of thousands of Minsk residents joined the Red Army. The party organization of the city did everything to help the regular troops repel enemy attacks; combat workers' squads and destruction battalions were created. The Nazi hordes approached the city on June 25. The evacuation of industrial enterprises and the population began from Minsk.

By the end of the fourth day of the war, on both the right and left wings of the Western Front, German tank formations had advanced up to 200 km deep into Soviet territory. As a result of the two-sided enemy envelopment of the main forces of the Western Front, the threat of their complete encirclement was created. On June 25, Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov, who was at the headquarters of the Western Front, reported to Headquarters about the current situation and asked for permission to immediately withdraw front troops from the Bialystok ledge to the line of the old fortified areas. Permission was received, and on the same day the Military Council of the front issued a directive to the troops for a general withdrawal. However, it was not possible to complete it completely. Events at the front developed rapidly. Already on June 26, the forward detachments of the 2nd and 3rd German tank groups broke through to the approaches to Minsk. Here they were met by formations of the 2nd and 44th Rifle Corps hastily advanced to the line of the Minsk fortified region, led by the 13th Army under the command of General P. M. Filatov. Having deployed on a front of over 100 km, they successfully repelled attacks by enemy tank units during June 26-28.

The 13th Army, consisting of the 2nd and 44th Rifle Corps and the 20th Mechanized Corps, without materiel, was ordered to organize the defense of Minsk along the line of Pleshchanitsa - Minsk and Slutsk fortified areas. The Germans bypassed the Minsk fortified area and linked up with a parachute landing in the Smelovichi area, cutting off the Minsk-Borisov highway. In the western direction, the attack groups of the 3rd and 2nd tank groups on the approaches to Minsk were met by artillerymen of the 13th Army. The artillery provided the infantry with barrage and concentrated fire; when German tanks broke through to the artillery firing positions, the tanks were destroyed by direct fire. Thus, direct fire from the 6th battery of the 49th corps artillery regiment destroyed 10 tanks and assault guns. The fire of the 151st Corps Artillery Regiment knocked out 8 tanks and destroyed up to a company of the enemy. In just one day, the Germans lost 34 tanks and assault guns. From June 22 to 26, the commander of the 45 mm anti-tank gun R. Sinyavsky and gunner A. Mukozobov knocked out 17 tanks and assault guns.

From the first days of the war, fighting in the air was fierce. Acting selflessly, Soviet pilots sought to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy. Often, having used up all their ammunition, they went to ram enemy aircraft. This is what D.V. Kokorev, I.I. Ivanov, L.G. Butelin, M.P. Zhukov, S.I. Zdorovtsev, P.T. Kharitonov, P.S. Ryabtsev, A. did in those June days. S. Danilov and others. On June 26, in the Belarusian sky, a feat unparalleled in courage and dedication was accomplished by the squadron commander of the 207th Aviation Regiment of the 42nd Bomber Division, Captain N. F. Gastello and members of the crew of his bomber, Lieutenants A. A. Burdenyuk, G. N. Skorobogaty and Senior Sergeant A. A. Kalinin. When the plane shot down by the enemy caught fire in the air, they, filled with burning hatred for the enemy, refused to parachute out and directed the flaming car towards a concentration of German troops.

After two days of fighting on the approaches to Minsk, the strike groups of the 3rd and 2nd German tank groups managed to break through the defenses of the 13th Army in a number of areas. On June 28, they united in the area of ​​the capital of Belarus, intercepting the escape routes of most of the divisions of the 3rd and 10th armies. The front command, having failed to organize defense, allowed the enemy to break through to the northern and southern outskirts of Minsk. As a result, German troops cut off the escape routes to the east of the 3rd and 1st armies. Who found themselves surrounded in the area between Bialystok and Minsk. The encircled Soviet troops pinned down the 21st division of Army Group Center, which could not advance further east, deep into the USSR. Until July 8, most of the troops on the Western Front fought stubborn battles behind enemy lines. Outside the encirclement ring, 16 bloodless divisions were held back by formations of the 2nd and 3rd German tank groups.

West of Minsk, in a vast area, the center of which was Nalibokskaya Pushcha, part of the forces of the 13th Army was also surrounded. Cut off from the rest of the front forces, deprived of centralized control and communication with the front command, the encircled troops continued to fight, pinning down about 25 enemy divisions (almost half of the German Army Group Center, including significant forces of its tank groups).

In the battles near Minsk, the 100th Infantry Division under the command of General I.N. Russiyanov especially distinguished itself. In the period from June 26 to 30, the formation caused heavy damage to units of the 39th Motorized Corps of the 3rd German Tank Group3. After these battles, as noted in the combat log of the 2nd Rifle Corps, the enemy began to use their tanks against the 100th Rifle Division with greater caution, since its soldiers had learned to fight effectively against them.

The protracted struggle in the western regions of Belarus caused discontent at Hitler's headquarters. On July 5, the main command of the ground forces demanded that the command of Army Group Center speed up the liquidation of the pocket near Novogrudok in order to free up infantry divisions to relieve the formations of the 2nd and 3rd tank groups connected near Minsk and subsequently advance them behind the tank forces to the Dnieper. However, the German infantry divisions were unable to quickly replace the tank formations, which were drawn into heavy battles with the encircled group. They failed to reliably block Soviet troops near Novogrudok. At the end of June and beginning of July, the encircled units in large groups came out to join the main forces on the Berezina and in the area between the Berezina and Dnieper rivers.

The units remaining near Novogrudok continued fighting until July 8. Many brave sons of the Motherland died brave deaths. Many took refuge in the forests and launched partisan operations behind enemy lines.

On July 9, the pocket was cleared by German troops, as a result, 328,898 people were captured, including several generals, and more than 3,000 tanks and about 1,800 artillery pieces were captured. The Soviet command, using the time gained, moved new formations from the depths of the country to the border of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers.

During the Second World War, Novogrudok was under German occupation from July 1941. One of the tragic events of the beginning of the war was the encirclement of Red Army units in the so-called. "Novogrudok cauldron". During the war years, over 45 thousand people died in Novogrudok and the region. About 60% of the housing stock in the city was destroyed. 11 divisions from the 3rd, 10th, 4th and 13th armies, stationed at the very western border, exhausted, battered, without equipment, scattered, finding themselves surrounded near Novogrudok, hampered offensive operations for more than a week 25 German divisions, which amounted to half the troops of Army Group Center

In June - July 1941, a huge number of our troops fell into the cauldron near Novogrudok.

In the first 2 weeks, out of 672 thousand soldiers, 417 thousand were irretrievably lost! 23 thousand of our people died every day. And the defeat of those who remained ended in the Novogrudok cauldron. The encirclement of disparate groups of people slammed shut. On 600 hectares of Nalibotskaya Pushcha from June 28 to July 8 they were simply mercilessly finished off. Of all those who retreated, about 100 thousand people remained, they then went to staff other divisions

Thus, during the offensive in the western direction, the enemy achieved major operational successes: he inflicted a heavy defeat on the troops of the Western Front, captured a significant part of Belarus and advanced to a depth of over 300 km. There was a threat of a quick exit of enemy mobile formations to the Dnieper and their breakthrough to Smolensk. To eliminate this threat, the Headquarters decided to accelerate the movement of the second strategic echelon troops to the line of the Dnieper and the upper reaches of the Western Dvina. At the beginning of July, these troops entered into battle with the advanced detachments of German tank groups, which broke through in certain sectors to the Dnieper and Western Dvina. The enemy, counting on further unhindered advance into the interior of the country, again met stubborn resistance from Soviet troops.

ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE A DEFENSE LINE ON THE BEREZINA AND DNEPR

In early July, fierce fighting broke out between the Berezina and Dnieper rivers. All attempts to cross the Dnieper were thwarted by the active actions of the mechanized corps. In an effort to capture the Dnieper line as quickly as possible and develop an offensive on Smolensk, the German command on July 3 united the mobile forces (2nd and 3rd tank groups) into the 4th Tank Army, including several army corps. Its leadership was entrusted to the management of the 4th Field Army of Field Marshal G. Kluge. The formations that were previously part of the 4th Field Army and continued fighting west of Minsk with the encircled group of Soviet troops were reassigned to the control of the 2nd Field Army of General M. Weichs, advanced from the OKH reserve.

The Soviet command, seeking the speedy restoration of the defense line in this direction, took measures to strengthen and strengthen the Western Front. On July 2, the Headquarters transferred the 22nd, 19th, 20th and 21st reserve armies to its composition. On the same day, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, took command of the Western Front.

On July 3-4, the forward detachments of the 4th German Tank Army managed to break through to the Western Dvina north-west of Polotsk and to the Dnieper near Rogachev. There they were detained by the advanced formations of the reserve armies that entered the battle.

During the fighting from June 22 to July 9, the troops of the Western Front did not complete the tasks assigned to them. Soviet troops, having suffered heavy losses, left Belarus and, retreating 550 km from the state border, approached the Dnieper. The defeat of the troops of the Western Front led to a breakthrough of the strategic front in the Minsk direction, where a gap more than 400 km wide opened in the defense of the Soviet troops. The defensive operation of the Western Front ended in a crushing defeat, 8 tank, 4 mechanized, 2 cavalry and 10 rifle divisions were defeated, a total of 24 out of 44 that began hostilities, the remaining divisions lost from 30 to 90 percent of their forces and assets. 45 ammunition depots and 32 fuel depots were destroyed. Losses amounted to 341,073 people killed and 76,717 people wounded, 9,427 artillery pieces and mortars, more than 4,800 tanks and about 1,800 aircraft. German losses amounted to about 40,000 people.

The German command, having reached the Dnieper, believed that the path to Moscow was open to them. There was a threat of access directly to Smolensk. On July 10, the Battle of Smolensk began on a front of 650 km and a depth of up to 250 km, a new stage of the armed struggle in the Western strategic direction, and ended on September 10.

These days, in the center of the front, fighting took place on the Berezina River, and was especially stubborn in the area from Borisov to Bobruisk. The 1st Moscow Motorized Rifle Division under the command of Colonel Ya. G. Kreizer, cadets of the Borisov Tank School, the 100th Rifle Division and a combined detachment of the 4th Army detained the enemy for two to three days. Only with the advancement of the second echelon of the 4th Tank Army did the enemy manage to cross the Berezina. During the retreat, Soviet troops continued to conduct holding battles.

The forward formations of the 22nd, 20th and 21st armies sequentially entered the battles. From July 6 to July 10, the 5th and 7th mechanized corps of the 20th Army of General P. A. Kurochkin launched a counterattack on the divisions of the 3rd Tank Group in the Lepel direction in the Senno area and detained them for several days. It took the Nazis about a week to cover the space between the Berezina and Dnieper rivers.

Front-line aviation and the 3rd Long-Range Bomber Corps took part in repelling enemy tank attacks. On the approaches to the Dnieper, the 401st Fighter Aviation Regiment, equipped with new MiG-3 aircraft, distinguished itself. It was headed by the combat commander, Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Colonel S.P. Suprun. The regiment's pilots made 5-6 combat missions every day. In one of the air battles on July 4, the regiment commander was killed. He was awarded posthumously a second Gold Star medal, becoming the first twice Hero of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War.

The troops of the Western Front stubbornly resisted the enemy, but were unable to stop him in front of the Dnieper. By July 10, divisions of the 3rd and 2nd German tank groups reached the approaches to Polotsk, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and the Dnieper in the Zhlobin, Rogachev area. Their onslaught was repelled by part of the reserve formations transferred to the Western Front.

The enemy, who had greater maneuverability, prevented the advance concentration and consolidation of Soviet troops on the planned defensive lines or in the initial areas for counterattacks. The units withdrawing from the border areas were weakened, and the advance of reserve formations to the Dnieper line was not completed by the beginning of July. Eleven divisions of the 22nd, 20th and 21st armies were on the way. The troops of the 19th Army of General I. S. Konev and the 16th Army of General M. F. Lukin did not finish concentrating either. By the time the enemy reached the Dnieper, defensive positions at this line were not equipped. The formations stretched along a wide front had poorly secured joints, the engineering preparation of the area was not completed, and there was a lack of air and anti-tank defense equipment.

On July 12, the enemy, with concentrated attacks from tank groups in narrow areas, broke the resistance of the defending troops in the Vitebsk region, south of Orsha and Mogilev, and began to quickly advance towards Smolensk.

In the entire defense zone of the Western Front, more than 600 km wide and more than 200 km deep, a gigantic battle began, known as Smolensk.

3.1 DEFENSE OF MOGILEV

Previous Events

After the capture of Minsk and the defeat of the main forces of the Soviet Western Front in the Bialystok and Minsk “cauldrons,” German motorized corps began advancing to the line of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers in order to launch a new offensive from there in the Moscow direction. Having overcome the weak defenses of the Soviet 20th Mechanized Corps and the 4th Airborne Corps on the Berezina and Drut rivers, the German 46th Motorized Corps of the 2nd Panzer Group under Colonel General Heinz Guderian reached the approaches to Mogilev. The rest of the motorized corps of the 2nd Tank Group also moved towards the Dnieper.

On July 5, the headquarters of the 61st Rifle Corps of Major General F.A. arrived from near Orsha. Bakunina took command of three rifle divisions in the Mogilev region (53rd Colonel I.Ya. Bartenev, 110th Colonel V.A. Khlebtsev and 172nd Major General M.T. Romanov). From that same day forward detachments of these Soviet divisions took part in holding battles west of Mogilev.

On July 7, the 61st Corps was subordinated to the headquarters of the 13th Army, which was retreating from Molodechno itself. Just on this day, the army commander, Lieutenant General P.M. Filatov was seriously wounded (died in a hospital in Moscow on July 14, 1941); Lieutenant General F.N. was appointed the new commander. Remezov.

Actions of the parties

On July 10-11, the crossing of the Dnieper began with three motorized corps of the 2nd Panzer Group of Colonel General Heinz Guderian:

The 47th motorized corps took a bridgehead in the Kopys area south of Orsha, from where it launched an attack on Smolensk,

The 46th motorized corps took a bridgehead in the Shklov area,

The 24th Motorized Corps crossed the Dnieper south of Mogilev and captured a bridgehead in the area of ​​Stary Bykhov (near the village of Borkolabovo). Expanding this bridgehead, the 24th Motorized Corps took control of the Mogilev-Gomel highway on July 11, its forward detachments were sent to Propoisk and Mogilev.

Soviet attacks aimed at eliminating German bridgeheads were unsuccessful. The 20th Mechanized Corps, withdrawn from the battle, and having received orders to attack the German bridgehead in the Shklov area, was able to concentrate and launch an offensive only on July 17, when the enemy had already pulled up infantry formations and fortified himself.

On July 12, the German 46th Motorized Corps launched an offensive from the captured bridgehead in the direction of Gorki. Finding itself at the forefront of the main attack, the Soviet 53rd Rifle Division is surrounded and scattered, and command contact with it has been lost. To block Mogilev from the north and cover the communications of the 46th motorized corps, the “Great Germany” life standard was left.

On the same day, the German 3rd Tank Division, Lieutenant General V. Model, tried to break through to the city from the south along the Bobruisk Highway, but after a difficult 14-hour battle in the Buinichi area, it was repulsed with heavy losses - the 388th Infantry Regiment held the defense here 172nd Division Colonel S.F. Kutepov, supported by artillery. 39 German tanks and armored vehicles remained on the battlefield. The defenders also suffered heavy losses, but maintained their positions. The next day, the German 3rd Panzer Division re-attacked the positions of the Soviet 172nd Rifle Division, but was stopped again after a 10-hour battle. On the same day, the 4th Tank Division of the 24th Motorized Corps, having repelled all Soviet attacks in the area of ​​​​Stary Bykhov, broke through in the direction of Krichev. On July 14, the advance detachment of the German 3rd Panzer Division bypassed the city and took Chausy without much resistance. Thus, the encirclement of Mogilev is completed. The city is blocked by the Life Standard "Gross Germany" and units of the 3rd Panzer Division. The Soviet 13th Army was cut up, the army headquarters was under attack, the commander, Lieutenant General F.N. Remezov was seriously wounded and evacuated, troop control was disrupted. The new commander of the 13th Army, Lieutenant General V.F. Gerasimenko took office only on July 15. Only the withdrawal of the 4th Army to the second echelon to the Pronya River line made it possible to delay the German advance and prevent German mobile formations from entering the operational space.

The Soviet offensive on Bobruisk, launched on July 13, diverted part of the forces from Mogilev, so the assault on the city resumed only after the approach of infantry formations of Army Group Center, which replaced the mobile units blockading the city.

On July 17, the assault on Mogilev began with the forces of the 7th Army Corps of Artillery General V. Farmbacher with the support of tanks of the 3rd Tank Division: the 7th Infantry Division attacked Soviet positions along the Minsk Highway, the 23rd Infantry Division advanced along the Bobruisk Highway. The 15th Infantry Division was transferred from France to the Mogilev area, and the 258th Infantry Division approached south of Mogilev.

Meanwhile, the German tank “wedge”, flowing around Mogilev, went deeper and deeper to the east. The 10th Tank Division, which was in the vanguard of the 46th Motorized Corps, took Pochinok and moved to Yelnya.

In the Mogilev area, formations of the 13th Army are completely blocked: the 61st Rifle Corps and the 20th Mechanized Corps. Ammunition was supplied by airplanes, but given the Luftwaffe's dominance in the air, it was not possible to count on a full supply of the encircled troops.

The Soviet command attached great importance to holding Mogilev. The telegram from the Supreme Command Headquarters read:

On July 20, another German infantry division, the 78th, approached the Mogilev area: it crossed to the eastern bank of the Dnieper in the Borkolabovo area and attacked the Soviet defenses along the Gomel Highway, but was stopped.

German troops gradually pushed back Soviet troops. On July 23, street fighting began; The enemy broke through to the railway station and occupied the Lupolovo airfield, which was used to supply troops surrounded in Mogilev. Communication between the headquarters of the 61st Corps and the 172nd Rifle Division, which was defending directly in Mogilev, was interrupted. Thus, the Mogilev “cauldron” was dissected.

Meanwhile, on July 21-24, the Soviet offensive began on the Smolensk Bulge. On July 22, the 21st Army of Colonel General F.I. launched an attack on Bykhov with the aim of connecting with the besieged Soviet troops in the Mogilev area. Kuznetsova. However, the enemy again managed to block the Soviet offensive.

On July 24, street fighting continued in Mogilev. The proposal of the commander of the German 7th Army Corps, Artillery General W. Farmbacher, to surrender was rejected. On the night of July 26, Soviet troops blew up the bridge across the Dnieper.

At a meeting of the commanders of the encircled formations in the village of Sukhari (26 km east of Mogilev), which was attended by the commander of the 61st Rifle Corps, Major General F.A. Bakunin, commander of the 20th Mechanized Corps, Major General N.D. Vedeneev, division commanders Colonel V.A. Khlebtsev (110th Rifle), brigade commander F.A. Parkhomenko (210th motorized) and Major General V.T. Obukhov (26th tank), the possibility of withdrawing the remaining corps forces from the encirclement was discussed. It was decided to begin the breakthrough in the evening of the same day. The plan provided for the movement of troops along three routes in the general direction of Mstislavl and Roslavl. The 20th Mechanized Corps was in the vanguard, and the most combat-ready units of the 110th Infantry Division were in the rearguard.

By this time, the remnants of the 1st Motorized Rifle Division, the 161st Rifle Division and some other units of the 20th Army, previously surrounded in the Orsha region, had reached the location of the 61st Corps.

On the night of July 26, the remnants of the 61st Rifle Corps in three columns began to break through their encirclement in the direction of Chausa.

The commander of the 172nd Infantry Division, cut off from the main forces, Major General M.T. Romanov decided to leave the encircled Mogilev on his own. It was decided to break through to the west into the forest in the area of ​​​​the village of Tishovka (along the Bobruisk highway). At about 24.00, the remnants of the 172nd Infantry Division began to break out of the encirclement.

On July 27, the Soviet Main Command of the Western Direction troops reacted nervously to the decision of the commanders of the formations encircled in the Mogilev area to break out of the encirclement. The report to the Supreme Command Headquarters stated:

Due to the fact that the defense of the 61st Rifle Corps of Mogilev diverted up to 5 infantry divisions to it and was carried out so energetically that it pinned down large enemy forces, we ordered the commander of the 13th Army to hold Mogilev at all costs and ordered him, and the Central Front Comrade Kuznetsov to go on the offensive on Mogilev, further ensuring Kachalov’s left flank and access to the Dnieper. However, Army Commander 13 not only did not spur on the hesitant commander of the 61st Corps, Bakunin, but missed the moment when he voluntarily left Mogilev, began retreating to the east, and only then reported.

With this movement of the corps, a difficult situation is created for it and enemy divisions are freed up, which can maneuver against the 13th and 21st armies. Immediately upon receiving news of the withdrawal from Mogilev and about the street battle still continuing there, the order was given to Army Commander 13 to stop the withdrawal from Mogilev and hold the city at all costs, and to replace Corps Commander Bakunin, who had grossly violated the order of the command, with Colonel Voevodin, who firmly stood behind keep Mogilev, and bring Bakunin to trial...

For the unauthorized abandonment of Mogilev, the commander of the 13th Army, Lieutenant General V.F. Gerasimenko was replaced by Major General K.D. Golubev.

An attempt at an organized exit from the encirclement of the 61st Corps failed: after two days of fighting, its commander, Major General F.A. Bakunin ordered to make his way to the east in small groups, having previously destroyed all the equipment and dispersed the horses. Bakunin himself led a group of 140 people out of encirclement.

The chief of artillery of the 61st corps, brigade commander N.G., was captured. Lazutin and the commander of the 53rd Infantry Division, Colonel I.Ya. Bartenev. From the 53rd Division, by July 20, about a thousand people without heavy weapons had gathered at the assembly point beyond the Desna. The 53rd Division was later restored and fought as part of the Western Front.

The 110th Rifle Division was almost completely destroyed (disbanded in September 1941); the division commander, Colonel V.A. Khlebtsev switched to partisan actions. On December 16, 1941, he led a group of 161 people out of encirclement. The 172nd Rifle Division was also completely defeated and soon disbanded; its commander, Major General M.T. When leaving the encirclement, Romanov was wounded, captured and executed in December 1941 for pro-Soviet agitation in the Flessenburg concentration camp. Commander of the 20th Mechanized Corps, Major General N.D. Vedeneev left the encirclement. The remnants of the 210th motorized division were withdrawn by its commander, brigade commander F.A., in early August 1941. Parkhomenko; On August 7, 1941, he received the rank of major general. The remnants of the 26th Tank Division were led out of encirclement by its commander, Major General V.T. Obukhov. The commander of the 38th Tank Division, Colonel S.I. Kapustin was captured near Roslavl on September 29, 1941. Both tank divisions were disbanded in September 1941.

On July 28, the Chief of the German General Staff of the Ground Forces, Franz Halder, wrote in his diary: The Mogilev area was finally cleared of enemy troops. Judging by the number of captured prisoners and guns, it can be assumed that, as expected, six enemy divisions were initially located here.

Consequences

The pinning down of significant forces on the southern flank of Army Group Center did not allow the enemy to strengthen the strike forces and develop an offensive in the direction of Roslavl in mid-July 1941. However, in the 20th of July, the enemy broke the resistance of the Soviet troops, deprived of all support.

The surrender of Mogilev and the defeat of the troops defending it contributed to the release of an entire army corps, which soon played an important role in the defeat of the operational group of Lieutenant General V. Ya. Kachalov.

EVACUATION OF INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES AND COLLECTIVE FARM PROPERTY

In the first months of the war, the Soviet Union lost much of its economic wealth. By November 1941, the Germans occupied the territory that before the war produced over 60% of coal and iron, about 60% of steel and aluminum, almost 40% of grain, 80% of sugar.

With the outbreak of the war, industry was quickly restructured to produce military products. This was partly made easier by the fact that even before the war, many enterprises that formally had a purely peaceful profile produced military products.

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The attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR. Germany's goals in the war against the Soviet Union.On June 22, 1941, at 3:30 a.m., aviation and the navy, and at 4:00 a.m., the ground forces of three fascist groups (“Center,” “North,” and “South”) on the front between the Baltic and Black Seas and three separate armies between the Gulf of Finland and the Barents Sea, consisting of 190 divisions (153 German and 37 allied), numbering 5.5 million people, broke into the territory of the Soviet Union. The German attack on the USSR was sudden and unexpected for the Soviet people and the country's Armed Forces.

Sudden and unexpected in the sense that, Firstly, the Soviet leadership mistakenly believed that Germany would not be able to attack the USSR until it completed the military operation “Sea Lion” against England, that a war in the West against England and in the East against the USSR would be unbearable for Germany. In addition, the German leadership, in order to misinform the leadership of the USSR, more than once stated that in 1940–1941. his main task is to capture England and its rich overseas colonies.

Today, publications have appeared that shed light on the position of the then leadership of England. The book by the Englishman Warren Campbell, “Entering the War,” talks about how Winston Churchill did everything possible to get the Germans to stop bombing England and send their forces to the East. He instructed his intelligence to write a false letter on his behalf to the Nazi leadership stating that he was ready to conduct separate negotiations, but with one condition: the Germans must start a war against the USSR, against communism, which W. Churchill, like Hitler and his clique, I hated it fiercely. W. Campbell writes that the Germans took this proposal seriously. They suspended the military operation against England and began to transfer troops to the Soviet-German border.

Secondly, Moscow mistakenly believed that after the end of the military operation against England, Germany would make a campaign in the oil-rich Middle East. Indeed, Germany did not have its own oil, and its satellites - Hungary and Romania - produced oil in quantities insufficient to conduct a large-scale military operation over a large territory. However, Germany was counting on a lightning war, a war of 3–4 months, and for such a war, fascist strategists believed, there would be enough oil products. In addition, they dreamed of soon taking over the oil of the USSR. Oil was not a problem for the Blitzkrieg.

Third, exactly a week before the start of the war, on June 14, 1941, radio and press disseminated a TASS message that Germany was fulfilling the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, just like the Soviet Union, so rumors about Germany's intentions to attack the USSR are without any basis. Moreover, in Soviet newspapers and magazines there was no information about German fascism, its “new order” in Europe. In the USSR, anti-fascist propaganda and statements against Hitler and Germany were prohibited. This tone of the Soviet press, as well as the TASS message of June 14, 1941, dulled the vigilance of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces and did not at all contribute to their mobilization readiness on the eve and at the beginning of the war.

Fourth, Soviet intelligence was unable to comprehensively assess the available information, obtain accurate information about the political decision of the German leadership to start a war against the USSR, or provide the USSR government with materials that would give an unambiguous answer about Germany’s intentions in the spring-summer of 1941 to attack the USSR. German intelligence services were deliberately engaged in disinformation and maintaining secrecy. The transfer of troops to the Soviet-German border was explained either by large maneuvers of the German army, or by an attempt to protect the troops from the bombing of British aircraft, give them the opportunity to rest, and then again transfer them to the west for the war with England. Operations to capture the island. Crete, the invasion of Greece and military operations in Libya were presented as a dress rehearsal for the landing in England. Before the attack on the USSR, the nature of disinformation changed: it became more blatant. Rumors were spreading that military preparations near the Soviet-German border were aimed at putting pressure on the Soviet government, forcing it to cede grain-rich Ukraine and the oil-rich Caucasus to Germany, without which Germany would not be able to defeat England. If the USSR refuses to enter the war with England on the side of the states of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis, it will be presented with an ultimatum, and Ukraine and the Baltic states will be occupied as collateral for participation in the war. Such German disinformation was not filtered, not checked, and in its “pure form” lay on I.V.’s table. Stalin and other top leaders of the state, who were waiting for the Germans to present an ultimatum, were wondering whether there would be a war or not, and if so, in what year - in 1941 or 1942. An example of unverified and inaccurate information is Soviet intelligence data about the start date of the war: May 14 or 15, May 20 or 21, June 15. Some Soviet intelligence officers named the true date of a possible attack by Nazi Germany on the USSR - June 22, but the top political and military leadership in Moscow used reports not from individual intelligence officers, but from generalized and filtered information from the leadership of Soviet intelligence, which, unfortunately, did not conclude that war was inevitable with Germany in the summer of 1941

Thus, the insufficient professionalism of the leaders of Soviet intelligence, the TASS statement of June 14, 1941, the calm tone of the Soviet press and radio broadcasting in relation to fascism and its “new order” in Europe, the undeservedly respectful attitude towards fascist Germany and its leaders, the failure to bring in Soviet troops into a state of heightened combat readiness, the desire not to give the fascist beast grounds for an attack, not to provoke it into a war against the USSR - all these are big strategic and tactical mistakes of the leadership of the USSR, including I.V. Stalin, for which the Soviet people had to pay dearly.

On June 22 at 4 o’clock in Berlin, Soviet Ambassador V. Dekanozov was presented with a memorandum from the German government, which stated: “The hostile behavior towards Germany of the Soviet government and the serious threat manifested in the movement of Soviet troops to the German eastern border forces the Reich to respond.” . The same was said in the statement of the German ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, which he officially made to the Soviet government. In a demagogic address to the troops on the Eastern Front on June 22, A. Hitler stated: “The Kremlin authorities... intended to destroy not only Germany, but all of Europe... The enemy armed itself to such an extent that it exceeded the most serious fears... God was merciful to our people and to the entire European world - if only this barbaric enemy had moved tens of thousands of his tanks before we moved ours! All of Europe would be lost..."

The accusation that the USSR was preparing an attack on Germany was repeatedly heard by Hitler and his inner circle. As for historiography, the myth that the USSR was preparing a preventive (anticipatory) strike was widespread immediately after the war in the memoirs of former German generals and officers, as well as officials of the “Third Reich”, who sought to justify their participation in the implementation of an expansive policy of conquest .

Unfortunately, some “democratic” publicists and historians (Suvorov, Belarusian historian Shibeko, etc.) repeat the myths of fascist propaganda. They also write that there were a large number of Soviet troops on the Soviet-German border; in May - June 1941, 4 Soviet armies (almost 400 thousand people) were additionally transferred from the central regions of the USSR to the western military districts (almost 400 thousand people), and in total in the western districts there were 2.9 million soldiers and officers (Germany and its satellites fielded 5.5 million soldiers and officers against the USSR). In addition, military warehouses along the western border of the USSR contained a lot of military equipment, weapons, ammunition, fuels and lubricants. That is the entire “argumentation” of the falsifiers of history regarding the Soviet preventive strike on Germany. They do not cite any documents, any decisions of the top leadership of the USSR on an attack on Germany, since they do not exist.

In fact, the Soviet Union had no intention of attacking Germany or any other state. He acted in accordance with the then Soviet military doctrine. Its essence is as follows: if we are attacked, the Armed Forces of the USSR must, in the shortest possible time, destroy a significant part of the enemy’s manpower and equipment on the border, transfer the war to foreign territory and achieve victory over the enemy with little loss of life. Therefore, a certain concentration of Soviet troops on the western borders of the country in response to the concentration of German troops represented the implementation of the Soviet defensive military doctrine. It is difficult to imagine that the falsifiers of history do not know this.

Hitler’s strategists, when drawing up the blitzkrieg plan, the “lightning war” plan, proceeded from the fact that Germany, compared to the USSR, had more electricity, armored and aircraft metal, higher firepower of weapons, more modern tanks and aircraft, and a more technologically advanced industry. In addition, Germany had at its disposal the industrial capacities, fuel resources and electricity of the conquered countries of Europe. On Germany's side, finally, there was the factor of surprise of an attack and strategic initiative, a fully mobilized military machine. Consequently, according to the Nazis, the rapid defeat of the USSR was inevitable, so a blitzkrieg plan was drawn up, a plan for a “lightning war” against the Soviet Union.

However, the leaders of the Reich were mistaken. They failed to identify and take into account a number of system factors, the main ones being the following:

1). . The economic history of the world has never known anything like this before;

2) the ability of the Soviet electric power industry, under the conditions of national government, to maintain the volume of power supply to the industry and the level of power supply of industrial workers, to increase generating capacity in the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia;

3) the technological ability of the Soviet defense industry to produce weapons in sufficient quantities, better than German ones. There was no such type and type of the latest military equipment that the USSR economy could not produce independently with the highest labor productivity for its time;

4) the Soviet planned economy, based on nationalized property and the system of national economic accounting, as undeniable advantages during the war years over the capitalist economy, based on private property, fierce competition and profit at any cost.

These are the systemic factors that played an important role in achieving our victory and which Hitler’s strategists did not identify or take into account when deciding to attack the USSR. The Nazis also did not take into account the heroism and patriotism of the peoples of the USSR, their readiness to defend their Motherland to the last drop of blood under the motto: “Whoever comes to Rus' with a sword will die by the sword. This is where the Russian land stood, stands and will stand.” They did not take into account the friendship of the peoples of the USSR. They did not take into account much that ensured the Great Victory in the war.

Together with fascist Germany, Italy, Finland, Romania, Hungary, puppet pro-German Slovakia (separated from Czechoslovakia), and pro-German Croatia (separated from Yugoslavia) opposed the USSR. Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Sweden, Denmark and Norway did not officially declare war on the Soviet Union, but in fact entered into a secret conspiracy with the aggressor and actually participated in the war with the USSR on the side of Germany. Here are some interesting facts and statistics. After June 22, 1941, fascist legions were created from among the volunteers - residents of Western Europe, which later turned into the SS divisions "Norland" (Scandinavian), "Langemarck" (Belgian-Flemish), "Charlemagne" (French), etc. From of the total number of 3,770,290 prisoners of war from all countries of the fascist bloc, the bulk were Germans and Austrians - 2,546,242 people; 766,901 people belonged to other states that declared war on the USSR (Hungarians, Romanians, Italians, Finns, etc.), and another 464,147 prisoners of war were French, Belgians, Czechs, i.e. representatives of states that did not officially fight with the USSR . In fact, a united Europe led by Germany fought with us.

On June 22 at 12 o'clock the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. addressed the Soviet people from the government of the USSR. Molotov. His speech ended with words that soon became popular: “Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours".

From the first days the war was called the “Great Patriotic War”. Today, some “democratic” historians unreasonably, without scientific arguments, with disrespect for the victorious people and their descendants, call the Great Patriotic War Soviet-German and even German-Soviet. Sometimes the term “Great Patriotic War” is not used and is replaced by the term “World War II”.

In the book by 3. Shibeko “Narys History of Belarus 1795–2002” the term “Great Patriotic War” is not used at all, and the paragraphs of the book are called as follows: “The height of the German-Soviet war. June 1941 – September 1943.” (p. 310); “The end of the German-Soviet war. September 1943 – May 1945.” (p. 328). In the book of historians of the Belarusian State University “History of Bedaru sі: in 2 parts. Part 2. ХІХ-ХХ stagodzi: lecture course” (Minsk, 2002) topic VII is called “Belarus during the Second World War”. None of the lecture titles in this book contain the term “Great Patriotic War,” although this term is modestly mentioned several times in the lecture texts themselves. The same position of the authors is reflected in the book “History of Belarus in the Cantex of European Civilization: A Guide” (Minsk, 2003), published by the Republican Institute of Higher Education. Again “Belarus during the Second World War” and not a single term “Great Patriotic War” in the paragraph titles. This term is used several times in the text. An analysis of the curricula on the history of Belarus of the history departments of some universities indicates that the term “Great Patriotic War” is absent in these textbooks.

One gets the impression that these books were written not by the descendants of the heroic Soviet people, who in June 1941 stood up to defend their Fatherland, but by the descendants of the Americans, British and French, for whom 1939–1945. are indeed the years of the Second World War. For Belarusians, as well as for representatives of other peoples of the great Soviet Union, 1941–1945. These are the years of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people. It’s hard to believe that professional Belarusian historians don’t know this or have forgotten about it.

Firstly, specific historical materials indicate that this was a war of the Soviet people for the independence of their Fatherland, and in terms of the scale of military operations, the severity of the struggle, the military-political and international results, it was truly Great. Secondly, not only Germany fought with the Soviet Union, but also other European countries, countries of the fascist bloc, so it is impossible to call this war Soviet-German or German-Soviet, if you adhere to a scientific approach to the analysis of historical facts. Third, the war “Great Patriotic War” was called by those who entered into a mortal battle with fascism and, at the cost of enormous sacrifices and suffering, strangled it in their own lair. Young historians should respect those who defeated fascism and live next to us, and honor the memory of those who are no longer among us, be proud of the victorious country and have a little respect for themselves, the descendants of the victorious people.

The goals of Nazi Germany in the war she started boiled down to the following.

1. Expansion of living space for the Germans in the East, expulsion of “Asians and Bolsheviks from Europe”, transformation of the East into a market and source of raw materials for Western Europe, conquest of world domination.

2. The defeat of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the destruction of the Soviet state - the main obstacles on the path of the Nazis to world domination, the division of the territory and wealth of the USSR between Germany and its satellites, the creation of small state formations of the colonial and semi-colonial type in the vastness of the USSR. The Nazis planned to populate Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia with 10 million German colonists - “the real masters of the land and industry”, then include these lands in “great Germany”. They were going to place garrisons of German troops in Transcaucasia and Central Asia and organize puppet governments from bourgeois nationalists, completely subordinate to Berlin. They wanted to place a large lake on the site of Moscow, destroy Leningrad and transfer it to the allied Finland. They promised to give Moldova and Odessa to Romania for military assistance, Italy - a number of lands in the south of the USSR, Turkey (subject to entry into the war) - a number of regions of Transcaucasia, Japan - the Soviet Far East and Eastern Siberia. The Nazis did not forget about the United States and England. Provided that they recognize Germany's primacy in the world, return its colonies, join a military campaign against the USSR or remain neutral, the Nazis promised the United States to give Chukotka and Kamchatka, England - the north of the European part of the USSR with Murmansk and Arkhangelsk.

3. Physical destruction of part of the Slavs - the population of the “lower race”, Germanization of the remaining Slavs, in whose veins Aryan blood supposedly flows, and turning them into slaves. In Minsk, for example, it was planned to leave 100 thousand people of the local population and settle 50 thousand German colonists, in Gomel - 50 and 30 thousand, respectively, in Mogilev and Bobruisk - 50 and 20 thousand each, in Borisov, Lida and Novogrudok - 15 thousand local population and 5 thousand German colonists, etc.

In order for “civilized” Germans to take up arms and embark on a criminal path, Hitler and his clique promised them “a thousand-year prosperity of the Reich”, “heavenly life” after the victory over the USSR: for everyone - a people's car (Volkswagen), exemption of all Germans from taxes, the opportunity receive land, property and Slavic slaves in the east. Unfortunately, the German people fell for this bait of fascist propaganda. For the crimes of Hitlerism during the Second World War, he bears responsibility before history and his conscience.

The Soviet Union, in the war imposed on it, set the task defense of the Fatherland, liberation of enemy-occupied Soviet territory and population; providing assistance to the peoples of Europe in liberation from fascism, the elimination of fascism and its “new order”, saving world civilization from fascist barbarism; preventing in the future the possibility of a new war on the part of aggressive forces and states.

These were the goals in the war between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany.

Defensive battles on the territory of Belarus and the retreat of the Red Army. When studying the history of the Great Patriotic War, it is necessary to know the structure (combat units) of the Red Army during the war. Without this, terms such as front, army, corps, division, brigade, regiment, battalion and others will remain incomprehensible.

The structure and combat units of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War are shown on p. 413 table.

From the first days of the war, the territory of Belarus, like other border territories of the USSR, became the scene of brutal hostilities. As of June 22, 1941, there were 672 thousand soldiers of the Western Front and the Pinsk military flotilla on the territory of Belarus. Border guards, pilots, and representatives of all branches of the military fought heroically with the enemy. The soldiers of the border outposts, commanded by officers, died, but did not leave their fighting positions N.K. Ishkov, A.M. Kizhevatov, I.R. Tikhonov, V.M. Usov. Pilots P.S. Ryabtsev, A.S. Danilov, CM. Gudimov, D.V. Kokorev rammed enemy planes. During the first day of the war, more than 100 German aircraft were shot down in air battles.

The whole world knows the heroic defense of the Brest Fortress. For the immortal feat performed by the defenders of the fortress, in 1965 it was awarded the honorary title “Fortress Hero”. Only in the first three days of the defense of Minsk, soldiers of the 100th Soviet division under the command Major General I.N. Russiyanova destroyed about 100 enemy tanks. In the battles for Minsk near Radoshkovichi, the bomber crew under the command of Captain N.F. Gastello. He sent his damaged plane into a column of German tanks and vehicles.

Despite the courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers and officers, on June 28, 1941, Nazi troops captured

Minsk. To the west of the Belarusian capital, in the Brest-Minsk-Bialystok triangle, formations of the 3rd, 4th, 10th and 13th Soviet armies were surrounded. The enemy captured a lot of military equipment, weapons, and military property. 323 thousand soldiers and commanders found themselves in the German cauldron. This tragedy of the Soviet troops in historical literature is called “ Novogrudok cauldron. Some of the soldiers were able to escape the encirclement, some remained in the forests and then moved on to partisan warfare, some ended up in German prisoner of war camps, where they died from wounds, hunger and epidemics. The human losses of the troops of the Western Front and the Pinsk military flotilla amounted to 418 thousand people.

Responsibility for the retreat of the Soviet troops and the enormous human and material losses lies with the highest political and state leadership of the USSR, the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the command of the Western Front, the commanders of regiments, divisions, corps, and military formations. But the accusation was laid only on the command of the Western Front and the commanders of military units. Front commander D. Pavlov, chief of staff V. Klimovskikh, communications chief A. Grigoriev, commander of the 4th Army A. Korobkov and other military leaders were shot by the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on July 22, 1941.

In a difficult military-strategic situation in July 1941, troops of the Western Front carried out a series of counterattacks. On July 6, troops of the 20th Army under the command of General P.A. Kurochkina was hit counterattack in the direction of Senno - Lepel(Vitebsk region) and threw the enemy back 30–40 km. One of the largest tank battles in the initial period of the war took place, in which more than 1,500 vehicles were involved on both sides. On July 13, troops of the 63rd Corps under the command of Lieutenant General L.R. Petrovsky crossed the Dnieper, liberated Zhlobin and Rogachev and began to develop an offensive against Bobruisk. On July 22, a 12-day raid began behind enemy lines of the cavalry group of General A.I. Gorodovikov, as a result of which there were liberated Glusk, Starye Dorogi, a sudden blow was struck against the Osipovichs. July 30th was Krichev was released. The counterattacks of the Soviet troops showed that the German army was not invincible. However, the counterattacks of individual military formations, which were not supported by the general offensive, were not successful.

The battles along the Dnieper line were exceptionally intense. On July 14, 1941, near Orsha, for the first time, a battery of rocket launchers (Katyushas) under the command of Captain I.A. delivered a mighty stunning blow to the enemy. Flerov. For 23 days, Soviet troops held back the enemy's onslaught near Mogilev. The battle for Gomel lasted for more than a month. However, despite the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, by the beginning of September 1941 the entire territory of Belarus was occupied by the Nazi invaders. The Western Front was unable to stop the enemy.

The North-Western Front in the Baltic states, like the Western Front in Belarus, also suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment and was unable to organize a sustainable defense. On July 9, 1941, soldiers of Army Group North took Pskov. There was a threat of their breakthrough to Luga, and then to Leningrad.

In Ukraine on the Southwestern Front under the command of M.P. Kirponos had a more successful situation. The front managed to pin down the enemy Army Group South near Kiev, on the line of the Dnieper. The front in Karelia has stabilized. Fierce fighting in the second half of July took place in the Smolensk region and between the Dnieper and Berezina rivers.

Under such conditions, the command of Army Group Center, fearing encirclement and destruction by Soviet troops, suspended the attack on Moscow, and on July 30, 1941, Army Group Center went on the defensive. The 2nd Panzer Group of the German General Guderian and the 2nd Field Army turned from the east to the south in order to strike in the rear of the Southwestern Front, whose troops held the Dnieper line and defended Kyiv.

At the end of August, the Germans reached the Dnieper and captured Right Bank Ukraine, with the exception of small bridgeheads in the area of ​​Kyiv and Odessa. On September 9, 1941, the Germans crossed the Dnieper and took a bridgehead in the Kremenchug area. The 2nd Tank Army Group Center broke through the defenses of the Bryansk Front in the Konotop area. There was a threat of encirclement of the troops of the Southwestern Front. Only on September 17 did I. Stalin allow the front to leave Kyiv. However, the country's top leadership was late in making this decision. On September 15, tank groups that moved towards each other in the Lokhvitsa-Dubna area closed the encirclement ring of the Soviet troops of the Southwestern Front. 450 thousand soldiers, sergeants and officers were surrounded, including 60 thousand command personnel. When leaving the encirclement, front commander M. Kirponos and chief of staff V. Tupikov died in battle. This was the second major disaster for Soviet troops at the beginning of the war.

After the destruction of Soviet troops in the Kyiv area, the Germans were able to resume their attack on Moscow. However, according to the Wehrmacht command, the capture of Moscow should have been preceded by the capture of Leningrad. On September 8, 1941, the Germans blocked Leningrad from land, and in mid-September they reached the Gulf of Finland. The city was surrounded, but the Germans were unable to take it. The heroic defense of Leningrad lasted 900 days and nights and became a symbol of the courage and heroism of the Soviet people.

In the face of military failures, they adopted emergency measures to strengthen the combat capability of the Red Army.

1. In July 1941, the institute of military commissars was introduced in the Red Army and Navy, operating in all regiments and divisions; An institute of political instructors operated in companies, batteries and squadrons. Together with the commanders, the commissars and political instructors bore “full responsibility for the accomplishment of the military unit’s combat mission, for its steadfastness in battle and unwavering readiness to fight to the last drop of blood with the enemies.”

2. On August 16, 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued order No. 270, according to which “those who tear off their insignia during battle and surrender are considered malicious deserters, whose families are subject to arrest as families of those who violated the oath and betrayed the Motherland.” Deserters were shot on the spot. This was carried out by special departments of the NKVD created in July 1941, instead of which in April 1943 the SMERSH Counterintelligence Directorate was organized as part of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense.

3. To prevent withdrawals and panic unauthorized by the command, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, in September 1941, barrage detachments of up to a battalion were introduced in each rifle division. In extreme cases, they were allowed to use weapons against “panic-ridden military personnel.”

On July 3, 1941, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Armed Forces F. Halder wrote in his diary: “It would not be an exaggeration if I say that the campaign against Russia was won within 14 days.” Of course, the enemy was quick to declare victory. But for the USSR the situation was critical. A mortal threat looms over the country.

The reasons for the failures and defeats of the Red Army in the summer and autumn of 1941. How could it happen that the Red Army was defeated in the initial period of the war?

The reasons for the failures and defeats of the Red Army were due to a number of economic, political and military factors - objective and subjective.

Let's start by considering objective factors of failures and defeats of the Red Army.

1. By the beginning of World War II, Germany, with the help of other capitalist countries, had created a powerful military economy, rebuilt its economy on a military basis, and launched mass production of all types of modern weapons. In addition, the fascists controlled the resources of 12 European countries. Before the attack on the USSR, the military-economic potential and human resources of Germany, its satellites and captured countries were several times greater than the military-economic potential and human resources of the Soviet Union.

2. After the conquest of Europe, Nazi Germany had an experienced, battle-tested army that was in full combat readiness, well-organized headquarters work, and almost hourly interaction between infantry, artillery, tanks and aviation. The Nazi army was concentrated in three powerful compact groups deployed along the western borders of the USSR, well-equipped technically, almost entirely motorized, which was largely facilitated by captured equipment and weapons captured in the occupied countries of Europe. The Wehrmacht used weapons and equipment of 180 divisions (92 German divisions were provided with captured vehicles). In France alone, fascist troops captured up to 5 thousand tanks and armored personnel carriers and 3 thousand aircraft.

The Red Army did not have much experience in modern warfare. Moreover, no in-depth analysis of Germany's military operations against Poland and France was made. In December 1940, People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko said that “in the sense of strategic creativity, the experience of the war in Europe, perhaps, does not provide anything new.” Although we surpassed Germany in the number of tanks and aircraft (by June 1941 the USSR had 7.6 thousand tanks and 17 thousand aircraft, Germany had 6 thousand tanks and 10 thousand aircraft), most of them were old vehicles structures with exhausted service life that required repair or decommissioning. For example, in the total fleet of combat aircraft, 82.7% were of the old type. At the beginning of the war, the Soviet troops did not have enough anti-tank and anti-aircraft installations, communications and transport equipment. It was also bad with ammunition.

3. The Soviet Union was forced to maintain significant military forces in the Far East (40 divisions - against the Japanese militarists) and in Transcaucasia (against the threat from Turkey). In this regard, the Soviet Union could not direct all its forces and means to repel the Nazi invasion.

Along with objective ones, there were also subjective reasons for the failures and defeats of the Red Army. Here are some of them.

1. The failures and defeats of the Red Army are explained not only by the fact that Soviet troops were attacked unexpectedly, that they were forced to engage in battle without the necessary strategic deployment, that many regiments and divisions were not staffed according to wartime levels, and had limited material and transport means and communications equipment, often operated without air and artillery support. All this cannot be overestimated, since on June 22, 1941, only 30 Soviet divisions of the first echelon of the covering army were attacked. The tragedy of the defeat of the main forces of the Western, North-Western and South-Western Fronts manifested itself during the counter-fights on June 23–30, 1941 between the new and old borders.

The course of border battles showed that our troops at all levels - from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the tactical level command staff were not prepared to wage a modern war with the massive use of artillery, tanks, and aviation. The Red Army had to master the skills of modern warfare during battles with heavy losses in manpower and equipment. Deficiencies in the combat readiness of our troops, revealed in battles around Fr. Khasan, on the river Khalkhin Gol and in the Soviet-Finnish war were not and could not be liquidated in a short time. In 1937, the mechanized corps were disbanded, which did not meet the requirements of modern warfare. Only in 1940 did they begin to be created again, but their formation could not be completed before the start of the war. The formation of aviation formations and arming them with the latest equipment, as well as the technical re-equipment of the entire Red Army, were also not completed. Not enough attention was paid to the combat training of armored forces and aviation, the interaction of military branches during modern warfare. In the German army, on the contrary, the interaction of tanks with infantry, artillery and aviation was observed on the battlefield.

2. The miscalculations of I. Stalin and his inner circle in assessing the military-strategic situation and in determining the possible timing of a German attack on the USSR played a negative role. The turn in the policy of Nazi Germany, which actually negated the non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, was not noticed in a timely manner by Soviet leaders, so it was believed that a military clash could be delayed.

Before the threat of war, the People's Commissariat of Defense managed to obtain permission from Stalin to partially conscript 500 thousand reserves into the army and redeploy four armies to the western military districts. Stalin did not give permission to bring the troops of the border districts into combat readiness. When German aircraft violated the airspace of the USSR (324 violations were recorded in the first half of 1941 alone), it was strictly forbidden to shoot them down. On the night of June 22, 1941, under pressure from new information, I. Stalin allowed the People's Commissariat of Defense to issue a directive to the districts about a possible surprise attack by the Germans on June 22–23 and about bringing all units to full combat readiness. However, the directive reached the troops very late, in fact after the enemy appeared on Soviet territory.

3. The failures of the Red Army were due to the fallacy of the Soviet military doctrine, shortcomings and miscalculations in the strategic and tactical training of the Soviet troops. In accordance with Soviet military doctrine, the Red Army, in the event of an attack on the USSR, had to stop the enemy at the border, and then conduct military operations under offensive conditions. The Soviet command did not have a reliable plan for strategic defense, and at the beginning of the war it was necessary to defend itself. Unfortunately, commanders and soldiers did not know how to do this professionally.

In the first half of 1941, the top Soviet leadership redeployed 4 armies from the central regions of the USSR to the territory of Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic states, transferred a large amount of military equipment, ammunition, fuel and lubricants, and military equipment in order to stop the enemy at the border in case of aggression, and then transfer the fighting to the territory of the aggressor.

4. The lack of personnel, professional command staff and professional staffs, from the Headquarters, the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff to the commanders of regiments, battalions and chiefs of staff of regiments, their lack of the necessary military knowledge and combat experience is another reason for the failures and defeats of the Red Army. Due to the repressions taking place in the country, by the beginning of the war, 70% of the command staff of the Red Army had service experience in positions from 1 to 6 months, 50% of battalion commanders were graduates of 6-month courses, they did not even graduate from a military school. Only about 15% of the command staff had experience in conducting combat operations in 1938–1940. Headquarters also did not have the necessary experience. Her orders to hold occupied lines by any means, even in conditions of deep flanking of the enemy, often became the reason that entire groups of Soviet troops found themselves under enemy attacks. This led to fighting under encirclement, large losses in manpower and equipment, and increased panic.

Soviet military leaders and commanders had the best soldier in the world, who during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939–1940. at 40-degree frost, a 2-meter layer of snow, in a wooded area with many lakes and rivers, he took the Mannerheim Line by storm. According to experts, not a single soldier in the world could do this. The Soviet soldier demonstrated his best qualities during the Great Patriotic War, but at the beginning of it, due primarily to the fault of military leaders and commanders at various levels, he was forced to retreat.

5. The Red Army had a catastrophic shortage of trained professional junior commanders (sergeants and foremen) and junior officers - from junior lieutenant to captain inclusive. Despite the repressions, there were enough generals and senior officers in the Red Army, but there was an acute shortage of junior commanders and junior officers. This was caused by an increase in the Armed Forces of the USSR from 1.9 million people in 1939 to 5 million at the beginning of 1941, after the adoption of the Law on Universal Conscription. If we take an infantry regiment of 1,500 people according to the wartime staff, then several dozen senior officers (major - lieutenant colonel - colonel) were needed, platoon commanders (junior lieutenant - lieutenant - senior lieutenant) - more than 60 people, and sergeants and foremen - more than 200 Human.

In connection with the increase in the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1941, they additionally required another 550 thousand officers. Not generals and colonels, but platoon, company and battalion commanders. It took at least 3 years to train a rifle platoon commander (lieutenant) (2 in a military school and at least 1 year in the army), and a company commander (captain) - another 3 years. In the Red Army, lower officer positions were occupied by people who had no service experience. The matter was complicated by the fact that junior commanders and officers were often trained in short-term officer and sergeant courses from people with a very low level of general education and culture. The army grew quantitatively, but not qualitatively. It is known for sure that the success of the operation on each specific sector of the front largely depended on junior commanders and officers.

6. Already in the first weeks and months of the war, the Red Army suffered huge losses in manpower and equipment. In addition, in the first months of the war, numerous warehouses with military equipment, ammunition, military equipment, warehouses of fuel and lubricants, which were built near theaters of possible military operations on the territory of the aggressor, as required by Soviet military doctrine, were lost. It was impossible to restore what was lost in a short period of time.

7. In the pre-war weeks, facts occurred that could not be ignored. These are frequent, openly provocative violations of our borders by German planes, the movement of sabotage and reconnaissance groups into the territory of the USSR, the mass eviction of Poles from border areas by the German authorities, the delivery of pontoon vehicles to rivers, the unloading of ammunition, and the removal of barbed wire barriers. Facts of this kind always serve as a signal that there are not weeks left before an enemy attack, but days and even hours. However, neither the country's political leadership nor the military leadership made the right decisions.

This is the harsh truth of the tragic history of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Nevertheless, during the defensive battles of the Soviet troops in the summer of 1941. The strategic plan of the “lightning war” of the Hitlerite command was thwarted. The enemy was unable to destroy the main potential of the Red Army on the offensive path of the fascist strike army group “Center”. During the fighting in Belarus, the Soviet command collected and concentrated reserves and strengthened the defense in the Moscow direction.

Military-political and international significance of the defeat of Nazi troops near Moscow. September 30, 1941 The first “general” offensive of fascist German troops against Moscow began. In the Vyazma area, 4 Soviet armies were surrounded, and 3 Soviet armies were surrounded near Bryansk. The enemy was approaching the capital of the USSR, but at the end of October 1941 he was stopped on the approaches to Moscow.

November 15–16, 1941The second “general” offensive of the Nazi troops against Moscow began. Like the first, it ended in failure. Although the enemy approached the capital within 25–30 km, he was unable to take it. For the first time in the entire war, having exhausted almost all of its reserves, the Wehrmacht was faced with the fact of its powerlessness before the enemy and the impossibility of breaking through the defenses of the Soviet troops.

December 5–6, 1941Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive and pushed the enemy back 350–400 km to the west. The Moscow and Tula regions and a number of districts of the Kalinin region were liberated. The counteroffensive of Soviet troops continued until April 1942. The defeat of the enemy strike force near Tikhvin (Leningrad Region) thwarted the plans of Hitler and Mannerheim to unite fascist German and Finnish troops to capture Leningrad.

The defeat of Nazi troops near Moscow and the successful offensive of the Red Army in the winter of 1941–1942. had great military-political and international significance. The victory of the Red Army completed the collapse of Hitler’s “blitzkrieg” strategy against the USSR. The myth of the invincibility of Hitler's army was dispelled, its morale and combat effectiveness were undermined. The victory of Soviet troops near Moscow inspired the peoples of the world to strengthen the liberation struggle and partisan movement in the countries of Europe and Asia enslaved by German fascism and Japanese militarism, and to intensify the Resistance movement. The victory near Moscow had an impact on the governments of Japan and Turkey, who were waiting for an opportune moment to attack the USSR.

The defeat of Nazi troops near Moscow accelerated the process of forming an anti-Hitler coalition. Back in July–August 1941, the governments of the United States and England decided to “provide all possible economic assistance in order to strengthen the Soviet Union in its fight against armed aggression.” At a conference of three countries - the USSR, the USA and England in Moscow on September 29 - October 1, 1941, specific issues were discussed about assistance to the USSR from the allies and about mutual supplies. On May 26, 1942, the Soviet Union signed an agreement with England, and on June 1942, an agreement with the United States on an alliance in the war against Nazi Germany. These documents finally formalized the alliance of the USSR, USA and England in the war. The process of creating the anti-Hitler coalition was completed.